JUDGMENT 1. - Appellants have preferred this appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, 'CPC') challenging the impugned judgment and decree dated 1st of October 1984, passed by District Judge, Balotra camp Barmer (for short, 'learned trial Court'), whereby the suit filed by them for declaration, perpetual injunction and possession with damages is dismissed. 2. Succinctly stated, facts of the case are that appellant-plaintiffs laid a civil suit for the aforementioned reliefs, inter-alia, on the ground that in Samvat 2003 (corresponding to year 1946) on Asad Sud 13, Thakur Madho Singh of Jasol allotted a piece of land to Oswal Samaj in Inayat and immediately after allotment its boundary was fortified by stone slabs and since then it is in possession of Oswal Samaj. The dimensions of the land, allotted/donated to Oswal Samaj, are mentioned in Para 2 of the plaint. In the plaint, it is averred that before abolition of Jagir, the land vested in Thakur Madho Singh and being its sole owner, Thakur Madho Singh allotted the same to Oswal Samaj in the form of Inayat and as such it is Pattasud land of Oswal Samaj since the date of allotment i.e. Samvat 2003. For proving title of Oswal Samaj, it is also stated in the plaint that on some of the stone slabs, fortifying the land, name of Oswal Samaj is also inscribed. A specific averment was made in the plaint that the land in question never vested in panchayat. A site plan showing the details of the land is also annexed with the plaint. After allotment, part of the land is being utilised by Samaj by constructing courtyard (Bara), a defecating place for the ladies of Samaj. For looking after the land in question, Oswal Samaj appointed one Cheelra s/o Wala, Rawna Rajput of Jasol and in the year 1972 he started using the same for his live stocks and also constructed a temporary hut for his dwelling. When the objectionable activities of Cheelra were resisted by Samaj, he started quarrelling with the members of Oswal Samaj and refused to vacate the part of the land on which he was having possession. The cantankerous behavior of Cheelra and disturbance of public tranquility was reported by Samaj and proceedings under Section 107 Cr.P.C. were also initiated. When the objectionable activities of Cheelra were resisted by Samaj, he started quarrelling with the members of Oswal Samaj and refused to vacate the part of the land on which he was having possession. The cantankerous behavior of Cheelra and disturbance of public tranquility was reported by Samaj and proceedings under Section 107 Cr.P.C. were also initiated. In the meanwhile, Cheelra spread his tentacles to grab the land and his sons also joined hands with him for making encroachment on the land. In that background, the suit was filed. 3. Earlier, for the land in question there was litigation before Jagir Commissioner and Jagir Commissioner decided the matter in favour of Oswal Samaj but Gram Panchayat without any authority of law passed an order against the decision of Jagir Commissioner. The Panchayat decided to auction the land in question and a notice under Section 79 of the Panchayat Act was given, however, in collusion with one Sarju Devi, part of the land was auctioned measuring 14204/9 sq.yards. It was in these circumstances, appellant/plaintiffs ventilated their grievances in the suit. The Panchayat decided to auction the land in question and a notice under Section 79 of the Panchayat Act was given, however, in collusion with one Sarju Devi, part of the land was auctioned measuring 14204/9 sq.yards. It was in these circumstances, appellant/plaintiffs ventilated their grievances in the suit. The prayer clause of the suit, in vernacular, reads as under: 13- oknhx.k dh izkFkZuk gS fd oknhx.k ds i{k esa o izfroknhx.k ds fo:) fuEu izdkj fMdzh lkfnj QjekbZ tkos %& " 1- nkok ds layXu uD'kk dh dqy Hkwfe , ,e ,y ds ts ,p eqdlsj 7378&7@9 oxZ xt vksloky lekt tlksy dks eeywdk djkj nh tkos] 2- uD'ks esa ntZ ,e ,y ds vkbZ Hkwfe eqdlsj 1420&4@9 oxZ xt dks fd;k x;k fuyke iq[rk u dj oknhx.k dks eeywdk o edcwtk djkj nh tkdj oknhx.k ds dCts esa fdlh rjg dk n[ky u fd;k tkosA 3- uD'ks esa ntZ Mh bZ ,Q ,p Hkwfe 1162&1@2 oxZ xt ij ls izfroknh la[;k 2 rk 6 dk uktk;t dCtk ekuk tkdj bl Hkwfe dk vlkyru dCtk bu izfroknhx.k ls fnyk;k tkos o bl rjg dCtk fnyk;s tkus esa o oknhx.k dk dCtk gks tkus ij izfroknh la[;k 1 oknhx.k ds gdwdksa o dCts esa fdlh rjg dk n[ky u djs] 4- izfroknhx.k la[;k 2 rk 6 ls ekfQd nkok eksu izksfQV~l ds :i;s 360@& o rkjh[k nkok ls rkjh[k dCtk rd :i;s 10@& egkokj ds fglkc ls ehu izksfQ~V fnyk;s tkos] 5- LFkkbZ fu"ks/kkKk bl vej dh lkfnj QjekbZ tkos fd uD'ks esa ntZ dqy Hkwfe 7378&79 oxZ xt ds fdlh Hkh fgLls esa izfroknh la[;k 1 o mldk dksbZ vf/kdkjh] ukSdjjksa ;k dksbZ Hkh O;fDr muds dgus ls oknhx.k ds dCts o gdwdksa esa fdlh rgj dk dksbZ n[ky u djs o blh vej dh nkSjku nkok vLFkkbZ fu"ks/kkKk tkjh QjekbZ tkos] 6- nhxj nknjlh eqQksn oknh vrk QjekbZ tkos] o oknhx.k dk dqy O;; izfroknhx.k ls fnyk;k tkos] bfr] " 4. The suit was contested by respondents No.2 to 4 & 6 jointly and a written statement was filed. In the written statement, averments contained in the plaint were denied and allotment of land to Oswal Samaj in the form of Inayat was also disputed. 