JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. This revision petition is directed against the order dated 20.7.2013 rendered in CMP No. 193-S/6 of 2013 and order dated 20.7.2013 rendered in Rent Appeal no. 19-S/14 of 2012 rendered by the Appellate Authority. 2. ?Key facts? necessary for the adjudication of this petition are that respondents-landlords (hereinafter referred to as the ?landlords? for convenience sake) filed eviction petition against the petitioner-tenant (hereinafter referred to as the ?tenant? for convenience sake) under section 14 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987. According to the landlords, tenant has ceased to occupy the premises continuously for a period of 12 months immediately prior to filing of eviction petition. The premises were lying locked continuously. Tenant has acquired sufficient accommodation for his requirement at B-19, Sector-1, near State Bank of India, New Shimla, which was within the urban area. The residential premises were two rooms, one kitchen and one bath room. The rent was fixed @ Rs. 300/- per month. 3. The petition was contested by the tenant. It was denied that tenant has ceased to occupy premises immediately prior to filing of eviction petition. He was inducted as tenant in premises in the year 1962. He was inducted by previous landlords, i.e. Jagat Ram and Suresh Chand. He was unmarried when he was inducted as tenant. He got married in the year 1967. He requested the landlord for one additional room, which was used as godown by landlords. In the year 1994, tenant requested the landlords to grant permission to start commercial activities from premises and the same was agreed at the enhanced rent and upon payment of lump sum amount of Rs.10,000/-. He has purchased B type plot in New Shimla in the year 1990. He has shifted to new premises in the year 2001. The premises were used by the tenant for business purpose. Tenant was suffering from skin problem. He was also suffering from heart ailment. 4. Landlords filed rejoinder. Learned Rent Controller framed the issues on 3.9.2009. He allowed the petition on 1.3.2012. Tenant preferred an appeal against the order dated 1.3.2012 before the Appellate Authority. Tenant also moved an application under order 41 rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Tenant was suffering from skin problem. He was also suffering from heart ailment. 4. Landlords filed rejoinder. Learned Rent Controller framed the issues on 3.9.2009. He allowed the petition on 1.3.2012. Tenant preferred an appeal against the order dated 1.3.2012 before the Appellate Authority. Tenant also moved an application under order 41 rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Appeal was dismissed on 20.7.2013 and the application under order 41 rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure vide CMP No. 193-S/6 of 2013 was also dismissed on 20.7.2013. Hence, the present petition. 5. Mr. B.C. Negi has vehemently argued that since the character of the building has been converted into non-residential building, landlords could not seek ejectment of the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement. He has also contended that his client has always remained in the occupation of the premises. 6. Mr. Satyen Vaidya has supported the orders passed by the Appellate Authority. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records carefully. 8. PW-1 Joginder Singh has testified that he has purchased building in the year 2007. It is three storeyed building. He has proved rough sketch plan Ex.PW-1/A. Neither tenant nor his family members were residing in the premises. The premises remained closed for more than 12 months. Tenant has acquired accommodation in New Shimla. 9. PW-2 Inder Mohan has deposed that no one was residing in the premises. The premises were closed for the last 5-6 years. He has not seen either Manohar Lal or his family members residing in the premises for the last 4-5 years. 10. PW-3 Nek Ram has proved Ex.PW-3/A. According to Ex.PW-3/A, from February, 2008 to June, 2009, total 192 units were consumed. No units have been consumed in the months of February, 2008, March, 2008, May, 2008, June, 2008, July, 2008, September, 2008, October, 2008, January, 2009, February, 2009 and only 4 and 10 units have been consumed during March, 2009 and April, 2009, respectively. 11. PW-4 Raj Pal has deposed that Manohar has been recorded as tenant in the disputed premises. The premises were found locked. 12. RW-1 Kamla Devi has proved that Ex.RW-1/A. She has admitted that there were no details of incoming calls. 13. RW-2 Aman Chadda has deposed that the tenant was agent of Bajaj Alliance. He has proved Ex.PW-2/A. 14. 11. PW-4 Raj Pal has deposed that Manohar has been recorded as tenant in the disputed premises. The premises were found locked. 12. RW-1 Kamla Devi has proved that Ex.RW-1/A. She has admitted that there were no details of incoming calls. 13. RW-2 Aman Chadda has deposed that the tenant was agent of Bajaj Alliance. He has proved Ex.PW-2/A. 14. RW-3 Lekh Raj has proved Ex.RW-3/A. 15. Tenant Manohar Lal has appeared as RW-4. According to him, the disputed premises comprised of two rooms, one kitchen and one bath room. It was taken on rent in the year 1962 from Jagat Ram Sood and Suresh Chand. He requested the landlords to give him one more room. Landlords agreed for the same. He retired from the Government service in the year 1994. He requested the landlords to convert residential premises into office-cum-residence. He started business of small saving agency, UTI agency and IDBI agency. The rent was enhanced to Rs. 1,200/-. In addition, he has also paid Rs. 10,000/- to the landlords. He has got a telephone installed in the premises. He has constructed the residential house in New Shimla. He has serious skin disease. He was doing business from the disputed premises between 10.30 A.M. to 3.30 P.M. 16. RW-5 Vinay Kumar has deposed that the tenant was his patient. He was suffering from skin disease. 