Judgment : 1. By order dated 28-08-2013 notice for final disposal of this writ petition was issued. Accordingly, I have heard Shri M.G. Sarda, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner and Shri H.D. Dangre, Advocate along with Shri A.N. Ansari, Advocate for the respondent. Rule. Rule heard forthwith with the consent of parties. 2. The challenge in the present writ petition is to the judgment passed by the learned District Judge-11, Nagpur in an appeal filed under Section 34 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (for short, 'the said Act'). By aforesaid judgment, the suit for eviction of tenant which was decreed by the trial Court has been dismissed by allowing the said appeal. 3. The petitioner/original plaintiff is a trust registered under provisions of Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. As it was in need of the suit premises that was occupied by the tenant, the trust filed Regular Civil Suit No.239 of 2005 for eviction on the ground of the tenant being in arrears of rent and that the trust required the premises for the purposes of the trust. The aforesaid suit was filed against M/s Baliram Vithoba Teli/Kalamkar through one D. Kalamkar. Written statement was filed by D. G. Kalamkar claiming to be one of the legal heirs of M/s Baliram Vithoba Teli/Kalamkar. The trial Court after considering the material on record, decreed the suit under provisions of Section 16 (1)(g) of the said Act. However, eviction on the ground of the tenant being in arrears of rent was not permitted. The present respondent filed appeal under Section 34 of the said Act. The appellate Court allowed the appeal on two grounds; firstly, that the suit as filed was against a dead person and hence the same was not tenable. Secondly, that the claim of the landlord was required to be examined in terms of provisions of Section 16(1)(i) of the said Act and as there were no pleadings or compliance of the aforesaid provisions, the decree passed by the trial Court was contrary to law. Hence, the trust has filed the present writ petition. 4. Shri M.G. Sarda the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the suit was filed against M/s Baliram Vithoba Teli/Kalamkar through D. Kalamkar and hence, it could not be said that the same was filed against a dead person. Hence, the trust has filed the present writ petition. 4. Shri M.G. Sarda the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the suit was filed against M/s Baliram Vithoba Teli/Kalamkar through D. Kalamkar and hence, it could not be said that the same was filed against a dead person. It was further submitted that the pleadings in the plaint clearly indicated that the suit premises was required by the trust for its activities and hence the adjudication by the trial Court under provisions of Section 16(1)(g) of the said Act was proper. He submitted that the case of the trust did not fall under provisions of Section 16(1)(i) of the said Act and the lower appellate Court has proceeded on a wrong premise in that regard. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Mohanlal Kisanlal Agrawal and others Vs Ajitnath Jain Shwetambar Mandir Trust, Nagpur and others, reported in 2011(2) Mh.L.J. 512 , to demonstrate that the present petitioner was the respondent therein and its claim was considered on merits. The learned Counsel further relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Sudha Sumant Barve Vs Ranjana Ramesh Padhye, reported in 2013(4) Mh.L.J. 735 , to urge that a suit filed against a mother representing interest of her minor children without impleadment of the children was maintainable. The learned Counsel further relied upon the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Annasaheb Balesha Waghe and others Vs Appasaheb Dada Pommai and others, reported in 2008 (1) Civil LJ 130, to urge that it was not necessary to file specific cross objections and the findings recorded by the trial Court against the respondent could be shown to be incorrect. He, therefore, submitted that the judgment passed by the lower appellate Court was required to be set aside. 5. Shri H.D. Dangre, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that the lower appellate Court had rightly found that as the petitioner desired to construct a community hall and temple, the case of the petitioner fell under provisions of Section 16(1)(i) of the said Act. He further submitted that the appellate Court had taken into account the fact that all legal heirs of deceased Baliram Vithoba Teli/Kalamkar were not impleaded and hence the suit itself was not tenable. He further submitted that the appellate Court had taken into account the fact that all legal heirs of deceased Baliram Vithoba Teli/Kalamkar were not impleaded and hence the suit itself was not tenable. He further submitted that there were no proper pleadings to make out any case of bona fide need. It was further urged that the present writ petition is filed on 19-03-2013 while judgment of the lower appellate Court is dated 21-03-2011 and hence, the same suffers from delay and laches. He, therefore, submitted that no interference was called for in writ jurisdiction. 