Judgment : S.C. Dharmadhikari, J. 1. The Honourable the Chief Justice has constituted this Full Bench in order to resolve a conflict between the conflicting views which have been expressed by two Division Benches of this Court. In our detailed order dated 24th April, 2014 we noticed that conflict and by consent of parties we formulated the questions which have to be answered by us. They read as under :- (1) Does Section 3(1)(b) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 read with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 r/w Section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 save the orders of exemption including all terms and conditions thereof passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act, namely, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and all actions taken there-under? (2) Whether, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 r/w Section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 apply to the repeal of the Principal Act by the Repealing Act, 1999? (3) Whether in view of Section 3(1)(b) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 and the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 : (a) the order of exemption including all its terms and conditions under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act, namely, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 can be continued and enforced in accordance with the provisions of the Principal Act; (b) all remedies and proceedings in respect of the order of exemption including all its terms and conditions may be instituted, continued and enforced? (4) Whether in view of the repeal of the Principal Act by the Repeal Act, the Government of Maharashtra can: (a) recall/cancel/modify the exemption order granted either under Section 20 of the Principal Act; (b) enforce circulars for implementation of exemption orders issued under Section 20 of the Principal Act prior to the repeal of the Principal Act; (c) acquire the land by issuing notification under Section 10(3) of the Principal Act; and (d) take any action of whatsoever nature on account of noncompliance/ breach of exemption order issued under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act? (5) Whether, the view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vithabai Bama Bhandari v/s State of Maharashtra and another reported in 2009(3) Bombay Cases Reporter 663 (Writ Petition No.4241/2008 decided on 31st March/16th April, 2009) and Damodar Laxman Navare and others v/s State of Maharashtra and others in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 dated 08th July, 2010 sets out the correct legal position as regards the ambit and scope of Section 3(1)(b) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 or whether, the view taken in Mira Bhayandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s the Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration and others in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 dated 27th August, 2009 to the contrary should be held to be laying down the correct principle of law? 2. Since both sides have canvassed arguments on legal issues, in order to appreciate them a few facts are required to be noted. We take the facts from a lead case, namely, Writ Petition No.9872/2010. That is a Writ Petition which has been filed by the Maharashtra Chamber of Housing Industry and its various Units. These are associations established to promote the housing and real estate industry. The Writ Petition is filed in the interest of members of these Associations and real estate industry and in the circumstances which are set out in paragraph 4 of the memo of Writ Petition. 3. It is the case of the Petitioners that the State of Maharashtra and Competent Authorities under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as “THE PRINCIPAL ACT”) continue to enforce and apply the provisions thereof despite enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “THE REPEAL ACT”). The Repeal Act has been brought into effect and is in force in the State of Maharashtra from 29.11.2007. 4. The grievance of the Petitioners is that there is a circular dated 18.03.2009 issued by the State Government, copy of which is at Annexure-A. That circular states that the Repeal Act has been brought into force in the State of Maharashtra w.e.f. 29.11.2007. The same expressly saves the vesting of excess vacant land in the State as also validity of an exemption order passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act. The same expressly saves the vesting of excess vacant land in the State as also validity of an exemption order passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act. Meaning thereby, the repeal of the Principal Act does not affect the vesting of excess vacant land in the State provided its possession has been taken, so also, validity of an exemption order passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act. Therefore, such excess vacant lands of which possession has not been taken, but which are subjected to certain concessions under the order of exemption passed in terms of Section 20(1) of the Principal Act and which are particularly to utilize the lands for residential purpose, for implementing residential housing scheme, for industry and it's expansion, shall not be transferred without prior permission of the State and there are restrictions placed on change of user thereof. The permission for change of user will not be granted unless premium is paid to the Government. 5. A reference is made in this circular and the steps taken to implement the Repeal Act. The steps include two communications from the Government dated 01.03.2008 and 03.03.2008 which outline the scheme for development of these lands or their transfer. 6. It has been revealed that the exempted lands are being dealt with and for the purpose of implementation of the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme, Rental Housing Scheme, etc.. Further, the reservations in respect of these lands have been changed or altered from industry/agriculture without any reference to the Government/Competent Authority. The permissions in that regard have been granted without any prior approval from the competent authorities under the Principal Act. Therefore, the Government has directed that the exempted lands cannot be used for any other purpose nor their reservation can be changed unless the approvals/remarks are called for from the competent authority under the Principal Act. Any violation of such requirement would visit the persons concerned with all consequences and at their costs. 7. Prior to this circular there are certain Government Resolutions and which enable utilization of Transferable Development Rights (TDR) so as to use the lands for construction of houses for weaker sections and equally to grant development permissions in relation thereto. This is a Government Resolution dated 30.06.2007. 8. 7. Prior to this circular there are certain Government Resolutions and which enable utilization of Transferable Development Rights (TDR) so as to use the lands for construction of houses for weaker sections and equally to grant development permissions in relation thereto. This is a Government Resolution dated 30.06.2007. 8. There is also an order and which has been referred to because it is the case of the Petitioners that their members had to obtain several permissions from the Respondent Nos.1 and 2 for carrying out the development. It is contended that the Government Resolutions referred by us including dated 30.06.2007 and emphasis by the authorities on compliance of the same continues despite the Repeal Act brought into force with effect from 29.11.2007. There are several instances which have been given and copies of the exemption orders passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act are referred to in paragraph 7 of the memo of Writ Petition No.9872/2010. 9. The grievance is that though the order of exemption was passed exempting the excess vacant land from the purview of Chapter-III of the Principal Act, when that Act was in force, but now after it's repeal the exemption order would not survive. In other words, the steps taken by the Authorities to give effect to the order of exemption even after repeal of the Principal Act in the State of Maharashtra are wholly illegal. The Authorities cannot compel parties like the Petitioners to seek any extension of time to complete the scheme or to comply with the conditions on which the order of exemption under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act has been passed. The stand taken is that the Respondents have no powers to enforce the Principal Act directly or indirectly. Several instances of such alleged attempts are set out. There is reference made to the legal provisions and finally what is prayed is that this Court must restrain by an appropriate writ, order or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Respondents from enforcing the provisions of the Principal Act insofar as such exemption orders and their terms and conditions. 10. There is reference made to the legal provisions and finally what is prayed is that this Court must restrain by an appropriate writ, order or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Respondents from enforcing the provisions of the Principal Act insofar as such exemption orders and their terms and conditions. 10. From the record, what transpires is that a Writ Petition being Writ Petition No.3815/2010 from this group or batch of petitions, appeared before a Division Bench of this Court and it pronounced its judgment on 22.12.2010 noting that two Division Benches in the cases of Sundersons and others v/s State of Maharashtra and others reported in 2008 (5) Bombay Cases Reporter 85 and Damodar Laxman Navre v/s State of Maharashtra in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 dated 08th July , 2010, take a view that certain steps in pursuance of the order of exemption or seeking to enforce the terms and conditions thereof cannot be taken, whereas a conflicting view has been rendered by another Division Bench of this Court in Mira Bhayandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s the Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration and others in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 dated 27th August, 2009. 11. The attention of the Division Bench in Writ Petition No.3815/2010 (Jayesh Tokarshi Shah v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration) was invited to all these judgments and orders and stated to be conflicting. The Division Bench, therefore, in its judgment dated 22nd December, 2010 in the aforesaid matter observed as under :- 15. This prompts an answer in favour of a premise that the Additional District Collector, Thane and Competent Authority was not competent to issue the said Circular, and as such the efficacy of the said Circular commanding the Registering Officer to refuse the registration of the documents referred to therein remains questionable. A view congenial to the said premise is found expressed in some of the judgments Sunderson & Ors Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2008(5) Bombay Cases Reporter 85, Damodar Laxman Navre & 4 others Vs. State of Maharashtra & 4 others Writ Petition No.6300 of 2009, delivered previously by the Division Bench of this Court. However, there is a conflicting view expressed in the judgments delivered by the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No.5745 of 2009 Mira Bhayander Builders & Developers Welfare Association Vs. Dy. State of Maharashtra & 4 others Writ Petition No.6300 of 2009, delivered previously by the Division Bench of this Court. However, there is a conflicting view expressed in the judgments delivered by the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No.5745 of 2009 Mira Bhayander Builders & Developers Welfare Association Vs. Dy. Collector & Competent Authority, Thane and 3 others. The Circular dated 23.6.2008 was the epicentre of controversy in Mira Bhayander Builders & Developers Welfare Association (Supra). The State contended as in the present case that the scheme holders were trying to wriggle out of their obligations under the scheme sanctioned under Section 20 of U.L.C. Act, and therefore, the said Circular came to be issued to protect the schemes meant for economically weaker sections, and also the government. The Division Bench after considering the rival contentions observed thus :- “In our view, if the members of the petitioners’ association have taken benefit of the schemes under Section 20 of the said Act by constructing buildings, they now cannot wiggle out of their obligations to surrender flats to the government which the government could sell at fixed rate. The entire tenor of the above petitioners appears to be that the petitioners do not want to fulfil their obligations under the said Schemes viz. surrendering the flats to the State Government and taking advantage of the repeal of the said Act want to contend that their obligations under the said schemes do not survive. In our view the impugned letter as rightly contended by the learned AGP has been issued to protect the public interest and government revenue. It does not befit the Petitioners who have taken advantage of the said scheme now contend that their obligations do not survive, and therefore, there is no need for them to surrender flats to the government. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the challenge raised in the above petition which is accordingly dismissed.” 16. In the instant case similar situation is portrayed in the affidavit in reply filed by the State. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the challenge raised in the above petition which is accordingly dismissed.” 16. In the instant case similar situation is portrayed in the affidavit in reply filed by the State. Referring to the Mohan Gopal Mate case (Supra) reported in 2008(6) ALL MR 41, the learned Advocate for the Petitioner submitted that a pertinent question regarding the extent of power of the State under Sections 20 and 21 of U.L.C. Act in the case of breach of conditions of the scheme by the scheme holder has been clearly answered as follows: “Powers of the State under Section 20 in case of breach of condition of the order of exemption is limited to withdraw exemption order only and so far as Section 21 is concerned, declare the land which is not to be treated as excess land in view of the Sub-Section (1) in case of breach of condition State can declare such land to be excess in view of Sub-Section (2) of Section 21. Thereupon, the provisions of Chapter III will apply to the said land.” 17. Going by strict interpretation of the Sections 20 and 21 of the ULC Act, the power of the State in case of contravention of any of the conditions of the scheme by scheme holder remains limited to withdrawal of the exemption and declaring the exempted land as excess land and to application of the provisions of the Chapter III of the said Act for acquisition of the said land as contemplated under Sub-Section (2) of Section 21 therein. 18. This view is in conflict with the view expressed by the Division Bench in Mira Bhayander Builders & Developers Welfare Association (Supra), and as such the controversy raised by such conflict deserves to be resolved by the Full Bench of this Court. 19. This Petition is, therefore, referred to the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for passing appropriate directions in the matter.” 12. It is in view of these events that a Full Bench was constituted and the above formulated questions await an answer from us. 13. At the outset we must clarify that we would be only answering the question/s formulated and reproduced hereinabove. We would not be expressing any opinion on the rival contentions insofar as merits of individual petitions. It is in view of these events that a Full Bench was constituted and the above formulated questions await an answer from us. 13. At the outset we must clarify that we would be only answering the question/s formulated and reproduced hereinabove. We would not be expressing any opinion on the rival contentions insofar as merits of individual petitions. Each of these petitions thereafter would be placed before the appropriate Division Benches and for a decision on merits and in accordance with law. Our observations and findings, therefore, shall not be construed as expression of any opinion on the merits of the Writ Petitions referred above or pending in this Court. 14. The Petitioners' counsel have made an attempt to show us as to how the Division Bench judgment in the case of Mira Bhayander Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane (supra) does not lay down the correct law. They have all, more or less, urged that repeal of the Principal Act in the State of Maharashtra on 29.11.2007 results in the State and competent authorities being prevented from withdrawing the order of exemption passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act. Assuming that the order of exemption or any action taken there-under is valid notwithstanding anything contrary held in any judgment or order of the competent court, yet the Repeal Act saves only validity of the order of exemption and nothing more. Such saving would not permit the State Government or competent authority to withdraw the order of exemption or enforce the terms and conditions thereof or to subject the excess vacant land to the consequences under the Principal Act. The saving is thus not absolute, but restricted in nature. Thirdly, it is urged that there being a Repealing Act containing such restricted saving clause, the same rules out applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 or its parimateria provision in the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904. 15. We shall now elaborate these contentions as articulated by Mr. Naphade, learned Senior Counsel and adopted with some additions by Mr. Sathe, Mr. Sridharan, Mr. Devitre, Mr. Samdani, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Gangal, Mr. oshi and Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners. 16. Mr. Naphade firstly submitted that for understanding the Repeal Act we must have a look at the Principal Act. The Principal Act, according to Mr. Sathe, Mr. Sridharan, Mr. Devitre, Mr. Samdani, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Gangal, Mr. oshi and Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners. 16. Mr. Naphade firstly submitted that for understanding the Repeal Act we must have a look at the Principal Act. The Principal Act, according to Mr. Naphade, contains several provisions, but material there-from are Sections 3, 5, 6, 8, 10 and 38. Mr. Naphade also took us through Section 11 of the Principal Act before coming to Section 20. In his submission the scheme of the Principal Act is that no one shall hold the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. The return or statement has to be filed so as to determine the extent of excess vacant land. In other words, Mr. Naphade submits that except as otherwise provided in the Principal Act, on and from the commencement of the Act, no person shall be entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of ceiling limit in the territories to which the Principal Act applies. Mr. Naphade submits that Section 4 sets out the ceiling limit. He submits that the transfer of vacant land is also an aspect which is taken care of by Section 5. The persons holding the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit have to file the statement. He submits that further provisions enable scrutiny of particulars, preparing a draft statement as regards the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit and the final statement. Mr. Naphade submits that Section 10 is entitled “Acquisition of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit”. The extent of the vacant land held by a person in excess of ceiling limit has to be specified by subsection (1) of Section 10 and the purpose of same is to enable acquisition of the same eventually. That is an aspect dealt with by subsections (2) and (3) of Section 10. The vesting of such excess vacant land free from all encumbrances and with effect from the date of publication of a notification under subsection (3) results in enabling the Government to take possession of the land. In these circumstances, according to Mr. Naphade, only consequence of not filing a return or statement, but which is not accepted in totality is provided by Section 10. There is also a provision, namely, Section 38 which makes such act a punishable offence and Mr. In these circumstances, according to Mr. Naphade, only consequence of not filing a return or statement, but which is not accepted in totality is provided by Section 10. There is also a provision, namely, Section 38 which makes such act a punishable offence and Mr. Naphade invites our attention to subsections (1) to (4) of Section 38 in that regard. Mr. Naphade's attempt was to show that even if the vacant land is in excess of ceiling limit and there is no compliance with the provisions requiring filing a statement of such vacant land, still the owner is not deprived of his rights in the same. Mr. Naphade in that regard invites our attention to Section 15 of the Principal Act and submits that it reflects the legislative intent. There is no loss of ownership on promulgation of the Principal Act. In these circumstances all that the Principal Act does is to create some sort of clog or cloud on the rights of a person to hold the land. His ownership rights therein are not affected. 17. Mr. Naphade, therefore, submits that the power to exempt the excess vacant land from applicability of Chapter-III of the Principal Act is exercised by the Government either on its own motion or otherwise and that is also clear by Sections 21 and 22 which permits the excess vacant land not to be treated as such in certain cases and it's retention under certain circumstances. Therefore, merely because a holder of the excess vacant land seeks exemption from applicability of Chapter-III or the State exempts such vacant land from applicability thereof will not mean that the right and particularly ownership therein is surrendered much less waived. Mr. Naphade's attempt was to show that the State seeks to put the excess vacant land beyond application of Chapter-III, but keeping all his rights and options intact. The reference, therefore, will have to be answered by us bearing in mind this vital aspect, is the submission of Mr. Naphade. 18. Mr. Naphade elaborated this aspect by submitting that once the land is exempted, it is out of the purview of the Principal Act. The right to hold it conditionally remains unaffected. The power to exempt is limited in nature. It is legislative in character. Naphade. 18. Mr. Naphade elaborated this aspect by submitting that once the land is exempted, it is out of the purview of the Principal Act. The right to hold it conditionally remains unaffected. The power to exempt is limited in nature. It is legislative in character. By no stretch of imagination it is a right conferred in the Government nor exercise of powers to exempt creates any right in the Government in respect of such excess vacant land. In these circumstances and if Sections 20(2) and 21(2) are read together it would be apparent that neither any action under subsection (1) of Section 21 or the power under subsection (2) is saved by repeal of the Principal Act. In fact the Repeal Act does not save Section 21 at all. Hence, when the Repeal Act in Section 3(1)(b) refers to the validity of exemption order, it deliberately omits to include or refer subsection (2) of Section 20. Hence, there is no power to withdraw the exemption order under Section 20(1) after repeal of the Principal Act. Hence, even breach or violation of the condition in the exemption order will not result in its cancellation or withdrawal. Apart there-from any breach or violation of the condition on which the exemption order was granted does not result in automatic withdrawal or cancellation thereof. That is apparent from Section 20(2). It is, therefore, clear that the Repeal Act does not save this power and by omitting subsection (2) of Section 20 from clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. The legislature was aware that the power to withdraw the exemption order will have to be exercised only after giving a reasonable opportunity to such person who has violated the conditions subject to which the exemption under clause (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of Section 20 is granted. That reasonable opportunity is to make representation against the proposed withdrawal. It is the only consequence of either not complying with the conditions subject to which the exemption is granted or not being able to satisfy the Government that such exemption should not be withdrawn or from applicability of Chapter-III to the excess vacant land. Meaning thereby same is capable of being acquired and thereafter, vested in the Government. It is the only consequence of either not complying with the conditions subject to which the exemption is granted or not being able to satisfy the Government that such exemption should not be withdrawn or from applicability of Chapter-III to the excess vacant land. Meaning thereby same is capable of being acquired and thereafter, vested in the Government. Once that power cannot be exercised post repeal of the Principal Act, then, we would be in complete error if we hold that the repeal of the Principal Act does not affect the power to withdraw the exemption or to enforce the terms and conditions thereof. 19. In that regard, Mr. Naphade has taken us through Sections 20(2), 21(2) and 22(2) of the Principal Act. He submits that subsection (2) of Section 20 confers discretion in the Government and it may not withdraw the exemption order despite the conditions subject to which the same is granted are not complied with by any person. Whereas, subsection (2) of Section 21 mandates declaring the vacant land to be excess. It is submitted that there are distinct consequences and which are taken care of by subsection (2) of Section 22. Thus, the power of exemption has different parameters and the legislature was aware that such power cannot survive the repeal of the Principal Act. Hence, in the teeth of this clear language of the Repeal Act recourse to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is impermissible. Once a different intention appears from the provisions contained in the Repeal Act, then, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 would not apply. The question of liberal construction of Section 3 of the Repeal Act, therefore, does not arise at all. 20. Mr. Naphade thereafter took us extensively through the Repeal Act to submit that what is saved is specific. By clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act the vesting of land of which possession has been taken by the State is saved. Meaning thereby, any vacant land which is subject matter of declaration under Section 10(3) of which possession has not been taken by the State Government, then its vesting is not saved by the Repeal Act. Meaning thereby, any vacant land which is subject matter of declaration under Section 10(3) of which possession has not been taken by the State Government, then its vesting is not saved by the Repeal Act. Such land of which possession has not been taken will have to be restored post repeal after the requirement stipulated in subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act is complied with. Therefore, there is no collision between clause (a) and clause (b). What clause (b) saves is only validity of the order granting exemption under Section 20(1) or any action taken thereunder. The power to withdraw the exemption is not saved. If it is held to be saved, then, clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act would be rendered redundant. Only consequence of exemption being withdrawn is to subject the land to applicability of Chapter-III of the Principal Act and particularly Section 10(3) thereof. If possession of such excess vacant land cannot be taken even after withdrawal of exemption in terms of subsection (2) of Section 20 of the Principal Act, then, there was no point in saving its validity. Therefore, the validity of the order of exemption is saved, but neither that saving will enable the State to withdraw the exemption post repeal nor will the State be in a position to give effect to the order of withdrawal of the exemption if cannot take possession of the excess vacant land. That is the reason why the power to withdraw the exemption has not been saved. Section 4 of the Repeal Act, therefore, would throw light on the interpretation of clauses (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. That Section 4 provides for abatement of legal proceedings. If the legal proceedings abate on the date on which the Repeal Act came into force, then, the intent could never be to save the power to withdraw the exemption. Therefore, the words, appearing in clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3, after Section 20 should be read accordingly and that would be consistent with the object and purpose sought to be achieved in enacting the Repeal Act. None of the proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the Principal Act pending immediately before commencement of the Repeal Act are saved. None of the proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the Principal Act pending immediately before commencement of the Repeal Act are saved. Even if they are pending before any court or tribunal or any other authority they shall abate. In these circumstances the Legislature clearly intended that any past or closed or conclusive action alone is saved. Anything in the pipeline or inchoate is affected and not saved. This is because the Principal Act is a self contained code. It contains substantive and procedural provisions and even creates a forum for the purpose of enforcing and exercising substantive rights and powers and equally procedural one. A forum is created so as to make and enact a complete code. Nothing beyond the Principal Act can be seen. If the Repeal Act is construed in this manner, then, it envisages complete destruction of the rights under the Principal Act. Any right which is crystallized and which is not a mere hope or chance is alone saved. 21. Mr. Naphade also submits that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act cannot be imported into and read when the Repeal Act is so specific and clear. Alternatively and without prejudice to this submission Mr. Naphade submits that if Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is analyzed, it by clauses (a) to (e) saves something which is in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect. It does not affect previous operation of the Act so repealed or anything duly done or suffered there-under. The repeal does not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the repealed enactment. Mr. Naphade submits that clause (b) would, therefore, refer to past or complete act and not something which is intended and incomplete. The liabilities that are crystallized under the enactment which is repealed alone are unaffected by repeal of the original or Principal Act and that is clarified by clause (c). This clause cannot be imported in the present Repealing Act for the simple reason that it would create inconsistency. Mr. Naphade submits that clause (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would have saved Section 20(2) of the Principal Act had Sections 3 and 4 been not enacted in the Repeal Act. This clause cannot be imported in the present Repealing Act for the simple reason that it would create inconsistency. Mr. Naphade submits that clause (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would have saved Section 20(2) of the Principal Act had Sections 3 and 4 been not enacted in the Repeal Act. That being clearly enacted there will be inconsistency if one imports clause (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act in Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act. For all these reasons Mr. Naphade would submit that the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, Delhi High Court and Madras High Court follows the Division Bench judgments of this Court from which Mira Bhayander (supra) differs. That is the only view possible in the present legal backdrop and we must, therefore, hold that Mira Bhayander (supra) does not lay down the correct law and should be overruled. Mr. Naphade submits that when three or four High Courts in the country have taken a consistent view of the provision contained in a Central Act, then, that view ought to be followed so as to bring comity and consistency in interpretation of a Parliamentary statute. The reference, therefore, be answered accordingly. 22. Mr. Naphade in support of the above submissions, has placed heavy reliance on the following decisions :- 1. Mohamed Ashref Noor v/s State of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.6856/2003 decided on 16.12.2009 by the Madras High Court. 2. Surendra Raj Jaiswal v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.26474/2009 decided on 24.08.2011 by a Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 3. The Principal Secretary to Government, Hyderabad v/s Surendra, in Writ Petition No.951/2012 decided on 25.07.2012 by the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 4. M/s Suri Industries v/s State of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.8610/2013 decided on 06.09.2010 by the Madras High Court. 5. Manik M. Ragit v/s State of Maharashtra reported in 2013 (2) Mh.L.J. 224 . (WP No.1290/2012 decided on 30.07.2012 Nagpur Bench). 6. M/s Nile Limited v/s State of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.23846/2008 decided on 06.11.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 7. State of Uttar Pradesh v/s Hari Ram reported in (2013) 4 SCC 280 . 8. M/s Tata Coffee Limited v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.11929/2013 decided on 22.07.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 9. M/s Nile Limited v/s State of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.23846/2008 decided on 06.11.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 7. State of Uttar Pradesh v/s Hari Ram reported in (2013) 4 SCC 280 . 8. M/s Tata Coffee Limited v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.11929/2013 decided on 22.07.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 9. Gajanan Kamlya Patil v/s Additional Collector and Competent Authority, in Civil Appeal Nos.2070, 2071/ 2014 arising out of SLP (C) Nos.14904, 14905 of 2011 decided on 14.02.2014 by the Honourable Supreme Court. 10. M/s L.G. Polymers India Private Limited v/s State of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.21934/2013 decided on 28.03.2014 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 11. Synco Industries Limited v/s Assessing Officer, Income Tax, Mumbai reported in (2008) 4 SCC 22 . 12. Tej Pratap Singh v/s Union of India, in Writ Petition (C) No.2455/1992 decided on 16.07.2009 by the Delhi High Court. 23. The submissions of Mr. Naphade have been adopted by Mr. Milind Sathe, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Writ Petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.2201/2009, 3815/2010 and 9703/2010. In addition, Mr. Sathe submits that the Preamble of the Principal Act provides for imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomeration, for acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit and to regulate the construction of buildings on such land. It is also to distribute the excess vacant land after it vests in the State. In these circumstances if the construction placed by the State on the provisions of the Repeal Act is accepted that would result in saving of the consequences following withdrawal of exemption. Section 20(2) of the Principal Act envisages withdrawal of exemption and after such withdrawal what follows is the vesting of the land in terms of Section 10(3) and its possession as envisaged by Section 10(5) and (6). This is specifically not saved by Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act. Having regard to the clear language of the Principal Act this is the only consequence which follows on withdrawal of exemption. If it is not expressly saved, then, by an indirect or oblique method the Court cannot save it. Mr. This is specifically not saved by Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act. Having regard to the clear language of the Principal Act this is the only consequence which follows on withdrawal of exemption. If it is not expressly saved, then, by an indirect or oblique method the Court cannot save it. Mr. Sathe's contention is that what is specifically saved is the validity of the order of exemption and the crucial words are to be found in clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act to this effect that the validity of any order granting exemption under Section 20 (1) or any action taken there-under is saved notwithstanding any judgment of any court to the contrary. Therefore, even if the Court declares the order of exemption or any action taken thereunder to be bad or invalid that is unaffected by repeal of the Principal Act. Beyond this nothing more can be read in the saving clause or the Repeal Act as a whole. The Reference, therefore, be answered accordingly. Mr. Sathe relies upon the following judgments : 1. Mukarram Ali Khan v/s State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2007) 11 SCC 90 . 2. Voltas Limited v/s Additional Collector and Competent Authority, reported in 2008 (5) Bom. C.R. 746. 3. Shanti Bhardwaj v/s State of U.P., reported in (2004) 10 SCC 130 . 4. Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, reported in (2012) 4 SCC 718 . 5. Ritesh Tewari v/s State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2010) 10 SCC 677 . 6. Simpson and General Finance Company Limited v/s State of State of Tamil Nadu, reported in (2006) 4 MLJ 1807 (Madras High Court). 7. Mohan Gopalrao Mate v/s Principal Secretary, reported in 2009 (1) Bom. C.R. 275. 8. Vithabai Bama Bhandari v/s State of Maharashtra, reported in 2009 (3) Bom. C.R. 663. 9. Tej Pratap Singh v/s Union of India, in Writ Petition (C) No.2455/1992 decided on 16.07.2009 by the Delhi High Court. 10. Mira Bhyandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s The Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration, in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 decided on 27.08.2009 by the Bombay High Court. 11. Kabbur Industries Private Limited v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.9890/2009 decided on 05.05.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 12. 10. Mira Bhyandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s The Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration, in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 decided on 27.08.2009 by the Bombay High Court. 11. Kabbur Industries Private Limited v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.9890/2009 decided on 05.05.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 12. Damodar Laxman Navare v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 decided on 08.07.2010 by the Bombay High Court : Reported in 2010(6) Bom. C.R. 611. 13. Waman Bandu Bhoir v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.4141/2010 decided on 11.10.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 14. Jayesh Tokarshi Shah v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane, in Writ Petition No.3815/2010 decided on 26.10.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 15. Maharaj Singh v/s State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (1977) 1 SCC 155 . 16. Union of India v/s Somasundaram Viswanath, reported in (1989) 1 SCC 175 . 17. John Thomas v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.38507/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 18. L. Kannappan and L. Thirunavukarasu v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.46091/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 19. Anil Nemichand Bafna v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.153/2008 decided on 06.05.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 20. Surendra Raj Jaiswal v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.26474/2009 decided on 24.08.2011 by a Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 21. Manik M. Ragit v/s State of Maharashtra reported in 2013 (2) Mh.L.J. 224 . (WP No.1290/2012 decided on 30.07.2012 Nagpur Bench). 