17. RW-6 Sandeep Kumar has deposed that the tenancy was created in the year 1962. Tenant was residing in premises comprised of two rooms, kitchen and bathroom. Tenant used to pay Rs. 300/- in the year 1962 initially. The rent was enhanced to Rs. 1200/- annually and a sum of Rs. 10,000/- additional was also paid when the request of tenant was accepted for converting premises for commercial purpose. 18. RW-7 Subhash Chand has deposed that tenant has retired from T&CP Department in the year 1995. Manohar Lal started business in the year 1995. He used the premises for office-cum-residence. 19. Mr. B.C. Negi has drawn the attention of the Court to section 2 (e) of the H.P. Urban Control Act, 1987. It reads as under: 2. 18. RW-7 Subhash Chand has deposed that tenant has retired from T&CP Department in the year 1995. Manohar Lal started business in the year 1995. He used the premises for office-cum-residence. 19. Mr. B.C. Negi has drawn the attention of the Court to section 2 (e) of the H.P. Urban Control Act, 1987. It reads as under: 2. (e) "non-residential building" means a building being used- (i) mainly for the purpose of business or trade; or (ii) partly for the purpose of business or trade and partly for the purpose of residence, subject to the condition that the person who carried on business or trade in the building resides therein : Provided that if a building is let out for residential and non-residential purposes, separately to more than one person, the portion thereof let out for the purpose of residence shall not be treated as non-residential building. 20. Section 12 of the H.P. Urban Control Act reads as under: ?12. Conversion of a residential building into a non-residential building No person shall convert a residential building into a non-residential building except with the permission in writing of the Controller. 13. Landlords` duty to keep the building or rented land in good repairs (1) Every landlord shall be bound to keep the building or rented land in good and tenantable repairs. (2) if the landlord neglects or fails to make, within a reasonable time after receiving a notice in writing, any repairs which he is bound to make under sub-section (1), the tenant may make the same himself and deduct the expenses of such repairs from the rent or otherwise recover them from the landlord : Provided that the amount so deducted or recoverable in any year shall not exceed one-twelfth of the rent payable by the tenant for the year.? 21. Tenant cannot take assistance from section 2 (e) (ii). It is evident from the plain language of section 2 (e) (ii) that non- residential building would mean ?building used partly for the purpose of business or trade and partly for the purpose of residence, subject to the condition that the person who carried on business or trade in the building resides therein?. Tenant has purchased the plot in the year 1994. He has raised the construction. He has shifted in the year 2001 to the new premises. Tenant has purchased the plot in the year 1994. He has raised the construction. He has shifted in the year 2001 to the new premises. The parties have not taken permission of the Rent Controller in writing for converting a residential building into non-residential building. Tenant while appearing as RW-4 has deposed that he had requested the landlords to give him one additional room. According to RW-4 he has sought permission of the landlords in the year 1994 to covert the residential premises into office-cum-residence. He has enhanced rent from Rs. 300/- to Rs. 1200/-. The language employed in section 12 is imperative and mandatory. It is reiterated that the parties were required to get the permission in writing from the Rent Controller before converting the residential premises to non-residential premises under section 12 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987. 22. PW-1 Joginder Singh has testified that neither the tenant nor his family members were residing in the premises and they have shifted to new accommodation in New Shimla. Similarly, PW-2 Inder Mohan has deposed that he has seen the premises closed for the last 5-6 years. He has not seen Manohar Lal or his family members residing in the premises for the last 4-5 years. It is also established from the statements of PW-3 Nek Ram and PW-4 Raj Pal that the premises were not being used by the tenant. 23. The copy of sale deed is mark P-1. It is evident from clause-B of mark P-1 that in demised premises Manohar Lal was residing. It is not mentioned in mark P-1 that Manohar Lal was carrying on his business as well. Tenant has not produced vendor. Landlords have conclusively proved that the tenant has ceased to occupy the premises and he has acquired alternative accommodation sufficient for his requirements in New Shimla. 