6. I have given anxious consideration to the submissions as made. I have also gone through the pleadings of the parties and judgments of the Courts below. Insofar as the claim for eviction on the ground of need of the trust is concerned, in para no.3 of the plaint it has been stated as under :- “3. That the petitioner/trust is consonance with its aims and objects as enshrined in the registration of the trust wanted to build a temple and community hall on the plot no.669, Anaz Bazar, Itwari, Nagpur for its bonafide use, occupation and purposes.” It is to be noted that the landlord was a trust suing through its trustee and under provisions of Section 16(1) (g) of the said Act, where the landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust and the premises are required for occupation for the purposes of trust, proceedings can be initiated under the said clause. The respondent in his written statement specifically denied that there was any need of the plaintiff trust to build any community hall or temple. The claim therefore as made was opposed. The trial Court after considering the case of the plaintiff under provisions of Section 16(1)(g) of the said Act proceeded to pass a decree for eviction on the said ground. The lower appellate Court, however, has reversed the said finding on the ground that as the trust required a premises for construction of community hall and temple, it ought to have invoked provisions of Section 16(1)(i) of the said Act. 7. The lower appellate Court, however, has reversed the said finding on the ground that as the trust required a premises for construction of community hall and temple, it ought to have invoked provisions of Section 16(1)(i) of the said Act. 7. It is necessary to note that insofar as provisions of Section 16(1)(g) of the said Act are concerned, when the same are invoked by a public charitable trust on the ground that it requires the premises for occupation for the purposes of trust, there is no need to show reasonable and bona fide need as contemplated by the first portion of clause (g) of Section 16(1) of the said Act. This issue is no longer res integra in view of the decision of this Court in the case of Bandu Ravji Nikam Vs Acharyaratna Deshbushan Shikshan Prasarak Mandal, Kolhapur, reported in 2003(3) Mh.L.J. 472, where in it has been observed thus:- “4. As rightly contended by the respondent, since the respondent is a public charitable trust, the requirement of pleading as well as proof to establish the ground under section 13(1)(g) of the Act would be different than the one required by any other landlord which is not a public charitable trust.” It is, therefore, clear that the requirement of pleading and proof is slightly different when the landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust. The only requirement is that the trust is required to show that the premises are required for the purposes for which trust is formed. In para no.3 of the plaint, it has been specifically stated that the premises were required for the bona fide use and purpose for which the trust was created. 8. Insofar as the need of the trust for building a community hall and temple is concerned, it is not necessary, that wherever any demolition of the tenanted premises and construction thereafter is involved, the landlord would be required to invoke provisions of Section 16(1)(i) of the said Act. If a trustee of a public trust demonstrates that the tenanted premises are required for the purposes of the trust, even if such purpose would involve demolition of premises and construction of new premises, that would not take the case of trust out of the purview of provisions of Section 16(1) (g) of the said Act. If a trustee of a public trust demonstrates that the tenanted premises are required for the purposes of the trust, even if such purpose would involve demolition of premises and construction of new premises, that would not take the case of trust out of the purview of provisions of Section 16(1) (g) of the said Act. In the case of Kunhamma alias Lakshmi Ammas Children and another Vs Akkali Purushothaman and others, reported in (2007) 11 SCC 181 , the Supreme Court held that merely because the existing premises were required to be demolished, the said aspect would not take out the case of the landlord from the purview of his bona fide need. 9. Insofar as provisions of Section 16(1)(i) of the said Act are concerned, the same contemplate reasonable and bona fide requirement of the landlord for immediate purpose of demolishing the premises with a view to erect a new building. When aforesaid provisions are compared with provisions of Section 16(1)(g) of the said Act, it is clear that insofar as a public charitable trust is concerned, it is not required to prove reasonable or bona fide need, but, it has only to prove that the premises are required for occupation for the purposes of the trust. Therefore, merely because the tenanted premises were required for the purposes of the trust for constructing a community hall and temple, the same would not have the effect on the case of such trust falling under provisions of Section 16(1)(i) of the said Act. The lower appellate Court, therefore, mis-directed itself by invoking the provisions of Section 16(1)(i) of