22. State of Uttar Pradesh v/s Hari Ram reported in (2013) 4 SCC 280 . 24. Mr. Naphade's submissions then have been adopted by Mr. Gangal, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition No.5024/2013. He went further to contend that what is saved by virtue of Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act is the validity of the order of exemption, but not the conditions subject to which such exemption is granted. In that regard Mr. Gangal relied upon the following judgments :- 1. Shanti Bhardwaj v/s State of U.P., reported in (2004) 10 SCC 130 . 2. L. Kannappan and L. Thirunavukarasu v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.46091/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 3. In that regard Mr. Gangal relied upon the following judgments :- 1. Shanti Bhardwaj v/s State of U.P., reported in (2004) 10 SCC 130 . 2. L. Kannappan and L. Thirunavukarasu v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.46091/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 3. Surendra Raj Jaiswal v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.26474/2009 decided on 24.08.2011 by a Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 25. Then Mr. Sridharan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.2243/2011 and 2244/2011, argued that the Repeal Act envisages application of same in the first instance to the whole of the State of Haryana and Punjab and to all the Union territories. This is envisaged by Section 1(2) of the Repeal Act. The Repeal Act comes into force in other States after other States adopt the Repeal Act by resolution passed in that behalf under Article 252(2) of the Constitution of India. Mr. Sridharan, therefore, submits that this aspect must be borne in mind while considering the submission or stand of the State regarding applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Mr. Sridharan submits that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act applies only when either the General Clauses Act or any Central Act or Regulation made after commencement of the General Clauses Act repeals any enactment made prior to the General Clauses Act coming into force or thereafter. In the present case the State Government has adopted by resolution passed under Article 252 of the Constitution of India the Repeal Act in the State of Maharashtra with effect from 29.11.2007. In the light of such adoption by resolution of the State Assembly the Section 6 of the General Clauses Act cannot be resorted to or applied. That applies only when either the General Clauses Act or any Central Act or Regulation made after commencement of the General Clauses Act repeals any enactment made or to be made by the Parliament. Both are Parliamentary Statues and in such circumstances by virtue of Article 252(2) of the Constitution of India the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out. 26. Alternatively, Mr. Sridharan submits that Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act is a special saving clause demonstrating a clear different intention. Therefore, Section 3 of the Repeal Act saves only what is specifically mentioned therein. 26. Alternatively, Mr. Sridharan submits that Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act is a special saving clause demonstrating a clear different intention. Therefore, Section 3 of the Repeal Act saves only what is specifically mentioned therein. There is no room for applying Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 by implication or impliedly. Mr. Sridharan also submits that in true sense we are not construing a validating statute or clause. What is saved by clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 is an order under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act and the exemptions which are subject matter of the same. All actions under the same are saved, but that does not mean that the power to take action under Section 20(2) is also saved. The saving in the present case is only to protect the rights of innocent third parties. Even the actions under the exemption are saved with a view to ensure such protection. This is not a substantive provision and therefore, it cannot be construed with reference to the Principal Act. By no stretch of imagination it revives the Principal Act. This is apparent from reading of Section 4 of the Repeal Act because even the proceedings as initiated abate on Principal Act coming into force. By clause (c) of subsection (1) of Section 3 the liability incurred under the exemption order is not saved, but only the payment made to the State Government as a condition for granting exemption under Section 20(1) is unaffected and thus, saved. Beyond all this we should not read anything into the Repeal Act. Mr. Sridharan relied upon the following decisions in support of the above contentions :- 1. Kolhapur Cane-sugar Works Limited v/s Union of India, reported in (2000) 2 SCC 536 . 2. Air India v/s Union of India, reported in (1995) 4 SCC 734 . 3. Union of India v/s West Coast Paper Mills Limited, reported in 2004 (164) E.L.T. 375 (SC). 4. Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Limited v/s Broach Borough Municipality, reported in 2000 (123) ELT 3 (SC). 27. It is pertinent to note that Mr. Sridharan's main argument has not been supported or adopted by any counsel. It is clear that Mr. Naphade's contentions and submissions as adopted by Mr. Sathe are further adopted and elaborated by Mr. Devitre, learned Senior Counsel appearing in the Original Side Writ Petition No.37/2010 and Mr. 27. It is pertinent to note that Mr. Sridharan's main argument has not been supported or adopted by any counsel. It is clear that Mr. Naphade's contentions and submissions as adopted by Mr. Sathe are further adopted and elaborated by Mr. Devitre, learned Senior Counsel appearing in the Original Side Writ Petition No.37/2010 and Mr. Samdani, learned Senior Counsel appearing in Writ Petition No.346/2011. Both of them have urged that a different intention appears in clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act and therefore, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act has no application. The specific saving is for the benefit of the land holders and therefore, there is no scope for construing clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act on equitable principles. Once there is no room for equitable considerations and particularly as Mr. Samdani urges because of the Principal Act being ex-propriatory in nature and providing for compulsory acquisition, then, all the more any liberal construction is ruled out. Mr. Samdani submits that even the saving clause has to be strictly construed in this case and the repeal of the Principal Act wipes out the same and obliterates it from the statute book completely. For all these reasons the Reference should be answered accordingly. 28. Mr. Devitre and Mr. Samdani relied upon the following decisions :- 1. Mohan Gopalrao Mate v/s Principal Secretary, reported in 2009 (1) Bom. C.R. 275. 2. Parripati Chandrasekharrao and Sons v/s Alapati Jalaiah, reported in (1995) 3 SCC 709 . 3. Khub Chand v/s State of Rajasthan, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1074 . 4. Gujarat Electricity Board v/s Girdharlal Motilal, reported in AIR 1969 SC 267 . 5. State of Maharashtra v/s B.E. Billimoria, reported in (2003) 7 SCC 336 . 6. Corporation of the City of Victoria v/s Bishop of Vancouver Island, reported in AIR 1921 PC 240. 7. T.R. Thandur v/s Union of India, reported in (1996) 3 SCC 690 . 29. Mr. Aniruddha Joshi, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition No.9872/2010 invites our attention to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vithabai Bama Bhandari v/s State of Maharashtra (supra) and submits that there is nothing sacrosanct about Section 20 of the Principal Act. By indirect process we cannot, therefore, save what is not expressly saved by the Repeal Act. By indirect process we cannot, therefore, save what is not expressly saved by the Repeal Act. Once the power to exempt cannot be exercised and not available after the Repeal Act, then, merely because such power is exercised during the subsistence of the Principal Act and prior to the Repeal Act coming into force does not mean that further or incidental power envisaged by the primary power to exempt is saved. Even this incidental or ancillary power is unavailable after repeal of the Principal Act. This argument is built more or less on the wording of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. 30. Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition No.556/2010, while adopting all arguments of all the Senior Counsel only submitted that when more than one High Court in this country have placed an interpretation on the Parliamentary Statute or construed its provisions in a particular way, then, for the sake of consistency and certainty this Court must follow the reasoning of the Delhi High Court, Madras High Court and Andhra Pradesh High Court. 31. Mr. Joshi and Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha relied upon the following judgments in support of the above submissions :- 1. Damodar Laxman Navare v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 decided on 08.07.2010 by the Bombay High Court : Reported in 2010(6) Bom. C.R. 611. 2. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v/s Alcock Ashdown & Company Limited, reported in 1979 ITR page 164 : in Income Tax Reference No.40/1969 decided on 07.07.1978 by the Bombay High Court. 3. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v/s T. Maneklal Mfg. Co. Ltd., reported in 1978 ITR Vol.115 page 725. 4. Bhagwat Dharmaraj Radke v/s State of Maharashtra, in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.35883/2012 decided on 31.03.2014 by the Honourable Supreme Court. 5. Government of Karnataka v/s Gowramma and others, reported in AIR 2008 SC 863 . 32. On the other hand, Mr. Khambata, learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State submits that it is fallacious to assume that the State or other Respondents, namely, Authorities under the Principal Act are requesting this Court to go by any equitable consideration or liberal principle. 32. On the other hand, Mr. Khambata, learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State submits that it is fallacious to assume that the State or other Respondents, namely, Authorities under the Principal Act are requesting this Court to go by any equitable consideration or liberal principle. The State has throughout maintained that in terms of the Preamble of the Principal Act and Constitutional philosophy as enshrined by Articles 21 and 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution of India a ceiling has been placed by the Principal Act on the holding of vacant land within the urban agglomeration. This ceiling limit, as is reflected from the Principal Act and which cannot be disputed, is placed by a statutory prescription that is to be found in Section 4 of the Principal Act. Chapter-III of the Principal Act is titled as “ceiling on vacant land”. Except as otherwise provided in the Principal Act on and from the commencement of the Principal Act no person shall be entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit in the territories to which this Act applies under subsection (2) of Section 1. The obligation under the statute is, therefore, clear and absolute. It relates and dates back to the commencement of the Principal Act. None can dispute that what is exempted from the purview of Chapter-III and by a overriding power conferred in the State Government is the applicability of Chapter-III to the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. Therefore, when the excess vacant land is exempted in exceptional circumstances and which have been also specified by the statute, then, all that happens is that the excess vacant land is exempted from the provisions of Chapter-III either conditionally or unconditionally and in terms of the satisfaction in clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of Section 20 of the Principal Act. The power to exempt is exercised by the State suo-motu or otherwise meaning thereby on the Application of the person holding the excess vacant land. The request is not to apply the Chapter in the light of the factors and circumstances specified therein. This request is made and granted only on the satisfaction reached and not as a matter of course. Thus, application of the chapter is a rule and its non-application is an exception. The request is not to apply the Chapter in the light of the factors and circumstances specified therein. This request is made and granted only on the satisfaction reached and not as a matter of course. Thus, application of the chapter is a rule and its non-application is an exception. Despite repeal of the Principal Act if the validity of the order granting exemption under subsection (1) of Section 20 is saved by Section 3 of the Repeal Act and such validity remains unaffected notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the order of the competent court, then, full effect will have to be given to the language of the Repeal Act. Once the Repeal Act is so clear and does not evince anything contrary to the principles enshrined in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, then, on the strength of the wording of the Repeal Act and in any event with the assistance of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act it can safely be held that there is no intention to destroy the rights and liabilities or consequences which flow from a valid exemption order. In fact the language of Section 3 of the Repeal Act supplements Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Nothing in Section 3 of the Repeal Act takes away applicability of the Principal Act to the extent of enforcing the obligations in terms of the conditions imposed in the order of exemption. The learned Advocate General submits that the arguments of the Petitioners revolve around the saving clause enacted by Section 3 of the Repeal Act. The submissions are that the Repeal Act shows intention contrary to the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act inasmuch as neither the exemption order nor any of the terms and conditions therein can be enforced post repeal. 33. The learned Advocate General submitted that the provisions of the Repeal Act and particularly Section 3(1) clauses (b) and (c) require a harmonious interpretation. 33. The learned Advocate General submitted that the provisions of the Repeal Act and particularly Section 3(1) clauses (b) and (c) require a harmonious interpretation. By reading these clauses together what is apparent is that by clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act it is clarified that repeal of the Principal Act shall not affect the vesting of any vacant land under Section 10(3) of the Principal Act, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorized by the State in this behalf or by the competent authority. Thus, if the steps as contemplated by subsection (3) of Section 10 of the Principal Act and equally by subsections (5) and (6) thereof are taken, then, the vesting of excess vacant land referred to in a Notification published under Section 10(1) in terms of subsection (3) thereof is not affected by repeal of the Principal Act. No person then can claim that the excess vacant land to which the Principal Act admittedly applies and which is deemed to have been acquired by the State does not belong to it or the State is not entitled to it because the Principal Act has been repealed and the vesting comes to an end. The vesting is of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. Undisputedly, if the land in excess of ceiling limit can vest after the notification in terms of Section 10(1) is published in the official Gazette, then, the declaration which is postulated or contemplated by subsection (3) is in relation to such excess vacant land. What subsection (3) of Section 10 really contemplates and envisages is that the State can declare that the excess vacant land is deemed to have been acquired by it upon publication of the declaration and particularly with effect from the dates specified therein. By such deemed acquisition the land is further deemed to have vested absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances with effect from the date specified in the declaration. By such deemed acquisition the land is further deemed to have vested absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances with effect from the date specified in the declaration. By the repeal what has been clarified is that unless the State has taken over possession of such excess vacant land and as referred to in the Notification under Section 10(1) either by itself or through any person duly authorized by it in this behalf or by the competent authority, its plain and simple vesting will not enable the Government to take over possession of the excess vacant land after coming into force of the Repeal Act. This coming into force or commencing is reckoned in terms of subsections (2) and (3) of Section 1 of the Repeal Act. Thus, the State is disabled from taking possession of the excess vacant land which has already vested in it if it has failed to take possession. Thereupon the land can be restored and that is how subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act would read. Therefore, this is not a restricted or limited saving clause in any sense of the term. Though Section 3 is titled “saving” it contains the substantive provisions. The Legislature or the Parliament did not intend a vacuum. It did not stop by only stating that if possession of the land vested in the State in terms of Section 10(3) is not taken, then, that cannot be taken or the land cannot be made over to the Government after repeal of the Principal Act. It enacts a further provision by which it is possible for the State to restore the land to the holder and that is why restoration is contemplated by virtue of Section 3 (2). That restoration is conditional upon repayment of an amount to the State Government by the holder. Section 11 of the Principal Act talks of payment of amount for the vacant land acquired under Section 10(3). That payment can be claimed even without the land being handed over or without the possession of the excess vacant land being taken. The deemed acquisition by virtue of Section 10(3) enables the person or persons having interest in the excess vacant land to claim the amount under Section 11. That payment can be claimed even without the land being handed over or without the possession of the excess vacant land being taken. The deemed acquisition by virtue of Section 10(3) enables the person or persons having interest in the excess vacant land to claim the amount under Section 11. If any payment has been made after such deemed acquisition, then, that amount has to be returned to the Government and only then the excess vacant land of which possession has not been taken will be restored to any person or the holder as the case may be. If this was a complete obliteration or destruction of the rights and liabilities under the Principal Act, then, such substantive provision enabling restoration would not have been inserted or incorporated is the submission of the learned Advocate General. The refund of such amount and which has been paid to the person or persons interested in the excess vacant land in terms of Section 11 of the Principal Act alone entitles such person to claim restoration of the land to him. If the repeal had been simplicitor and without such substantive provision, then, it would not have been possible for the holder or any person interested in the excess vacant land to claim its restoration. It is, therefore, erroneous to urge that the Repeal Act evidences an intention contrary to the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. 34. Inviting our attention to clauses (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act the learned Advocate General submits that the true nature of the power to exempt under the Principal Act would have to be properly and completely appreciated. He submits that the basis on which the power to exempt is exercised is that the person is holding the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. It is in case of such vacant land that the State Government must be satisfied either on its own motion or otherwise that having regard to its location, purpose for which such land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require, it is necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do that the Government is conferred with discretion to pass an order exempting such vacant land from the provisions of Chapter-III either conditionally or otherwise. The learned Advocate General submits that it is not just having regard to location of the land, purpose for which the excess vacant land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require, but it is necessary and expedient in the public interest that the discretion to exempt such land has to be exercised. That is in terms of clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 20. Whereas, in terms of clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 20, the State is satisfied either on its own motion or otherwise that the application of the provisions of Chapter-III would cause undue hardship to the persons holding the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit that the Government may by order exempt conditionally or unconditionally the vacant land from the provisions of Chapter-III. Further the order under clause (b) cannot be made unless the reasons for doing so are recorded in writing. That is because clause (b) contemplates relieving the person holding the excess vacant land from undue hardship. Clause (a) necessarily postulates an exercise of powers to exempt the excess vacant land in public interest. When such is the ambit and scope of the powers and it is vacant land in excess of ceiling limit which is exempted from the provisions of Chapter-III that too in exceptional circumstances, then, it is futile to contend that the State Government despite validity of its Act or order being saved by the Repeal Act, would not be able to do anything in relation to such land post repeal of the Principal Act. The learned Advocate General submits that in this case the power of exemption and which is to be exercised for public good and in public interest is so exercised by making an order in that behalf. That the validity of such an order is saved though the Principal Act is repealed, but the legal consequences flowing from exercise of such clause are not saved, would be an incorrect, improper and legally untenable reading of the saving clause and the Repeal Act itself. The true nature of the power to exempt has not been appreciated in making such submissions. The true nature of the power to exempt has not been appreciated in making such submissions. The Petitioners' arguments proceed on an unsound and erroneous basis and namely that the power to exempt in terms of Section 20(1) of the Principal Act is exercised by the State Government only to benefit the holder. The argument is that it is to relieve the holder from the consequences of applicability of Chapter-III that the State exercises such power and therefore, nothing further can be done in pursuance of the valid order of exemption post repeal of the Principal Act. Judgment : S.C. Dharmadhikari, J. 1. The Honourable the Chief Justice has constituted this Full Bench in order to resolve a conflict between the conflicting views which have been expressed by two Division Benches of this Court. In our detailed order dated 24th April, 2014 we noticed that conflict and by consent of parties we formulated the questions which have to be answered by us. They read as under :- (1) Does Section 3(1)(b) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 read with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 r/w Section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 save the orders of exemption including all terms and conditions thereof passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act, namely, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and all actions taken there-under? (2) Whether, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 r/w Section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 apply to the repeal of the Principal Act by the Repealing Act, 1999? (3) Whether in view of Section 3(1)(b) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 and the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 : (a) the order of exemption including all its terms and conditions under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act, namely, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 can be continued and enforced in accordance with the provisions of the Principal Act; (b) all remedies and proceedings in respect of the order of exemption including all its terms and conditions may be instituted, continued and enforced? (4) Whether in view of the repeal of the Principal Act by the Repeal Act, the Government of Maharashtra can: (a) recall/cancel/modify the exemption order granted either under Section 20 of the Principal Act; (b) enforce circulars for implementation of exemption orders issued under Section 20 of the Principal Act prior to the repeal of the Principal Act; (c) acquire the land by issuing notification under Section 10(3) of the Principal Act; and (d) take any action of whatsoever nature on account of noncompliance/ breach of exemption order issued under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act? (5) Whether, the view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vithabai Bama Bhandari v/s State of Maharashtra and another reported in 2009(3) Bombay Cases Reporter 663 (Writ Petition No.4241/2008 decided on 31st March/16th April, 2009) and Damodar Laxman Navare and others v/s State of Maharashtra and others in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 dated 08th July, 2010 sets out the correct legal position as regards the ambit and scope of Section 3(1)(b) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 or whether, the view taken in Mira Bhayandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s the Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration and others in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 dated 27th August, 2009 to the contrary should be held to be laying down the correct principle of law? 2. Since both sides have canvassed arguments on legal issues, in order to appreciate them a few facts are required to be noted. We take the facts from a lead case, namely, Writ Petition No.9872/2010. That is a Writ Petition which has been filed by the Maharashtra Chamber of Housing Industry and its various Units. These are associations established to promote the housing and real estate industry. The Writ Petition is filed in the interest of members of these Associations and real estate industry and in the circumstances which are set out in paragraph 4 of the memo of Writ Petition. 3. It is the case of the Petitioners that the State of Maharashtra and Competent Authorities under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as “THE PRINCIPAL ACT”) continue to enforce and apply the provisions thereof despite enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “THE REPEAL ACT”). 3. It is the case of the Petitioners that the State of Maharashtra and Competent Authorities under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as “THE PRINCIPAL ACT”) continue to enforce and apply the provisions thereof despite enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “THE REPEAL ACT”). The Repeal Act has been brought into effect and is in force in the State of Maharashtra from 29.11.2007. 4. The grievance of the Petitioners is that there is a circular dated 18.03.2009 issued by the State Government, copy of which is at Annexure-A. That circular states that the Repeal Act has been brought into force in the State of Maharashtra w.e.f. 29.11.2007. The same expressly saves the vesting of excess vacant land in the State as also validity of an exemption order passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act. Meaning thereby, the repeal of the Principal Act does not affect the vesting of excess vacant land in the State provided its possession has been taken, so also, validity of an exemption order passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act. Therefore, such excess vacant lands of which possession has not been taken, but which are subjected to certain concessions under the order of exemption passed in terms of Section 20(1) of the Principal Act and which are particularly to utilize the lands for residential purpose, for implementing residential housing scheme, for industry and it's expansion, shall not be transferred without prior permission of the State and there are restrictions placed on change of user thereof. The permission for change of user will not be granted unless premium is paid to the Government. 5. A reference is made in this circular and the steps taken to implement the Repeal Act. The steps include two communications from the Government dated 01.03.2008 and 03.03.2008 which outline the scheme for development of these lands or their transfer. 6. It has been revealed that the exempted lands are being dealt with and for the purpose of implementation of the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme, Rental Housing Scheme, etc.. Further, the reservations in respect of these lands have been changed or altered from industry/agriculture without any reference to the Government/Competent Authority. The permissions in that regard have been granted without any prior approval from the competent authorities under the Principal Act. Further, the reservations in respect of these lands have been changed or altered from industry/agriculture without any reference to the Government/Competent Authority. The permissions in that regard have been granted without any prior approval from the competent authorities under the Principal Act. Therefore, the Government has directed that the exempted lands cannot be used for any other purpose nor their reservation can be changed unless the approvals/remarks are called for from the competent authority under the Principal Act. Any violation of such requirement would visit the persons concerned with all consequences and at their costs. 7. Prior to this circular there are certain Government Resolutions and which enable utilization of Transferable Development Rights (TDR) so as to use the lands for construction of houses for weaker sections and equally to grant development permissions in relation thereto. This is a Government Resolution dated 30.06.2007. 8. There is also an order and which has been referred to because it is the case of the Petitioners that their members had to obtain several permissions from the Respondent Nos.1 and 2 for carrying out the development. It is contended that the Government Resolutions referred by us including dated 30.06.2007 and emphasis by the authorities on compliance of the same continues despite the Repeal Act brought into force with effect from 29.11.2007. There are several instances which have been given and copies of the exemption orders passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act are referred to in paragraph 7 of the memo of Writ Petition No.9872/2010. 9. The grievance is that though the order of exemption was passed exempting the excess vacant land from the purview of Chapter-III of the Principal Act, when that Act was in force, but now after it's repeal the exemption order would not survive. In other words, the steps taken by the Authorities to give effect to the order of exemption even after repeal of the Principal Act in the State of Maharashtra are wholly illegal. The Authorities cannot compel parties like the Petitioners to seek any extension of time to complete the scheme or to comply with the conditions on which the order of exemption under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act has been passed. The stand taken is that the Respondents have no powers to enforce the Principal Act directly or indirectly. Several instances of such alleged attempts are set out. The stand taken is that the Respondents have no powers to enforce the Principal Act directly or indirectly. Several instances of such alleged attempts are set out. There is reference made to the legal provisions and finally what is prayed is that this Court must restrain by an appropriate writ, order or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Respondents from enforcing the provisions of the Principal Act insofar as such exemption orders and their terms and conditions. 10. From the record, what transpires is that a Writ Petition being Writ Petition No.3815/2010 from this group or batch of petitions, appeared before a Division Bench of this Court and it pronounced its judgment on 22.12.2010 noting that two Division Benches in the cases of Sundersons and others v/s State of Maharashtra and others reported in 2008 (5) Bombay Cases Reporter 85 and Damodar Laxman Navre v/s State of Maharashtra in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 dated 08th July , 2010, take a view that certain steps in pursuance of the order of exemption or seeking to enforce the terms and conditions thereof cannot be taken, whereas a conflicting view has been rendered by another Division Bench of this Court in Mira Bhayandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s the Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration and others in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 dated 27th August, 2009. 11. The attention of the Division Bench in Writ Petition No.3815/2010 (Jayesh Tokarshi Shah v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration) was invited to all these judgments and orders and stated to be conflicting. The Division Bench, therefore, in its judgment dated 22nd December, 2010 in the aforesaid matter observed as under :- 15. This prompts an answer in favour of a premise that the Additional District Collector, Thane and Competent Authority was not competent to issue the said Circular, and as such the efficacy of the said Circular commanding the Registering Officer to refuse the registration of the documents referred to therein remains questionable. A view congenial to the said premise is found expressed in some of the judgments Sunderson & Ors Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2008(5) Bombay Cases Reporter 85, Damodar Laxman Navre & 4 others Vs. State of Maharashtra & 4 others Writ Petition No.6300 of 2009, delivered previously by the Division Bench of this Court. A view congenial to the said premise is found expressed in some of the judgments Sunderson & Ors Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2008(5) Bombay Cases Reporter 85, Damodar Laxman Navre & 4 others Vs. State of Maharashtra & 4 others Writ Petition No.6300 of 2009, delivered previously by the Division Bench of this Court. However, there is a conflicting view expressed in the judgments delivered by the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No.5745 of 2009 Mira Bhayander Builders & Developers Welfare Association Vs. Dy. Collector & Competent Authority, Thane and 3 others. The Circular dated 23.6.2008 was the epicentre of controversy in Mira Bhayander Builders & Developers Welfare Association (Supra). The State contended as in the present case that the scheme holders were trying to wriggle out of their obligations under the scheme sanctioned under Section 20 of U.L.C. Act, and therefore, the said Circular came to be issued to protect the schemes meant for economically weaker sections, and also the government. The Division Bench after considering the rival contentions observed thus :- “In our view, if the members of the petitioners’ association have taken benefit of the schemes under Section 20 of the said Act by constructing buildings, they now cannot wiggle out of their obligations to surrender flats to the government which the government could sell at fixed rate. The entire tenor of the above petitioners appears to be that the petitioners do not want to fulfil their obligations under the said Schemes viz. surrendering the flats to the State Government and taking advantage of the repeal of the said Act want to contend that their obligations under the said schemes do not survive. In our view the impugned letter as rightly contended by the learned AGP has been issued to protect the public interest and government revenue. It does not befit the Petitioners who have taken advantage of the said scheme now contend that their obligations do not survive, and therefore, there is no need for them to surrender flats to the government. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the challenge raised in the above petition which is accordingly dismissed.” 16. In the instant case similar situation is portrayed in the affidavit in reply filed by the State. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the challenge raised in the above petition which is accordingly dismissed.” 16. In the instant case similar situation is portrayed in the affidavit in reply filed by the State. Referring to the Mohan Gopal Mate case (Supra) reported in 2008(6) ALL MR 41, the learned Advocate for the Petitioner submitted that a pertinent question regarding the extent of power of the State under Sections 20 and 21 of U.L.C. Act in the case of breach of conditions of the scheme by the scheme holder has been clearly answered as follows: “Powers of the State under Section 20 in case of breach of condition of the order of exemption is limited to withdraw exemption order only and so far as Section 21 is concerned, declare the land which is not to be treated as excess land in view of the Sub-Section (1) in case of breach of condition State can declare such land to be excess in view of Sub-Section (2) of Section 21. Thereupon, the provisions of Chapter III will apply to the said land.” 17. Going by strict interpretation of the Sections 20 and 21 of the ULC Act, the power of the State in case of contravention of any of the conditions of the scheme by scheme holder remains limited to withdrawal of the exemption and declaring the exempted land as excess land and to application of the provisions of the Chapter III of the said Act for acquisition of the said land as contemplated under Sub-Section (2) of Section 21 therein. 18. This view is in conflict with the view expressed by the Division Bench in Mira Bhayander Builders & Developers Welfare Association (Supra), and as such the controversy raised by such conflict deserves to be resolved by the Full Bench of this Court. 19. This Petition is, therefore, referred to the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for passing appropriate directions in the matter.” 12. It is in view of these events that a Full Bench was constituted and the above formulated questions await an answer from us. 13. At the outset we must clarify that we would be only answering the question/s formulated and reproduced hereinabove. We would not be expressing any opinion on the rival contentions insofar as merits of individual petitions. It is in view of these events that a Full Bench was constituted and the above formulated questions await an answer from us. 13. At the outset we must clarify that we would be only answering the question/s formulated and reproduced hereinabove. We would not be expressing any opinion on the rival contentions insofar as merits of individual petitions. Each of these petitions thereafter would be placed before the appropriate Division Benches and for a decision on merits and in accordance with law. Our observations and findings, therefore, shall not be construed as expression of any opinion on the merits of the Writ Petitions referred above or pending in this Court. 