24. Since the premises have never been converted from residential to non-residential, landlords have absolute right to evict the tenant from the premises. There is no merit in the contention of Mr. B.C.Negi, Advocate that for violating Section 12, there is only provision of penalty under Section 30 and the eviction proceedings could not be initiated. Section 30 does not debar the landlord to file independent petition seeking eviction of the tenant under Section 14 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 from the residential premises. Section 12 & 30 operate independently. Section 30 does not debar the landlord to file independent petition seeking eviction of the tenant under Section 14 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 from the residential premises. Section 12 & 30 operate independently. A person violating Section 12 can be punished with fine, which may extend to Rs. 1000/-. The underlying purpose of enacting Sections 12 and 30 is to highlight the scarcity of residential premises and not converting the same to non-residential premises. In this case, no permission has been taken under Section 12 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987. The suit premises have never lost the character of residential premises. 25. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kamal Arora vs. Amar Singh and others, 1986 (Supp) SCC 481 have held that the landlord and the tenant by their mutual consent cannot convert a residential building into a non-residential building because that would be violative of the provisions of section 11. Their Lordships have held as under: ?3. Undoubtedly, the landlord let out the premises knowingly that it is being taken for running a school and admittedly the building is used for running a school. Therefore, prima facie the leased premises would fall within the definition of a non-residential building. The High Court after examining the provision of the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 read with Section 11 of the Rent Act held that statute prohibits conversion of residential building into non-residential by act inter vivos. It was said that the landlord and the tenant by their mutual consent cannot convert a residential building into a non-residential building because that would be violative of the provision of Section 11. And it is admitted that building is situated in a sector falling within the residential zone. In this fact situation, coupled with the fact that the landlord has retired from service and genuinely needs the premises for his residence as found by all courts, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment and order of the High Court. Mr. Goel, however, wanted us to examine the question : whether where the parties have by mutual consent changed the user, the landlord cannot be permitted to back out from his consent? He wanted to invoke the situation where parties are pari delicto court should not render assistance to any one of them. Mr. Goel, however, wanted us to examine the question : whether where the parties have by mutual consent changed the user, the landlord cannot be permitted to back out from his consent? He wanted to invoke the situation where parties are pari delicto court should not render assistance to any one of them. In our opinion this is not a case to examine this contention. Let it be decided in an appropriate case.? 26. Kamal Arora vs. Amar Singh and others, 1986 (Supp) SCC 481 has been relied upon by their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar Arora vs. Surjit Kaur, (1987) 3 SCC 711 . Their Lordships have held as under: ?11 However, when the appellant entered the witness box, he gave up the case set out in the written statement and propounded a different case that the hall had been taken on lease only for non-residential purposes. The perceptible manner in which the appellant had shifted his defence has escaped the notice and consideration of the Statutory Authorities. Both the Authorities have failed to bear in mind that the pleadings of the parties form the foundation of their case and it is not open to them to give up the case set out in the pleadings and propound a new and different case. Another failing noticed in the judgments of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority is that they have been oblivious to the fact that the respondent had leased out the hall to the appellant only for a period of 11 months. Such being the case, even if the respondent had come to know soon after the lease was created that the appellant was using the hall to run a clinic, she may have thought it prudent to let the appellant have his way so that she can recover possession of the hall after 11 months without hitch whereas if she began quarrelling with the appellant for his running a clinic, she would have to be locked up in litigation with him for a considerable length of time and can obtain possession of the hall only after succeeding in the litigation. Yet another factor which vitiates the findings of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority is that both of them have overlooked Sec. 11 of the Act, and the sustainability of any lease transaction entered in contravention of Sec. 11. Yet another factor which vitiates the findings of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority is that both of them have overlooked Sec. 11 of the Act, and the sustainability of any lease transaction entered in contravention of Sec. 11. The legislature, with a view to ensure adequate housing accommodation for the people, has interdicted by means of Section 11 the conversion of residential buildings into non-residential ones without the written consent of the Rent Controller. Admittedly, in