5. First respondent Gram Panchayat also refuted the claim of the appellants by filing its separate written statement. In the written statement, averments contained in the plaint were denied and allotment of land to Oswal Samaj in the form of Inayat was also disputed. 5. First respondent Gram Panchayat also refuted the claim of the appellants by filing its separate written statement. The Gram Panchayat has also stated in the written statement that suit has been filed by unauthorized persons as there is no registered trust of Oswal Samaj, therefore a suit is not maintainable. In the specific objections, it is also submitted that so called document of Inayatnama/Bakshishnama is not a registered document, therefore, it is not admissible in evidence. The objection about misjoinder of causes of action was also incorporated in the return. It is also averred in the reply that suit is barred by limitation. After submission of written statement by first respondent, additional pleadings were also submitted on behalf of the appellants.6. The objection about misjoinder of causes of action was also incorporated in the return. It is also averred in the reply that suit is barred by limitation. After submission of written statement by first respondent, additional pleadings were also submitted on behalf of the appellants.6. On the basis of pleadings of the rival parties, the learned trial Court framed following issues for determination: 1- D;k oknhx.k vksloky lekt tlksy ds V~LVhx.k gS vkSj mudks xzke tlksy ds vksloky lekt dh vksj ls nkok ykus dk gd gS\ oknh 2- D;k xzke tlksy esa Hkhyksokyk Bsyk dh Hkwfe 7378&7@9 oxZ xtZ gS ftldh fLFkfr oknhx.k ds ekufp= ds vuqlkj gSA oknh 3- D;k oknxzLr Hkwfe tkfxj ds le; Bkdqj ek/kksflagth tlksy ds LokfeRo dh Fkh ftls tkfxj lekIr gksus ij ek/kksflag dh O;fDrxr laifr dh ?kksf"kr dh xbZA oknh 4- D;k Bkdqj ek/kksflag us oknxzLr Hkwfe laor 2003 ds vlkM lqn 13 dks tfj;s fyf[kr tlksy ds vksloky lekt dks buk;r dh FkhA oknh 5- D;k oknxzLr Hkwfe ij tlksy ds vksloky lekt dk laor 2003 ls LokfeRo ,oa 'kkfUr iw.kZ dCtk pyk vk jgk gSA oknh 6- D;k oknxzLr Hkwfe dk fgLlk xk;ksokyk okMk tks oknhx.k ds uD'ks esa Mh bZ ,Q ,p crkbZ xbZ gS] dks vksloky lekt }kjk Jh phyjk dks xk;s laHkkyus ds fy, fu;qDr fd;k Fkk ijUrq bl Hkwfe ij Jh phyjk o usuflag us dze'k% lu~ 1972&1974 esa uktk;t dCtk dj fy;kA oknh 7- D;k phyjk dh e`R;q ds mijkUr mijksDr Hkwfe ij mlds iq= izfroknh la0 3 ls 6 o l% 2 dk uktk;t dCtk tkjh gS ftlls oknhx.k mUgsa csn[ky djokus ds vf/kdkjh gSA oknh 8- D;k oknhx.k izfroknh la0% 2 ls 6 ls oknxzLr Hkwfe dks dke ysus ds eqvkoys o gjtkuk ds :0 360@& ikus ds vf/kdkjhA oknhA 9- D;k fn0 11&2&75 dks Jh ftusUnzflag us iwoZorhZ buk;r dks Lohdkj djds oknxzLr Hkwfe dk iathc) o;ukek oknhx.k ds gd esa fd;kA oknh 10- D;k oknxzLr Hkwfe ,e] ,y] ds] vkbZ] Hkwfe Hkhyksa okys Bsys dk Hkkx gS o blds ckjs esa ftyk/kh'k ckM+esj vkSj xzke iapk;r tlksy ds }kjk dh tk jgh fuykeh dh dk;Zokgh voS/k vkSj vukf/kd`r gSA oknh 11- D;k xzke iapk;r tlksy us oknxzLr Hkwfe ds vU; fgLlksa ds ckjs esa fn0 27&7&75 o fn0 24&8&75 dks tks vkns'k ikfjr dj oknhx.k dk dCtk gksus ds vkns'k fn;s gSa og vukf/kd`r gSA oknh 12- D;k oknhx.k ekfQd nkok izfroknhx.k ds fo:) LFkkbZ fu"ks/kkKk tkjh djokus ds vf/kdkjh gSA oknh 13- D;k oknxzLr Hkwfe esa ls Hkhyks okys Bsyk xzke tlksy dh efgykvksa }kjk xr 60&70 o"kksZ ls lkoZtfud V~Vh;ksa ds mi;ksx esa vkSj HkSalksa dk okMk o xk;ksa dk okMk xr 40 o"kksZa ls xkao dk eos'kh Hksalksa o xk;ksa ds cSBus ds mi;ksx esa vk jgk gS\ ;fn ,slk gS rks bl nkok ij D;k izHkko gksxk\ izfroknh %1 14- D;k oknxzLr Hkwfe yxHkx 32956 :i;s ds ewY; dh gS ftlls oknhx.k us viw.kZ U;k;'kqYd is'k fd;k gSA izfroknh 15- D;k oknhx.k ds nkok esa fel tksbUMj vkWQ dktst vkQ ,Dlu ,UM ikfVZt gksus ls ;g nkok [kkfjt gksus ;ksX; gSA izfroknh l%1 16- D;k bl nkok esa ftyk/kh'k ckMesj vkp';d i{kdkj gS ( izfroknh ) 17- D;k oknhx.k }kjk fn;k x;k uksfVl /kkjk 79 jktLFkku iapk;r vf/kfu;e ds vuqlkj ugha gksus ls nkok [kkfjt gksus ;ksX; gSA ( izfroknh ) 18- D;k oknhx.k dk nkok e;kn ckgj gS\ ( izfroknh la% 1 ) 19- D;k izfroknh l% 1 oknhx.k ls fo'ks"k gjtkuk ikus dk vf/kdkjh gS\ ( izfroknh l% 1 ) 20- D;k oknhx.k Hkwfe ij izfroknh l% 2 ls 6 dk dCtk eq[kkyQkuk xr 40 o"kksZa ls gS\ ( izfroknh l% 2 ls 6 ) 21- D;k oknhx.k us Bkdqj ftusUnzflag ls lkft'k djds oknxzLr Hkwfe dk Qjth cd~'khukek iqjkuh rkjh[k dk cuk;k gSA ( izfroknh l% 2 ls 6 ) 22- nknjlh\ " 7. Issue No.18 relating to limitation is decided by learned trial Court on 19th July 1978 in favour of appellants and against the respondents by holding that suit is not barred by limitation. Similarly, Issue No. 16 & 17 were also decided in favour of appellants by order dated 27th October 1978. 