14. The Petitioners' counsel have made an attempt to show us as to how the Division Bench judgment in the case of Mira Bhayander Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane (supra) does not lay down the correct law. They have all, more or less, urged that repeal of the Principal Act in the State of Maharashtra on 29.11.2007 results in the State and competent authorities being prevented from withdrawing the order of exemption passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act. Assuming that the order of exemption or any action taken there-under is valid notwithstanding anything contrary held in any judgment or order of the competent court, yet the Repeal Act saves only validity of the order of exemption and nothing more. Such saving would not permit the State Government or competent authority to withdraw the order of exemption or enforce the terms and conditions thereof or to subject the excess vacant land to the consequences under the Principal Act. The saving is thus not absolute, but restricted in nature. Thirdly, it is urged that there being a Repealing Act containing such restricted saving clause, the same rules out applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 or its parimateria provision in the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904. 15. We shall now elaborate these contentions as articulated by Mr. Naphade, learned Senior Counsel and adopted with some additions by Mr. Sathe, Mr. Sridharan, Mr. Devitre, Mr. Samdani, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Gangal, Mr. oshi and Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners. 16. Mr. Naphade firstly submitted that for understanding the Repeal Act we must have a look at the Principal Act. The Principal Act, according to Mr. Sathe, Mr. Sridharan, Mr. Devitre, Mr. Samdani, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Gangal, Mr. oshi and Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners. 16. Mr. Naphade firstly submitted that for understanding the Repeal Act we must have a look at the Principal Act. The Principal Act, according to Mr. Naphade, contains several provisions, but material there-from are Sections 3, 5, 6, 8, 10 and 38. Mr. Naphade also took us through Section 11 of the Principal Act before coming to Section 20. In his submission the scheme of the Principal Act is that no one shall hold the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. The return or statement has to be filed so as to determine the extent of excess vacant land. In other words, Mr. Naphade submits that except as otherwise provided in the Principal Act, on and from the commencement of the Act, no person shall be entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of ceiling limit in the territories to which the Principal Act applies. Mr. Naphade submits that Section 4 sets out the ceiling limit. He submits that the transfer of vacant land is also an aspect which is taken care of by Section 5. The persons holding the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit have to file the statement. He submits that further provisions enable scrutiny of particulars, preparing a draft statement as regards the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit and the final statement. Mr. Naphade submits that Section 10 is entitled “Acquisition of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit”. The extent of the vacant land held by a person in excess of ceiling limit has to be specified by subsection (1) of Section 10 and the purpose of same is to enable acquisition of the same eventually. That is an aspect dealt with by subsections (2) and (3) of Section 10. The vesting of such excess vacant land free from all encumbrances and with effect from the date of publication of a notification under subsection (3) results in enabling the Government to take possession of the land. In these circumstances, according to Mr. Naphade, only consequence of not filing a return or statement, but which is not accepted in totality is provided by Section 10. There is also a provision, namely, Section 38 which makes such act a punishable offence and Mr. In these circumstances, according to Mr. Naphade, only consequence of not filing a return or statement, but which is not accepted in totality is provided by Section 10. There is also a provision, namely, Section 38 which makes such act a punishable offence and Mr. Naphade invites our attention to subsections (1) to (4) of Section 38 in that regard. Mr. Naphade's attempt was to show that even if the vacant land is in excess of ceiling limit and there is no compliance with the provisions requiring filing a statement of such vacant land, still the owner is not deprived of his rights in the same. Mr. Naphade in that regard invites our attention to Section 15 of the Principal Act and submits that it reflects the legislative intent. There is no loss of ownership on promulgation of the Principal Act. In these circumstances all that the Principal Act does is to create some sort of clog or cloud on the rights of a person to hold the land. His ownership rights therein are not affected. 17. Mr. Naphade, therefore, submits that the power to exempt the excess vacant land from applicability of Chapter-III of the Principal Act is exercised by the Government either on its own motion or otherwise and that is also clear by Sections 21 and 22 which permits the excess vacant land not to be treated as such in certain cases and it's retention under certain circumstances. Therefore, merely because a holder of the excess vacant land seeks exemption from applicability of Chapter-III or the State exempts such vacant land from applicability thereof will not mean that the right and particularly ownership therein is surrendered much less waived. Mr. Naphade's attempt was to show that the State seeks to put the excess vacant land beyond application of Chapter-III, but keeping all his rights and options intact. The reference, therefore, will have to be answered by us bearing in mind this vital aspect, is the submission of Mr. Naphade. 18. Mr. Naphade elaborated this aspect by submitting that once the land is exempted, it is out of the purview of the Principal Act. The right to hold it conditionally remains unaffected. The power to exempt is limited in nature. It is legislative in character. Naphade. 18. Mr. Naphade elaborated this aspect by submitting that once the land is exempted, it is out of the purview of the Principal Act. The right to hold it conditionally remains unaffected. The power to exempt is limited in nature. It is legislative in character. By no stretch of imagination it is a right conferred in the Government nor exercise of powers to exempt creates any right in the Government in respect of such excess vacant land. In these circumstances and if Sections 20(2) and 21(2) are read together it would be apparent that neither any action under subsection (1) of Section 21 or the power under subsection (2) is saved by repeal of the Principal Act. In fact the Repeal Act does not save Section 21 at all. Hence, when the Repeal Act in Section 3(1)(b) refers to the validity of exemption order, it deliberately omits to include or refer subsection (2) of Section 20. Hence, there is no power to withdraw the exemption order under Section 20(1) after repeal of the Principal Act. Hence, even breach or violation of the condition in the exemption order will not result in its cancellation or withdrawal. Apart there-from any breach or violation of the condition on which the exemption order was granted does not result in automatic withdrawal or cancellation thereof. That is apparent from Section 20(2). It is, therefore, clear that the Repeal Act does not save this power and by omitting subsection (2) of Section 20 from clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. The legislature was aware that the power to withdraw the exemption order will have to be exercised only after giving a reasonable opportunity to such person who has violated the conditions subject to which the exemption under clause (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of Section 20 is granted. That reasonable opportunity is to make representation against the proposed withdrawal. It is the only consequence of either not complying with the conditions subject to which the exemption is granted or not being able to satisfy the Government that such exemption should not be withdrawn or from applicability of Chapter-III to the excess vacant land. Meaning thereby same is capable of being acquired and thereafter, vested in the Government. It is the only consequence of either not complying with the conditions subject to which the exemption is granted or not being able to satisfy the Government that such exemption should not be withdrawn or from applicability of Chapter-III to the excess vacant land. Meaning thereby same is capable of being acquired and thereafter, vested in the Government. Once that power cannot be exercised post repeal of the Principal Act, then, we would be in complete error if we hold that the repeal of the Principal Act does not affect the power to withdraw the exemption or to enforce the terms and conditions thereof. 19. In that regard, Mr. Naphade has taken us through Sections 20(2), 21(2) and 22(2) of the Principal Act. He submits that subsection (2) of Section 20 confers discretion in the Government and it may not withdraw the exemption order despite the conditions subject to which the same is granted are not complied with by any person. Whereas, subsection (2) of Section 21 mandates declaring the vacant land to be excess. It is submitted that there are distinct consequences and which are taken care of by subsection (2) of Section 22. Thus, the power of exemption has different parameters and the legislature was aware that such power cannot survive the repeal of the Principal Act. Hence, in the teeth of this clear language of the Repeal Act recourse to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is impermissible. Once a different intention appears from the provisions contained in the Repeal Act, then, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 would not apply. The question of liberal construction of Section 3 of the Repeal Act, therefore, does not arise at all. 20. Mr. Naphade thereafter took us extensively through the Repeal Act to submit that what is saved is specific. By clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act the vesting of land of which possession has been taken by the State is saved. Meaning thereby, any vacant land which is subject matter of declaration under Section 10(3) of which possession has not been taken by the State Government, then its vesting is not saved by the Repeal Act. Meaning thereby, any vacant land which is subject matter of declaration under Section 10(3) of which possession has not been taken by the State Government, then its vesting is not saved by the Repeal Act. Such land of which possession has not been taken will have to be restored post repeal after the requirement stipulated in subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act is complied with. Therefore, there is no collision between clause (a) and clause (b). What clause (b) saves is only validity of the order granting exemption under Section 20(1) or any action taken thereunder. The power to withdraw the exemption is not saved. If it is held to be saved, then, clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act would be rendered redundant. Only consequence of exemption being withdrawn is to subject the land to applicability of Chapter-III of the Principal Act and particularly Section 10(3) thereof. If possession of such excess vacant land cannot be taken even after withdrawal of exemption in terms of subsection (2) of Section 20 of the Principal Act, then, there was no point in saving its validity. Therefore, the validity of the order of exemption is saved, but neither that saving will enable the State to withdraw the exemption post repeal nor will the State be in a position to give effect to the order of withdrawal of the exemption if cannot take possession of the excess vacant land. That is the reason why the power to withdraw the exemption has not been saved. Section 4 of the Repeal Act, therefore, would throw light on the interpretation of clauses (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. That Section 4 provides for abatement of legal proceedings. If the legal proceedings abate on the date on which the Repeal Act came into force, then, the intent could never be to save the power to withdraw the exemption. Therefore, the words, appearing in clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3, after Section 20 should be read accordingly and that would be consistent with the object and purpose sought to be achieved in enacting the Repeal Act. None of the proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the Principal Act pending immediately before commencement of the Repeal Act are saved. None of the proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the Principal Act pending immediately before commencement of the Repeal Act are saved. Even if they are pending before any court or tribunal or any other authority they shall abate. In these circumstances the Legislature clearly intended that any past or closed or conclusive action alone is saved. Anything in the pipeline or inchoate is affected and not saved. This is because the Principal Act is a self contained code. It contains substantive and procedural provisions and even creates a forum for the purpose of enforcing and exercising substantive rights and powers and equally procedural one. A forum is created so as to make and enact a complete code. Nothing beyond the Principal Act can be seen. If the Repeal Act is construed in this manner, then, it envisages complete destruction of the rights under the Principal Act. Any right which is crystallized and which is not a mere hope or chance is alone saved. 21. Mr. Naphade also submits that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act cannot be imported into and read when the Repeal Act is so specific and clear. Alternatively and without prejudice to this submission Mr. Naphade submits that if Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is analyzed, it by clauses (a) to (e) saves something which is in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect. It does not affect previous operation of the Act so repealed or anything duly done or suffered there-under. The repeal does not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the repealed enactment. Mr. Naphade submits that clause (b) would, therefore, refer to past or complete act and not something which is intended and incomplete. The liabilities that are crystallized under the enactment which is repealed alone are unaffected by repeal of the original or Principal Act and that is clarified by clause (c). This clause cannot be imported in the present Repealing Act for the simple reason that it would create inconsistency. Mr. Naphade submits that clause (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would have saved Section 20(2) of the Principal Act had Sections 3 and 4 been not enacted in the Repeal Act. This clause cannot be imported in the present Repealing Act for the simple reason that it would create inconsistency. Mr. Naphade submits that clause (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would have saved Section 20(2) of the Principal Act had Sections 3 and 4 been not enacted in the Repeal Act. That being clearly enacted there will be inconsistency if one imports clause (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act in Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act. For all these reasons Mr. Naphade would submit that the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, Delhi High Court and Madras High Court follows the Division Bench judgments of this Court from which Mira Bhayander (supra) differs. That is the only view possible in the present legal backdrop and we must, therefore, hold that Mira Bhayander (supra) does not lay down the correct law and should be overruled. Mr. Naphade submits that when three or four High Courts in the country have taken a consistent view of the provision contained in a Central Act, then, that view ought to be followed so as to bring comity and consistency in interpretation of a Parliamentary statute. The reference, therefore, be answered accordingly. 22. Mr. Naphade in support of the above submissions, has placed heavy reliance on the following decisions :- 1. Mohamed Ashref Noor v/s State of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.6856/2003 decided on 16.12.2009 by the Madras High Court. 2. Surendra Raj Jaiswal v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.26474/2009 decided on 24.08.2011 by a Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 3. The Principal Secretary to Government, Hyderabad v/s Surendra, in Writ Petition No.951/2012 decided on 25.07.2012 by the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 4. M/s Suri Industries v/s State of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.8610/2013 decided on 06.09.2010 by the Madras High Court. 5. Manik M. Ragit v/s State of Maharashtra reported in 2013 (2) Mh.L.J. 224 . (WP No.1290/2012 decided on 30.07.2012 Nagpur Bench). 6. M/s Nile Limited v/s State of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.23846/2008 decided on 06.11.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 7. State of Uttar Pradesh v/s Hari Ram reported in (2013) 4 SCC 280 . 8. M/s Tata Coffee Limited v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.11929/2013 decided on 22.07.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 9. M/s Nile Limited v/s State of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.23846/2008 decided on 06.11.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 7. State of Uttar Pradesh v/s Hari Ram reported in (2013) 4 SCC 280 . 8. M/s Tata Coffee Limited v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.11929/2013 decided on 22.07.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 9. Gajanan Kamlya Patil v/s Additional Collector and Competent Authority, in Civil Appeal Nos.2070, 2071/ 2014 arising out of SLP (C) Nos.14904, 14905 of 2011 decided on 14.02.2014 by the Honourable Supreme Court. 10. M/s L.G. Polymers India Private Limited v/s State of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.21934/2013 decided on 28.03.2014 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 11. Synco Industries Limited v/s Assessing Officer, Income Tax, Mumbai reported in (2008) 4 SCC 22 . 12. Tej Pratap Singh v/s Union of India, in Writ Petition (C) No.2455/1992 decided on 16.07.2009 by the Delhi High Court. 23. The submissions of Mr. Naphade have been adopted by Mr. Milind Sathe, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Writ Petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.2201/2009, 3815/2010 and 9703/2010. In addition, Mr. Sathe submits that the Preamble of the Principal Act provides for imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomeration, for acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit and to regulate the construction of buildings on such land. It is also to distribute the excess vacant land after it vests in the State. In these circumstances if the construction placed by the State on the provisions of the Repeal Act is accepted that would result in saving of the consequences following withdrawal of exemption. Section 20(2) of the Principal Act envisages withdrawal of exemption and after such withdrawal what follows is the vesting of the land in terms of Section 10(3) and its possession as envisaged by Section 10(5) and (6). This is specifically not saved by Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act. Having regard to the clear language of the Principal Act this is the only consequence which follows on withdrawal of exemption. If it is not expressly saved, then, by an indirect or oblique method the Court cannot save it. Mr. This is specifically not saved by Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act. Having regard to the clear language of the Principal Act this is the only consequence which follows on withdrawal of exemption. If it is not expressly saved, then, by an indirect or oblique method the Court cannot save it. Mr. Sathe's contention is that what is specifically saved is the validity of the order of exemption and the crucial words are to be found in clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act to this effect that the validity of any order granting exemption under Section 20 (1) or any action taken there-under is saved notwithstanding any judgment of any court to the contrary. Therefore, even if the Court declares the order of exemption or any action taken thereunder to be bad or invalid that is unaffected by repeal of the Principal Act. Beyond this nothing more can be read in the saving clause or the Repeal Act as a whole. The Reference, therefore, be answered accordingly. Mr. Sathe relies upon the following judgments : 1. Mukarram Ali Khan v/s State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2007) 11 SCC 90 . 2. Voltas Limited v/s Additional Collector and Competent Authority, reported in 2008 (5) Bom. C.R. 746. 3. Shanti Bhardwaj v/s State of U.P., reported in (2004) 10 SCC 130 . 4. Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, reported in (2012) 4 SCC 718 . 5. Ritesh Tewari v/s State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2010) 10 SCC 677 . 6. Simpson and General Finance Company Limited v/s State of State of Tamil Nadu, reported in (2006) 4 MLJ 1807 (Madras High Court). 7. Mohan Gopalrao Mate v/s Principal Secretary, reported in 2009 (1) Bom. C.R. 275. 8. Vithabai Bama Bhandari v/s State of Maharashtra, reported in 2009 (3) Bom. C.R. 663. 9. Tej Pratap Singh v/s Union of India, in Writ Petition (C) No.2455/1992 decided on 16.07.2009 by the Delhi High Court. 10. Mira Bhyandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s The Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration, in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 decided on 27.08.2009 by the Bombay High Court. 11. Kabbur Industries Private Limited v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.9890/2009 decided on 05.05.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 12. 10. Mira Bhyandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s The Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration, in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 decided on 27.08.2009 by the Bombay High Court. 11. Kabbur Industries Private Limited v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.9890/2009 decided on 05.05.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 12. Damodar Laxman Navare v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 decided on 08.07.2010 by the Bombay High Court : Reported in 2010(6) Bom. C.R. 611. 13. Waman Bandu Bhoir v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.4141/2010 decided on 11.10.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 14. Jayesh Tokarshi Shah v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane, in Writ Petition No.3815/2010 decided on 26.10.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 15. Maharaj Singh v/s State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (1977) 1 SCC 155 . 16. Union of India v/s Somasundaram Viswanath, reported in (1989) 1 SCC 175 . 17. John Thomas v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.38507/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 18. L. Kannappan and L. Thirunavukarasu v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.46091/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 19. Anil Nemichand Bafna v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.153/2008 decided on 06.05.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 20. Surendra Raj Jaiswal v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.26474/2009 decided on 24.08.2011 by a Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 21. Manik M. Ragit v/s State of Maharashtra reported in 2013 (2) Mh.L.J. 224 . (WP No.1290/2012 decided on 30.07.2012 Nagpur Bench). 22. State of Uttar Pradesh v/s Hari Ram reported in (2013) 4 SCC 280 . 24. Mr. Naphade's submissions then have been adopted by Mr. Gangal, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition No.5024/2013. He went further to contend that what is saved by virtue of Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act is the validity of the order of exemption, but not the conditions subject to which such exemption is granted. In that regard Mr. Gangal relied upon the following judgments :- 1. Shanti Bhardwaj v/s State of U.P., reported in (2004) 10 SCC 130 . 2. L. Kannappan and L. Thirunavukarasu v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.46091/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 3. In that regard Mr. Gangal relied upon the following judgments :- 1. Shanti Bhardwaj v/s State of U.P., reported in (2004) 10 SCC 130 . 2. L. Kannappan and L. Thirunavukarasu v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.46091/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 3. Surendra Raj Jaiswal v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.26474/2009 decided on 24.08.2011 by a Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 25. Then Mr. Sridharan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.2243/2011 and 2244/2011, argued that the Repeal Act envisages application of same in the first instance to the whole of the State of Haryana and Punjab and to all the Union territories. This is envisaged by Section 1(2) of the Repeal Act. The Repeal Act comes into force in other States after other States adopt the Repeal Act by resolution passed in that behalf under Article 252(2) of the Constitution of India. Mr. Sridharan, therefore, submits that this aspect must be borne in mind while considering the submission or stand of the State regarding applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Mr. Sridharan submits that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act applies only when either the General Clauses Act or any Central Act or Regulation made after commencement of the General Clauses Act repeals any enactment made prior to the General Clauses Act coming into force or thereafter. In the present case the State Government has adopted by resolution passed under Article 252 of the Constitution of India the Repeal Act in the State of Maharashtra with effect from 29.11.2007. In the light of such adoption by resolution of the State Assembly the Section 6 of the General Clauses Act cannot be resorted to or applied. That applies only when either the General Clauses Act or any Central Act or Regulation made after commencement of the General Clauses Act repeals any enactment made or to be made by the Parliament. Both are Parliamentary Statues and in such circumstances by virtue of Article 252(2) of the Constitution of India the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out. 26. Alternatively, Mr. Sridharan submits that Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act is a special saving clause demonstrating a clear different intention. Therefore, Section 3 of the Repeal Act saves only what is specifically mentioned therein. 26. Alternatively, Mr. Sridharan submits that Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act is a special saving clause demonstrating a clear different intention. Therefore, Section 3 of the Repeal Act saves only what is specifically mentioned therein. There is no room for applying Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 by implication or impliedly. Mr. Sridharan also submits that in true sense we are not construing a validating statute or clause. What is saved by clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 is an order under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act and the exemptions which are subject matter of the same. All actions under the same are saved, but that does not mean that the power to take action under Section 20(2) is also saved. The saving in the present case is only to protect the rights of innocent third parties. Even the actions under the exemption are saved with a view to ensure such protection. This is not a substantive provision and therefore, it cannot be construed with reference to the Principal Act. By no stretch of imagination it revives the Principal Act. This is apparent from reading of Section 4 of the Repeal Act because even the proceedings as initiated abate on Principal Act coming into force. By clause (c) of subsection (1) of Section 3 the liability incurred under the exemption order is not saved, but only the payment made to the State Government as a condition for granting exemption under Section 20(1) is unaffected and thus, saved. Beyond all this we should not read anything into the Repeal Act. Mr. Sridharan relied upon the following decisions in support of the above contentions :- 1. Kolhapur Cane-sugar Works Limited v/s Union of India, reported in (2000) 2 SCC 536 . 2. Air India v/s Union of India, reported in (1995) 4 SCC 734 . 3. Union of India v/s West Coast Paper Mills Limited, reported in 2004 (164) E.L.T. 375 (SC). 4. Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Limited v/s Broach Borough Municipality, reported in 2000 (123) ELT 3 (SC). 27. It is pertinent to note that Mr. Sridharan's main argument has not been supported or adopted by any counsel. It is clear that Mr. Naphade's contentions and submissions as adopted by Mr. Sathe are further adopted and elaborated by Mr. Devitre, learned Senior Counsel appearing in the Original Side Writ Petition No.37/2010 and Mr. 27. It is pertinent to note that Mr. Sridharan's main argument has not been supported or adopted by any counsel. It is clear that Mr. Naphade's contentions and submissions as adopted by Mr. Sathe are further adopted and elaborated by Mr. Devitre, learned Senior Counsel appearing in the Original Side Writ Petition No.37/2010 and Mr. Samdani, learned Senior Counsel appearing in Writ Petition No.346/2011. Both of them have urged that a different intention appears in clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act and therefore, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act has no application. The specific saving is for the benefit of the land holders and therefore, there is no scope for construing clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act on equitable principles. Once there is no room for equitable considerations and particularly as Mr. Samdani urges because of the Principal Act being ex-propriatory in nature and providing for compulsory acquisition, then, all the more any liberal construction is ruled out. Mr. Samdani submits that even the saving clause has to be strictly construed in this case and the repeal of the Principal Act wipes out the same and obliterates it from the statute book completely. For all these reasons the Reference should be answered accordingly. 28. Mr. Devitre and Mr. Samdani relied upon the following decisions :- 1. Mohan Gopalrao Mate v/s Principal Secretary, reported in 2009 (1) Bom. C.R. 275. 2. Parripati Chandrasekharrao and Sons v/s Alapati Jalaiah, reported in (1995) 3 SCC 709 . 3. Khub Chand v/s State of Rajasthan, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1074 . 4. Gujarat Electricity Board v/s Girdharlal Motilal, reported in AIR 1969 SC 267 . 5. State of Maharashtra v/s B.E. Billimoria, reported in (2003) 7 SCC 336 . 6. Corporation of the City of Victoria v/s Bishop of Vancouver Island, reported in AIR 1921 PC 240. 7. T.R. Thandur v/s Union of India, reported in (1996) 3 SCC 690 . 29. Mr. Aniruddha Joshi, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition No.9872/2010 invites our attention to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vithabai Bama Bhandari v/s State of Maharashtra (supra) and submits that there is nothing sacrosanct about Section 20 of the Principal Act. By indirect process we cannot, therefore, save what is not expressly saved by the Repeal Act. By indirect process we cannot, therefore, save what is not expressly saved by the Repeal Act. Once the power to exempt cannot be exercised and not available after the Repeal Act, then, merely because such power is exercised during the subsistence of the Principal Act and prior to the Repeal Act coming into force does not mean that further or incidental power envisaged by the primary power to exempt is saved. Even this incidental or ancillary power is unavailable after repeal of the Principal Act. This argument is built more or less on the wording of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. 30. Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition No.556/2010, while adopting all arguments of all the Senior Counsel only submitted that when more than one High Court in this country have placed an interpretation on the Parliamentary Statute or construed its provisions in a particular way, then, for the sake of consistency and certainty this Court must follow the reasoning of the Delhi High Court, Madras High Court and Andhra Pradesh High Court. 31. Mr. Joshi and Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha relied upon the following judgments in support of the above submissions :- 1. Damodar Laxman Navare v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 decided on 08.07.2010 by the Bombay High Court : Reported in 2010(6) Bom. C.R. 611. 2. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v/s Alcock Ashdown & Company Limited, reported in 1979 ITR page 164 : in Income Tax Reference No.40/1969 decided on 07.07.1978 by the Bombay High Court. 3. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v/s T. Maneklal Mfg. Co. Ltd., reported in 1978 ITR Vol.115 page 725. 4. Bhagwat Dharmaraj Radke v/s State of Maharashtra, in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.35883/2012 decided on 31.03.2014 by the Honourable Supreme Court. 5. Government of Karnataka v/s Gowramma and others, reported in AIR 2008 SC 863 . 32. On the other hand, Mr. Khambata, learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State submits that it is fallacious to assume that the State or other Respondents, namely, Authorities under the Principal Act are requesting this Court to go by any equitable consideration or liberal principle. 32. On the other hand, Mr. Khambata, learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State submits that it is fallacious to assume that the State or other Respondents, namely, Authorities under the Principal Act are requesting this Court to go by any equitable consideration or liberal principle. The State has throughout maintained that in terms of the Preamble of the Principal Act and Constitutional philosophy as enshrined by Articles 21 and 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution of India a ceiling has been placed by the Principal Act on the holding of vacant land within the urban agglomeration. This ceiling limit, as is reflected from the Principal Act and which cannot be disputed, is placed by a statutory prescription that is to be found in Section 4 of the Principal Act. Chapter-III of the Principal Act is titled as “ceiling on vacant land”. Except as otherwise provided in the Principal Act on and from the commencement of the Principal Act no person shall be entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit in the territories to which this Act applies under subsection (2) of Section 1. The obligation under the statute is, therefore, clear and absolute. It relates and dates back to the commencement of the Principal Act. None can dispute that what is exempted from the purview of Chapter-III and by a overriding power conferred in the State Government is the applicability of Chapter-III to the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. Therefore, when the excess vacant land is exempted in exceptional circumstances and which have been also specified by the statute, then, all that happens is that the excess vacant land is exempted from the provisions of Chapter-III either conditionally or unconditionally and in terms of the satisfaction in clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of Section 20 of the Principal Act. The power to exempt is exercised by the State suo-motu or otherwise meaning thereby on the Application of the person holding the excess vacant land. The request is not to apply the Chapter in the light of the factors and circumstances specified therein. This request is made and granted only on the satisfaction reached and not as a matter of course. Thus, application of the chapter is a rule and its non-application is an exception. The request is not to apply the Chapter in the light of the factors and circumstances specified therein. This request is made and granted only on the satisfaction reached and not as a matter of course. Thus, application of the chapter is a rule and its non-application is an exception. Despite repeal of the Principal Act if the validity of the order granting exemption under subsection (1) of Section 20 is saved by Section 3 of the Repeal Act and such validity remains unaffected notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the order of the competent court, then, full effect will have to be given to the language of the Repeal Act. Once the Repeal Act is so clear and does not evince anything contrary to the principles enshrined in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, then, on the strength of the wording of the Repeal Act and in any event with the assistance of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act it can safely be held that there is no intention to destroy the rights and liabilities or consequences which flow from a valid exemption order. In fact the language of Section 3 of the Repeal Act supplements Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Nothing in Section 3 of the Repeal Act takes away applicability of the Principal Act to the extent of enforcing the obligations in terms of the conditions imposed in the order of exemption. The learned Advocate General submits that the arguments of the Petitioners revolve around the saving clause enacted by Section 3 of the Repeal Act. The submissions are that the Repeal Act shows intention contrary to the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act inasmuch as neither the exemption order nor any of the terms and conditions therein can be enforced post repeal. 33. The learned Advocate General submitted that the provisions of the Repeal Act and particularly Section 3(1) clauses (b) and (c) require a harmonious interpretation. 