the said Act. 10. Insofar as the objection that the proceedings were initiated against a dead person is concerned, it is to be noted that the plaintiff had filed suit against M/s Baliram Vithoba Teli/Kalamkar through D. Kalamkar. Said D. Kalamkar filed his written statement and contested the suit on merits. It is no doubt true, that it has been pleaded in the written statement that the proceedings initiated by the petitioner were not maintainable for non joinder of necessary parties. Further pleadings indicate that the defendant also contested the proceedings on merits in the capacity of being a tenant of the premises in question. Similarly, against the decree as passed, said D. Kalamkar filed appeal under Section 34 of the said Act that was decided on 21-03-2011. Further pleadings indicate that the defendant also contested the proceedings on merits in the capacity of being a tenant of the premises in question. Similarly, against the decree as passed, said D. Kalamkar filed appeal under Section 34 of the said Act that was decided on 21-03-2011. The suit having been filed against M/s Baliram Vithoba Teli/Kalamkar through D. Kalamkar, it cannot be said that it was filed against a dead person. 11. The lower appellate Court has held that as all legal heirs of deceased Baliram Vithoba Teli/Kalamkar were not impleaded, the suit itself was not tenable. In this regard, it is necessary to refer to the provisions of Section 7(15) of the said Act. The term “tenant” means and includes, when the premises are let for business, a person using the premises for such purpose after the death of the tenant. The respondent who claims to be a legal heir of Baliram and who is also paying rent, would therefore a tenant in occupation of the premises that were let out for business. Insofar as the plea that other legal representatives of deceased Baliram Vithoba Teli/Kalamkar were not impleaded in the proceedings, it may be noted that the same would not make the suit untenable. In the case of Shkuntala Vasant Pahadi and others Vs Purushottam Vasant Pethe and others, reported in (2007) 3 SCC 123 , it was held that in absence of any allegation and proof that the legal heir impleaded was malafidely neglecting the interests of other legal heirs, the same would not have the effect of the suit itself not being tenable against one of the legal heirs. The observation of the lower appellate Court that only one tenant could inherent tenancy rights on behalf other legal heirs is also contrary to provisions of Section 7 (15) of the said Act. Therefore, failure to implead other legal heirs would not make the suit untenable as held by the lower appellate Court. 12. Insofar as the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent that there is delay in approaching this Court, it has been stated in para 16 of the writ petition that as there was some litigations against the trustees and proceedings were required to be initiated against the trust Authorities, some delay was caused in approaching this Court. 12. Insofar as the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent that there is delay in approaching this Court, it has been stated in para 16 of the writ petition that as there was some litigations against the trustees and proceedings were required to be initiated against the trust Authorities, some delay was caused in approaching this Court. Considering the fact that the ground of need of the trust was being pursued by the petitioner, it cannot be said that there is such delay on part of the petitioner so as to hold that the claim sought to be agitated is belated or stale. 13. Therefore, in my view, the lower appellate Court committed a serious error of jurisdiction by holding the suit not to be tenable on the ground that all legal heirs of the deceased tenant were not impleaded and secondly; that its case fell within provisions of Section 16(1)(i) of the said Act when in fact the same clearly fell within the purview of Section 16(i)(g) of the said Act. I am satisfied that the impugned judgment has resulted in miscarriage of justice to the petitioner-trust. Hence, interference in writ jurisdiction is clearly warranted. In view of the aforesaid, the impugned judgment will have to be set aside. As the claim of the petitioner under provisions of Section 16(1)(g) of the said Act has not been considered on merits, the appeal has to be directed to be re-decided by the lower appellate Court. 14. In view of aforesaid, I pass the following order:- ORDER Judgment dated 21-03-2011 passed by District Judge-11, Nagpur in Regular Civil Appeal No.104 of 2008 is quashed and set aside. The appeal is remitted to the lower appellate Court for fresh decision in accordance with the observations made herein above. It is clarified that this Court has not gone into the correctness of the findings that are recorded by the trial Court and the lower appellate Court should consider the appeal before it independently without being influenced by the observations of this Court. The parties to appear before the lower appellate Court on 15-09-2014, so that the issuance of fresh notices can be dispensed with. The writ petition is thus partly allowed on aforesaid terms with no order as to costs.