Judgment : 1. Present petition is filed assailing the order dated 18.01.2014 passed by Labour Court, Haridwar whereby application moved by the petitioner (paper no. D-30) challenging the jurisdiction of Labour Court was dismissed as well as order dated 11.04.2014 passed by Labour Court, Haridwar whereby review application moved by the petitioner was also rejected. 2. Brief facts of the present case, inter alia, are that Registrar of the Trade Unions, Uttarakhand, vide order dated 13.06.2013, was pleased to cancel the certificate of registration, earlier issued in favour of the respondent no. 5. Feeling aggrieved from the cancellation of certificate of registration respondent no. 5, herein, preferred an Trade Union Appeal No. 2 of 2013 before the Labour Court, Haridwar. Petitioner, herein, moved an application before the Labour Court (D-30) stating therein that Labour Court has absolutely no jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Section 11 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 in view of the fact that no Labour Court was ever appointed under Section 28-B of the Indian Trade Unions (Amendment) Act, 1947. It was further contended before the Labour Court that Labour Court established / constituted under Section 4 A of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act can hear and decide only those cases, which are mentioned in the first schedule of the Industrial Disputes Act or other matters, as specifically assigned to the Labour Court. Since jurisdiction under Section 11 of the Trade Unions Act was never assigned to the Labour Court established under Section 4-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, Labour Court was lacking jurisdiction to entertain the appeal under Section 11 (aa) of the Trade Unions Act. 3. Learned Labour Court did not find favour with petitioner and was pleased to reject application vide impugned order dated 18.01.2014. 4. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner once again took chance by way of filing review application being review application 01 of 2014, which also came to be dismissed vide order dated 11.04.2014. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner approached this Court by way of filing present writ petition. 5. I have heard Mr. M.S. Tyagi, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. M.C. Pant, learned counsel for the respondents no. 5 & 6 and Mr. R.C. Arya, learned Standing Counsel for the State of Uttarakhand / respondents no. 1 to 4. 6. Mr.
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner approached this Court by way of filing present writ petition. 5. I have heard Mr. M.S. Tyagi, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. M.C. Pant, learned counsel for the respondents no. 5 & 6 and Mr. R.C. Arya, learned Standing Counsel for the State of Uttarakhand / respondents no. 1 to 4. 6. Mr. M.S. Tyagi, learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that before creation of State of Uttarakhand, District Judge, Kanpur was authorized by State of Uttar Pradesh to hear the appeal under Section 11 (b) of the Trade Unions Act, 1926; after creation of State of Uttarakhand, State of Uttarakhand has not appointed any judicial officer, as mentioned in Section 11 (b) of the Trade Unions Act to hear the Appeal under Section 11 of the Trade Unions Act. He further contends that the word “Labour Court” used in sub-Section (aa) of Section 11 should construe to mean “Labour Court”, as defined under Section 3 (e) of the Indian Trade Unions (Amendment) Act, 1947 and such Labour Court can only be appointed under sub-Section (1) of Section 28-B of the Indian Trade Unions (Amendment) Act, 1947. He further contends that Labour Court created / established under Section 4 A of the Industrial Disputes Act has jurisdiction only over the matters, as mentioned in First Schedule of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act or specifically assigned to the Labour Court by the State Government, therefore, Labour Court appointed / created / established under Section 4-A of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act cannot hear the appeal under Section 11 (aa) of the Trade Unions Act. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment passed by learned Single Judge of Allahabad High Court in the case of Starian Employees Union Vs. Presiding Officer, Noida reported 2008 (117) FLR 279. Paragraph 7 of the judgment of Allahabad High Court reads as under: “7. The result, therefore, is that the provisions of Section 11 (aa) cannot be given effect to in the absence of legislative intervention by suitable amendment in the Trade Union Act 1926 or the Industrial Disputes Act specifying the labour court or industrial tribunal to which the appeal would lie or until a Labour Court under Section 28-B of the Trade Unions Amendment Act 1947 is constituted.