33. The learned Advocate General submitted that the provisions of the Repeal Act and particularly Section 3(1) clauses (b) and (c) require a harmonious interpretation. By reading these clauses together what is apparent is that by clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act it is clarified that repeal of the Principal Act shall not affect the vesting of any vacant land under Section 10(3) of the Principal Act, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorized by the State in this behalf or by the competent authority. Thus, if the steps as contemplated by subsection (3) of Section 10 of the Principal Act and equally by subsections (5) and (6) thereof are taken, then, the vesting of excess vacant land referred to in a Notification published under Section 10(1) in terms of subsection (3) thereof is not affected by repeal of the Principal Act. No person then can claim that the excess vacant land to which the Principal Act admittedly applies and which is deemed to have been acquired by the State does not belong to it or the State is not entitled to it because the Principal Act has been repealed and the vesting comes to an end. The vesting is of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. Undisputedly, if the land in excess of ceiling limit can vest after the notification in terms of Section 10(1) is published in the official Gazette, then, the declaration which is postulated or contemplated by subsection (3) is in relation to such excess vacant land. What subsection (3) of Section 10 really contemplates and envisages is that the State can declare that the excess vacant land is deemed to have been acquired by it upon publication of the declaration and particularly with effect from the dates specified therein. By such deemed acquisition the land is further deemed to have vested absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances with effect from the date specified in the declaration. By such deemed acquisition the land is further deemed to have vested absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances with effect from the date specified in the declaration. By the repeal what has been clarified is that unless the State has taken over possession of such excess vacant land and as referred to in the Notification under Section 10(1) either by itself or through any person duly authorized by it in this behalf or by the competent authority, its plain and simple vesting will not enable the Government to take over possession of the excess vacant land after coming into force of the Repeal Act. This coming into force or commencing is reckoned in terms of subsections (2) and (3) of Section 1 of the Repeal Act. Thus, the State is disabled from taking possession of the excess vacant land which has already vested in it if it has failed to take possession. Thereupon the land can be restored and that is how subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act would read. Therefore, this is not a restricted or limited saving clause in any sense of the term. Though Section 3 is titled “saving” it contains the substantive provisions. The Legislature or the Parliament did not intend a vacuum. It did not stop by only stating that if possession of the land vested in the State in terms of Section 10(3) is not taken, then, that cannot be taken or the land cannot be made over to the Government after repeal of the Principal Act. It enacts a further provision by which it is possible for the State to restore the land to the holder and that is why restoration is contemplated by virtue of Section 3 (2). That restoration is conditional upon repayment of an amount to the State Government by the holder. Section 11 of the Principal Act talks of payment of amount for the vacant land acquired under Section 10(3). That payment can be claimed even without the land being handed over or without the possession of the excess vacant land being taken. The deemed acquisition by virtue of Section 10(3) enables the person or persons having interest in the excess vacant land to claim the amount under Section 11. That payment can be claimed even without the land being handed over or without the possession of the excess vacant land being taken. The deemed acquisition by virtue of Section 10(3) enables the person or persons having interest in the excess vacant land to claim the amount under Section 11. If any payment has been made after such deemed acquisition, then, that amount has to be returned to the Government and only then the excess vacant land of which possession has not been taken will be restored to any person or the holder as the case may be. If this was a complete obliteration or destruction of the rights and liabilities under the Principal Act, then, such substantive provision enabling restoration would not have been inserted or incorporated is the submission of the learned Advocate General. The refund of such amount and which has been paid to the person or persons interested in the excess vacant land in terms of Section 11 of the Principal Act alone entitles such person to claim restoration of the land to him. If the repeal had been simplicitor and without such substantive provision, then, it would not have been possible for the holder or any person interested in the excess vacant land to claim its restoration. It is, therefore, erroneous to urge that the Repeal Act evidences an intention contrary to the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. 34. Inviting our attention to clauses (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act the learned Advocate General submits that the true nature of the power to exempt under the Principal Act would have to be properly and completely appreciated. He submits that the basis on which the power to exempt is exercised is that the person is holding the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. It is in case of such vacant land that the State Government must be satisfied either on its own motion or otherwise that having regard to its location, purpose for which such land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require, it is necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do that the Government is conferred with discretion to pass an order exempting such vacant land from the provisions of Chapter-III either conditionally or otherwise. The learned Advocate General submits that it is not just having regard to location of the land, purpose for which the excess vacant land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require, but it is necessary and expedient in the public interest that the discretion to exempt such land has to be exercised. That is in terms of clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 20. Whereas, in terms of clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 20, the State is satisfied either on its own motion or otherwise that the application of the provisions of Chapter-III would cause undue hardship to the persons holding the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit that the Government may by order exempt conditionally or unconditionally the vacant land from the provisions of Chapter-III. Further the order under clause (b) cannot be made unless the reasons for doing so are recorded in writing. That is because clause (b) contemplates relieving the person holding the excess vacant land from undue hardship. Clause (a) necessarily postulates an exercise of powers to exempt the excess vacant land in public interest. When such is the ambit and scope of the powers and it is vacant land in excess of ceiling limit which is exempted from the provisions of Chapter-III that too in exceptional circumstances, then, it is futile to contend that the State Government despite validity of its Act or order being saved by the Repeal Act, would not be able to do anything in relation to such land post repeal of the Principal Act. The learned Advocate General submits that in this case the power of exemption and which is to be exercised for public good and in public interest is so exercised by making an order in that behalf. That the validity of such an order is saved though the Principal Act is repealed, but the legal consequences flowing from exercise of such clause are not saved, would be an incorrect, improper and legally untenable reading of the saving clause and the Repeal Act itself. The true nature of the power to exempt has not been appreciated in making such submissions. The true nature of the power to exempt has not been appreciated in making such submissions. The Petitioners' arguments proceed on an unsound and erroneous basis and namely that the power to exempt in terms of Section 20(1) of the Principal Act is exercised by the State Government only to benefit the holder. The argument is that it is to relieve the holder from the consequences of applicability of Chapter-III that the State exercises such power and therefore, nothing further can be done in pursuance of the valid order of exemption post repeal of the Principal Act. Judgment : S.C. Dharmadhikari, J. 1. The Honourable the Chief Justice has constituted this Full Bench in order to resolve a conflict between the conflicting views which have been expressed by two Division Benches of this Court. In our detailed order dated 24th April, 2014 we noticed that conflict and by consent of parties we formulated the questions which have to be answered by us. They read as under :- (1) Does Section 3(1)(b) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 read with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 r/w Section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 save the orders of exemption including all terms and conditions thereof passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act, namely, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and all actions taken there-under? (2) Whether, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 r/w Section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 apply to the repeal of the Principal Act by the Repealing Act, 1999? (3) Whether in view of Section 3(1)(b) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 and the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 : (a) the order of exemption including all its terms and conditions under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act, namely, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 can be continued and enforced in accordance with the provisions of the Principal Act; (b) all remedies and proceedings in respect of the order of exemption including all its terms and conditions may be instituted, continued and enforced? (4) Whether in view of the repeal of the Principal Act by the Repeal Act, the Government of Maharashtra can: (a) recall/cancel/modify the exemption order granted either under Section 20 of the Principal Act; (b) enforce circulars for implementation of exemption orders issued under Section 20 of the Principal Act prior to the repeal of the Principal Act; (c) acquire the land by issuing notification under Section 10(3) of the Principal Act; and (d) take any action of whatsoever nature on account of noncompliance/ breach of exemption order issued under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act? (5) Whether, the view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vithabai Bama Bhandari v/s State of Maharashtra and another reported in 2009(3) Bombay Cases Reporter 663 (Writ Petition No.4241/2008 decided on 31st March/16th April, 2009) and Damodar Laxman Navare and others v/s State of Maharashtra and others in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 dated 08th July, 2010 sets out the correct legal position as regards the ambit and scope of Section 3(1)(b) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 or whether, the view taken in Mira Bhayandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s the Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration and others in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 dated 27th August, 2009 to the contrary should be held to be laying down the correct principle of law? 2. Since both sides have canvassed arguments on legal issues, in order to appreciate them a few facts are required to be noted. We take the facts from a lead case, namely, Writ Petition No.9872/2010. That is a Writ Petition which has been filed by the Maharashtra Chamber of Housing Industry and its various Units. These are associations established to promote the housing and real estate industry. The Writ Petition is filed in the interest of members of these Associations and real estate industry and in the circumstances which are set out in paragraph 4 of the memo of Writ Petition. 3. It is the case of the Petitioners that the State of Maharashtra and Competent Authorities under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as “THE PRINCIPAL ACT”) continue to enforce and apply the provisions thereof despite enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “THE REPEAL ACT”). 3. It is the case of the Petitioners that the State of Maharashtra and Competent Authorities under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as “THE PRINCIPAL ACT”) continue to enforce and apply the provisions thereof despite enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “THE REPEAL ACT”). The Repeal Act has been brought into effect and is in force in the State of Maharashtra from 29.11.2007. 4. The grievance of the Petitioners is that there is a circular dated 18.03.2009 issued by the State Government, copy of which is at Annexure-A. That circular states that the Repeal Act has been brought into force in the State of Maharashtra w.e.f. 29.11.2007. The same expressly saves the vesting of excess vacant land in the State as also validity of an exemption order passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act. Meaning thereby, the repeal of the Principal Act does not affect the vesting of excess vacant land in the State provided its possession has been taken, so also, validity of an exemption order passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act. Therefore, such excess vacant lands of which possession has not been taken, but which are subjected to certain concessions under the order of exemption passed in terms of Section 20(1) of the Principal Act and which are particularly to utilize the lands for residential purpose, for implementing residential housing scheme, for industry and it's expansion, shall not be transferred without prior permission of the State and there are restrictions placed on change of user thereof. The permission for change of user will not be granted unless premium is paid to the Government. 5. A reference is made in this circular and the steps taken to implement the Repeal Act. The steps include two communications from the Government dated 01.03.2008 and 03.03.2008 which outline the scheme for development of these lands or their transfer. 6. It has been revealed that the exempted lands are being dealt with and for the purpose of implementation of the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme, Rental Housing Scheme, etc.. Further, the reservations in respect of these lands have been changed or altered from industry/agriculture without any reference to the Government/Competent Authority. The permissions in that regard have been granted without any prior approval from the competent authorities under the Principal Act. Further, the reservations in respect of these lands have been changed or altered from industry/agriculture without any reference to the Government/Competent Authority. The permissions in that regard have been granted without any prior approval from the competent authorities under the Principal Act. Therefore, the Government has directed that the exempted lands cannot be used for any other purpose nor their reservation can be changed unless the approvals/remarks are called for from the competent authority under the Principal Act. Any violation of such requirement would visit the persons concerned with all consequences and at their costs. 7. Prior to this circular there are certain Government Resolutions and which enable utilization of Transferable Development Rights (TDR) so as to use the lands for construction of houses for weaker sections and equally to grant development permissions in relation thereto. This is a Government Resolution dated 30.06.2007. 8. There is also an order and which has been referred to because it is the case of the Petitioners that their members had to obtain several permissions from the Respondent Nos.1 and 2 for carrying out the development. It is contended that the Government Resolutions referred by us including dated 30.06.2007 and emphasis by the authorities on compliance of the same continues despite the Repeal Act brought into force with effect from 29.11.2007. There are several instances which have been given and copies of the exemption orders passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act are referred to in paragraph 7 of the memo of Writ Petition No.9872/2010. 9. The grievance is that though the order of exemption was passed exempting the excess vacant land from the purview of Chapter-III of the Principal Act, when that Act was in force, but now after it's repeal the exemption order would not survive. In other words, the steps taken by the Authorities to give effect to the order of exemption even after repeal of the Principal Act in the State of Maharashtra are wholly illegal. The Authorities cannot compel parties like the Petitioners to seek any extension of time to complete the scheme or to comply with the conditions on which the order of exemption under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act has been passed. The stand taken is that the Respondents have no powers to enforce the Principal Act directly or indirectly. Several instances of such alleged attempts are set out. The stand taken is that the Respondents have no powers to enforce the Principal Act directly or indirectly. Several instances of such alleged attempts are set out. There is reference made to the legal provisions and finally what is prayed is that this Court must restrain by an appropriate writ, order or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Respondents from enforcing the provisions of the Principal Act insofar as such exemption orders and their terms and conditions. 10. From the record, what transpires is that a Writ Petition being Writ Petition No.3815/2010 from this group or batch of petitions, appeared before a Division Bench of this Court and it pronounced its judgment on 22.12.2010 noting that two Division Benches in the cases of Sundersons and others v/s State of Maharashtra and others reported in 2008 (5) Bombay Cases Reporter 85 and Damodar Laxman Navre v/s State of Maharashtra in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 dated 08th July , 2010, take a view that certain steps in pursuance of the order of exemption or seeking to enforce the terms and conditions thereof cannot be taken, whereas a conflicting view has been rendered by another Division Bench of this Court in Mira Bhayandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s the Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration and others in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 dated 27th August, 2009. 11. The attention of the Division Bench in Writ Petition No.3815/2010 (Jayesh Tokarshi Shah v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration) was invited to all these judgments and orders and stated to be conflicting. The Division Bench, therefore, in its judgment dated 22nd December, 2010 in the aforesaid matter observed as under :- 15. This prompts an answer in favour of a premise that the Additional District Collector, Thane and Competent Authority was not competent to issue the said Circular, and as such the efficacy of the said Circular commanding the Registering Officer to refuse the registration of the documents referred to therein remains questionable. A view congenial to the said premise is found expressed in some of the judgments Sunderson & Ors Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2008(5) Bombay Cases Reporter 85, Damodar Laxman Navre & 4 others Vs. State of Maharashtra & 4 others Writ Petition No.6300 of 2009, delivered previously by the Division Bench of this Court. A view congenial to the said premise is found expressed in some of the judgments Sunderson & Ors Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2008(5) Bombay Cases Reporter 85, Damodar Laxman Navre & 4 others Vs. State of Maharashtra & 4 others Writ Petition No.6300 of 2009, delivered previously by the Division Bench of this Court. However, there is a conflicting view expressed in the judgments delivered by the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No.5745 of 2009 Mira Bhayander Builders & Developers Welfare Association Vs. Dy. Collector & Competent Authority, Thane and 3 others. The Circular dated 23.6.2008 was the epicentre of controversy in Mira Bhayander Builders & Developers Welfare Association (Supra). The State contended as in the present case that the scheme holders were trying to wriggle out of their obligations under the scheme sanctioned under Section 20 of U.L.C. Act, and therefore, the said Circular came to be issued to protect the schemes meant for economically weaker sections, and also the government. The Division Bench after considering the rival contentions observed thus :- “In our view, if the members of the petitioners’ association have taken benefit of the schemes under Section 20 of the said Act by constructing buildings, they now cannot wiggle out of their obligations to surrender flats to the government which the government could sell at fixed rate. The entire tenor of the above petitioners appears to be that the petitioners do not want to fulfil their obligations under the said Schemes viz. surrendering the flats to the State Government and taking advantage of the repeal of the said Act want to contend that their obligations under the said schemes do not survive. In our view the impugned letter as rightly contended by the learned AGP has been issued to protect the public interest and government revenue. It does not befit the Petitioners who have taken advantage of the said scheme now contend that their obligations do not survive, and therefore, there is no need for them to surrender flats to the government. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the challenge raised in the above petition which is accordingly dismissed.” 16. In the instant case similar situation is portrayed in the affidavit in reply filed by the State. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the challenge raised in the above petition which is accordingly dismissed.” 16. In the instant case similar situation is portrayed in the affidavit in reply filed by the State. Referring to the Mohan Gopal Mate case (Supra) reported in 2008(6) ALL MR 41, the learned Advocate for the Petitioner submitted that a pertinent question regarding the extent of power of the State under Sections 20 and 21 of U.L.C. Act in the case of breach of conditions of the scheme by the scheme holder has been clearly answered as follows: “Powers of the State under Section 20 in case of breach of condition of the order of exemption is limited to withdraw exemption order only and so far as Section 21 is concerned, declare the land which is not to be treated as excess land in view of the Sub-Section (1) in case of breach of condition State can declare such land to be excess in view of Sub-Section (2) of Section 21. Thereupon, the provisions of Chapter III will apply to the said land.” 17. Going by strict interpretation of the Sections 20 and 21 of the ULC Act, the power of the State in case of contravention of any of the conditions of the scheme by scheme holder remains limited to withdrawal of the exemption and declaring the exempted land as excess land and to application of the provisions of the Chapter III of the said Act for acquisition of the said land as contemplated under Sub-Section (2) of Section 21 therein. 18. This view is in conflict with the view expressed by the Division Bench in Mira Bhayander Builders & Developers Welfare Association (Supra), and as such the controversy raised by such conflict deserves to be resolved by the Full Bench of this Court. 19. This Petition is, therefore, referred to the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for passing appropriate directions in the matter.” 12. It is in view of these events that a Full Bench was constituted and the above formulated questions await an answer from us. 13. At the outset we must clarify that we would be only answering the question/s formulated and reproduced hereinabove. We would not be expressing any opinion on the rival contentions insofar as merits of individual petitions. It is in view of these events that a Full Bench was constituted and the above formulated questions await an answer from us. 13. At the outset we must clarify that we would be only answering the question/s formulated and reproduced hereinabove. We would not be expressing any opinion on the rival contentions insofar as merits of individual petitions. Each of these petitions thereafter would be placed before the appropriate Division Benches and for a decision on merits and in accordance with law. Our observations and findings, therefore, shall not be construed as expression of any opinion on the merits of the Writ Petitions referred above or pending in this Court. 14. The Petitioners' counsel have made an attempt to show us as to how the Division Bench judgment in the case of Mira Bhayander Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane (supra) does not lay down the correct law. They have all, more or less, urged that repeal of the Principal Act in the State of Maharashtra on 29.11.2007 results in the State and competent authorities being prevented from withdrawing the order of exemption passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act. Assuming that the order of exemption or any action taken there-under is valid notwithstanding anything contrary held in any judgment or order of the competent court, yet the Repeal Act saves only validity of the order of exemption and nothing more. Such saving would not permit the State Government or competent authority to withdraw the order of exemption or enforce the terms and conditions thereof or to subject the excess vacant land to the consequences under the Principal Act. The saving is thus not absolute, but restricted in nature. Thirdly, it is urged that there being a Repealing Act containing such restricted saving clause, the same rules out applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 or its parimateria provision in the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904. 15. We shall now elaborate these contentions as articulated by Mr. Naphade, learned Senior Counsel and adopted with some additions by Mr. Sathe, Mr. Sridharan, Mr. Devitre, Mr. Samdani, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Gangal, Mr. oshi and Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners. 16. Mr. Naphade firstly submitted that for understanding the Repeal Act we must have a look at the Principal Act. The Principal Act, according to Mr. Sathe, Mr. Sridharan, Mr. Devitre, Mr. Samdani, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Gangal, Mr. oshi and Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners. 16. Mr. Naphade firstly submitted that for understanding the Repeal Act we must have a look at the Principal Act. The Principal Act, according to Mr. Naphade, contains several provisions, but material there-from are Sections 3, 5, 6, 8, 10 and 38. Mr. Naphade also took us through Section 11 of the Principal Act before coming to Section 20. In his submission the scheme of the Principal Act is that no one shall hold the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. The return or statement has to be filed so as to determine the extent of excess vacant land. In other words, Mr. Naphade submits that except as otherwise provided in the Principal Act, on and from the commencement of the Act, no person shall be entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of ceiling limit in the territories to which the Principal Act applies. Mr. Naphade submits that Section 4 sets out the ceiling limit. He submits that the transfer of vacant land is also an aspect which is taken care of by Section 5. The persons holding the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit have to file the statement. He submits that further provisions enable scrutiny of particulars, preparing a draft statement as regards the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit and the final statement. Mr. Naphade submits that Section 10 is entitled “Acquisition of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit”. The extent of the vacant land held by a person in excess of ceiling limit has to be specified by subsection (1) of Section 10 and the purpose of same is to enable acquisition of the same eventually. That is an aspect dealt with by subsections (2) and (3) of Section 10. The vesting of such excess vacant land free from all encumbrances and with effect from the date of publication of a notification under subsection (3) results in enabling the Government to take possession of the land. In these circumstances, according to Mr. Naphade, only consequence of not filing a return or statement, but which is not accepted in totality is provided by Section 10. There is also a provision, namely, Section 38 which makes such act a punishable offence and Mr. In these circumstances, according to Mr. Naphade, only consequence of not filing a return or statement, but which is not accepted in totality is provided by Section 10. There is also a provision, namely, Section 38 which makes such act a punishable offence and Mr. Naphade invites our attention to subsections (1) to (4) of Section 38 in that regard. Mr. Naphade's attempt was to show that even if the vacant land is in excess of ceiling limit and there is no compliance with the provisions requiring filing a statement of such vacant land, still the owner is not deprived of his rights in the same. Mr. Naphade in that regard invites our attention to Section 15 of the Principal Act and submits that it reflects the legislative intent. There is no loss of ownership on promulgation of the Principal Act. In these circumstances all that the Principal Act does is to create some sort of clog or cloud on the rights of a person to hold the land. His ownership rights therein are not affected. 17. Mr. Naphade, therefore, submits that the power to exempt the excess vacant land from applicability of Chapter-III of the Principal Act is exercised by the Government either on its own motion or otherwise and that is also clear by Sections 21 and 22 which permits the excess vacant land not to be treated as such in certain cases and it's retention under certain circumstances. Therefore, merely because a holder of the excess vacant land seeks exemption from applicability of Chapter-III or the State exempts such vacant land from applicability thereof will not mean that the right and particularly ownership therein is surrendered much less waived. Mr. Naphade's attempt was to show that the State seeks to put the excess vacant land beyond application of Chapter-III, but keeping all his rights and options intact. The reference, therefore, will have to be answered by us bearing in mind this vital aspect, is the submission of Mr. Naphade. 18. Mr. Naphade elaborated this aspect by submitting that once the land is exempted, it is out of the purview of the Principal Act. The right to hold it conditionally remains unaffected. The power to exempt is limited in nature. It is legislative in character. Naphade. 18. Mr. Naphade elaborated this aspect by submitting that once the land is exempted, it is out of the purview of the Principal Act. The right to hold it conditionally remains unaffected. The power to exempt is limited in nature. It is legislative in character. By no stretch of imagination it is a right conferred in the Government nor exercise of powers to exempt creates any right in the Government in respect of such excess vacant land. In these circumstances and if Sections 20(2) and 21(2) are read together it would be apparent that neither any action under subsection (1) of Section 21 or the power under subsection (2) is saved by repeal of the Principal Act. In fact the Repeal Act does not save Section 21 at all. Hence, when the Repeal Act in Section 3(1)(b) refers to the validity of exemption order, it deliberately omits to include or refer subsection (2) of Section 20. Hence, there is no power to withdraw the exemption order under Section 20(1) after repeal of the Principal Act. Hence, even breach or violation of the condition in the exemption order will not result in its cancellation or withdrawal. Apart there-from any breach or violation of the condition on which the exemption order was granted does not result in automatic withdrawal or cancellation thereof. That is apparent from Section 20(2). It is, therefore, clear that the Repeal Act does not save this power and by omitting subsection (2) of Section 20 from clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. The legislature was aware that the power to withdraw the exemption order will have to be exercised only after giving a reasonable opportunity to such person who has violated the conditions subject to which the exemption under clause (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of Section 20 is granted. That reasonable opportunity is to make representation against the proposed withdrawal. It is the only consequence of either not complying with the conditions subject to which the exemption is granted or not being able to satisfy the Government that such exemption should not be withdrawn or from applicability of Chapter-III to the excess vacant land. Meaning thereby same is capable of being acquired and thereafter, vested in the Government. It is the only consequence of either not complying with the conditions subject to which the exemption is granted or not being able to satisfy the Government that such exemption should not be withdrawn or from applicability of Chapter-III to the excess vacant land. Meaning thereby same is capable of being acquired and thereafter, vested in the Government. Once that power cannot be exercised post repeal of the Principal Act, then, we would be in complete error if we hold that the repeal of the Principal Act does not affect the power to withdraw the exemption or to enforce the terms and conditions thereof. 19. In that regard, Mr. Naphade has taken us through Sections 20(2), 21(2) and 22(2) of the Principal Act. He submits that subsection (2) of Section 20 confers discretion in the Government and it may not withdraw the exemption order despite the conditions subject to which the same is granted are not complied with by any person. Whereas, subsection (2) of Section 21 mandates declaring the vacant land to be excess. It is submitted that there are distinct consequences and which are taken care of by subsection (2) of Section 22. Thus, the power of exemption has different parameters and the legislature was aware that such power cannot survive the repeal of the Principal Act. Hence, in the teeth of this clear language of the Repeal Act recourse to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is impermissible. Once a different intention appears from the provisions contained in the Repeal Act, then, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 would not apply. The question of liberal construction of Section 3 of the Repeal Act, therefore, does not arise at all. 20. Mr. Naphade thereafter took us extensively through the Repeal Act to submit that what is saved is specific. By clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act the vesting of land of which possession has been taken by the State is saved. Meaning thereby, any vacant land which is subject matter of declaration under Section 10(3) of which possession has not been taken by the State Government, then its vesting is not saved by the Repeal Act. Meaning thereby, any vacant land which is subject matter of declaration under Section 10(3) of which possession has not been taken by the State Government, then its vesting is not saved by the Repeal Act. Such land of which possession has not been taken will have to be restored post repeal after the requirement stipulated in subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act is complied with. Therefore, there is no collision between clause (a) and clause (b). What clause (b) saves is only validity of the order granting exemption under Section 20(1) or any action taken thereunder. The power to withdraw the exemption is not saved. If it is held to be saved, then, clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act would be rendered redundant. Only consequence of exemption being withdrawn is to subject the land to applicability of Chapter-III of the Principal Act and particularly Section 10(3) thereof. If possession of such excess vacant land cannot be taken even after withdrawal of exemption in terms of subsection (2) of Section 20 of the Principal Act, then, there was no point in saving its validity. Therefore, the validity of the order of exemption is saved, but neither that saving will enable the State to withdraw the exemption post repeal nor will the State be in a position to give effect to the order of withdrawal of the exemption if cannot take possession of the excess vacant land. That is the reason why the power to withdraw the exemption has not been saved. Section 4 of the Repeal Act, therefore, would throw light on the interpretation of clauses (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. That Section 4 provides for abatement of legal proceedings. If the legal proceedings abate on the date on which the Repeal Act came into force, then, the intent could never be to save the power to withdraw the exemption. Therefore, the words, appearing in clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3, after Section 20 should be read accordingly and that would be consistent with the object and purpose sought to be achieved in enacting the Repeal Act. None of the proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the Principal Act pending immediately before commencement of the Repeal Act are saved. None of the proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the Principal Act pending immediately before commencement of the Repeal Act are saved. Even if they are pending before any court or tribunal or any other authority they shall abate. In these circumstances the Legislature clearly intended that any past or closed or conclusive action alone is saved. Anything in the pipeline or inchoate is affected and not saved. This is because the Principal Act is a self contained code. It contains substantive and procedural provisions and even creates a forum for the purpose of enforcing and exercising substantive rights and powers and equally procedural one. A forum is created so as to make and enact a complete code. Nothing beyond the Principal Act can be seen. If the Repeal Act is construed in this manner, then, it envisages complete destruction of the rights under the Principal Act. Any right which is crystallized and which is not a mere hope or chance is alone saved. 21. Mr. Naphade also submits that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act cannot be imported into and read when the Repeal Act is so specific and clear. Alternatively and without prejudice to this submission Mr. Naphade submits that if Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is analyzed, it by clauses (a) to (e) saves something which is in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect. It does not affect previous operation of the Act so repealed or anything duly done or suffered there-under. The repeal does not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the repealed enactment. Mr. Naphade submits that clause (b) would, therefore, refer to past or complete act and not something which is intended and incomplete. The liabilities that are crystallized under the enactment which is repealed alone are unaffected by repeal of the original or Principal Act and that is clarified by clause (c). This clause cannot be imported in the present Repealing Act for the simple reason that it would create inconsistency. Mr. Naphade submits that clause (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would have saved Section 20(2) of the Principal Act had Sections 3 and 4 been not enacted in the Repeal Act. This clause cannot be imported in the present Repealing Act for the simple reason that it would create inconsistency. Mr. Naphade submits that clause (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would have saved Section 20(2) of the Principal Act had Sections 3 and 4 been not enacted in the Repeal Act. That being clearly enacted there will be inconsistency if one imports clause (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act in Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act. For all these reasons Mr. Naphade would submit that the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, Delhi High Court and Madras High Court follows the Division Bench judgments of this Court from which Mira Bhayander (supra) differs. That is the only view possible in the present legal backdrop and we must, therefore, hold that Mira Bhayander (supra) does not lay down the correct law and should be overruled. Mr. Naphade submits that when three or four High Courts in the country have taken a consistent view of the provision contained in a Central Act, then, that view ought to be followed so as to bring comity and consistency in interpretation of a Parliamentary statute. The reference, therefore, be answered accordingly. 22. Mr. Naphade in support of the above submissions, has placed heavy reliance on the following decisions :- 1. Mohamed Ashref Noor v/s State of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.6856/2003 decided on 16.12.2009 by the Madras High Court. 2. Surendra Raj Jaiswal v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.26474/2009 decided on 24.08.2011 by a Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 3. The Principal Secretary to Government, Hyderabad v/s Surendra, in Writ Petition No.951/2012 decided on 25.07.2012 by the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 4. M/s Suri Industries v/s State of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.8610/2013 decided on 06.09.2010 by the Madras High Court. 5. Manik M. Ragit v/s State of Maharashtra reported in 2013 (2) Mh.L.J. 224 . (WP No.1290/2012 decided on 30.07.2012 Nagpur Bench). 6. M/s Nile Limited v/s State of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.23846/2008 decided on 06.11.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 7. State of Uttar Pradesh v/s Hari Ram reported in (2013) 4 SCC 280 . 8. M/s Tata Coffee Limited v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.11929/2013 decided on 22.07.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 9. M/s Nile Limited v/s State of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.23846/2008 decided on 06.11.