8. For substantiating averments in the plaint, on behalf of appellants PW1 Jasraj, PW2 Jitendra Singh, PW3 Champalal appeared in the witness box and documentary evidence was also tendered. On behalf of respondents, in all 10 witnesses were examined. The learned trial Court, after conclusion of the evidence of rival parties, heard final arguments and dismissed the suit by impugned judgment and decree.9. Learned counsel for the appellants Mr. D.R. Bhandari, while assailing the finding of the learned trial Court on Issue No.4, 9 & 21, submits that Ex.2 Inayat or Bakshish, issued by the Jagirdar under his sovereign power, was not required to be registered as it was a grant by Jagirdar under the Government Grants Act, 1895 (for short, 'Act of 1895'). Learned counsel submits that without examining the provisions of the Act of 1895, the learned Court below has seriously erred in deciding these issues against the appellants. Elaborating his submissions in this behalf, Mr. Bhandari submits that by virtue of Section 1(2) of the Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance 1950, Crown (Government) Grants Act was applicable to Rajasthan and subsequently on Adaptation of Laws No.2 from 1950, Ex.3 was executed by Jeenendra Singh reiterating Ex.2 by the Jagirdar of Malani and therefore is a formal affirmation of earlier transfer deed made by former Jagirdar, which requires no registration. Mr. Bhandari further submits that by virtue of Section 2 & 3 of the Act of 1895 vis-`-vis Government grants, the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short, 'Act of 1882') is not applicable and this vital aspect has not been examined by the learned Court below while deciding these issues against the appellants. He, therefore, submits that the finding of the learned Court below is perverse and cannot be sustained. Mr. Bhandari would contend that the true effect of Government Grant is that it takes effect according to its tenor. He, therefore, submits that the finding of the learned Court below is perverse and cannot be sustained. Mr. Bhandari would contend that the true effect of Government Grant is that it takes effect according to its tenor. He further submits that all provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations contained in any such grant or transfer, as aforesaid, shall be valid and take effect according to their tenor, any rule of law, statute or enactment of legislature to the contrary notwithstanding. Laying emphasis on Section 2 & 3 of the Act of 1895, Mr. Bhandari has further buttressed his submissions that Act of 1882 was not applicable and the grant as such was valid and has taken effect according to its tenor notwithstanding any rule of law, statute or enactment of the legislature to the contrary. The sum and substance of the submission of Mr. Bhandari is that the grant has conferred a valid title to the Oswal Samaj, the grantee of Jagirdar. In support of his contentions, learned counsel has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Champa Lal & Ors. v. Rameshwar, AIR 1967 (Raj.) 233 . In this verdict, the Court held in Para 8 to 12 as under: 8. It is true that it was extended without any adaptation. But it is quite clear that the intention was to extend the provisions of the Act to Rajasthan The Adaptation of Laws (No. 2) Order 1956 was passed under Article 372A of the Constitution. It only adapted the Government Grants Act as it stood on that date. There was no intention to repeal the Crown Grants Act 1895 which had already been extended to Rajasthan under the Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance 1950. The name of the Act was changed to the Government Grants Act 1895 after the coming into force of the Constitution. 9. I accordingly find that the Government Grants Act 1895 is applicable to Rajasthan. 10. The next contention on behalf of the applicants is that Section 2 of the Government Grants Act is not applicable to the sale-deed in question, as it is a commercial transaction and not a Government grant. I am unable to accept this contention. The Act does not make any distinction between a commercial transaction and a non-commercial transaction. 10. The next contention on behalf of the applicants is that Section 2 of the Government Grants Act is not applicable to the sale-deed in question, as it is a commercial transaction and not a Government grant. I am unable to accept this contention. The Act does not make any distinction between a commercial transaction and a non-commercial transaction. Section 2 is applicable not only to grants but is also applicable to every transfer of land or of any interest therein. 