this case the parties had not obtained the consent in writing of the Rent Controller for converting the hall in a residential building into a clinic. Such being the case, the appellant cannot get over the embargo placed by section 11 by pleading that the respondent was well aware of his running a clinic in the hall and that she had not raised objection at any time to the running of the clinic. Learned counsel for the appellant referred us to the decision in Dr. Gopal Dass Verma v. Dr. S.K. Bharadwaj (1962) 2 SCR 678 : ( AIR 1963 SC 337 ) and argued that the ratio laid down therein would be fully attracted to the facts of this case. It is true that in the said decision, it was held that when a leased premises was used by the lessee incidentally for professional purposes and that too with the consent of the landlord, then the case would go out of the purview of Section 13 (3) (e) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1954 and consequently the landlord would not be entitled to see eviction of the tenant on the ground he required the premises for his own residential requirements. We find the facts in that case to be markedly different and it was the speciality of the facts which was largely instrumental in, persuading this Court to render its decision in the aforesaid manner. Moreover, the Court had not considered the question whether the conversion of a residential premises into a non-residential one without the permission of the Rent Controller was permissible under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act and if it was not permitted, how far the contravention would affect the rights of the parties. Moreover, the Court had not considered the question whether the conversion of a residential premises into a non-residential one without the permission of the Rent Controller was permissible under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act and if it was not permitted, how far the contravention would affect the rights of the parties. In our opinion, the more relevant decision to be noticed would be Kamal Arora v. Amar Singh, 1986 (Suppl) SCC 481 where this Court declined to interfere with an order of eviction passed in favour of the landlord as the Court was of the view that even if the landlord and the tenant had converted a residential building into a non-residential one by mutual consent, it would still be violative of Section 11 of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act and, therefore, the landlord cannot be barred from seeking recovery of possession of the leased building for his residential needs. We are therefore of the view that the findings of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority about the appellant having taken the hall on lease only for running a clinic and that he had not changed the user of the premises have been rendered without reference to the pleadings and without examining the legality of the appellant's contentions in the light of Section 11 of the Act. We do not therefore think the High Court has committed any error in law in ignoring the findings rendered by the Statutory Authorities about the purpose for which the hall had been taken on lease. 27. Learned Single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Tara Chand Chandani vs. Shri Shashi Bhushan Gupta, 1980 (2) Rent L.R. 212 has held that when the premises were let out to a Chartered Accountant for residential purposes and the Chartered Accountant was running office in the building, the premises would remain residential building. Learned Single Judge has held as under: ?[8] There is another aspect of the matter as well. Section 11 of the Act, as reproduced earlier, says that no person shall convert a residential building into a non-residential building except with the permission in writing of the Controller In the present case admittedly the rented premises are a part or a portion of a residential building known as `Lakshmi Vishnu Bhawan. The portion other than the rented one is being used by the landlord for his own residence. The portion other than the rented one is being used by the landlord for his own residence. Under these circumstances, could the landlord convert a part of the residential building into a non-residential one without the permission in writing of the Rent Controller? Since there is a bar provided under the Act itself and under Section 19 of the Act penalty for the breach of the same has been provided it is quite clear that a residential building as such could not be converted into a non-residential building by letting it out to a Chartered Accountant for running his office therein. Anything done in contravention of the provisions of the Act cannot bind the landlord or the tenant. In this view of the matter also it cannot be held that the premises have become non-residential building because it is being used solely for the purpose of running the office by the tenant as Chartered Accountant. This also indicates that the Legislature used the expression 'profession as distinguished from the expression 'business' or 'trade' under the Act.? 28. The Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana Court in Shri Hari Mittal vs. Shri B.M. Sikka, 1986 (1) Punjab Law Reporter 1 has held that section 11 of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 was intended to subserve a public policy of seeing that the residential accommodation does not fall short of community's requirement. The Full Bench has further held that the residential building let