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 7. State of Uttar Pradesh v/s Hari Ram reported in (2013) 4 SCC 280 . 8. M/s Tata Coffee Limited v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.11929/2013 decided on 22.07.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 9. Gajanan Kamlya Patil v/s Additional Collector and Competent Authority, in Civil Appeal Nos.2070, 2071/ 2014 arising out of SLP (C) Nos.14904, 14905 of 2011 decided on 14.02.2014 by the Honourable Supreme Court. 10. M/s L.G. Polymers India Private Limited v/s State of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.21934/2013 decided on 28.03.2014 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 11. Synco Industries Limited v/s Assessing Officer, Income Tax, Mumbai reported in (2008) 4 SCC 22 . 12. Tej Pratap Singh v/s Union of India, in Writ Petition (C) No.2455/1992 decided on 16.07.2009 by the Delhi High Court. 23. The submissions of Mr. Naphade have been adopted by Mr. Milind Sathe, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Writ Petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.2201/2009, 3815/2010 and 9703/2010. In addition, Mr. Sathe submits that the Preamble of the Principal Act provides for imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomeration, for acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit and to regulate the construction of buildings on such land. It is also to distribute the excess vacant land after it vests in the State. In these circumstances if the construction placed by the State on the provisions of the Repeal Act is accepted that would result in saving of the consequences following withdrawal of exemption. Section 20(2) of the Principal Act envisages withdrawal of exemption and after such withdrawal what follows is the vesting of the land in terms of Section 10(3) and its possession as envisaged by Section 10(5) and (6). This is specifically not saved by Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act. Having regard to the clear language of the Principal Act this is the only consequence which follows on withdrawal of exemption. If it is not expressly saved, then, by an indirect or oblique method the Court cannot save it. Mr. This is specifically not saved by Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act. Having regard to the clear language of the Principal Act this is the only consequence which follows on withdrawal of exemption. If it is not expressly saved, then, by an indirect or oblique method the Court cannot save it. Mr. Sathe's contention is that what is specifically saved is the validity of the order of exemption and the crucial words are to be found in clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act to this effect that the validity of any order granting exemption under Section 20 (1) or any action taken there-under is saved notwithstanding any judgment of any court to the contrary. Therefore, even if the Court declares the order of exemption or any action taken thereunder to be bad or invalid that is unaffected by repeal of the Principal Act. Beyond this nothing more can be read in the saving clause or the Repeal Act as a whole. The Reference, therefore, be answered accordingly. Mr. Sathe relies upon the following judgments : 1. Mukarram Ali Khan v/s State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2007) 11 SCC 90 . 2. Voltas Limited v/s Additional Collector and Competent Authority, reported in 2008 (5) Bom. C.R. 746. 3. Shanti Bhardwaj v/s State of U.P., reported in (2004) 10 SCC 130 . 4. Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, reported in (2012) 4 SCC 718 . 5. Ritesh Tewari v/s State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2010) 10 SCC 677 . 6. Simpson and General Finance Company Limited v/s State of State of Tamil Nadu, reported in (2006) 4 MLJ 1807 (Madras High Court). 7. Mohan Gopalrao Mate v/s Principal Secretary, reported in 2009 (1) Bom. C.R. 275. 8. Vithabai Bama Bhandari v/s State of Maharashtra, reported in 2009 (3) Bom. C.R. 663. 9. Tej Pratap Singh v/s Union of India, in Writ Petition (C) No.2455/1992 decided on 16.07.2009 by the Delhi High Court. 10. Mira Bhyandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s The Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration, in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 decided on 27.08.2009 by the Bombay High Court. 11. Kabbur Industries Private Limited v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.9890/2009 decided on 05.05.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 12. 10. Mira Bhyandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s The Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration, in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 decided on 27.08.2009 by the Bombay High Court. 11. Kabbur Industries Private Limited v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.9890/2009 decided on 05.05.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 12. Damodar Laxman Navare v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 decided on 08.07.2010 by the Bombay High Court : Reported in 2010(6) Bom. C.R. 611. 13. Waman Bandu Bhoir v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.4141/2010 decided on 11.10.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 14. Jayesh Tokarshi Shah v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane, in Writ Petition No.3815/2010 decided on 26.10.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 15. Maharaj Singh v/s State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (1977) 1 SCC 155 . 16. Union of India v/s Somasundaram Viswanath, reported in (1989) 1 SCC 175 . 17. John Thomas v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.38507/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 18. L. Kannappan and L. Thirunavukarasu v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.46091/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 19. Anil Nemichand Bafna v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.153/2008 decided on 06.05.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 20. Surendra Raj Jaiswal v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.26474/2009 decided on 24.08.2011 by a Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 21. Manik M. Ragit v/s State of Maharashtra reported in 2013 (2) Mh.L.J. 224 . (WP No.1290/2012 decided on 30.07.2012 Nagpur Bench). 22. State of Uttar Pradesh v/s Hari Ram reported in (2013) 4 SCC 280 . 24. Mr. Naphade's submissions then have been adopted by Mr. Gangal, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition No.5024/2013. He went further to contend that what is saved by virtue of Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act is the validity of the order of exemption, but not the conditions subject to which such exemption is granted. In that regard Mr. Gangal relied upon the following judgments :- 1. Shanti Bhardwaj v/s State of U.P., reported in (2004) 10 SCC 130 . 2. L. Kannappan and L. Thirunavukarasu v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.46091/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 3. In that regard Mr. Gangal relied upon the following judgments :- 1. Shanti Bhardwaj v/s State of U.P., reported in (2004) 10 SCC 130 . 2. L. Kannappan and L. Thirunavukarasu v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.46091/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 3. Surendra Raj Jaiswal v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.26474/2009 decided on 24.08.2011 by a Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 25. Then Mr. Sridharan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.2243/2011 and 2244/2011, argued that the Repeal Act envisages application of same in the first instance to the whole of the State of Haryana and Punjab and to all the Union territories. This is envisaged by Section 1(2) of the Repeal Act. The Repeal Act comes into force in other States after other States adopt the Repeal Act by resolution passed in that behalf under Article 252(2) of the Constitution of India. Mr. Sridharan, therefore, submits that this aspect must be borne in mind while considering the submission or stand of the State regarding applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Mr. Sridharan submits that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act applies only when either the General Clauses Act or any Central Act or Regulation made after commencement of the General Clauses Act repeals any enactment made prior to the General Clauses Act coming into force or thereafter. In the present case the State Government has adopted by resolution passed under Article 252 of the Constitution of India the Repeal Act in the State of Maharashtra with effect from 29.11.2007. In the light of such adoption by resolution of the State Assembly the Section 6 of the General Clauses Act cannot be resorted to or applied. That applies only when either the General Clauses Act or any Central Act or Regulation made after commencement of the General Clauses Act repeals any enactment made or to be made by the Parliament. Both are Parliamentary Statues and in such circumstances by virtue of Article 252(2) of the Constitution of India the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out. 26. Alternatively, Mr. Sridharan submits that Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act is a special saving clause demonstrating a clear different intention. Therefore, Section 3 of the Repeal Act saves only what is specifically mentioned therein. 26. Alternatively, Mr. Sridharan submits that Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act is a special saving clause demonstrating a clear different intention. Therefore, Section 3 of the Repeal Act saves only what is specifically mentioned therein. There is no room for applying Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 by implication or impliedly. Mr. Sridharan also submits that in true sense we are not construing a validating statute or clause. What is saved by clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 is an order under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act and the exemptions which are subject matter of the same. All actions under the same are saved, but that does not mean that the power to take action under Section 20(2) is also saved. The saving in the present case is only to protect the rights of innocent third parties. Even the actions under the exemption are saved with a view to ensure such protection. This is not a substantive provision and therefore, it cannot be construed with reference to the Principal Act. By no stretch of imagination it revives the Principal Act. This is apparent from reading of Section 4 of the Repeal Act because even the proceedings as initiated abate on Principal Act coming into force. By clause (c) of subsection (1) of Section 3 the liability incurred under the exemption order is not saved, but only the payment made to the State Government as a condition for granting exemption under Section 20(1) is unaffected and thus, saved. Beyond all this we should not read anything into the Repeal Act. Mr. Sridharan relied upon the following decisions in support of the above contentions :- 1. Kolhapur Cane-sugar Works Limited v/s Union of India, reported in (2000) 2 SCC 536 . 2. Air India v/s Union of India, reported in (1995) 4 SCC 734 . 3. Union of India v/s West Coast Paper Mills Limited, reported in 2004 (164) E.L.T. 375 (SC). 4. Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Limited v/s Broach Borough Municipality, reported in 2000 (123) ELT 3 (SC). 27. It is pertinent to note that Mr. Sridharan's main argument has not been supported or adopted by any counsel. It is clear that Mr. Naphade's contentions and submissions as adopted by Mr. Sathe are further adopted and elaborated by Mr. Devitre, learned Senior Counsel appearing in the Original Side Writ Petition No.37/2010 and Mr. 27. It is pertinent to note that Mr. Sridharan's main argument has not been supported or adopted by any counsel. It is clear that Mr. Naphade's contentions and submissions as adopted by Mr. Sathe are further adopted and elaborated by Mr. Devitre, learned Senior Counsel appearing in the Original Side Writ Petition No.37/2010 and Mr. Samdani, learned Senior Counsel appearing in Writ Petition No.346/2011. Both of them have urged that a different intention appears in clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act and therefore, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act has no application. The specific saving is for the benefit of the land holders and therefore, there is no scope for construing clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act on equitable principles. Once there is no room for equitable considerations and particularly as Mr. Samdani urges because of the Principal Act being ex-propriatory in nature and providing for compulsory acquisition, then, all the more any liberal construction is ruled out. Mr. Samdani submits that even the saving clause has to be strictly construed in this case and the repeal of the Principal Act wipes out the same and obliterates it from the statute book completely. For all these reasons the Reference should be answered accordingly. 28. Mr. Devitre and Mr. Samdani relied upon the following decisions :- 1. Mohan Gopalrao Mate v/s Principal Secretary, reported in 2009 (1) Bom. C.R. 275. 2. Parripati Chandrasekharrao and Sons v/s Alapati Jalaiah, reported in (1995) 3 SCC 709 . 3. Khub Chand v/s State of Rajasthan, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1074 . 4. Gujarat Electricity Board v/s Girdharlal Motilal, reported in AIR 1969 SC 267 . 5. State of Maharashtra v/s B.E. Billimoria, reported in (2003) 7 SCC 336 . 6. Corporation of the City of Victoria v/s Bishop of Vancouver Island, reported in AIR 1921 PC 240. 7. T.R. Thandur v/s Union of India, reported in (1996) 3 SCC 690 . 29. Mr. Aniruddha Joshi, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition No.9872/2010 invites our attention to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vithabai Bama Bhandari v/s State of Maharashtra (supra) and submits that there is nothing sacrosanct about Section 20 of the Principal Act. By indirect process we cannot, therefore, save what is not expressly saved by the Repeal Act. By indirect process we cannot, therefore, save what is not expressly saved by the Repeal Act. Once the power to exempt cannot be exercised and not available after the Repeal Act, then, merely because such power is exercised during the subsistence of the Principal Act and prior to the Repeal Act coming into force does not mean that further or incidental power envisaged by the primary power to exempt is saved. Even this incidental or ancillary power is unavailable after repeal of the Principal Act. This argument is built more or less on the wording of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. 30. Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition No.556/2010, while adopting all arguments of all the Senior Counsel only submitted that when more than one High Court in this country have placed an interpretation on the Parliamentary Statute or construed its provisions in a particular way, then, for the sake of consistency and certainty this Court must follow the reasoning of the Delhi High Court, Madras High Court and Andhra Pradesh High Court. 31. Mr. Joshi and Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha relied upon the following judgments in support of the above submissions :- 1. Damodar Laxman Navare v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 decided on 08.07.2010 by the Bombay High Court : Reported in 2010(6) Bom. C.R. 611. 2. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v/s Alcock Ashdown & Company Limited, reported in 1979 ITR page 164 : in Income Tax Reference No.40/1969 decided on 07.07.1978 by the Bombay High Court. 3. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v/s T. Maneklal Mfg. Co. Ltd., reported in 1978 ITR Vol.115 page 725. 4. Bhagwat Dharmaraj Radke v/s State of Maharashtra, in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.35883/2012 decided on 31.03.2014 by the Honourable Supreme Court. 5. Government of Karnataka v/s Gowramma and others, reported in AIR 2008 SC 863 . 32. On the other hand, Mr. Khambata, learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State submits that it is fallacious to assume that the State or other Respondents, namely, Authorities under the Principal Act are requesting this Court to go by any equitable consideration or liberal principle. 32. On the other hand, Mr. Khambata, learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State submits that it is fallacious to assume that the State or other Respondents, namely, Authorities under the Principal Act are requesting this Court to go by any equitable consideration or liberal principle. The State has throughout maintained that in terms of the Preamble of the Principal Act and Constitutional philosophy as enshrined by Articles 21 and 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution of India a ceiling has been placed by the Principal Act on the holding of vacant land within the urban agglomeration. This ceiling limit, as is reflected from the Principal Act and which cannot be disputed, is placed by a statutory prescription that is to be found in Section 4 of the Principal Act. Chapter-III of the Principal Act is titled as “ceiling on vacant land”. Except as otherwise provided in the Principal Act on and from the commencement of the Principal Act no person shall be entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit in the territories to which this Act applies under subsection (2) of Section 1. The obligation under the statute is, therefore, clear and absolute. It relates and dates back to the commencement of the Principal Act. None can dispute that what is exempted from the purview of Chapter-III and by a overriding power conferred in the State Government is the applicability of Chapter-III to the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. Therefore, when the excess vacant land is exempted in exceptional circumstances and which have been also specified by the statute, then, all that happens is that the excess vacant land is exempted from the provisions of Chapter-III either conditionally or unconditionally and in terms of the satisfaction in clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of Section 20 of the Principal Act. The power to exempt is exercised by the State suo-motu or otherwise meaning thereby on the Application of the person holding the excess vacant land. The request is not to apply the Chapter in the light of the factors and circumstances specified therein. This request is made and granted only on the satisfaction reached and not as a matter of course. Thus, application of the chapter is a rule and its non-application is an exception. The request is not to apply the Chapter in the light of the factors and circumstances specified therein. This request is made and granted only on the satisfaction reached and not as a matter of course. Thus, application of the chapter is a rule and its non-application is an exception. Despite repeal of the Principal Act if the validity of the order granting exemption under subsection (1) of Section 20 is saved by Section 3 of the Repeal Act and such validity remains unaffected notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the order of the competent court, then, full effect will have to be given to the language of the Repeal Act. Once the Repeal Act is so clear and does not evince anything contrary to the principles enshrined in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, then, on the strength of the wording of the Repeal Act and in any event with the assistance of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act it can safely be held that there is no intention to destroy the rights and liabilities or consequences which flow from a valid exemption order. In fact the language of Section 3 of the Repeal Act supplements Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Nothing in Section 3 of the Repeal Act takes away applicability of the Principal Act to the extent of enforcing the obligations in terms of the conditions imposed in the order of exemption. The learned Advocate General submits that the arguments of the Petitioners revolve around the saving clause enacted by Section 3 of the Repeal Act. The submissions are that the Repeal Act shows intention contrary to the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act inasmuch as neither the exemption order nor any of the terms and conditions therein can be enforced post repeal. 33. The learned Advocate General submitted that the provisions of the Repeal Act and particularly Section 3(1) clauses (b) and (c) require a harmonious interpretation. 33. The learned Advocate General submitted that the provisions of the Repeal Act and particularly Section 3(1) clauses (b) and (c) require a harmonious interpretation. By reading these clauses together what is apparent is that by clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act it is clarified that repeal of the Principal Act shall not affect the vesting of any vacant land under Section 10(3) of the Principal Act, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorized by the State in this behalf or by the competent authority. Thus, if the steps as contemplated by subsection (3) of Section 10 of the Principal Act and equally by subsections (5) and (6) thereof are taken, then, the vesting of excess vacant land referred to in a Notification published under Section 10(1) in terms of subsection (3) thereof is not affected by repeal of the Principal Act. No person then can claim that the excess vacant land to which the Principal Act admittedly applies and which is deemed to have been acquired by the State does not belong to it or the State is not entitled to it because the Principal Act has been repealed and the vesting comes to an end. The vesting is of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. Undisputedly, if the land in excess of ceiling limit can vest after the notification in terms of Section 10(1) is published in the official Gazette, then, the declaration which is postulated or contemplated by subsection (3) is in relation to such excess vacant land. What subsection (3) of Section 10 really contemplates and envisages is that the State can declare that the excess vacant land is deemed to have been acquired by it upon publication of the declaration and particularly with effect from the dates specified therein. By such deemed acquisition the land is further deemed to have vested absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances with effect from the date specified in the declaration. By such deemed acquisition the land is further deemed to have vested absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances with effect from the date specified in the declaration. By the repeal what has been clarified is that unless the State has taken over possession of such excess vacant land and as referred to in the Notification under Section 10(1) either by itself or through any person duly authorized by it in this behalf or by the competent authority, its plain and simple vesting will not enable the Government to take over possession of the excess vacant land after coming into force of the Repeal Act. This coming into force or commencing is reckoned in terms of subsections (2) and (3) of Section 1 of the Repeal Act. Thus, the State is disabled from taking possession of the excess vacant land which has already vested in it if it has failed to take possession. Thereupon the land can be restored and that is how subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act would read. Therefore, this is not a restricted or limited saving clause in any sense of the term. Though Section 3 is titled “saving” it contains the substantive provisions. The Legislature or the Parliament did not intend a vacuum. It did not stop by only stating that if possession of the land vested in the State in terms of Section 10(3) is not taken, then, that cannot be taken or the land cannot be made over to the Government after repeal of the Principal Act. It enacts a further provision by which it is possible for the State to restore the land to the holder and that is why restoration is contemplated by virtue of Section 3 (2). That restoration is conditional upon repayment of an amount to the State Government by the holder. Section 11 of the Principal Act talks of payment of amount for the vacant land acquired under Section 10(3). That payment can be claimed even without the land being handed over or without the possession of the excess vacant land being taken. The deemed acquisition by virtue of Section 10(3) enables the person or persons having interest in the excess vacant land to claim the amount under Section 11. That payment can be claimed even without the land being handed over or without the possession of the excess vacant land being taken. The deemed acquisition by virtue of Section 10(3) enables the person or persons having interest in the excess vacant land to claim the amount under Section 11. If any payment has been made after such deemed acquisition, then, that amount has to be returned to the Government and only then the excess vacant land of which possession has not been taken will be restored to any person or the holder as the case may be. If this was a complete obliteration or destruction of the rights and liabilities under the Principal Act, then, such substantive provision enabling restoration would not have been inserted or incorporated is the submission of the learned Advocate General. The refund of such amount and which has been paid to the person or persons interested in the excess vacant land in terms of Section 11 of the Principal Act alone entitles such person to claim restoration of the land to him. If the repeal had been simplicitor and without such substantive provision, then, it would not have been possible for the holder or any person interested in the excess vacant land to claim its restoration. It is, therefore, erroneous to urge that the Repeal Act evidences an intention contrary to the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. 34. Inviting our attention to clauses (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act the learned Advocate General submits that the true nature of the power to exempt under the Principal Act would have to be properly and completely appreciated. He submits that the basis on which the power to exempt is exercised is that the person is holding the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. It is in case of such vacant land that the State Government must be satisfied either on its own motion or otherwise that having regard to its location, purpose for which such land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require, it is necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do that the Government is conferred with discretion to pass an order exempting such vacant land from the provisions of Chapter-III either conditionally or otherwise. The learned Advocate General submits that it is not just having regard to location of the land, purpose for which the excess vacant land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require, but it is necessary and expedient in the public interest that the discretion to exempt such land has to be exercised. That is in terms of clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 20. Whereas, in terms of clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 20, the State is satisfied either on its own motion or otherwise that the application of the provisions of Chapter-III would cause undue hardship to the persons holding the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit that the Government may by order exempt conditionally or unconditionally the vacant land from the provisions of Chapter-III. Further the order under clause (b) cannot be made unless the reasons for doing so are recorded in writing. That is because clause (b) contemplates relieving the person holding the excess vacant land from undue hardship. Clause (a) necessarily postulates an exercise of powers to exempt the excess vacant land in public interest. When such is the ambit and scope of the powers and it is vacant land in excess of ceiling limit which is exempted from the provisions of Chapter-III that too in exceptional circumstances, then, it is futile to contend that the State Government despite validity of its Act or order being saved by the Repeal Act, would not be able to do anything in relation to such land post repeal of the Principal Act. The learned Advocate General submits that in this case the power of exemption and which is to be exercised for public good and in public interest is so exercised by making an order in that behalf. That the validity of such an order is saved though the Principal Act is repealed, but the legal consequences flowing from exercise of such clause are not saved, would be an incorrect, improper and legally untenable reading of the saving clause and the Repeal Act itself. The true nature of the power to exempt has not been appreciated in making such submissions. The true nature of the power to exempt has not been appreciated in making such submissions. The Petitioners' arguments proceed on an unsound and erroneous basis and namely that the power to exempt in terms of Section 20(1) of the Principal Act is exercised by the State Government only to benefit the holder. The argument is that it is to relieve the holder from the consequences of applicability of Chapter-III that the State exercises such power and therefore, nothing further can be done in pursuance of the valid order of exemption post repeal of the Principal Act. Judgment : S.C. Dharmadhikari, J. 1. The Honourable the Chief Justice has constituted this Full Bench in order to resolve a conflict between the conflicting views which have been expressed by two Division Benches of this Court. In our detailed order dated 24th April, 2014 we noticed that conflict and by consent of parties we formulated the questions which have to be answered by us. They read as under :- (1) Does Section 3(1)(b) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 read with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 r/w Section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 save the orders of exemption including all terms and conditions thereof passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act, namely, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and all actions taken there-under? (2) Whether, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 r/w Section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 apply to the repeal of the Principal Act by the Repealing Act, 1999? (3) Whether in view of Section 3(1)(b) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 and the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 : (a) the order of exemption including all its terms and conditions under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act, namely, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 can be continued and enforced in accordance with the provisions of the Principal Act; (b) all remedies and proceedings in respect of the order of exemption including all its terms and conditions may be instituted, continued and enforced? (4) Whether in view of the repeal of the Principal Act by the Repeal Act, the Government of Maharashtra can: (a) recall/cancel/modify the exemption order granted either under Section 20 of the Principal Act; (b) enforce circulars for implementation of exemption orders issued under Section 20 of the Principal Act prior to the repeal of the Principal Act; (c) acquire the land by issuing notification under Section 10(3) of the Principal Act; and (d) take any action of whatsoever nature on account of noncompliance/ breach of exemption order issued under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act? (5) Whether, the view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vithabai Bama Bhandari v/s State of Maharashtra and another reported in 2009(3) Bombay Cases Reporter 663 (Writ Petition No.4241/2008 decided on 31st March/16th April, 2009) and Damodar Laxman Navare and others v/s State of Maharashtra and others in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 dated 08th July, 2010 sets out the correct legal position as regards the ambit and scope of Section 3(1)(b) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 or whether, the view taken in Mira Bhayandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s the Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration and others in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 dated 27th August, 2009 to the contrary should be held to be laying down the correct principle of law? 2. Since both sides have canvassed arguments on legal issues, in order to appreciate them a few facts are required to be noted. We take the facts from a lead case, namely, Writ Petition No.9872/2010. That is a Writ Petition which has been filed by the Maharashtra Chamber of Housing Industry and its various Units. These are associations established to promote the housing and real estate industry. The Writ Petition is filed in the interest of members of these Associations and real estate industry and in the circumstances which are set out in paragraph 4 of the memo of Writ Petition. 3. It is the case of the Petitioners that the State of Maharashtra and Competent Authorities under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as “THE PRINCIPAL ACT”) continue to enforce and apply the provisions thereof despite enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “THE REPEAL ACT”). 3. It is the case of the Petitioners that the State of Maharashtra and Competent Authorities under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as “THE PRINCIPAL ACT”) continue to enforce and apply the provisions thereof despite enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “THE REPEAL ACT”). The Repeal Act has been brought into effect and is in force in the State of Maharashtra from 29.11.2007. 4. The grievance of the Petitioners is that there is a circular dated 18.03.2009 issued by the State Government, copy of which is at Annexure-A. That circular states that the Repeal Act has been brought into force in the State of Maharashtra w.e.f. 29.11.2007. The same expressly saves the vesting of excess vacant land in the State as also validity of an exemption order passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act. Meaning thereby, the repeal of the Principal Act does not affect the vesting of excess vacant land in the State provided its possession has been taken, so also, validity of an exemption order passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act. Therefore, such excess vacant lands of which possession has not been taken, but which are subjected to certain concessions under the order of exemption passed in terms of Section 20(1) of the Principal Act and which are particularly to utilize the lands for residential purpose, for implementing residential housing scheme, for industry and it's expansion, shall not be transferred without prior permission of the State and there are restrictions placed on change of user thereof. The permission for change of user will not be granted unless premium is paid to the Government. 5. A reference is made in this circular and the steps taken to implement the Repeal Act. The steps include two communications from the Government dated 01.03.2008 and 03.03.2008 which outline the scheme for development of these lands or their transfer. 6. It has been revealed that the exempted lands are being dealt with and for the purpose of implementation of the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme, Rental Housing Scheme, etc.. Further, the reservations in respect of these lands have been changed or altered from industry/agriculture without any reference to the Government/Competent Authority. The permissions in that regard have been granted without any prior approval from the competent authorities under the Principal Act. Further, the reservations in respect of these lands have been changed or altered from industry/agriculture without any reference to the Government/Competent Authority. The permissions in that regard have been granted without any prior approval from the competent authorities under the Principal Act. Therefore, the Government has directed that the exempted lands cannot be used for any other purpose nor their reservation can be changed unless the approvals/remarks are called for from the competent authority under the Principal Act. Any violation of such requirement would visit the persons concerned with all consequences and at their costs. 7. Prior to this circular there are certain Government Resolutions and which enable utilization of Transferable Development Rights (TDR) so as to use the lands for construction of houses for weaker sections and equally to grant development permissions in relation thereto. This is a Government Resolution dated 30.06.2007. 8. There is also an order and which has been referred to because it is the case of the Petitioners that their members had to obtain several permissions from the Respondent Nos.1 and 2 for carrying out the development. It is contended that the Government Resolutions referred by us including dated 30.06.2007 and emphasis by the authorities on compliance of the same continues despite the Repeal Act brought into force with effect from 29.11.2007. There are several instances which have been given and copies of the exemption orders passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act are referred to in paragraph 7 of the memo of Writ Petition No.9872/2010. 9. The grievance is that though the order of exemption was passed exempting the excess vacant land from the purview of Chapter-III of the Principal Act, when that Act was in force, but now after it's repeal the exemption order would not survive. In other words, the steps taken by the Authorities to give effect to the order of exemption even after repeal of the Principal Act in the State of Maharashtra are wholly illegal. The Authorities cannot compel parties like the Petitioners to seek any extension of time to complete the scheme or to comply with the conditions on which the order of exemption under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act has been passed. The stand taken is that the Respondents have no powers to enforce the Principal Act directly or indirectly. Several instances of such alleged attempts are set out. The stand taken is that the Respondents have no powers to enforce the Principal Act directly or indirectly. Several instances of such alleged attempts are set out. There is reference made to the legal provisions and finally what is prayed is that this Court must restrain by an appropriate writ, order or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Respondents from enforcing the provisions of the Principal Act insofar as such exemption orders and their terms and conditions. 10. From the record, what transpires is that a Writ Petition being Writ Petition No.3815/2010 from this group or batch of petitions, appeared before a Division Bench of this Court and it pronounced its judgment on 22.12.2010 noting that two Division Benches in the cases of Sundersons and others v/s State of Maharashtra and others reported in 2008 (5) Bombay Cases Reporter 85 and Damodar Laxman Navre v/s State of Maharashtra in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 dated 08th July , 2010, take a view that certain steps in pursuance of the order of exemption or seeking to enforce the terms and conditions thereof cannot be taken, whereas a conflicting view has been rendered by another Division Bench of this Court in Mira Bhayandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s the Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration and others in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 dated 27th August, 2009. 