11. Two decisions were referred to by learned counsel for the applicants. In Munshi Lal v. Gopi Ballabh AIR 1914 All 120 a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that a lease executed on behalf of the Government was not exempt from registration under the provisions of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. The learned Judges relied on an earlier decision of their Court in Dost Mohammed Khan v. Bank of Upper India (1906) 3 All LJ 628 . A Crown grant was mortgaged in that case and it was claimed that the grant was not subject to sale at the suit of the mortgagee This contention was repelled with the following observations: "It is difficult to interpret Section 2 of the Crown Grants Act but from a perusal of the preamble to the Act it is reasonably clear that the object of the Legislature in passing the Act was to validate any provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations over which might be contained in any Crown Grant and which otherwise might be held to be obnoxious to the restrictions imposed in respect of grants generally by the Transfer of Property Act. We do not think that it was intended by the Legislature that unconditional grants made by the Crown free from restrictions as to alienation should not be the subject of a sale at the suit of a mortgagee." 12. With all respect to the learned Judges who decided AIR 1914 All 120 I do not see how the decision in (1906) 3 All LJ 628 was at all applicable to the facts of the case before them. At any rate it was not brought to their notice that Section 2 of the Crown Grants Act was applicable to a transfer of land or interest in land made by or on behalf of the Crown. At any rate it was not brought to their notice that Section 2 of the Crown Grants Act was applicable to a transfer of land or interest in land made by or on behalf of the Crown. A lease of immovable property is certainly a transfer of an interest in land. 10. Learned counsel has also placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Urban Improvement Trust, Udaipur & Ors. v. Maharana Pratap Smarak Samiti, Udaipur, 1982 WLN (UC) 119. The Division Bench held in Para 10 as under: 10. It can hardly be disputed that the grant of 139 bighas 17 biswas of land for constructing the memorial to Maharana Pratap under the order of the year 1955 was a State grant. The Government Grants Act. 1885 (for short, 'the Grants Act' here in after) was applicable to the State of Rajasthan. By virtue of Rajasthan Central Laws Adaptation Ordinance 1950 and subsequently by the order Adaptation of Laws (No. 2) Order 1956 the Crown Grants Act, 1895 was extended to Rajasthan (see Champalal v. Ramshwar 1967 RLW 243) . Under Section 3 of the Grants Act, all State grants are to take effect according to their tenor. The Grants Act was repealed by Section 5 of the Rajasthan Government Grants Act, 1961 (Here in after called 'the Act of 1961' for brevity sake). By virtue of Section 3 of the Rajasthan Act, the Rajasthan Act would be applicable even to any grant or other transfer of land or of any interest therein made before or to be made thereafter. Under Section 4 of the Rajasthan Act, all Government grants have to take effect according to their tenor. We have already reproduced the terms of the grant in our earlier part of the judgment. It is not the case of the State that any of the terms of the original grant had been violated or a breach thereof had been committed by the Smarak Samiti. It is not disputed that the Smarak Samiti has developed a sizeable portion of the land granted to it in the year 1955 for the purpose for which it was granted by the State Government. The development of land and construction of a befitting memorial to Maharana Pratap has to be a phased programme. It is not disputed that the Smarak Samiti has developed a sizeable portion of the land granted to it in the year 1955 for the purpose for which it was granted by the State Government. The development of land and construction of a befitting memorial to Maharana Pratap has to be a phased programme. Under the terms of the grant, the land could only be resumed if it was not utilised for the purpose for which it was granted. The grant was in accordance with law and thus, under its terms and conditions, in case of breach of its terms it could be resumed but it is not the case of the State Government that the Smarak Samiti has committed breach of the terms and conditions of the grant. Admittedly before passing the order dated April 14, 1970, no notice was given either to Shri Pratap Sabha or the Smarak Samiti, and the learned Single Judge has rightly held that the order is liable to be quashed for violation of the principles of natural justice. A look at the order dated April 14, 1970 will show that it is not mentioned there in that the grant is being resumed because of the breach of the conditions of the grant. It appears from the aforesaid order that the State Government simply withdrew the earlier order dated October 31, 1955 and made a fresh grant of only 70 bighas 10 biswas of land. Once having made the grant, it was no longer within the powers of the State Government to have resumed the grant unless its terms had been violated or breach thereof had been committed by the grantee. Thus, the order dated April 14, 1970 is per se not legal. Once there is a grant in force and the possession of the land had been delivered to the grantee, the ownership no longer vests in the State unless the State Government forfeits or resumes the land granted. We are, therefore, in agreement with the learned Single Judge that the order dated April 14, 1970 of the State Government withdrawing the earlier order dated October 31, 1955 is not in accordance with Jaw and is liable to be quashed. 