out for non-residential purpose by the landlord without obtaining the written permission of the Rent Controller would continue to be residential building and the landlord would be entitled to seek ejectment of the tenant on the ground of his bona fide personal requirement. The Full bench has held as under: ?18. In our opinion, the kind of purpose that clause (k) of S. 14 (1) of the Delhi Rent Act served, the same purpose appears to have been intended by the Punjab appears to have been intended by the Punjab Legislature in the present case to be served by the provision of S. 11 of the Act, so far as the use of the residential building for non-residential purpose is concerned. This injunction was intended to subserve a public policy of seeing that the residential accommodation does not fall short of the community's requirement, as the shortage of residential accommodation would tend to result in unhygienic conditions of the residential areas by accommodating more members than it could legitimately be intended or the extra population resorting to unhygienic use of the open spaces and pavements and creating social tension and health hazards to the community. In view of the above, the provisions of section 11 of the Act are mandatory in character. 30. The reference made by the learned single judge is answered in the affirmative and it is held that a residential building let out for non-residential purpose by the landlord without obtaining the written permission of the Rent Controller in terms of S. 11 of the Act would continue to be a residential building and the landlord would be entitled to seek ejectment of the tenant on the ground of his bona fide personal requirement.? 29. Learned Single Judge of Punjab Haryana High Court in Varinder Kumar vs. Janak Raj, 1987 (3) Rent Law Reporter 193 has held that residential building let out for non-residential purposes without the permission of Rent Controller under section 11 of the Rent Act, the premises would continue to be residential and character of the building would not be changed. Learned Single Judge has held as under: ?[3] The only contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner before me is that the premises in dispute is a house bearing Municipal No. 366 situated at Buria Gate, Jagadhri. It consists of one room and a courtyard. In spite of the fact that it is proved on the record that it was let out to the respondent for a non-residential purpose, the premises continues to be a residential house and the petitioner has a right to seek eviction of the respondent on the ground that he requires the premises bonafide his own use and occupation. He placed reliance on Hari Mittal v. B.M. Sikka, 1986 90 PunLR 1, to urge that without the permission of the Rent Controller a residential building cannot be converted into non-residential one.? 30. He placed reliance on Hari Mittal v. B.M. Sikka, 1986 90 PunLR 1, to urge that without the permission of the Rent Controller a residential building cannot be converted into non-residential one.? 30. Learned Single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Surjit Singh Arora vs. Harbans Singh 1989 (1) Rent Control Reporter while replying upon Shri Hari Mittal vs. Shri B.M. Sikka, 1986 (1) Punjab Law Reporter 1 has held that the landlord cannot convert a residential building into non-residential without permission of Rent Controller as required under section 11. Learned Single Judge has held as under: ?[6] Section 11 of the Act is intended to prevent residential accommodation being converted into a non-residential one without the permission of the Rent Controller. The landlord cannot convert a residential building into a non-residential one without permission of the Rent Controller and Section 11 of the Act is mandatory. This Court in the Full Bench judgment reported as Shri Hari Mittal v. Shri B.M. Sikka, 1986 90 PunLR 1 held as under: In our opinion, the kind of purpose that Clause (k) of S. 14 (1) of the Delhi Rent Act served, the same purpose appears to have been intended by the Punjab Legislature in the present case to be served by the provision of Section 11 of the Act, so far as the use of the residential building for non-residential purpose is concerned. This injunction was intended to subserve a public policy of seeing that the residential accommodation does not fall short of the community's requirement, as the shortage of residential accommodation would tend to result in unhygienic condition of the residential areas by accommodating more members than it could legitimately be intended or the extra population resorting to unhygienic use of the open spaces and pavements and creating social tension and health hazards to the community in view of the above, the provisions of Section 11 of the Act are mandatory in character. It was then argued that if Section 11 of the Act was intended to subserve a public policy of the kind, then it would prohibit even a landlord for converting a self occupied residential building, but this Court in two Division Bench decisions referred to by the Division Bench in Bansal's case that is, Chattar Sain's case and Faqir Chand's case has taken the view that Section 11 is not attracted to a residential building which is in the self-occupation of the landlord, hence the landlord could convert it into a self occupied non-residential building without the permission of the Controller in terms of Section 11 of the Act. The learned Counsel drew my attention to a case reported as Dr. Jagit Mehta v. Dev Brat Sharma, 1987 HRR 680, to substantiate the plea that the demised premises being a non-residential building cannot be got vacated by the Respondent by invoking the provisions of Section 13-A of the Act. This judgment is not applicable to the facts of the present case. The premises in dispute in that case were located in Jullundur and the provisions of the Regulation Act were not applicable to the town of Jullundur Moreover, the learned Judge, on the evidence produced on the record came to the conclusion that the location and nature of the building was such that it could only be used as shop and for no other purpose.? 