11. The attention of the Division Bench in Writ Petition No.3815/2010 (Jayesh Tokarshi Shah v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration) was invited to all these judgments and orders and stated to be conflicting. The Division Bench, therefore, in its judgment dated 22nd December, 2010 in the aforesaid matter observed as under :- 15. This prompts an answer in favour of a premise that the Additional District Collector, Thane and Competent Authority was not competent to issue the said Circular, and as such the efficacy of the said Circular commanding the Registering Officer to refuse the registration of the documents referred to therein remains questionable. A view congenial to the said premise is found expressed in some of the judgments Sunderson & Ors Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2008(5) Bombay Cases Reporter 85, Damodar Laxman Navre & 4 others Vs. State of Maharashtra & 4 others Writ Petition No.6300 of 2009, delivered previously by the Division Bench of this Court. A view congenial to the said premise is found expressed in some of the judgments Sunderson & Ors Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2008(5) Bombay Cases Reporter 85, Damodar Laxman Navre & 4 others Vs. State of Maharashtra & 4 others Writ Petition No.6300 of 2009, delivered previously by the Division Bench of this Court. However, there is a conflicting view expressed in the judgments delivered by the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No.5745 of 2009 Mira Bhayander Builders & Developers Welfare Association Vs. Dy. Collector & Competent Authority, Thane and 3 others. The Circular dated 23.6.2008 was the epicentre of controversy in Mira Bhayander Builders & Developers Welfare Association (Supra). The State contended as in the present case that the scheme holders were trying to wriggle out of their obligations under the scheme sanctioned under Section 20 of U.L.C. Act, and therefore, the said Circular came to be issued to protect the schemes meant for economically weaker sections, and also the government. The Division Bench after considering the rival contentions observed thus :- “In our view, if the members of the petitioners’ association have taken benefit of the schemes under Section 20 of the said Act by constructing buildings, they now cannot wiggle out of their obligations to surrender flats to the government which the government could sell at fixed rate. The entire tenor of the above petitioners appears to be that the petitioners do not want to fulfil their obligations under the said Schemes viz. surrendering the flats to the State Government and taking advantage of the repeal of the said Act want to contend that their obligations under the said schemes do not survive. In our view the impugned letter as rightly contended by the learned AGP has been issued to protect the public interest and government revenue. It does not befit the Petitioners who have taken advantage of the said scheme now contend that their obligations do not survive, and therefore, there is no need for them to surrender flats to the government. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the challenge raised in the above petition which is accordingly dismissed.” 16. In the instant case similar situation is portrayed in the affidavit in reply filed by the State. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the challenge raised in the above petition which is accordingly dismissed.” 16. In the instant case similar situation is portrayed in the affidavit in reply filed by the State. Referring to the Mohan Gopal Mate case (Supra) reported in 2008(6) ALL MR 41, the learned Advocate for the Petitioner submitted that a pertinent question regarding the extent of power of the State under Sections 20 and 21 of U.L.C. Act in the case of breach of conditions of the scheme by the scheme holder has been clearly answered as follows: “Powers of the State under Section 20 in case of breach of condition of the order of exemption is limited to withdraw exemption order only and so far as Section 21 is concerned, declare the land which is not to be treated as excess land in view of the Sub-Section (1) in case of breach of condition State can declare such land to be excess in view of Sub-Section (2) of Section 21. Thereupon, the provisions of Chapter III will apply to the said land.” 17. Going by strict interpretation of the Sections 20 and 21 of the ULC Act, the power of the State in case of contravention of any of the conditions of the scheme by scheme holder remains limited to withdrawal of the exemption and declaring the exempted land as excess land and to application of the provisions of the Chapter III of the said Act for acquisition of the said land as contemplated under Sub-Section (2) of Section 21 therein. 18. This view is in conflict with the view expressed by the Division Bench in Mira Bhayander Builders & Developers Welfare Association (Supra), and as such the controversy raised by such conflict deserves to be resolved by the Full Bench of this Court. 19. This Petition is, therefore, referred to the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for passing appropriate directions in the matter.” 12. It is in view of these events that a Full Bench was constituted and the above formulated questions await an answer from us. 13. At the outset we must clarify that we would be only answering the question/s formulated and reproduced hereinabove. We would not be expressing any opinion on the rival contentions insofar as merits of individual petitions. It is in view of these events that a Full Bench was constituted and the above formulated questions await an answer from us. 13. At the outset we must clarify that we would be only answering the question/s formulated and reproduced hereinabove. We would not be expressing any opinion on the rival contentions insofar as merits of individual petitions. Each of these petitions thereafter would be placed before the appropriate Division Benches and for a decision on merits and in accordance with law. Our observations and findings, therefore, shall not be construed as expression of any opinion on the merits of the Writ Petitions referred above or pending in this Court. 14. The Petitioners' counsel have made an attempt to show us as to how the Division Bench judgment in the case of Mira Bhayander Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane (supra) does not lay down the correct law. They have all, more or less, urged that repeal of the Principal Act in the State of Maharashtra on 29.11.2007 results in the State and competent authorities being prevented from withdrawing the order of exemption passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act. Assuming that the order of exemption or any action taken there-under is valid notwithstanding anything contrary held in any judgment or order of the competent court, yet the Repeal Act saves only validity of the order of exemption and nothing more. Such saving would not permit the State Government or competent authority to withdraw the order of exemption or enforce the terms and conditions thereof or to subject the excess vacant land to the consequences under the Principal Act. The saving is thus not absolute, but restricted in nature. Thirdly, it is urged that there being a Repealing Act containing such restricted saving clause, the same rules out applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 or its parimateria provision in the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904. 15. We shall now elaborate these contentions as articulated by Mr. Naphade, learned Senior Counsel and adopted with some additions by Mr. Sathe, Mr. Sridharan, Mr. Devitre, Mr. Samdani, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Gangal, Mr. oshi and Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners. 16. Mr. Naphade firstly submitted that for understanding the Repeal Act we must have a look at the Principal Act. The Principal Act, according to Mr. Sathe, Mr. Sridharan, Mr. Devitre, Mr. Samdani, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Gangal, Mr. oshi and Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners. 16. Mr. Naphade firstly submitted that for understanding the Repeal Act we must have a look at the Principal Act. The Principal Act, according to Mr. Naphade, contains several provisions, but material there-from are Sections 3, 5, 6, 8, 10 and 38. Mr. Naphade also took us through Section 11 of the Principal Act before coming to Section 20. In his submission the scheme of the Principal Act is that no one shall hold the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. The return or statement has to be filed so as to determine the extent of excess vacant land. In other words, Mr. Naphade submits that except as otherwise provided in the Principal Act, on and from the commencement of the Act, no person shall be entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of ceiling limit in the territories to which the Principal Act applies. Mr. Naphade submits that Section 4 sets out the ceiling limit. He submits that the transfer of vacant land is also an aspect which is taken care of by Section 5. The persons holding the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit have to file the statement. He submits that further provisions enable scrutiny of particulars, preparing a draft statement as regards the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit and the final statement. Mr. Naphade submits that Section 10 is entitled “Acquisition of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit”. The extent of the vacant land held by a person in excess of ceiling limit has to be specified by subsection (1) of Section 10 and the purpose of same is to enable acquisition of the same eventually. That is an aspect dealt with by subsections (2) and (3) of Section 10. The vesting of such excess vacant land free from all encumbrances and with effect from the date of publication of a notification under subsection (3) results in enabling the Government to take possession of the land. In these circumstances, according to Mr. Naphade, only consequence of not filing a return or statement, but which is not accepted in totality is provided by Section 10. There is also a provision, namely, Section 38 which makes such act a punishable offence and Mr. In these circumstances, according to Mr. Naphade, only consequence of not filing a return or statement, but which is not accepted in totality is provided by Section 10. There is also a provision, namely, Section 38 which makes such act a punishable offence and Mr. Naphade invites our attention to subsections (1) to (4) of Section 38 in that regard. Mr. Naphade's attempt was to show that even if the vacant land is in excess of ceiling limit and there is no compliance with the provisions requiring filing a statement of such vacant land, still the owner is not deprived of his rights in the same. Mr. Naphade in that regard invites our attention to Section 15 of the Principal Act and submits that it reflects the legislative intent. There is no loss of ownership on promulgation of the Principal Act. In these circumstances all that the Principal Act does is to create some sort of clog or cloud on the rights of a person to hold the land. His ownership rights therein are not affected. 17. Mr. Naphade, therefore, submits that the power to exempt the excess vacant land from applicability of Chapter-III of the Principal Act is exercised by the Government either on its own motion or otherwise and that is also clear by Sections 21 and 22 which permits the excess vacant land not to be treated as such in certain cases and it's retention under certain circumstances. Therefore, merely because a holder of the excess vacant land seeks exemption from applicability of Chapter-III or the State exempts such vacant land from applicability thereof will not mean that the right and particularly ownership therein is surrendered much less waived. Mr. Naphade's attempt was to show that the State seeks to put the excess vacant land beyond application of Chapter-III, but keeping all his rights and options intact. The reference, therefore, will have to be answered by us bearing in mind this vital aspect, is the submission of Mr. Naphade. 18. Mr. Naphade elaborated this aspect by submitting that once the land is exempted, it is out of the purview of the Principal Act. The right to hold it conditionally remains unaffected. The power to exempt is limited in nature. It is legislative in character. Naphade. 18. Mr. Naphade elaborated this aspect by submitting that once the land is exempted, it is out of the purview of the Principal Act. The right to hold it conditionally remains unaffected. The power to exempt is limited in nature. It is legislative in character. By no stretch of imagination it is a right conferred in the Government nor exercise of powers to exempt creates any right in the Government in respect of such excess vacant land. In these circumstances and if Sections 20(2) and 21(2) are read together it would be apparent that neither any action under subsection (1) of Section 21 or the power under subsection (2) is saved by repeal of the Principal Act. In fact the Repeal Act does not save Section 21 at all. Hence, when the Repeal Act in Section 3(1)(b) refers to the validity of exemption order, it deliberately omits to include or refer subsection (2) of Section 20. Hence, there is no power to withdraw the exemption order under Section 20(1) after repeal of the Principal Act. Hence, even breach or violation of the condition in the exemption order will not result in its cancellation or withdrawal. Apart there-from any breach or violation of the condition on which the exemption order was granted does not result in automatic withdrawal or cancellation thereof. That is apparent from Section 20(2). It is, therefore, clear that the Repeal Act does not save this power and by omitting subsection (2) of Section 20 from clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. The legislature was aware that the power to withdraw the exemption order will have to be exercised only after giving a reasonable opportunity to such person who has violated the conditions subject to which the exemption under clause (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of Section 20 is granted. That reasonable opportunity is to make representation against the proposed withdrawal. It is the only consequence of either not complying with the conditions subject to which the exemption is granted or not being able to satisfy the Government that such exemption should not be withdrawn or from applicability of Chapter-III to the excess vacant land. Meaning thereby same is capable of being acquired and thereafter, vested in the Government. It is the only consequence of either not complying with the conditions subject to which the exemption is granted or not being able to satisfy the Government that such exemption should not be withdrawn or from applicability of Chapter-III to the excess vacant land. Meaning thereby same is capable of being acquired and thereafter, vested in the Government. Once that power cannot be exercised post repeal of the Principal Act, then, we would be in complete error if we hold that the repeal of the Principal Act does not affect the power to withdraw the exemption or to enforce the terms and conditions thereof. 19. In that regard, Mr. Naphade has taken us through Sections 20(2), 21(2) and 22(2) of the Principal Act. He submits that subsection (2) of Section 20 confers discretion in the Government and it may not withdraw the exemption order despite the conditions subject to which the same is granted are not complied with by any person. Whereas, subsection (2) of Section 21 mandates declaring the vacant land to be excess. It is submitted that there are distinct consequences and which are taken care of by subsection (2) of Section 22. Thus, the power of exemption has different parameters and the legislature was aware that such power cannot survive the repeal of the Principal Act. Hence, in the teeth of this clear language of the Repeal Act recourse to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is impermissible. Once a different intention appears from the provisions contained in the Repeal Act, then, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 would not apply. The question of liberal construction of Section 3 of the Repeal Act, therefore, does not arise at all. 20. Mr. Naphade thereafter took us extensively through the Repeal Act to submit that what is saved is specific. By clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act the vesting of land of which possession has been taken by the State is saved. Meaning thereby, any vacant land which is subject matter of declaration under Section 10(3) of which possession has not been taken by the State Government, then its vesting is not saved by the Repeal Act. Meaning thereby, any vacant land which is subject matter of declaration under Section 10(3) of which possession has not been taken by the State Government, then its vesting is not saved by the Repeal Act. Such land of which possession has not been taken will have to be restored post repeal after the requirement stipulated in subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act is complied with. Therefore, there is no collision between clause (a) and clause (b). What clause (b) saves is only validity of the order granting exemption under Section 20(1) or any action taken thereunder. The power to withdraw the exemption is not saved. If it is held to be saved, then, clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act would be rendered redundant. Only consequence of exemption being withdrawn is to subject the land to applicability of Chapter-III of the Principal Act and particularly Section 10(3) thereof. If possession of such excess vacant land cannot be taken even after withdrawal of exemption in terms of subsection (2) of Section 20 of the Principal Act, then, there was no point in saving its validity. Therefore, the validity of the order of exemption is saved, but neither that saving will enable the State to withdraw the exemption post repeal nor will the State be in a position to give effect to the order of withdrawal of the exemption if cannot take possession of the excess vacant land. That is the reason why the power to withdraw the exemption has not been saved. Section 4 of the Repeal Act, therefore, would throw light on the interpretation of clauses (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. That Section 4 provides for abatement of legal proceedings. If the legal proceedings abate on the date on which the Repeal Act came into force, then, the intent could never be to save the power to withdraw the exemption. Therefore, the words, appearing in clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3, after Section 20 should be read accordingly and that would be consistent with the object and purpose sought to be achieved in enacting the Repeal Act. None of the proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the Principal Act pending immediately before commencement of the Repeal Act are saved. None of the proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the Principal Act pending immediately before commencement of the Repeal Act are saved. Even if they are pending before any court or tribunal or any other authority they shall abate. In these circumstances the Legislature clearly intended that any past or closed or conclusive action alone is saved. Anything in the pipeline or inchoate is affected and not saved. This is because the Principal Act is a self contained code. It contains substantive and procedural provisions and even creates a forum for the purpose of enforcing and exercising substantive rights and powers and equally procedural one. A forum is created so as to make and enact a complete code. Nothing beyond the Principal Act can be seen. If the Repeal Act is construed in this manner, then, it envisages complete destruction of the rights under the Principal Act. Any right which is crystallized and which is not a mere hope or chance is alone saved. 21. Mr. Naphade also submits that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act cannot be imported into and read when the Repeal Act is so specific and clear. Alternatively and without prejudice to this submission Mr. Naphade submits that if Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is analyzed, it by clauses (a) to (e) saves something which is in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect. It does not affect previous operation of the Act so repealed or anything duly done or suffered there-under. The repeal does not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the repealed enactment. Mr. Naphade submits that clause (b) would, therefore, refer to past or complete act and not something which is intended and incomplete. The liabilities that are crystallized under the enactment which is repealed alone are unaffected by repeal of the original or Principal Act and that is clarified by clause (c). This clause cannot be imported in the present Repealing Act for the simple reason that it would create inconsistency. Mr. Naphade submits that clause (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would have saved Section 20(2) of the Principal Act had Sections 3 and 4 been not enacted in the Repeal Act. This clause cannot be imported in the present Repealing Act for the simple reason that it would create inconsistency. Mr. Naphade submits that clause (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would have saved Section 20(2) of the Principal Act had Sections 3 and 4 been not enacted in the Repeal Act. That being clearly enacted there will be inconsistency if one imports clause (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act in Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act. For all these reasons Mr. Naphade would submit that the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, Delhi High Court and Madras High Court follows the Division Bench judgments of this Court from which Mira Bhayander (supra) differs. That is the only view possible in the present legal backdrop and we must, therefore, hold that Mira Bhayander (supra) does not lay down the correct law and should be overruled. Mr. Naphade submits that when three or four High Courts in the country have taken a consistent view of the provision contained in a Central Act, then, that view ought to be followed so as to bring comity and consistency in interpretation of a Parliamentary statute. The reference, therefore, be answered accordingly. 22. Mr. Naphade in support of the above submissions, has placed heavy reliance on the following decisions :- 1. Mohamed Ashref Noor v/s State of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.6856/2003 decided on 16.12.2009 by the Madras High Court. 2. Surendra Raj Jaiswal v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.26474/2009 decided on 24.08.2011 by a Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 3. The Principal Secretary to Government, Hyderabad v/s Surendra, in Writ Petition No.951/2012 decided on 25.07.2012 by the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 4. M/s Suri Industries v/s State of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.8610/2013 decided on 06.09.2010 by the Madras High Court. 5. Manik M. Ragit v/s State of Maharashtra reported in 2013 (2) Mh.L.J. 224 . (WP No.1290/2012 decided on 30.07.2012 Nagpur Bench). 6. M/s Nile Limited v/s State of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.23846/2008 decided on 06.11.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 7. State of Uttar Pradesh v/s Hari Ram reported in (2013) 4 SCC 280 . 8. M/s Tata Coffee Limited v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.11929/2013 decided on 22.07.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 9. M/s Nile Limited v/s State of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.23846/2008 decided on 06.11.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 7. State of Uttar Pradesh v/s Hari Ram reported in (2013) 4 SCC 280 . 8. M/s Tata Coffee Limited v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.11929/2013 decided on 22.07.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 9. Gajanan Kamlya Patil v/s Additional Collector and Competent Authority, in Civil Appeal Nos.2070, 2071/ 2014 arising out of SLP (C) Nos.14904, 14905 of 2011 decided on 14.02.2014 by the Honourable Supreme Court. 10. M/s L.G. Polymers India Private Limited v/s State of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.21934/2013 decided on 28.03.2014 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 11. Synco Industries Limited v/s Assessing Officer, Income Tax, Mumbai reported in (2008) 4 SCC 22 . 12. Tej Pratap Singh v/s Union of India, in Writ Petition (C) No.2455/1992 decided on 16.07.2009 by the Delhi High Court. 23. The submissions of Mr. Naphade have been adopted by Mr. Milind Sathe, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Writ Petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.2201/2009, 3815/2010 and 9703/2010. In addition, Mr. Sathe submits that the Preamble of the Principal Act provides for imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomeration, for acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit and to regulate the construction of buildings on such land. It is also to distribute the excess vacant land after it vests in the State. In these circumstances if the construction placed by the State on the provisions of the Repeal Act is accepted that would result in saving of the consequences following withdrawal of exemption. Section 20(2) of the Principal Act envisages withdrawal of exemption and after such withdrawal what follows is the vesting of the land in terms of Section 10(3) and its possession as envisaged by Section 10(5) and (6). This is specifically not saved by Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act. Having regard to the clear language of the Principal Act this is the only consequence which follows on withdrawal of exemption. If it is not expressly saved, then, by an indirect or oblique method the Court cannot save it. Mr. This is specifically not saved by Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act. Having regard to the clear language of the Principal Act this is the only consequence which follows on withdrawal of exemption. If it is not expressly saved, then, by an indirect or oblique method the Court cannot save it. Mr. Sathe's contention is that what is specifically saved is the validity of the order of exemption and the crucial words are to be found in clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act to this effect that the validity of any order granting exemption under Section 20 (1) or any action taken there-under is saved notwithstanding any judgment of any court to the contrary. Therefore, even if the Court declares the order of exemption or any action taken thereunder to be bad or invalid that is unaffected by repeal of the Principal Act. Beyond this nothing more can be read in the saving clause or the Repeal Act as a whole. The Reference, therefore, be answered accordingly. Mr. Sathe relies upon the following judgments : 1. Mukarram Ali Khan v/s State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2007) 11 SCC 90 . 2. Voltas Limited v/s Additional Collector and Competent Authority, reported in 2008 (5) Bom. C.R. 746. 3. Shanti Bhardwaj v/s State of U.P., reported in (2004) 10 SCC 130 . 4. Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, reported in (2012) 4 SCC 718 . 5. Ritesh Tewari v/s State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2010) 10 SCC 677 . 6. Simpson and General Finance Company Limited v/s State of State of Tamil Nadu, reported in (2006) 4 MLJ 1807 (Madras High Court). 7. Mohan Gopalrao Mate v/s Principal Secretary, reported in 2009 (1) Bom. C.R. 275. 8. Vithabai Bama Bhandari v/s State of Maharashtra, reported in 2009 (3) Bom. C.R. 663. 9. Tej Pratap Singh v/s Union of India, in Writ Petition (C) No.2455/1992 decided on 16.07.2009 by the Delhi High Court. 10. Mira Bhyandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s The Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration, in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 decided on 27.08.2009 by the Bombay High Court. 11. Kabbur Industries Private Limited v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.9890/2009 decided on 05.05.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 12. 10. Mira Bhyandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s The Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration, in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 decided on 27.08.2009 by the Bombay High Court. 11. Kabbur Industries Private Limited v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.9890/2009 decided on 05.05.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 12. Damodar Laxman Navare v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 decided on 08.07.2010 by the Bombay High Court : Reported in 2010(6) Bom. C.R. 611. 13. Waman Bandu Bhoir v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.4141/2010 decided on 11.10.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 14. Jayesh Tokarshi Shah v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane, in Writ Petition No.3815/2010 decided on 26.10.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 15. Maharaj Singh v/s State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (1977) 1 SCC 155 . 16. Union of India v/s Somasundaram Viswanath, reported in (1989) 1 SCC 175 . 17. John Thomas v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.38507/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 18. L. Kannappan and L. Thirunavukarasu v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.46091/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 19. Anil Nemichand Bafna v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.153/2008 decided on 06.05.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 20. Surendra Raj Jaiswal v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.26474/2009 decided on 24.08.2011 by a Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 21. Manik M. Ragit v/s State of Maharashtra reported in 2013 (2) Mh.L.J. 224 . (WP No.1290/2012 decided on 30.07.2012 Nagpur Bench). 22. State of Uttar Pradesh v/s Hari Ram reported in (2013) 4 SCC 280 . 24. Mr. Naphade's submissions then have been adopted by Mr. Gangal, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition No.5024/2013. He went further to contend that what is saved by virtue of Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act is the validity of the order of exemption, but not the conditions subject to which such exemption is granted. In that regard Mr. Gangal relied upon the following judgments :- 1. Shanti Bhardwaj v/s State of U.P., reported in (2004) 10 SCC 130 . 2. L. Kannappan and L. Thirunavukarasu v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.46091/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 3. In that regard Mr. Gangal relied upon the following judgments :- 1. Shanti Bhardwaj v/s State of U.P., reported in (2004) 10 SCC 130 . 2. L. Kannappan and L. Thirunavukarasu v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.46091/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 3. Surendra Raj Jaiswal v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.26474/2009 decided on 24.08.2011 by a Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 25. Then Mr. Sridharan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.2243/2011 and 2244/2011, argued that the Repeal Act envisages application of same in the first instance to the whole of the State of Haryana and Punjab and to all the Union territories. This is envisaged by Section 1(2) of the Repeal Act. The Repeal Act comes into force in other States after other States adopt the Repeal Act by resolution passed in that behalf under Article 252(2) of the Constitution of India. Mr. Sridharan, therefore, submits that this aspect must be borne in mind while considering the submission or stand of the State regarding applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Mr. Sridharan submits that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act applies only when either the General Clauses Act or any Central Act or Regulation made after commencement of the General Clauses Act repeals any enactment made prior to the General Clauses Act coming into force or thereafter. In the present case the State Government has adopted by resolution passed under Article 252 of the Constitution of India the Repeal Act in the State of Maharashtra with effect from 29.11.2007. In the light of such adoption by resolution of the State Assembly the Section 6 of the General Clauses Act cannot be resorted to or applied. That applies only when either the General Clauses Act or any Central Act or Regulation made after commencement of the General Clauses Act repeals any enactment made or to be made by the Parliament. Both are Parliamentary Statues and in such circumstances by virtue of Article 252(2) of the Constitution of India the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out. 26. Alternatively, Mr. Sridharan submits that Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act is a special saving clause demonstrating a clear different intention. Therefore, Section 3 of the Repeal Act saves only what is specifically mentioned therein. 26. Alternatively, Mr. Sridharan submits that Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act is a special saving clause demonstrating a clear different intention. Therefore, Section 3 of the Repeal Act saves only what is specifically mentioned therein. There is no room for applying Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 by implication or impliedly. Mr. Sridharan also submits that in true sense we are not construing a validating statute or clause. What is saved by clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 is an order under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act and the exemptions which are subject matter of the same. All actions under the same are saved, but that does not mean that the power to take action under Section 20(2) is also saved. The saving in the present case is only to protect the rights of innocent third parties. Even the actions under the exemption are saved with a view to ensure such protection. This is not a substantive provision and therefore, it cannot be construed with reference to the Principal Act. By no stretch of imagination it revives the Principal Act. This is apparent from reading of Section 4 of the Repeal Act because even the proceedings as initiated abate on Principal Act coming into force. By clause (c) of subsection (1) of Section 3 the liability incurred under the exemption order is not saved, but only the payment made to the State Government as a condition for granting exemption under Section 20(1) is unaffected and thus, saved. Beyond all this we should not read anything into the Repeal Act. Mr. Sridharan relied upon the following decisions in support of the above contentions :- 1. Kolhapur Cane-sugar Works Limited v/s Union of India, reported in (2000) 2 SCC 536 . 2. Air India v/s Union of India, reported in (1995) 4 SCC 734 . 3. Union of India v/s West Coast Paper Mills Limited, reported in 2004 (164) E.L.T. 375 (SC). 4. Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Limited v/s Broach Borough Municipality, reported in 2000 (123) ELT 3 (SC). 27. It is pertinent to note that Mr. Sridharan's main argument has not been supported or adopted by any counsel. It is clear that Mr. Naphade's contentions and submissions as adopted by Mr. Sathe are further adopted and elaborated by Mr. Devitre, learned Senior Counsel appearing in the Original Side Writ Petition No.37/2010 and Mr. 27. It is pertinent to note that Mr. Sridharan's main argument has not been supported or adopted by any counsel. It is clear that Mr. Naphade's contentions and submissions as adopted by Mr. Sathe are further adopted and elaborated by Mr. Devitre, learned Senior Counsel appearing in the Original Side Writ Petition No.37/2010 and Mr. Samdani, learned Senior Counsel appearing in Writ Petition No.346/2011. Both of them have urged that a different intention appears in clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act and therefore, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act has no application. The specific saving is for the benefit of the land holders and therefore, there is no scope for construing clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act on equitable principles. Once there is no room for equitable considerations and particularly as Mr. Samdani urges because of the Principal Act being ex-propriatory in nature and providing for compulsory acquisition, then, all the more any liberal construction is ruled out. Mr. Samdani submits that even the saving clause has to be strictly construed in this case and the repeal of the Principal Act wipes out the same and obliterates it from the statute book completely. For all these reasons the Reference should be answered accordingly. 28. Mr. Devitre and Mr. Samdani relied upon the following decisions :- 1. Mohan Gopalrao Mate v/s Principal Secretary, reported in 2009 (1) Bom. C.R. 275. 2. Parripati Chandrasekharrao and Sons v/s Alapati Jalaiah, reported in (1995) 3 SCC 709 . 3. Khub Chand v/s State of Rajasthan, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1074 . 4. Gujarat Electricity Board v/s Girdharlal Motilal, reported in AIR 1969 SC 267 . 5. State of Maharashtra v/s B.E. Billimoria, reported in (2003) 7 SCC 336 . 6. Corporation of the City of Victoria v/s Bishop of Vancouver Island, reported in AIR 1921 PC 240. 7. T.R. Thandur v/s Union of India, reported in (1996) 3 SCC 690 . 29. Mr. Aniruddha Joshi, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition No.9872/2010 invites our attention to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vithabai Bama Bhandari v/s State of Maharashtra (supra) and submits that there is nothing sacrosanct about Section 20 of the Principal Act. By indirect process we cannot, therefore, save what is not expressly saved by the Repeal Act. By indirect process we cannot, therefore, save what is not expressly saved by the Repeal Act. Once the power to exempt cannot be exercised and not available after the Repeal Act, then, merely because such power is exercised during the subsistence of the Principal Act and prior to the Repeal Act coming into force does not mean that further or incidental power envisaged by the primary power to exempt is saved. Even this incidental or ancillary power is unavailable after repeal of the Principal Act. This argument is built more or less on the wording of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. 30. Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition No.556/2010, while adopting all arguments of all the Senior Counsel only submitted that when more than one High Court in this country have placed an interpretation on the Parliamentary Statute or construed its provisions in a particular way, then, for the sake of consistency and certainty this Court must follow the reasoning of the Delhi High Court, Madras High Court and Andhra Pradesh High Court. 31. Mr. Joshi and Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha relied upon the following judgments in support of the above submissions :- 1. Damodar Laxman Navare v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 decided on 08.07.2010 by the Bombay High Court : Reported in 2010(6) Bom. C.R. 611. 2. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v/s Alcock Ashdown & Company Limited, reported in 1979 ITR page 164 : in Income Tax Reference No.40/1969 decided on 07.07.1978 by the Bombay High Court. 3. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v/s T. Maneklal Mfg. Co. Ltd., reported in 1978 ITR Vol.115 page 725. 4. Bhagwat Dharmaraj Radke v/s State of Maharashtra, in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.35883/2012 decided on 31.03.2014 by the Honourable Supreme Court. 5. Government of Karnataka v/s Gowramma and others, reported in AIR 2008 SC 863 . 32. On the other hand, Mr. Khambata, learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State submits that it is fallacious to assume that the State or other Respondents, namely, Authorities under the Principal Act are requesting this Court to go by any equitable consideration or liberal principle. 