11. Lastly, learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on yet another Division Bench judgment of this Court in Bachh Raj v. Sunder Mal & Ors., AIR 1963 Raj. 119 . 11. Lastly, learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on yet another Division Bench judgment of this Court in Bachh Raj v. Sunder Mal & Ors., AIR 1963 Raj. 119 . In this verdict, while considering the rigor of Section 71(b) of the Registration Act, 1908, the Division Bench held that Patta issued by Thikana of a land for consideration was not compulsorily registrable and was 'Sanad' evidencing sale of land by Thikana. Court held in Para 14 to 17 as under: 14. It is true that the Marwar Patta Ordinance does not in term apply to the Jagir-lands but it cannot be disputed that in the jagir-lands also pattas had to be Issued and renewed in accordance with certain practices. In this connection we may refer to a notification issued under the authority of the Darbar which reads as follows: "As there is some confusion in regard to appeals from owners in cases relating to pattas in thikana, His Highness the Maharaja Sahib Bahadur has been pleased to order (vide Convening Member's letter No. 1083 dated 22nd April, 1925 and C. R. No. 10 dated 13-4-1925.) 1. That in cases when there are two parties to the patta proceedings in a thikana Court the thikana being merely a Judge between them, any person aggrieved by the order passed should appeal to the Chief Court according to the current practice. 2. That where a thikana has taken any proceedings of its own motion for the grant of patta in a Jagir village or to compel a person to take a patta or in any other way, any person aggrieved by the order may appeal to the Mehakma Khas." It is clear from this notification that the jagirdars dealing with the issuing and renewing of pattas were not the final disposing authorities and were subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the Chief Court and the Mehakma Khas and they were expected to deal with the patta cases in accordance with the guiding principles enunciated in the Patta Ordinance. We may in this connection refer to Dharam Chand v. Bhagwandass, 1943 Mar LR 49 (Civil) where a Division Bench of the former Chief Court made the following observations: "This Ordinance does not of course apply to Thikanas, but it does afford a good guidance to the Thikanas as regards the procedure to be followed by them in dealing with patta cases." In the case before the Chief Court as the respondent's objections were not decided after framing issues and recording evidence, the case was remanded for fresh decision to the thikana. In the absence of any other contrary materials, we consider that the opinion expressed by the Chief Court as early as 1943 deserves to be accepted and followed. 15. Thus, the principles deduced above on the review of the Patta Ordinance can be considered also relevant in considering the proper significance of the pattas issued by the jagirdars. 16. Now, on a consideration of (i) the creation of a general obligation to obtain a patta or renewal of patta in the various contingencies enumerated above, (ii) prescription of different fees as also penalties varying according to the periods of possession and time taken in making applications, (iii) drastic provisions of Section 19, (iv) the possibilities of cancellation of patta in consequence of adverse appellate decisions, and, (v) provisions for the recovery of fees and penalties under the Public Demands Recovery Act before the issue of patta, a patta cannot invariably be taken as a title deed or a document creating rights in respect of immovable land. In the cases mentioned in principles Nos. 1 to 3 stated earlier, a patta can never be treated as a title deed or a document creating rights in immovable property and, therefore, the question of registration does not arise. The position with regard to the cases dealt in the principle No. 4 above which involves a transfer of land, requires a further examination. At this stage, it will be useful to refer to the fact that up to March, 1949 the Transfer of Property Act was not in force in the former Marwar State and there was no, provision like Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act requiring that a transfer in the form of a sale of tangible immovable property in the value of Rs. 100/- or above can be made only by a registered instrument. 