31. Learned Single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Krishan Lal Nanda vs. Madan Lal, 1992 (2) Rent Control Reporter 104 has held that though the tenant has converted the residential building into non-residential with consent of landlord, it being violative of section 11, would not deprive the landlord seeking ejectment of tenant on ground of his bona fide need. Learned Single Judge has held as under: ?[7] Tara Chand RW-3 and Jagan Nath RW-4 have admitted in their cross-examination that the main building of which the demised premises was a part, was being used by the landlord as his residence; that the houses in neighbourhood of the said property were also being used for residential purposes; that Vakilpura mohalla was a residential locality and portions of various houses in that mohalla are being used as shops. Both the lower authorities on the basis of appreciation of evidence on record have concurrently found that tenant failed to prove that the premises in question was constructed as an independent shop. It was in fact a portion of the main residential building. In Dr. Subhash Chander's case (supra), it has been held that mere fact that a room of the main building was being used by the tenant as a shop, did not convert the building into a non-residential building and that merely because it was given for business purpose was not sufficient to hold that it had become commercial premises. More over, in Vinod Kumar Arora v. Smt. Surjit Kaur, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 2179. it has been held that even if the tenant had converted the residential building into a non-residential one, by mutual consent, it being violative of Section 11 of the Act, the landlord could not be deprived of seeking the ejectment of the tenant on the ground of his bonafide residential need. 32. Tenant had also moved an application under section 41 rule 27 of the Code of civil Procedure whereby he intended to place on record copy of order dated 2.8.2012 and letter dated 31.3.2013. Learned first appellate court has rightly rejected the application under section 41 rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Tenant has placed on record unattested Photostat copy of the document. It has also come on record that the landlords have purchased built up area and the same did not fall within the definition of section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972. Eviction petition was instituted by the landlords in the year 2009 and the application was thus filed belatedly to delay the proceedings. Moreover, the parties cannot be permitted to fill in lacuna in their case by filing an application under order 41 rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The principles for allowing the additional evidence must be fulfilled while allowing the application under order 41 rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 33. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Ibrahim Uddin and another, (2012) 8 SCC 148 have held that party guilty of remissness in not producing evidence in trial court cannot be allowed to produce it in appellate court. 33. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Ibrahim Uddin and another, (2012) 8 SCC 148 have held that party guilty of remissness in not producing evidence in trial court cannot be allowed to produce it in appellate court. There must be satisfactory reasons for non-production of the evidence in trial court for seeking production thereof in appellate court. Their Lordships have held as under: ?36. The general principle is that the Appellate Court should not travel outside the record of the lower court and cannot take any evidence in appeal. However, as an exception, Order XLI Rule 27 CPC enables the Appellate Court to take additional evidence in exceptional circumstances. The Appellate Court may permit additional evidence only and only if the conditions laid down in this rule are found to exist. The parties are not entitled, as of right, to the admission of such evidence. Thus, provision does not apply, when on the basis of evidence on record, the Appellate Court can pronounce a satisfactory judgment. The matter is entirely within the discretion of the court and is to be used sparingly. Such a discretion is only a judicial discretion circumscribed by the limitation specified in the rule itself. (Vide: K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy & Ors., AIR 1963 SC 1526 ; The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham & Ors., AIR 1965 SC 1008 ; Soonda Ram & Anr. v. Rameshwaralal & Anr., AIR 1975 SC 479 ; and Syed Abdul Khader v. Rami Reddy & Ors., AIR 1979 SC 553 ). 