The result is that the appeal would lie to a court referred to in Section 11(1)(b) of the Act. The Labour Court was therefore right in returning the appeal for presentation to the proper Court. Petition dismissed.” 8. Undisputedly, as per sub-Section (2) of Section (1) of the Indian Trade Unions (Amendment) Act, 1947, the Act would come into force, when the Central Government by Notification in the official Gazette appoint. Undisputedly, Amendment Act has not come into force, as yet, for want of Notification, as required under sub- Section (2) of Section 1 of the Amendment Act. 9. Section 11 of the Trade Unions Act, reads as under: “11. Appeal (1) Any person aggrieved by any refusal of the Registrar to register a Trade Union or by the withdrawal or cancellation of a certificate or registration may, within such period as may be prescribed, appeal- (a) Where the head office of the Trade Union is situated within the limits of a Presidency-town, to the High Court, or (aa) Where the head office is situated in an area, falling within the jurisdiction of a Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal, to that Court or Tribunal, as the case may be; (b) where the head office is situated in any other area, to such Court, not inferior to the Court of an additional or assistant Judge of a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, as the4[Appropriate Government] may appoint in this behalf for that area. (2) The appellate Court may dismiss the appeal, or pass an order directing the Registrar to register the Union and to issue a certificate of registration under the provisions of section 9 or setting aside the order for withdrawal or cancellation of the certificate, as the case may be, and the Registrar shall comply with such order. (3) For the purpose of an appeal under sub-section (1) an Appellate Court shall, so far as may be, follow the same procedure and have the same power, as it follows and has when trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), and may direct by whom the whole or any part of the costs of the appeal shall be paid and such costs shall be recovered as if they had been awarded in a suit under the said Code.
(4) In the event of the dismissal of an appeal by any Court appointed under clause (b) of sub-section (1), the person aggrieved shall have a right of appeal to the High Court, and the High Court shall, for the purpose of such appeal, have all the powers of an appellate Court under sub-sections (2) and (3), and the provisions of those sub-sections shall apply accordingly.” 10. Having perused Section 11 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, I have no hesitation to hold that appeal under Section 11 can be preferred before the High Court, if head office of the Trade Union is situated within the limits of Presidency town; or where head office is situated in an area, falling within the jurisdiction of the a Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal, to that Court or Tribunal, as the case may be. However, if head office is situated in any other area then before the Judicial Officer not inferior to the Assistant or Additional Sessions Judge, as appointed by the appropriate Government. 11. Undisputedly, head office of trade Union of respondent no. 5 is situated at BHEL, Haridwar, which is within the territorial jurisdiction of Labour Court, as created / established under Section 4-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. 12. A careful reading of sub-Section (aa) of Section 11 of the Trade Unions Act would reveal that sub-Section (aa) was substituted w.e.f. 09.01.2002 by way of Act No. 31 of 2001. 13. Undisputedly, “Labour Court” is not defined under the Trade Unions Act, 1926. Although “Labour Court” is defined under Section 3 (e) of the Indian Trade Unions (Amendment) Act, 1947 which was never enforced, therefore, not in existence. Thus, in my considered opinion, definition of “Lower Court”, as defined in the Amendment Act cannot be imported in view of the peculiar fact that Amendment Act is not in force. 14. Moreover, a careful reading of Section (aa) of Section 11 of the Trade Unions Act would also go to demonstrate that Parliament has not used the word “Labour Court” as defined in Section 3 (e) of the Indian Trade Unions (Amendment) Act, 1947. Further reading of Section (aa) would go to demonstrate that an appeal can be filed either before Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal. Neither Labour Court nor Industrial Tribunal is created / established under the Trade Unions Act.
Further reading of Section (aa) would go to demonstrate that an appeal can be filed either before Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal. Neither Labour Court nor Industrial Tribunal is created / established under the Trade Unions Act. Therefore, in my considered opinion, “Labour Court” or “Industrial Tribunal” cannot be given restricted meaning and should be understood to mean created / established under the relevant law. With all due respect, I am not in agreement with the judgment passed by learned Single Judge of Allahabad High Court in the case of Starian Employees Union (supra) in view of the observations made hereinbefore. 15. Learned Single Judge of Jharkhand High Court in the case of Tata Workers’ Union Vs. State of Jharkhand reported in 2008 (107) FLR 1181 has also held that appeal against the cancellation of certificate of registration would be maintainable before the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal under sub-Section (aa) of the Section 11 of the Trade Unions Act. 16. In view of the above discussion, I do not find any justification or reason to take contrary view to the view taken by the Labour Court. Consequently, petition fails and is hereby dismissed. 17. CLMA No. 4023 of 2014 also stands disposed of.