100/- or above can be made only by a registered instrument. Oral sales of immovable properties were permissible under the law in force in the former Jodhpur State. The law relating to registration has no bearing on this aspect of the case, as the law of registration, as it is well settled, affects only the documents but not the transactions. It only implies that if there is an instrument executed to create rights in immovable properties of the value of over Rs. 100/- then that instrument requires to be registered. Another important fact which we must emphasise is that the grant of a patta by a jagirdar pre-supposes some proceedings and that these proceedings were subject to" the appellate jurisdiction of the Chief Court or the Mehakma Khas in certain cases. We might also add that even in. respect of applications for grant of pattas of unoccupied jagir lands there could be objection by the neighbours or the members of the public on the ground of public interest and they could further take up the matter in appeal to the Mehakma Khas and the Mehakma Khas in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction could cancel the order of a jagirdar granting patta. On giving proper consideration to these facts, we can safely arrive at a conclusion that ordinarily the grant of a patta followed a prior oral sale in a proper proceeding and that pattas used to be issued to recognise the oral sale in the customary manner by the grant of patta and that the patta merely contained a recital of a prior completed oral sale. In these circumstances, in our opinion, a patta cannot ordinarily be considered a sale-deed or a document by itself creating rights in immovable properties. Such a document, in our opinion, did not require to be registered compulsorily. 17. We may at this stage refer to a decision of the former Chief Court reported in Jutha v. Bhoma, 1939 Mar LR 266 (Civil) where a Bench of that Court observed as follows: "The Transfer of Property Act is not in force an Marwar so that the statutory provisions of that Act embodied in Section 54 as to the modes of transfer of property cannot be enforced and an oral sale can be recognised as valid. The Patta which is issued by the Thikana is not a sale deed. The Patta which is issued by the Thikana is not a sale deed. It is only a sanad evidencing the sale of land by Thikana. In case of Thikana land sold by public auction according to the principles of Patta Ordinance as in case of Khalsa land, it is not necessary to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the purchaser." There can be no doubt that the Chief Court had the advantage of having intimate knowledge of the practices relating to the grant of pattas by jagirdars and, therefore, the view taken by that Court deserves to be given due weight and we see no good reason to differ from it. We are not unconscious of the fact that in some cases the jagirdar might have combined transaction of sale and the issue of a patta and might have issued a patta which by itself might have purported to create rights in immovable property. Such a patta might require to be registered compulsorily. The final conclusion then to which we reach is that whether a patta should be registered or not, cannot be decided in the abstract and must be decided on the facts and the circumstances under which the patta was granted. Ordinarily the presumption will be that the patta was intended to be the sanad evidencing the sale of land by thikana and did not require registration. 12. By placing reliance on all these verdicts, learned counsel submits that by virtue of the Act of 1895 and applicability of Marwar Patta Ordinance, a grant by the Crown requires no registration and even at the time of grant, the Transfer of Property Act was not applicable, which was enforced in the State w.e.f. April 1949.13. Learned counsel has also urged that Ex.2 & 3 as well as Ex.11, which is a decision of the Jagirdar Commissioner, Rajasthan, Jaipur, was a vital piece of document throwing light on the controversy, but while deciding the crucial issues, the learned Court below has not at all considered these documents appropriately and has virtually eschewed these documents, therefore, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. Challenging the finding of the learned Court below on Issue No.1, learned counsel has urged that the suit as such was filed in the representative capacity under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC but the learned Court below has not cared to thrash out the matter in right perspective, rather it has misconstrued it to be by the unregistered trust. Therefore, Mr. Bhandari submits that findings on Issue No.1 are per-se erroneous and cannot be sustained. Mr. Bhandari has placed heavy reliance on the testimony of witness Jitendra Singh, who has admitted in clear and unequivocal terms that land was given in Inayat by Thakur Madho Singh to Oswal Samaj. Mr. Bhandari has also urged that the Panchayat was having no right, title or interest over the land in question and even before the learned Court below no endeavor was made by it to contest the suit inasmuch as the impugned judgment was rendered against Gram Panchayat, Jasol ex-parte is sufficient to bring home this vital point