37. The Appellate Court should not, ordinarily allow new evidence to be adduced in order to enable a party to raise a new point in appeal. Similarly, where a party on whom the onus of proving a certain point lies fails to discharge the onus, he is not entitled to a fresh opportunity to produce evidence, as the Court can, in such a case, pronounce judgment against him and does not require any additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment. (Vide: Haji Mohammed Ishaq Wd. S. K. Mohammed & Ors. v. Mohamed Iqbal and Mohamed Ali and Co., AIR 1978 SC 798 ). 38. Under Order XLI , Rule 27 CPC, the appellate Court has the power to allow a document to be produced and a witness to be examined. (Vide: Haji Mohammed Ishaq Wd. S. K. Mohammed & Ors. v. Mohamed Iqbal and Mohamed Ali and Co., AIR 1978 SC 798 ). 38. Under Order XLI , Rule 27 CPC, the appellate Court has the power to allow a document to be produced and a witness to be examined. But the requirement of the said Court must be limited to those cases where it found it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment. This provision does not entitle the appellate Court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can pronounce judgment in a case. It does not entitle the appellate Court to let in fresh evidence only for the purpose of pronouncing judgment in a particular way. In other words, it is only for removing a lacuna in the evidence that the appellate Court is empowered to admit additional evidence. [Vide: Lala Pancham & Ors. (supra) ]. 39. It is not the business of the Appellate Court to supplement the evidence adduced by one party or the other in the lower Court. Hence, in the absence of satisfactory reasons for the non- production of the evidence in the trial court, additional evidence should not be admitted in appeal as a party guilty of remissness in the lower court is not entitled to the indulgence of being allowed to give further evidence under this rule. So a party who had ample opportunity to produce certain evidence in the lower court but failed to do so or elected not to do so, cannot have it admitted in appeal. (Vide: State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912 ; and S. Rajagopal v. C.M. Armugam & Ors., AIR 1969 SC 101 ). 40. The inadvertence of the party or his inability to understand the legal issues involved or the wrong advice of a pleader or the negligence of a pleader or that the party did not realise the importance of a document does not constitute a "substantial cause" within the meaning of this rule. The mere fact that certain evidence is important, is not in itself a sufficient ground for admitting that evidence in appeal. 41. The mere fact that certain evidence is important, is not in itself a sufficient ground for admitting that evidence in appeal. 41. The words "for any other substantial cause" must be read with the word "requires" in the beginning of sentence, so that it is only where, for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court requires additional evidence, that this rule will apply, e.g., when evidence has been taken by the lower Court so imperfectly that the Appellate Court cannot pass a satisfactory judgment. 42. Whenever the appellate Court admits additional evidence it should record its reasons for doing so. (Sub-rule 2). It is a salutary provision which operates as a check against a too easy reception of evidence at a late stage of litigation and the statement of reasons may inspire confidence and disarm objection. Another reason of this requirement is that, where a further appeal lies from the decision, the record of reasons will be useful and necessary for the Court of further appeal to see, if the discretion under this rule has been properly exercised by the Court below. The omission to record the reasons must, therefore, be treated as a serious defect. But this provision is only directory and not mandatory, if the reception of such evidence can be justified under the rule. 43. The reasons need not be recorded in a separate order provided they are embodied in the judgment of the appellate Court. A mere reference to the peculiar circumstances of the case, or mere statement that the evidence is necessary to pronounce judgment, or that the additional evidence is required to be admitted in the interests of justice, or that there is no reason to reject the prayer for the admission of the additional evidence, is not enough compliance with the requirement as to recording of reasons. 44. It is a settled legal proposition that not only administrative order, but also judicial order must be supported by reasons, recorded in it. Thus, while deciding an issue, the Court is bound to give reasons for its conclusion. It is the duty and obligation on the part of the Court to record reasons while disposing of the case. 44. It is a settled legal proposition that not only administrative order, but also judicial order must be supported by reasons, recorded in it. Thus, while deciding an issue, the Court is bound to give reasons for its conclusion. It is the duty and obligation on the part of the Court to record reasons while disposing of the case. The hallmark of order and exercise of judicial power by a judicial forum is for the forum to disclose its reasons by itself and giving of reasons has always been insisted upon as one of the fundamentals of sound administration of the justice - delivery system, to make it known that there had been proper and due application of mind to the issue before the Court and also as an essential requisite of the principles of natural justice. The reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion. It introduces clarity in an order and without the same, the order becomes