JUDGMENT Pankaj Mithal, J. – Heard Sri Bhuvneshwar Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioners. 2. The petitioners have preferred this petition against the order of Civil Judge (Junior Division) rejecting their application filed under Section 30 of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the order of revisional court dismissing the revision arising therefrom. 3. The aforesaid orders are dated 30.9.2011 and 21.4.2014 respectively. 4. The petitioners applied for depositing rent in court under Section 30 of the Act contending that they are carrying 'Jajmani' work on the banks of Ganga at Brij Ghat. They are providing service of Tilak/Chandan to pilgrims and for the purpose pays Rs.500/- per annum to the Nagar Palika Parishad. They have lastly paid the aforesaid amount for the year 2005-06. Since the Nagar Palika Parishad thereafter has refused to accept it, they may be permitted to deposit the rent in court. 5. Section 30 of the Act contemplates deposit of rent in court in two contingencies namely where there is bona fide doubt or dispute as to the person to whom the rent is payable or where the landlord refuses to accept the rent of the building from the tenant. 6. A bare reading of Section 30 of the Act makes it clear that it is attracted where there is a doubt or dispute as to the person to whom the rent is payable or where the landlord refuses to accpet the rent of a building from the tenant. 7. In other words existence of relationship of landlord and tenant in relation to a building are the twin conditions necessary for applying Section 30 of the Act. 8. The petitioners contends that they have put a Takhat and a Chappar over the open space and the structure is within the purview of the definition of a building of which they are the tenants. In support they have relied upon certain decisions. The first is of second appeal in the case of Ram Dulare Vs. D.D. Jain and others 1965 ALJ 722 wherein the court has considered the meaning of the word 'accommodation' and has held that any building which provide shelter including a flimsy structure like a Jhopri which thatched roof would be covered in it. 9. The other decision is of Anwar Ahmad Vs. IVth Additional District Judge, Saharanpur 1981 Law Suit (Alld.) 563. 9. The other decision is of Anwar Ahmad Vs. IVth Additional District Judge, Saharanpur 1981 Law Suit (Alld.) 563. This decision is based upon Ram Dulare (Supra) and holds that building means a roofed structure whether made of wood or otherwise. 10. Similarly in Abdul Hamid Vs. District Judge, Sitapur and others 1987 (1) Alld. Rent Cases 208 it was held that a wooden shop attached with a Pucca shop is a fixture to the main shop and would be a building within the meaning of Section 3(i) of the Act. 11. Notwithstanding the above decisions and the fact that a thatched Chappar with a Takhat may be construed to be a building the provisions of Section 30 of the Act would not be attracted unless the relationship of landlord between the parties is proved to establish the tenancy. 12. The Nagar Palika Parishad alleges that petitioners are mere licencees. This fact stands accepted by the petitioners by necessary implication which can be inferred from their own application which has been filed under Section 30 of the Act. The said application reveals that the petitioners intended to deposit Shulk (Fees) i.e. licence fee and not rent in respect of the above space/structure. It clearly proves that petitioners do not claim themselves to be tenants and there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the two. 13. The petitioners have not brought on record any material to prove that they are tenants of the structure. The receipt of Rs.500/- filed by them also does not mention the petitioners to be tenant rather as Shulk realized from Chandan Ghatwalia. 14. In the absence of any evidence regarding existence of relationship of landlord and tenant, the conclusion is inevitable that petitioners are mere licencees, who have been permitted to put Takhat on Brij Ghat to carry their Jajmani business and not tenants. Therefore, the provisions of the Act do not get attracted and Section 30 of the Act does not come into play. 15. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the courts below have not erred in law in rejecting their application and in refusing to permit them to deposit any amount under Section 30 of the Act. 16. The writ petition has no merit and is dismissed.