favourable to the appellants. He, therefore, submits that in these circumstances there remains no quarrel that title on the land in question of Oswal Samaj is unquestionable and by dismissing the suit as not maintainable, the learned Court below has committed grave and serious error of law and fact, which has rendered the impugned judgment and decree all the more vulnerable.14. Learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. Bhandari, would contend that the finding of learned trial Court on Issue No.4 to question the genuineness of Inayatnama Ex.2 is ex-facie contrary to Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 inasmuch as the document was 30 years old and therefore it was admissible. He further submits that by virtue of being Government Grant, Ex.2 was a public document within the four corners of Section 74 of the Act of 1872 and its admissibility was beyond doubt. According to Mr. Bhandari, this was a very vital issue but the learned Court below has not dilated on that issue while deciding Issue No.4 in an absolute casual and cursory manner. According to Mr. Bhandari, this was a very vital issue but the learned Court below has not dilated on that issue while deciding Issue No.4 in an absolute casual and cursory manner. Learned counsel has lastly submitted that document Ex.11 was binding and conclusive between the parties and from the said order it is clearly discernible that at the time of Inayatnama the land belonged to Thakur Madho Singh and such Inayat cannot be questioned before any civil court or revenue court by virtue of Section 46 of the Land Revenue and Resumption of Jagir Act, 1952. According to learned counsel, this was a very important aspect throwing light on the lis involved but the learned Court below has not addressed on it. With these submissions, learned counsel has urged that impugned judgment is liable to be reversed.15. Before I proceed to deal with the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the appellants, it is worthwhile to note that at the behest of appellants an endeavor was made before this Court to produce additional evidence on record by laying application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. The application was registered as I.A. No.2253 of 2006. In the application, it is inter-alia averred that at the threshold the suit was filed in the representative capacity by some of the members of Oswal Samaj under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC to promote social, economic and ethical activities of Samaj. In the application, it is submitted that during now Oswal Samaj is a Society registered under the Rajasthan Societies Registration Act, 1958 (for short, 'Act of 1958') known as Shree Oswal Samaj Sansthan, Jasol. Alongwith the application, a duly approved constitution of the Society is also placed on record to indicate the registration of Samaj as a Society under the Act of 1958.16. The application came up before the Court on 2nd of August 2006 and the Court was pleased to issue notice of the application to first respondent Gram Panchayat Jasol. Despite service of notice none appeared for Gram Panchayat to oppose the application. On 17th of February 2009, while considering the application the Court was pleased to permit the appellants to treat the registered Society as plaintiff for limited purpose while clarifying that the application shall be disposed of at the time of final disposal of the appeal. Despite service of notice none appeared for Gram Panchayat to oppose the application. On 17th of February 2009, while considering the application the Court was pleased to permit the appellants to treat the registered Society as plaintiff for limited purpose while clarifying that the application shall be disposed of at the time of final disposal of the appeal. It goes without saying that under Section 17 of the Act of 1958, a Society can be registered at any time. From the tenor of the pleadings incorporated in the plaint, there remains no quarrel that the suit as such was instituted by some of the enthusiastic members of Oswal Samaj in representative capacity. The application is pending since 2006 and no one has come forward to oppose the same. Order 41 Rule 27 CPC empowers the appellate Court to admit additional affidavit. It is trite that the provision contained therein has not been engrafted in the Code so as to patch up the weak points in the case and to fill up the omissions in the Court of appeal. It also does not authorise any lacunae or gap in the evidence to be filled up. However, taking into account the fact that at the threshold the suit itself was filed under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC in the representative capacity and later on registration of Oswal Samaj as Society under the Act of 1958 is a subsequent development having direct ramification on the framework of the suit as it would facilitate rendering fair justice. There is apparent reason for not producing additional evidence when the