lifeless. Reasons substitute subjectivity with objectivity. The absence of reasons renders an order indefensible/unsustainable particularly when the order is subject to further challenge before a higher forum. Recording of reasons is principle of natural justice and every judicial order must be supported by reasons recorded in writing. It ensures transparency and fairness in decision making. The person who is adversely affected must know why his application has been rejected. (Vide: State of Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar, AIR 2004 SC 1794 ; State of Uttaranchal & Anr. v. Sunil Kumar Singh Negi, AIR 2008 SC 2026 ; The Secretary & Curator, Victoria Memorial Hall v. Howrah Ganatantrik Nagrik Samity & Ors., AIR 2010 SC 1285 ; and Sant Lal Gupta & Ors. v. Modern Cooperative Group Housing Society Limited & Ors., (2010) 13 SCC 336 ). 45. In The Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board, Bangalore v. H. Narayanaiah etc. etc., AIR 1976 SC 2403 , while dealing with the issue, a three judge Bench of this Court held as under: ?We are of the opinion that the High Court should have recorded its reasons to show why it found the admission of such evidence to be necessary for some substantial reason. And if it found it necessary to admit it an opportunity should have been given to the appellant to rebut any inference arising from its insistence by leading other evidence.? And if it found it necessary to admit it an opportunity should have been given to the appellant to rebut any inference arising from its insistence by leading other evidence.? (Emphasis added) A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Basayya I. Mathad v. Rudrayya S. Mathad and Ors., AIR 2008 SC 1108 . 46. A Constitution Bench of this Court in K. Venkataramiah (Supra), while dealing with the same issue held: ?It is very much to be desired that the courts of appeal should not overlook the provisions of cl. (2) of the Rule and should record their reasons for admitting additional evidence….. The omission to record reason must, therefore, be treated as a serious defect. Even so, we are unable to persuade ourselves that this provision is mandatory.? (Emphasis added) In the said case, the court after examining the record of the case came to the conclusion that the appeal was heard for a long time and the application for taking additional evidence on record was filed during the final hearing of the appeal. In such a factsituation, the order allowing such application did not vitiate for want of reasons. 47. Where the additional evidence sought to be adduced removes the cloud of doubt over the case and the evidence has a direct and important bearing on the main issue in the suit and interest of justice clearly renders it imperative that it may be allowed to be permitted on record such application may be allowed. 48. To sum up on the issue, it may be held that application for taking additional evidence on record at a belated stage cannot be filed as a matter of right. The court can consider such an application with circumspection, provided it is covered under either of the prerequisite condition incorporated in the statutory provisions itself. The discretion is to be exercised by the court judicially taking into consideration the relevance of the document in respect of the issues involved in the case and the circumstances under which such an evidence could not be led in the court below and as to whether the applicant had prosecuted his case before the court below diligently and as to whether such evidence is required to pronounce the judgment by the appellate court. In case the court comes to the conclusion that the application filed comes within the four corners of the statutory provisions itself, the evidence may be taken on record, however, the court must record reasons as on what basis such an application has been allowed. However, the application should not be moved at a belated stage. Stage of Consideration: 49. An application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC is to be considered at the time of hearing of appeal on merits so as to find whether the documents and/or the evidence sought to be adduced have any relevance/bearing on the issues involved. The admissibility of additional evidence does not depend upon the relevancy to the issue on hand, or on the fact, whether the applicant had an opportunity for adducing such evidence at an earlier stage or not, but it depends upon whether or not the Appellate Court requires the evidence sought to be adduced to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. The true test, therefore is, whether the Appellate Court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced. Such occasion would arise only if on examining the evidence as it stands the court comes to the conclusion that some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent to the Court. (Vide: Arjan Singh v. Kartar Singh & Ors., AIR 1951 SC 193 ; and Natha Singh & Ors. v. The Financial Commissioner, Taxation, Punjab & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 1053 ).? 34. Accordingly, in view of the analysis and discussion made hereinabove, there is no merit in the petition and the same is dismissed. The tenant shall handover the premises in question to the landlords within a period of three months from today, failing which it shall be open to the landlords to initiate appropriate proceedings for the eviction of the tenant. Pending application (s), if any, also stands disposed of. No costs.