32. On the other hand, Mr. Khambata, learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State submits that it is fallacious to assume that the State or other Respondents, namely, Authorities under the Principal Act are requesting this Court to go by any equitable consideration or liberal principle. The State has throughout maintained that in terms of the Preamble of the Principal Act and Constitutional philosophy as enshrined by Articles 21 and 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution of India a ceiling has been placed by the Principal Act on the holding of vacant land within the urban agglomeration. This ceiling limit, as is reflected from the Principal Act and which cannot be disputed, is placed by a statutory prescription that is to be found in Section 4 of the Principal Act. Chapter-III of the Principal Act is titled as “ceiling on vacant land”. Except as otherwise provided in the Principal Act on and from the commencement of the Principal Act no person shall be entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit in the territories to which this Act applies under subsection (2) of Section 1. The obligation under the statute is, therefore, clear and absolute. It relates and dates back to the commencement of the Principal Act. None can dispute that what is exempted from the purview of Chapter-III and by a overriding power conferred in the State Government is the applicability of Chapter-III to the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. Therefore, when the excess vacant land is exempted in exceptional circumstances and which have been also specified by the statute, then, all that happens is that the excess vacant land is exempted from the provisions of Chapter-III either conditionally or unconditionally and in terms of the satisfaction in clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of Section 20 of the Principal Act. The power to exempt is exercised by the State suo-motu or otherwise meaning thereby on the Application of the person holding the excess vacant land. The request is not to apply the Chapter in the light of the factors and circumstances specified therein. This request is made and granted only on the satisfaction reached and not as a matter of course. Thus, application of the chapter is a rule and its non-application is an exception. The request is not to apply the Chapter in the light of the factors and circumstances specified therein. This request is made and granted only on the satisfaction reached and not as a matter of course. Thus, application of the chapter is a rule and its non-application is an exception. Despite repeal of the Principal Act if the validity of the order granting exemption under subsection (1) of Section 20 is saved by Section 3 of the Repeal Act and such validity remains unaffected notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the order of the competent court, then, full effect will have to be given to the language of the Repeal Act. Once the Repeal Act is so clear and does not evince anything contrary to the principles enshrined in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, then, on the strength of the wording of the Repeal Act and in any event with the assistance of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act it can safely be held that there is no intention to destroy the rights and liabilities or consequences which flow from a valid exemption order. In fact the language of Section 3 of the Repeal Act supplements Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Nothing in Section 3 of the Repeal Act takes away applicability of the Principal Act to the extent of enforcing the obligations in terms of the conditions imposed in the order of exemption. The learned Advocate General submits that the arguments of the Petitioners revolve around the saving clause enacted by Section 3 of the Repeal Act. The submissions are that the Repeal Act shows intention contrary to the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act inasmuch as neither the exemption order nor any of the terms and conditions therein can be enforced post repeal. 33. The learned Advocate General submitted that the provisions of the Repeal Act and particularly Section 3(1) clauses (b) and (c) require a harmonious interpretation. 33. The learned Advocate General submitted that the provisions of the Repeal Act and particularly Section 3(1) clauses (b) and (c) require a harmonious interpretation. By reading these clauses together what is apparent is that by clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act it is clarified that repeal of the Principal Act shall not affect the vesting of any vacant land under Section 10(3) of the Principal Act, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorized by the State in this behalf or by the competent authority. Thus, if the steps as contemplated by subsection (3) of Section 10 of the Principal Act and equally by subsections (5) and (6) thereof are taken, then, the vesting of excess vacant land referred to in a Notification published under Section 10(1) in terms of subsection (3) thereof is not affected by repeal of the Principal Act. No person then can claim that the excess vacant land to which the Principal Act admittedly applies and which is deemed to have been acquired by the State does not belong to it or the State is not entitled to it because the Principal Act has been repealed and the vesting comes to an end. The vesting is of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. Undisputedly, if the land in excess of ceiling limit can vest after the notification in terms of Section 10(1) is published in the official Gazette, then, the declaration which is postulated or contemplated by subsection (3) is in relation to such excess vacant land. What subsection (3) of Section 10 really contemplates and envisages is that the State can declare that the excess vacant land is deemed to have been acquired by it upon publication of the declaration and particularly with effect from the dates specified therein. By such deemed acquisition the land is further deemed to have vested absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances with effect from the date specified in the declaration. By such deemed acquisition the land is further deemed to have vested absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances with effect from the date specified in the declaration. By the repeal what has been clarified is that unless the State has taken over possession of such excess vacant land and as referred to in the Notification under Section 10(1) either by itself or through any person duly authorized by it in this behalf or by the competent authority, its plain and simple vesting will not enable the Government to take over possession of the excess vacant land after coming into force of the Repeal Act. This coming into force or commencing is reckoned in terms of subsections (2) and (3) of Section 1 of the Repeal Act. Thus, the State is disabled from taking possession of the excess vacant land which has already vested in it if it has failed to take possession. Thereupon the land can be restored and that is how subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act would read. Therefore, this is not a restricted or limited saving clause in any sense of the term. Though Section 3 is titled “saving” it contains the substantive provisions. The Legislature or the Parliament did not intend a vacuum. It did not stop by only stating that if possession of the land vested in the State in terms of Section 10(3) is not taken, then, that cannot be taken or the land cannot be made over to the Government after repeal of the Principal Act. It enacts a further provision by which it is possible for the State to restore the land to the holder and that is why restoration is contemplated by virtue of Section 3 (2). That restoration is conditional upon repayment of an amount to the State Government by the holder. Section 11 of the Principal Act talks of payment of amount for the vacant land acquired under Section 10(3). That payment can be claimed even without the land being handed over or without the possession of the excess vacant land being taken. The deemed acquisition by virtue of Section 10(3) enables the person or persons having interest in the excess vacant land to claim the amount under Section 11. That payment can be claimed even without the land being handed over or without the possession of the excess vacant land being taken. The deemed acquisition by virtue of Section 10(3) enables the person or persons having interest in the excess vacant land to claim the amount under Section 11. If any payment has been made after such deemed acquisition, then, that amount has to be returned to the Government and only then the excess vacant land of which possession has not been taken will be restored to any person or the holder as the case may be. If this was a complete obliteration or destruction of the rights and liabilities under the Principal Act, then, such substantive provision enabling restoration would not have been inserted or incorporated is the submission of the learned Advocate General. The refund of such amount and which has been paid to the person or persons interested in the excess vacant land in terms of Section 11 of the Principal Act alone entitles such person to claim restoration of the land to him. If the repeal had been simplicitor and without such substantive provision, then, it would not have been possible for the holder or any person interested in the excess vacant land to claim its restoration. It is, therefore, erroneous to urge that the Repeal Act evidences an intention contrary to the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. 34. Inviting our attention to clauses (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act the learned Advocate General submits that the true nature of the power to exempt under the Principal Act would have to be properly and completely appreciated. He submits that the basis on which the power to exempt is exercised is that the person is holding the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. It is in case of such vacant land that the State Government must be satisfied either on its own motion or otherwise that having regard to its location, purpose for which such land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require, it is necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do that the Government is conferred with discretion to pass an order exempting such vacant land from the provisions of Chapter-III either conditionally or otherwise. The learned Advocate General submits that it is not just having regard to location of the land, purpose for which the excess vacant land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require, but it is necessary and expedient in the public interest that the discretion to exempt such land has to be exercised. That is in terms of clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 20. Whereas, in terms of clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 20, the State is satisfied either on its own motion or otherwise that the application of the provisions of Chapter-III would cause undue hardship to the persons holding the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit that the Government may by order exempt conditionally or unconditionally the vacant land from the provisions of Chapter-III. Further the order under clause (b) cannot be made unless the reasons for doing so are recorded in writing. That is because clause (b) contemplates relieving the person holding the excess vacant land from undue hardship. Clause (a) necessarily postulates an exercise of powers to exempt the excess vacant land in public interest. When such is the ambit and scope of the powers and it is vacant land in excess of ceiling limit which is exempted from the provisions of Chapter-III that too in exceptional circumstances, then, it is futile to contend that the State Government despite validity of its Act or order being saved by the Repeal Act, would not be able to do anything in relation to such land post repeal of the Principal Act. The learned Advocate General submits that in this case the power of exemption and which is to be exercised for public good and in public interest is so exercised by making an order in that behalf. That the validity of such an order is saved though the Principal Act is repealed, but the legal consequences flowing from exercise of such clause are not saved, would be an incorrect, improper and legally untenable reading of the saving clause and the Repeal Act itself. The true nature of the power to exempt has not been appreciated in making such submissions. The true nature of the power to exempt has not been appreciated in making such submissions. The Petitioners' arguments proceed on an unsound and erroneous basis and namely that the power to exempt in terms of Section 20(1) of the Principal Act is exercised by the State Government only to benefit the holder. The argument is that it is to relieve the holder from the consequences of applicability of Chapter-III that the State exercises such power and therefore, nothing further can be done in pursuance of the valid order of exemption post repeal of the Principal Act. Judgment : S.C. Dharmadhikari, J. 1. The Honourable the Chief Justice has constituted this Full Bench in order to resolve a conflict between the conflicting views which have been expressed by two Division Benches of this Court. In our detailed order dated 24th April, 2014 we noticed that conflict and by consent of parties we formulated the questions which have to be answered by us. They read as under :- (1) Does Section 3(1)(b) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 read with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 r/w Section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 save the orders of exemption including all terms and conditions thereof passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act, namely, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and all actions taken there-under? (2) Whether, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 r/w Section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 apply to the repeal of the Principal Act by the Repealing Act, 1999? (3) Whether in view of Section 3(1)(b) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 and the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 : (a) the order of exemption including all its terms and conditions under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act, namely, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 can be continued and enforced in accordance with the provisions of the Principal Act; (b) all remedies and proceedings in respect of the order of exemption including all its terms and conditions may be instituted, continued and enforced? (4) Whether in view of the repeal of the Principal Act by the Repeal Act, the Government of Maharashtra can: (a) recall/cancel/modify the exemption order granted either under Section 20 of the Principal Act; (b) enforce circulars for implementation of exemption orders issued under Section 20 of the Principal Act prior to the repeal of the Principal Act; (c) acquire the land by issuing notification under Section 10(3) of the Principal Act; and (d) take any action of whatsoever nature on account of noncompliance/ breach of exemption order issued under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act? (5) Whether, the view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vithabai Bama Bhandari v/s State of Maharashtra and another reported in 2009(3) Bombay Cases Reporter 663 (Writ Petition No.4241/2008 decided on 31st March/16th April, 2009) and Damodar Laxman Navare and others v/s State of Maharashtra and others in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 dated 08th July, 2010 sets out the correct legal position as regards the ambit and scope of Section 3(1)(b) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 or whether, the view taken in Mira Bhayandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s the Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration and others in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 dated 27th August, 2009 to the contrary should be held to be laying down the correct principle of law? 2. Since both sides have canvassed arguments on legal issues, in order to appreciate them a few facts are required to be noted. We take the facts from a lead case, namely, Writ Petition No.9872/2010. That is a Writ Petition which has been filed by the Maharashtra Chamber of Housing Industry and its various Units. These are associations established to promote the housing and real estate industry. The Writ Petition is filed in the interest of members of these Associations and real estate industry and in the circumstances which are set out in paragraph 4 of the memo of Writ Petition. 3. It is the case of the Petitioners that the State of Maharashtra and Competent Authorities under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as “THE PRINCIPAL ACT”) continue to enforce and apply the provisions thereof despite enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “THE REPEAL ACT”). 3. It is the case of the Petitioners that the State of Maharashtra and Competent Authorities under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as “THE PRINCIPAL ACT”) continue to enforce and apply the provisions thereof despite enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “THE REPEAL ACT”). The Repeal Act has been brought into effect and is in force in the State of Maharashtra from 29.11.2007. 4. The grievance of the Petitioners is that there is a circular dated 18.03.2009 issued by the State Government, copy of which is at Annexure-A. That circular states that the Repeal Act has been brought into force in the State of Maharashtra w.e.f. 29.11.2007. The same expressly saves the vesting of excess vacant land in the State as also validity of an exemption order passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act. Meaning thereby, the repeal of the Principal Act does not affect the vesting of excess vacant land in the State provided its possession has been taken, so also, validity of an exemption order passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act. Therefore, such excess vacant lands of which possession has not been taken, but which are subjected to certain concessions under the order of exemption passed in terms of Section 20(1) of the Principal Act and which are particularly to utilize the lands for residential purpose, for implementing residential housing scheme, for industry and it's expansion, shall not be transferred without prior permission of the State and there are restrictions placed on change of user thereof. The permission for change of user will not be granted unless premium is paid to the Government. 5. A reference is made in this circular and the steps taken to implement the Repeal Act. The steps include two communications from the Government dated 01.03.2008 and 03.03.2008 which outline the scheme for development of these lands or their transfer. 6. It has been revealed that the exempted lands are being dealt with and for the purpose of implementation of the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme, Rental Housing Scheme, etc.. Further, the reservations in respect of these lands have been changed or altered from industry/agriculture without any reference to the Government/Competent Authority. The permissions in that regard have been granted without any prior approval from the competent authorities under the Principal Act. Further, the reservations in respect of these lands have been changed or altered from industry/agriculture without any reference to the Government/Competent Authority. The permissions in that regard have been granted without any prior approval from the competent authorities under the Principal Act. Therefore, the Government has directed that the exempted lands cannot be used for any other purpose nor their reservation can be changed unless the approvals/remarks are called for from the competent authority under the Principal Act. Any violation of such requirement would visit the persons concerned with all consequences and at their costs. 7. Prior to this circular there are certain Government Resolutions and which enable utilization of Transferable Development Rights (TDR) so as to use the lands for construction of houses for weaker sections and equally to grant development permissions in relation thereto. This is a Government Resolution dated 30.06.2007. 8. There is also an order and which has been referred to because it is the case of the Petitioners that their members had to obtain several permissions from the Respondent Nos.1 and 2 for carrying out the development. It is contended that the Government Resolutions referred by us including dated 30.06.2007 and emphasis by the authorities on compliance of the same continues despite the Repeal Act brought into force with effect from 29.11.2007. There are several instances which have been given and copies of the exemption orders passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act are referred to in paragraph 7 of the memo of Writ Petition No.9872/2010. 9. The grievance is that though the order of exemption was passed exempting the excess vacant land from the purview of Chapter-III of the Principal Act, when that Act was in force, but now after it's repeal the exemption order would not survive. In other words, the steps taken by the Authorities to give effect to the order of exemption even after repeal of the Principal Act in the State of Maharashtra are wholly illegal. The Authorities cannot compel parties like the Petitioners to seek any extension of time to complete the scheme or to comply with the conditions on which the order of exemption under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act has been passed. The stand taken is that the Respondents have no powers to enforce the Principal Act directly or indirectly. Several instances of such alleged attempts are set out. The stand taken is that the Respondents have no powers to enforce the Principal Act directly or indirectly. Several instances of such alleged attempts are set out. There is reference made to the legal provisions and finally what is prayed is that this Court must restrain by an appropriate writ, order or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Respondents from enforcing the provisions of the Principal Act insofar as such exemption orders and their terms and conditions. 10. From the record, what transpires is that a Writ Petition being Writ Petition No.3815/2010 from this group or batch of petitions, appeared before a Division Bench of this Court and it pronounced its judgment on 22.12.2010 noting that two Division Benches in the cases of Sundersons and others v/s State of Maharashtra and others reported in 2008 (5) Bombay Cases Reporter 85 and Damodar Laxman Navre v/s State of Maharashtra in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 dated 08th July , 2010, take a view that certain steps in pursuance of the order of exemption or seeking to enforce the terms and conditions thereof cannot be taken, whereas a conflicting view has been rendered by another Division Bench of this Court in Mira Bhayandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s the Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration and others in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 dated 27th August, 2009. 11. The attention of the Division Bench in Writ Petition No.3815/2010 (Jayesh Tokarshi Shah v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration) was invited to all these judgments and orders and stated to be conflicting. The Division Bench, therefore, in its judgment dated 22nd December, 2010 in the aforesaid matter observed as under :- 15. This prompts an answer in favour of a premise that the Additional District Collector, Thane and Competent Authority was not competent to issue the said Circular, and as such the efficacy of the said Circular commanding the Registering Officer to refuse the registration of the documents referred to therein remains questionable. A view congenial to the said premise is found expressed in some of the judgments Sunderson & Ors Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2008(5) Bombay Cases Reporter 85, Damodar Laxman Navre & 4 others Vs. State of Maharashtra & 4 others Writ Petition No.6300 of 2009, delivered previously by the Division Bench of this Court. A view congenial to the said premise is found expressed in some of the judgments Sunderson & Ors Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2008(5) Bombay Cases Reporter 85, Damodar Laxman Navre & 4 others Vs. State of Maharashtra & 4 others Writ Petition No.6300 of 2009, delivered previously by the Division Bench of this Court. However, there is a conflicting view expressed in the judgments delivered by the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No.5745 of 2009 Mira Bhayander Builders & Developers Welfare Association Vs. Dy. Collector & Competent Authority, Thane and 3 others. The Circular dated 23.6.2008 was the epicentre of controversy in Mira Bhayander Builders & Developers Welfare Association (Supra). The State contended as in the present case that the scheme holders were trying to wriggle out of their obligations under the scheme sanctioned under Section 20 of U.L.C. Act, and therefore, the said Circular came to be issued to protect the schemes meant for economically weaker sections, and also the government. The Division Bench after considering the rival contentions observed thus :- “In our view, if the members of the petitioners’ association have taken benefit of the schemes under Section 20 of the said Act by constructing buildings, they now cannot wiggle out of their obligations to surrender flats to the government which the government could sell at fixed rate. The entire tenor of the above petitioners appears to be that the petitioners do not want to fulfil their obligations under the said Schemes viz. surrendering the flats to the State Government and taking advantage of the repeal of the said Act want to contend that their obligations under the said schemes do not survive. In our view the impugned letter as rightly contended by the learned AGP has been issued to protect the public interest and government revenue. It does not befit the Petitioners who have taken advantage of the said scheme now contend that their obligations do not survive, and therefore, there is no need for them to surrender flats to the government. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the challenge raised in the above petition which is accordingly dismissed.” 16. In the instant case similar situation is portrayed in the affidavit in reply filed by the State. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the challenge raised in the above petition which is accordingly dismissed.” 16. In the instant case similar situation is portrayed in the affidavit in reply filed by the State. Referring to the Mohan Gopal Mate case (Supra) reported in 2008(6) ALL MR 41, the learned Advocate for the Petitioner submitted that a pertinent question regarding the extent of power of the State under Sections 20 and 21 of U.L.C. Act in the case of breach of conditions of the scheme by the scheme holder has been clearly answered as follows: “Powers of the State under Section 20 in case of breach of condition of the order of exemption is limited to withdraw exemption order only and so far as Section 21 is concerned, declare the land which is not to be treated as excess land in view of the Sub-Section (1) in case of breach of condition State can declare such land to be excess in view of Sub-Section (2) of Section 21. Thereupon, the provisions of Chapter III will apply to the said land.” 17. Going by strict interpretation of the Sections 20 and 21 of the ULC Act, the power of the State in case of contravention of any of the conditions of the scheme by scheme holder remains limited to withdrawal of the exemption and declaring the exempted land as excess land and to application of the provisions of the Chapter III of the said Act for acquisition of the said land as contemplated under Sub-Section (2) of Section 21 therein. 18. This view is in conflict with the view expressed by the Division Bench in Mira Bhayander Builders & Developers Welfare Association (Supra), and as such the controversy raised by such conflict deserves to be resolved by the Full Bench of this Court. 19. This Petition is, therefore, referred to the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for passing appropriate directions in the matter.” 12. It is in view of these events that a Full Bench was constituted and the above formulated questions await an answer from us. 13. At the outset we must clarify that we would be only answering the question/s formulated and reproduced hereinabove. We would not be expressing any opinion on the rival contentions insofar as merits of individual petitions. It is in view of these events that a Full Bench was constituted and the above formulated questions await an answer from us. 13. At the outset we must clarify that we would be only answering the question/s formulated and reproduced hereinabove. We would not be expressing any opinion on the rival contentions insofar as merits of individual petitions. Each of these petitions thereafter would be placed before the appropriate Division Benches and for a decision on merits and in accordance with law. Our observations and findings, therefore, shall not be construed as expression of any opinion on the merits of the Writ Petitions referred above or pending in this Court. 14. The Petitioners' counsel have made an attempt to show us as to how the Division Bench judgment in the case of Mira Bhayander Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane (supra) does not lay down the correct law. They have all, more or less, urged that repeal of the Principal Act in the State of Maharashtra on 29.11.2007 results in the State and competent authorities being prevented from withdrawing the order of exemption passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act. Assuming that the order of exemption or any action taken there-under is valid notwithstanding anything contrary held in any judgment or order of the competent court, yet the Repeal Act saves only validity of the order of exemption and nothing more. Such saving would not permit the State Government or competent authority to withdraw the order of exemption or enforce the terms and conditions thereof or to subject the excess vacant land to the consequences under the Principal Act. The saving is thus not absolute, but restricted in nature. Thirdly, it is urged that there being a Repealing Act containing such restricted saving clause, the same rules out applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 or its parimateria provision in the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904. 15. We shall now elaborate these contentions as articulated by Mr. Naphade, learned Senior Counsel and adopted with some additions by Mr. Sathe, Mr. Sridharan, Mr. Devitre, Mr. Samdani, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Gangal, Mr. oshi and Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners. 16. Mr. Naphade firstly submitted that for understanding the Repeal Act we must have a look at the Principal Act. The Principal Act, according to Mr. Sathe, Mr. Sridharan, Mr. Devitre, Mr. Samdani, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Gangal, Mr. oshi and Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners. 16. Mr. Naphade firstly submitted that for understanding the Repeal Act we must have a look at the Principal Act. The Principal Act, according to Mr. Naphade, contains several provisions, but material there-from are Sections 3, 5, 6, 8, 10 and 38. Mr. Naphade also took us through Section 11 of the Principal Act before coming to Section 20. In his submission the scheme of the Principal Act is that no one shall hold the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. The return or statement has to be filed so as to determine the extent of excess vacant land. In other words, Mr. Naphade submits that except as otherwise provided in the Principal Act, on and from the commencement of the Act, no person shall be entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of ceiling limit in the territories to which the Principal Act applies. Mr. Naphade submits that Section 4 sets out the ceiling limit. He submits that the transfer of vacant land is also an aspect which is taken care of by Section 5. The persons holding the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit have to file the statement. He submits that further provisions enable scrutiny of particulars, preparing a draft statement as regards the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit and the final statement. Mr. Naphade submits that Section 10 is entitled “Acquisition of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit”. The extent of the vacant land held by a person in excess of ceiling limit has to be specified by subsection (1) of Section 10 and the purpose of same is to enable acquisition of the same eventually. That is an aspect dealt with by subsections (2) and (3) of Section 10. The vesting of such excess vacant land free from all encumbrances and with effect from the date of publication of a notification under subsection (3) results in enabling the Government to take possession of the land. In these circumstances, according to Mr. Naphade, only consequence of not filing a return or statement, but which is not accepted in totality is provided by Section 10. There is also a provision, namely, Section 38 which makes such act a punishable offence and Mr. In these circumstances, according to Mr. Naphade, only consequence of not filing a return or statement, but which is not accepted in totality is provided by Section 10. There is also a provision, namely, Section 38 which makes such act a punishable offence and Mr. Naphade invites our attention to subsections (1) to (4) of Section 38 in that regard. Mr. Naphade's attempt was to show that even if the vacant land is in excess of ceiling limit and there is no compliance with the provisions requiring filing a statement of such vacant land, still the owner is not deprived of his rights in the same. Mr. Naphade in that regard invites our attention to Section 15 of the Principal Act and submits that it reflects the legislative intent. There is no loss of ownership on promulgation of the Principal Act. In these circumstances all that the Principal Act does is to create some sort of clog or cloud on the rights of a person to hold the land. His ownership rights therein are not affected. 17. Mr. Naphade, therefore, submits that the power to exempt the excess vacant land from applicability of Chapter-III of the Principal Act is exercised by the Government either on its own motion or otherwise and that is also clear by Sections 21 and 22 which permits the excess vacant land not to be treated as such in certain cases and it's retention under certain circumstances. Therefore, merely because a holder of the excess vacant land seeks exemption from applicability of Chapter-III or the State exempts such vacant land from applicability thereof will not mean that the right and particularly ownership therein is surrendered much less waived. Mr. Naphade's attempt was to show that the State seeks to put the excess vacant land beyond application of Chapter-III, but keeping all his rights and options intact. The reference, therefore, will have to be answered by us bearing in mind this vital aspect, is the submission of Mr. Naphade. 18. Mr. Naphade elaborated this aspect by submitting that once the land is exempted, it is out of the purview of the Principal Act. The right to hold it conditionally remains unaffected. The power to exempt is limited in nature. It is legislative in character. Naphade. 18. Mr. Naphade elaborated this aspect by submitting that once the land is exempted, it is out of the purview of the Principal Act. The right to hold it conditionally remains unaffected. The power to exempt is limited in nature. It is legislative in character. By no stretch of imagination it is a right conferred in the Government nor exercise of powers to exempt creates any right in the Government in respect of such excess vacant land. In these circumstances and if Sections 20(2) and 21(2) are read together it would be apparent that neither any action under subsection (1) of Section 21 or the power under subsection (2) is saved by repeal of the Principal Act. In fact the Repeal Act does not save Section 21 at all. Hence, when the Repeal Act in Section 3(1)(b) refers to the validity of exemption order, it deliberately omits to include or refer subsection (2) of Section 20. Hence, there is no power to withdraw the exemption order under Section 20(1) after repeal of the Principal Act. Hence, even breach or violation of the condition in the exemption order will not result in its cancellation or withdrawal. Apart there-from any breach or violation of the condition on which the exemption order was granted does not result in automatic withdrawal or cancellation thereof. That is apparent from Section 20(2). It is, therefore, clear that the Repeal Act does not save this power and by omitting subsection (2) of Section 20 from clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. The legislature was aware that the power to withdraw the exemption order will have to be exercised only after giving a reasonable opportunity to such person who has violated the conditions subject to which the exemption under clause (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of Section 20 is granted. That reasonable opportunity is to make representation against the proposed withdrawal. It is the only consequence of either not complying with the conditions subject to which the exemption is granted or not being able to satisfy the Government that such exemption should not be withdrawn or from applicability of Chapter-III to the excess vacant land. Meaning thereby same is capable of being acquired and thereafter, vested in the Government. It is the only consequence of either not complying with the conditions subject to which the exemption is granted or not being able to satisfy the Government that such exemption should not be withdrawn or from applicability of Chapter-III to the excess vacant land. Meaning thereby same is capable of being acquired and thereafter, vested in the Government. Once that power cannot be exercised post repeal of the Principal Act, then, we would be in complete error if we hold that the repeal of the Principal Act does not affect the power to withdraw the exemption or to enforce the terms and conditions thereof. 