trial of the suit was in vogue inasmuch as Oswal Samaj was registered as a Society under the Act of 1958 after decision of the suit by the learned trial Court. It is undeniable that document in the form of additional evidence sought to be produced by the appellants are material and if substantiated, would have a material effect on the case of appellants to remove the clouds of doubt over the case, therefore, interest of justice also clearly renders it imperative that it may be allowed to be permitted on record. Moreover, looking to the nature of the suit, this Court feels that taking additional evidence on record would enable it to pronounce judgment and it will farther the cause of substantial justice. Moreover, looking to the nature of the suit, this Court feels that taking additional evidence on record would enable it to pronounce judgment and it will farther the cause of substantial justice. One more important aspect is that the application has not been opposed as none has appeared on behalf of the respondents. Therefore, in that background, I feel persuaded to allow the application for taking additional evidence on record. It may be observed that at the threshold, while considering the application, the coordinate Bench has granted limited indulgence to the appellants by its order dated 17th of February 2009 observing that the Society is deemed to be plaintiff for limited purpose. Therefore, taking into account the nature of additional document without making any comment on merits of the case at this stage, the application is allowed and the additional document is taken on record.17. Although the learned counsel for the appellants has raised many arguments touching the merits of judgment of the learned trial Court, which ought to have been adjudicated by the learned trial Court, but in view of acceptance of additional evidence, it would not be fair for this Court to adjudicate all these issues on merits. One more important aspect is that application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC has been decided in favour of the appellants in absence of the respondents and as nobody is present on their behalf to contest this appeal, the contentious issues raised by the learned counsel for the appellants are required to be adjudicated by the learned Court below after giving opportunity of being heard to all the respondent-defendants. The decisions, on which the learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance to prove the title of Samaj, are required to be re-examined by the learned trial Court for deciding Issue No.1, 4, 9 & 21 as well as other issues afresh.18. As the suit has been dismissed on the preliminary point, namely, maintainability of suit by the appellants and admissibility of the documentary evidence, it is desirable to reverse that finding and to remand the matter to prevent the end of justice being defeated. Therefore, I feel persuaded to exercise powers of the appellate Court under Order 41 Rule 23 CPC for remanding the matter back for its decision afresh.19. Therefore, I feel persuaded to exercise powers of the appellate Court under Order 41 Rule 23 CPC for remanding the matter back for its decision afresh.19. The upshot of the above discussion is that as a consequence of acceptance of application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC laid on behalf of appellants for taking additional evidence on record, and some of the legal issues canvassed by the appellants have not been properly thrashed out in the impugned judgment, the instant appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment and decree dated 1st of October 1984 is set aside and the matter is remanded back for its decision afresh in the light of submissions made hereinabove.20. The learned trial Court is directed to take note of provisions of the Act of 1895 and the Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance, 1950 as well as Marwar Patta Ordinance, the issue relating to applicability of Transfer of Property Act anterior to March 1949 and the rigor of Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act 1908. The learned trial Court shall re-examine and re-address on these aspects in the light of legal precedents referred to supra. The learned trial Court shall proceed with the trial of the suit afresh in the name of Shree Oswal Samaj Sansthan, Jasol, a registered Society, which was originally filed by the appellants in representative capacity. As the original suit was instituted way back in the year 1976, the learned trial Court is expected to decide the same as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the record after summoning the respondent-defendants and affording opportunity of being heard to them. While deciding the suit afresh, the learned trial Court shall also make endeavour to ascertain the current status of the suit property for arriving at a just decision.21. The office is directed to remit the entire record of the case forthwith.Appeal Allowed. *******