19. In that regard, Mr. Naphade has taken us through Sections 20(2), 21(2) and 22(2) of the Principal Act. He submits that subsection (2) of Section 20 confers discretion in the Government and it may not withdraw the exemption order despite the conditions subject to which the same is granted are not complied with by any person. Whereas, subsection (2) of Section 21 mandates declaring the vacant land to be excess. It is submitted that there are distinct consequences and which are taken care of by subsection (2) of Section 22. Thus, the power of exemption has different parameters and the legislature was aware that such power cannot survive the repeal of the Principal Act. Hence, in the teeth of this clear language of the Repeal Act recourse to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is impermissible. Once a different intention appears from the provisions contained in the Repeal Act, then, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 would not apply. The question of liberal construction of Section 3 of the Repeal Act, therefore, does not arise at all. 20. Mr. Naphade thereafter took us extensively through the Repeal Act to submit that what is saved is specific. By clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act the vesting of land of which possession has been taken by the State is saved. Meaning thereby, any vacant land which is subject matter of declaration under Section 10(3) of which possession has not been taken by the State Government, then its vesting is not saved by the Repeal Act. Meaning thereby, any vacant land which is subject matter of declaration under Section 10(3) of which possession has not been taken by the State Government, then its vesting is not saved by the Repeal Act. Such land of which possession has not been taken will have to be restored post repeal after the requirement stipulated in subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act is complied with. Therefore, there is no collision between clause (a) and clause (b). What clause (b) saves is only validity of the order granting exemption under Section 20(1) or any action taken thereunder. The power to withdraw the exemption is not saved. If it is held to be saved, then, clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act would be rendered redundant. Only consequence of exemption being withdrawn is to subject the land to applicability of Chapter-III of the Principal Act and particularly Section 10(3) thereof. If possession of such excess vacant land cannot be taken even after withdrawal of exemption in terms of subsection (2) of Section 20 of the Principal Act, then, there was no point in saving its validity. Therefore, the validity of the order of exemption is saved, but neither that saving will enable the State to withdraw the exemption post repeal nor will the State be in a position to give effect to the order of withdrawal of the exemption if cannot take possession of the excess vacant land. That is the reason why the power to withdraw the exemption has not been saved. Section 4 of the Repeal Act, therefore, would throw light on the interpretation of clauses (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. That Section 4 provides for abatement of legal proceedings. If the legal proceedings abate on the date on which the Repeal Act came into force, then, the intent could never be to save the power to withdraw the exemption. Therefore, the words, appearing in clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3, after Section 20 should be read accordingly and that would be consistent with the object and purpose sought to be achieved in enacting the Repeal Act. None of the proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the Principal Act pending immediately before commencement of the Repeal Act are saved. None of the proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the Principal Act pending immediately before commencement of the Repeal Act are saved. Even if they are pending before any court or tribunal or any other authority they shall abate. In these circumstances the Legislature clearly intended that any past or closed or conclusive action alone is saved. Anything in the pipeline or inchoate is affected and not saved. This is because the Principal Act is a self contained code. It contains substantive and procedural provisions and even creates a forum for the purpose of enforcing and exercising substantive rights and powers and equally procedural one. A forum is created so as to make and enact a complete code. Nothing beyond the Principal Act can be seen. If the Repeal Act is construed in this manner, then, it envisages complete destruction of the rights under the Principal Act. Any right which is crystallized and which is not a mere hope or chance is alone saved. 21. Mr. Naphade also submits that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act cannot be imported into and read when the Repeal Act is so specific and clear. Alternatively and without prejudice to this submission Mr. Naphade submits that if Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is analyzed, it by clauses (a) to (e) saves something which is in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect. It does not affect previous operation of the Act so repealed or anything duly done or suffered there-under. The repeal does not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the repealed enactment. Mr. Naphade submits that clause (b) would, therefore, refer to past or complete act and not something which is intended and incomplete. The liabilities that are crystallized under the enactment which is repealed alone are unaffected by repeal of the original or Principal Act and that is clarified by clause (c). This clause cannot be imported in the present Repealing Act for the simple reason that it would create inconsistency. Mr. Naphade submits that clause (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would have saved Section 20(2) of the Principal Act had Sections 3 and 4 been not enacted in the Repeal Act. This clause cannot be imported in the present Repealing Act for the simple reason that it would create inconsistency. Mr. Naphade submits that clause (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would have saved Section 20(2) of the Principal Act had Sections 3 and 4 been not enacted in the Repeal Act. That being clearly enacted there will be inconsistency if one imports clause (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act in Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act. For all these reasons Mr. Naphade would submit that the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, Delhi High Court and Madras High Court follows the Division Bench judgments of this Court from which Mira Bhayander (supra) differs. That is the only view possible in the present legal backdrop and we must, therefore, hold that Mira Bhayander (supra) does not lay down the correct law and should be overruled. Mr. Naphade submits that when three or four High Courts in the country have taken a consistent view of the provision contained in a Central Act, then, that view ought to be followed so as to bring comity and consistency in interpretation of a Parliamentary statute. The reference, therefore, be answered accordingly. 22. Mr. Naphade in support of the above submissions, has placed heavy reliance on the following decisions :- 1. Mohamed Ashref Noor v/s State of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.6856/2003 decided on 16.12.2009 by the Madras High Court. 2. Surendra Raj Jaiswal v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.26474/2009 decided on 24.08.2011 by a Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 3. The Principal Secretary to Government, Hyderabad v/s Surendra, in Writ Petition No.951/2012 decided on 25.07.2012 by the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 4. M/s Suri Industries v/s State of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.8610/2013 decided on 06.09.2010 by the Madras High Court. 5. Manik M. Ragit v/s State of Maharashtra reported in 2013 (2) Mh.L.J. 224 . (WP No.1290/2012 decided on 30.07.2012 Nagpur Bench). 6. M/s Nile Limited v/s State of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.23846/2008 decided on 06.11.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 7. State of Uttar Pradesh v/s Hari Ram reported in (2013) 4 SCC 280 . 8. M/s Tata Coffee Limited v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.11929/2013 decided on 22.07.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 9. M/s Nile Limited v/s State of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.23846/2008 decided on 06.11.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 7. State of Uttar Pradesh v/s Hari Ram reported in (2013) 4 SCC 280 . 8. M/s Tata Coffee Limited v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.11929/2013 decided on 22.07.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 9. Gajanan Kamlya Patil v/s Additional Collector and Competent Authority, in Civil Appeal Nos.2070, 2071/ 2014 arising out of SLP (C) Nos.14904, 14905 of 2011 decided on 14.02.2014 by the Honourable Supreme Court. 10. M/s L.G. Polymers India Private Limited v/s State of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.21934/2013 decided on 28.03.2014 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 11. Synco Industries Limited v/s Assessing Officer, Income Tax, Mumbai reported in (2008) 4 SCC 22 . 12. Tej Pratap Singh v/s Union of India, in Writ Petition (C) No.2455/1992 decided on 16.07.2009 by the Delhi High Court. 23. The submissions of Mr. Naphade have been adopted by Mr. Milind Sathe, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Writ Petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.2201/2009, 3815/2010 and 9703/2010. In addition, Mr. Sathe submits that the Preamble of the Principal Act provides for imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomeration, for acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit and to regulate the construction of buildings on such land. It is also to distribute the excess vacant land after it vests in the State. In these circumstances if the construction placed by the State on the provisions of the Repeal Act is accepted that would result in saving of the consequences following withdrawal of exemption. Section 20(2) of the Principal Act envisages withdrawal of exemption and after such withdrawal what follows is the vesting of the land in terms of Section 10(3) and its possession as envisaged by Section 10(5) and (6). This is specifically not saved by Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act. Having regard to the clear language of the Principal Act this is the only consequence which follows on withdrawal of exemption. If it is not expressly saved, then, by an indirect or oblique method the Court cannot save it. Mr. This is specifically not saved by Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act. Having regard to the clear language of the Principal Act this is the only consequence which follows on withdrawal of exemption. If it is not expressly saved, then, by an indirect or oblique method the Court cannot save it. Mr. Sathe's contention is that what is specifically saved is the validity of the order of exemption and the crucial words are to be found in clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act to this effect that the validity of any order granting exemption under Section 20 (1) or any action taken there-under is saved notwithstanding any judgment of any court to the contrary. Therefore, even if the Court declares the order of exemption or any action taken thereunder to be bad or invalid that is unaffected by repeal of the Principal Act. Beyond this nothing more can be read in the saving clause or the Repeal Act as a whole. The Reference, therefore, be answered accordingly. Mr. Sathe relies upon the following judgments : 1. Mukarram Ali Khan v/s State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2007) 11 SCC 90 . 2. Voltas Limited v/s Additional Collector and Competent Authority, reported in 2008 (5) Bom. C.R. 746. 3. Shanti Bhardwaj v/s State of U.P., reported in (2004) 10 SCC 130 . 4. Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, reported in (2012) 4 SCC 718 . 5. Ritesh Tewari v/s State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2010) 10 SCC 677 . 6. Simpson and General Finance Company Limited v/s State of State of Tamil Nadu, reported in (2006) 4 MLJ 1807 (Madras High Court). 7. Mohan Gopalrao Mate v/s Principal Secretary, reported in 2009 (1) Bom. C.R. 275. 8. Vithabai Bama Bhandari v/s State of Maharashtra, reported in 2009 (3) Bom. C.R. 663. 9. Tej Pratap Singh v/s Union of India, in Writ Petition (C) No.2455/1992 decided on 16.07.2009 by the Delhi High Court. 10. Mira Bhyandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s The Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration, in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 decided on 27.08.2009 by the Bombay High Court. 11. Kabbur Industries Private Limited v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.9890/2009 decided on 05.05.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 12. 10. Mira Bhyandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s The Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration, in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 decided on 27.08.2009 by the Bombay High Court. 11. Kabbur Industries Private Limited v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.9890/2009 decided on 05.05.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 12. Damodar Laxman Navare v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 decided on 08.07.2010 by the Bombay High Court : Reported in 2010(6) Bom. C.R. 611. 13. Waman Bandu Bhoir v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.4141/2010 decided on 11.10.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 14. Jayesh Tokarshi Shah v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane, in Writ Petition No.3815/2010 decided on 26.10.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 15. Maharaj Singh v/s State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (1977) 1 SCC 155 . 16. Union of India v/s Somasundaram Viswanath, reported in (1989) 1 SCC 175 . 17. John Thomas v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.38507/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 18. L. Kannappan and L. Thirunavukarasu v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.46091/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 19. Anil Nemichand Bafna v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.153/2008 decided on 06.05.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 20. Surendra Raj Jaiswal v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.26474/2009 decided on 24.08.2011 by a Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 21. Manik M. Ragit v/s State of Maharashtra reported in 2013 (2) Mh.L.J. 224 . (WP No.1290/2012 decided on 30.07.2012 Nagpur Bench). 22. State of Uttar Pradesh v/s Hari Ram reported in (2013) 4 SCC 280 . 24. Mr. Naphade's submissions then have been adopted by Mr. Gangal, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition No.5024/2013. He went further to contend that what is saved by virtue of Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act is the validity of the order of exemption, but not the conditions subject to which such exemption is granted. In that regard Mr. Gangal relied upon the following judgments :- 1. Shanti Bhardwaj v/s State of U.P., reported in (2004) 10 SCC 130 . 2. L. Kannappan and L. Thirunavukarasu v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.46091/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 3. In that regard Mr. Gangal relied upon the following judgments :- 1. Shanti Bhardwaj v/s State of U.P., reported in (2004) 10 SCC 130 . 2. L. Kannappan and L. Thirunavukarasu v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.46091/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 3. Surendra Raj Jaiswal v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.26474/2009 decided on 24.08.2011 by a Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 25. Then Mr. Sridharan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.2243/2011 and 2244/2011, argued that the Repeal Act envisages application of same in the first instance to the whole of the State of Haryana and Punjab and to all the Union territories. This is envisaged by Section 1(2) of the Repeal Act. The Repeal Act comes into force in other States after other States adopt the Repeal Act by resolution passed in that behalf under Article 252(2) of the Constitution of India. Mr. Sridharan, therefore, submits that this aspect must be borne in mind while considering the submission or stand of the State regarding applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Mr. Sridharan submits that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act applies only when either the General Clauses Act or any Central Act or Regulation made after commencement of the General Clauses Act repeals any enactment made prior to the General Clauses Act coming into force or thereafter. In the present case the State Government has adopted by resolution passed under Article 252 of the Constitution of India the Repeal Act in the State of Maharashtra with effect from 29.11.2007. In the light of such adoption by resolution of the State Assembly the Section 6 of the General Clauses Act cannot be resorted to or applied. That applies only when either the General Clauses Act or any Central Act or Regulation made after commencement of the General Clauses Act repeals any enactment made or to be made by the Parliament. Both are Parliamentary Statues and in such circumstances by virtue of Article 252(2) of the Constitution of India the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out. 26. Alternatively, Mr. Sridharan submits that Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act is a special saving clause demonstrating a clear different intention. Therefore, Section 3 of the Repeal Act saves only what is specifically mentioned therein. 26. Alternatively, Mr. Sridharan submits that Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act is a special saving clause demonstrating a clear different intention. Therefore, Section 3 of the Repeal Act saves only what is specifically mentioned therein. There is no room for applying Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 by implication or impliedly. Mr. Sridharan also submits that in true sense we are not construing a validating statute or clause. What is saved by clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 is an order under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act and the exemptions which are subject matter of the same. All actions under the same are saved, but that does not mean that the power to take action under Section 20(2) is also saved. The saving in the present case is only to protect the rights of innocent third parties. Even the actions under the exemption are saved with a view to ensure such protection. This is not a substantive provision and therefore, it cannot be construed with reference to the Principal Act. By no stretch of imagination it revives the Principal Act. This is apparent from reading of Section 4 of the Repeal Act because even the proceedings as initiated abate on Principal Act coming into force. By clause (c) of subsection (1) of Section 3 the liability incurred under the exemption order is not saved, but only the payment made to the State Government as a condition for granting exemption under Section 20(1) is unaffected and thus, saved. Beyond all this we should not read anything into the Repeal Act. Mr. Sridharan relied upon the following decisions in support of the above contentions :- 1. Kolhapur Cane-sugar Works Limited v/s Union of India, reported in (2000) 2 SCC 536 . 2. Air India v/s Union of India, reported in (1995) 4 SCC 734 . 3. Union of India v/s West Coast Paper Mills Limited, reported in 2004 (164) E.L.T. 375 (SC). 4. Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Limited v/s Broach Borough Municipality, reported in 2000 (123) ELT 3 (SC). 27. It is pertinent to note that Mr. Sridharan's main argument has not been supported or adopted by any counsel. It is clear that Mr. Naphade's contentions and submissions as adopted by Mr. Sathe are further adopted and elaborated by Mr. Devitre, learned Senior Counsel appearing in the Original Side Writ Petition No.37/2010 and Mr. 27. It is pertinent to note that Mr. Sridharan's main argument has not been supported or adopted by any counsel. It is clear that Mr. Naphade's contentions and submissions as adopted by Mr. Sathe are further adopted and elaborated by Mr. Devitre, learned Senior Counsel appearing in the Original Side Writ Petition No.37/2010 and Mr. Samdani, learned Senior Counsel appearing in Writ Petition No.346/2011. Both of them have urged that a different intention appears in clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act and therefore, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act has no application. The specific saving is for the benefit of the land holders and therefore, there is no scope for construing clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act on equitable principles. Once there is no room for equitable considerations and particularly as Mr. Samdani urges because of the Principal Act being ex-propriatory in nature and providing for compulsory acquisition, then, all the more any liberal construction is ruled out. Mr. Samdani submits that even the saving clause has to be strictly construed in this case and the repeal of the Principal Act wipes out the same and obliterates it from the statute book completely. For all these reasons the Reference should be answered accordingly. 28. Mr. Devitre and Mr. Samdani relied upon the following decisions :- 1. Mohan Gopalrao Mate v/s Principal Secretary, reported in 2009 (1) Bom. C.R. 275. 2. Parripati Chandrasekharrao and Sons v/s Alapati Jalaiah, reported in (1995) 3 SCC 709 . 3. Khub Chand v/s State of Rajasthan, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1074 . 4. Gujarat Electricity Board v/s Girdharlal Motilal, reported in AIR 1969 SC 267 . 5. State of Maharashtra v/s B.E. Billimoria, reported in (2003) 7 SCC 336 . 6. Corporation of the City of Victoria v/s Bishop of Vancouver Island, reported in AIR 1921 PC 240. 7. T.R. Thandur v/s Union of India, reported in (1996) 3 SCC 690 . 29. Mr. Aniruddha Joshi, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition No.9872/2010 invites our attention to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vithabai Bama Bhandari v/s State of Maharashtra (supra) and submits that there is nothing sacrosanct about Section 20 of the Principal Act. By indirect process we cannot, therefore, save what is not expressly saved by the Repeal Act. By indirect process we cannot, therefore, save what is not expressly saved by the Repeal Act. Once the power to exempt cannot be exercised and not available after the Repeal Act, then, merely because such power is exercised during the subsistence of the Principal Act and prior to the Repeal Act coming into force does not mean that further or incidental power envisaged by the primary power to exempt is saved. Even this incidental or ancillary power is unavailable after repeal of the Principal Act. This argument is built more or less on the wording of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. 30. Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition No.556/2010, while adopting all arguments of all the Senior Counsel only submitted that when more than one High Court in this country have placed an interpretation on the Parliamentary Statute or construed its provisions in a particular way, then, for the sake of consistency and certainty this Court must follow the reasoning of the Delhi High Court, Madras High Court and Andhra Pradesh High Court. 31. Mr. Joshi and Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha relied upon the following judgments in support of the above submissions :- 1. Damodar Laxman Navare v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 decided on 08.07.2010 by the Bombay High Court : Reported in 2010(6) Bom. C.R. 611. 2. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v/s Alcock Ashdown & Company Limited, reported in 1979 ITR page 164 : in Income Tax Reference No.40/1969 decided on 07.07.1978 by the Bombay High Court. 3. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v/s T. Maneklal Mfg. Co. Ltd., reported in 1978 ITR Vol.115 page 725. 4. Bhagwat Dharmaraj Radke v/s State of Maharashtra, in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.35883/2012 decided on 31.03.2014 by the Honourable Supreme Court. 5. Government of Karnataka v/s Gowramma and others, reported in AIR 2008 SC 863 . 32. On the other hand, Mr. Khambata, learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State submits that it is fallacious to assume that the State or other Respondents, namely, Authorities under the Principal Act are requesting this Court to go by any equitable consideration or liberal principle. 32. On the other hand, Mr. Khambata, learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State submits that it is fallacious to assume that the State or other Respondents, namely, Authorities under the Principal Act are requesting this Court to go by any equitable consideration or liberal principle. The State has throughout maintained that in terms of the Preamble of the Principal Act and Constitutional philosophy as enshrined by Articles 21 and 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution of India a ceiling has been placed by the Principal Act on the holding of vacant land within the urban agglomeration. This ceiling limit, as is reflected from the Principal Act and which cannot be disputed, is placed by a statutory prescription that is to be found in Section 4 of the Principal Act. Chapter-III of the Principal Act is titled as “ceiling on vacant land”. Except as otherwise provided in the Principal Act on and from the commencement of the Principal Act no person shall be entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit in the territories to which this Act applies under subsection (2) of Section 1. The obligation under the statute is, therefore, clear and absolute. It relates and dates back to the commencement of the Principal Act. None can dispute that what is exempted from the purview of Chapter-III and by a overriding power conferred in the State Government is the applicability of Chapter-III to the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. Therefore, when the excess vacant land is exempted in exceptional circumstances and which have been also specified by the statute, then, all that happens is that the excess vacant land is exempted from the provisions of Chapter-III either conditionally or unconditionally and in terms of the satisfaction in clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of Section 20 of the Principal Act. The power to exempt is exercised by the State suo-motu or otherwise meaning thereby on the Application of the person holding the excess vacant land. The request is not to apply the Chapter in the light of the factors and circumstances specified therein. This request is made and granted only on the satisfaction reached and not as a matter of course. Thus, application of the chapter is a rule and its non-application is an exception. The request is not to apply the Chapter in the light of the factors and circumstances specified therein. This request is made and granted only on the satisfaction reached and not as a matter of course. Thus, application of the chapter is a rule and its non-application is an exception. Despite repeal of the Principal Act if the validity of the order granting exemption under subsection (1) of Section 20 is saved by Section 3 of the Repeal Act and such validity remains unaffected notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the order of the competent court, then, full effect will have to be given to the language of the Repeal Act. Once the Repeal Act is so clear and does not evince anything contrary to the principles enshrined in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, then, on the strength of the wording of the Repeal Act and in any event with the assistance of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act it can safely be held that there is no intention to destroy the rights and liabilities or consequences which flow from a valid exemption order. In fact the language of Section 3 of the Repeal Act supplements Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Nothing in Section 3 of the Repeal Act takes away applicability of the Principal Act to the extent of enforcing the obligations in terms of the conditions imposed in the order of exemption. The learned Advocate General submits that the arguments of the Petitioners revolve around the saving clause enacted by Section 3 of the Repeal Act. The submissions are that the Repeal Act shows intention contrary to the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act inasmuch as neither the exemption order nor any of the terms and conditions therein can be enforced post repeal. 33. The learned Advocate General submitted that the provisions of the Repeal Act and particularly Section 3(1) clauses (b) and (c) require a harmonious interpretation. 33. The learned Advocate General submitted that the provisions of the Repeal Act and particularly Section 3(1) clauses (b) and (c) require a harmonious interpretation. By reading these clauses together what is apparent is that by clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act it is clarified that repeal of the Principal Act shall not affect the vesting of any vacant land under Section 10(3) of the Principal Act, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorized by the State in this behalf or by the competent authority. Thus, if the steps as contemplated by subsection (3) of Section 10 of the Principal Act and equally by subsections (5) and (6) thereof are taken, then, the vesting of excess vacant land referred to in a Notification published under Section 10(1) in terms of subsection (3) thereof is not affected by repeal of the Principal Act. No person then can claim that the excess vacant land to which the Principal Act admittedly applies and which is deemed to have been acquired by the State does not belong to it or the State is not entitled to it because the Principal Act has been repealed and the vesting comes to an end. The vesting is of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. Undisputedly, if the land in excess of ceiling limit can vest after the notification in terms of Section 10(1) is published in the official Gazette, then, the declaration which is postulated or contemplated by subsection (3) is in relation to such excess vacant land. What subsection (3) of Section 10 really contemplates and envisages is that the State can declare that the excess vacant land is deemed to have been acquired by it upon publication of the declaration and particularly with effect from the dates specified therein. By such deemed acquisition the land is further deemed to have vested absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances with effect from the date specified in the declaration. By such deemed acquisition the land is further deemed to have vested absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances with effect from the date specified in the declaration. By the repeal what has been clarified is that unless the State has taken over possession of such excess vacant land and as referred to in the Notification under Section 10(1) either by itself or through any person duly authorized by it in this behalf or by the competent authority, its plain and simple vesting will not enable the Government to take over possession of the excess vacant land after coming into force of the Repeal Act. This coming into force or commencing is reckoned in terms of subsections (2) and (3) of Section 1 of the Repeal Act. Thus, the State is disabled from taking possession of the excess vacant land which has already vested in it if it has failed to take possession. Thereupon the land can be restored and that is how subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act would read. Therefore, this is not a restricted or limited saving clause in any sense of the term. Though Section 3 is titled “saving” it contains the substantive provisions. The Legislature or the Parliament did not intend a vacuum. It did not stop by only stating that if possession of the land vested in the State in terms of Section 10(3) is not taken, then, that cannot be taken or the land cannot be made over to the Government after repeal of the Principal Act. It enacts a further provision by which it is possible for the State to restore the land to the holder and that is why restoration is contemplated by virtue of Section 3 (2). That restoration is conditional upon repayment of an amount to the State Government by the holder. Section 11 of the Principal Act talks of payment of amount for the vacant land acquired under Section 10(3). That payment can be claimed even without the land being handed over or without the possession of the excess vacant land being taken. The deemed acquisition by virtue of Section 10(3) enables the person or persons having interest in the excess vacant land to claim the amount under Section 11. That payment can be claimed even without the land being handed over or without the possession of the excess vacant land being taken. The deemed acquisition by virtue of Section 10(3) enables the person or persons having interest in the excess vacant land to claim the amount under Section 11. If any payment has been made after such deemed acquisition, then, that amount has to be returned to the Government and only then the excess vacant land of which possession has not been taken will be restored to any person or the holder as the case may be. If this was a complete obliteration or destruction of the rights and liabilities under the Principal Act, then, such substantive provision enabling restoration would not have been inserted or incorporated is the submission of the learned Advocate General. The refund of such amount and which has been paid to the person or persons interested in the excess vacant land in terms of Section 11 of the Principal Act alone entitles such person to claim restoration of the land to him. If the repeal had been simplicitor and without such substantive provision, then, it would not have been possible for the holder or any person interested in the excess vacant land to claim its restoration. It is, therefore, erroneous to urge that the Repeal Act evidences an intention contrary to the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. 34. Inviting our attention to clauses (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act the learned Advocate General submits that the true nature of the power to exempt under the Principal Act would have to be properly and completely appreciated. He submits that the basis on which the power to exempt is exercised is that the person is holding the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. It is in case of such vacant land that the State Government must be satisfied either on its own motion or otherwise that having regard to its location, purpose for which such land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require, it is necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do that the Government is conferred with discretion to pass an order exempting such vacant land from the provisions of Chapter-III either conditionally or otherwise. The learned Advocate General submits that it is not just having regard to location of the land, purpose for which the excess vacant land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require, but it is necessary and expedient in the public interest that the discretion to exempt such land has to be exercised. That is in terms of clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 20. Whereas, in terms of clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 20, the State is satisfied either on its own motion or otherwise that the application of the provisions of Chapter-III would cause undue hardship to the persons holding the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit that the Government may by order exempt conditionally or unconditionally the vacant land from the provisions of Chapter-III. Further the order under clause (b) cannot be made unless the reasons for doing so are recorded in writing. That is because clause (b) contemplates relieving the person holding the excess vacant land from undue hardship. Clause (a) necessarily postulates an exercise of powers to exempt the excess vacant land in public interest. When such is the ambit and scope of the powers and it is vacant land in excess of ceiling limit which is exempted from the provisions of Chapter-III that too in exceptional circumstances, then, it is futile to contend that the State Government despite validity of its Act or order being saved by the Repeal Act, would not be able to do anything in relation to such land post repeal of the Principal Act. The learned Advocate General submits that in this case the power of exemption and which is to be exercised for public good and in public interest is so exercised by making an order in that behalf. That the validity of such an order is saved though the Principal Act is repealed, but the legal consequences flowing from exercise of such clause are not saved, would be an incorrect, improper and legally untenable reading of the saving clause and the Repeal Act itself. The true nature of the power to exempt has not been appreciated in making such submissions. The true nature of the power to exempt has not been appreciated in making such submissions. The Petitioners' arguments proceed on an unsound and erroneous basis and namely that the power to exempt in terms of Section 20(1) of the Principal Act is exercised by the State Government only to benefit the holder. The argument is that it is to relieve the holder from the consequences of applicability of Chapter-III that the State exercises such power and therefore, nothing further can be done in pursuance of the valid order of exemption post repeal of the Principal Act. Judgment : S.C. Dharmadhikari, J. 1. The Honourable the Chief Justice has constituted this Full Bench in order to resolve a conflict between the conflicting views which have been expressed by two Division Benches of this Court. In our detailed order dated 24th April, 2014 we noticed that conflict and by consent of parties we formulated the questions which have to be answered by us. They read as under :- (1) Does Section 3(1)(b) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 read with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 r/w Section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 save the orders of exemption including all terms and conditions thereof passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act, namely, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and all actions taken there-under? (2) Whether, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 r/w Section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 apply to the repeal of the Principal Act by the Repealing Act, 1999? (3) Whether in view of Section 3(1)(b) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 and the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 : (a) the order of exemption including all its terms and conditions under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act, namely, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 can be continued and enforced in accordance with the provisions of the Principal Act; (b) all remedies and proceedings in respect of the order of exemption including all its terms and conditions may be instituted, continued and enforced? (4) Whether in view of the repeal of the Principal Act by the Repeal Act, the Government of Maharashtra can: (a) recall/cancel/modify the exemption order granted either under Section 20 of the Principal Act; (b) enforce circulars for implementation of exemption orders issued under Section 20 of the Principal Act prior to the repeal of the Principal Act; (c) acquire the land by issuing notification under Section 10(3) of the Principal Act; and (d) take any action of whatsoever nature on account of noncompliance/ breach of exemption order issued under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act? (5) Whether, the view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vithabai Bama Bhandari v/s State of Maharashtra and another reported in 2009(3) Bombay Cases Reporter 663 (Writ Petition No.4241/2008 decided on 31st March/16th April, 2009) and Damodar Laxman Navare and others v/s State of Maharashtra and others in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 dated 08th July, 2010 sets out the correct legal position as regards the ambit and scope of Section 3(1)(b) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 or whether, the view taken in Mira Bhayandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s the Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration and others in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 dated 27th August, 2009 to the contrary should be held to be laying down the correct principle of law? 2. Since both sides have canvassed arguments on legal issues, in order to appreciate them a few facts are required to be noted. We take the facts from a lead case, namely, Writ Petition No.9872/2010. That is a Writ Petition which has been filed by the Maharashtra Chamber of Housing Industry and its various Units. These are associations established to promote the housing and real estate industry. The Writ Petition is filed in the interest of members of these Associations and real estate industry and in the circumstances which are set out in paragraph 4 of the memo of Writ Petition. 3. It is the case of the Petitioners that the State of Maharashtra and Competent Authorities under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as “THE PRINCIPAL ACT”) continue to enforce and apply the provisions thereof despite enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “THE REPEAL ACT”). 3. It is the case of the Petitioners that the State of Maharashtra and Competent Authorities under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as “THE PRINCIPAL ACT”) continue to enforce and apply the provisions thereof despite enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “THE REPEAL ACT”). The Repeal Act has been brought into effect and is in force in the State of Maharashtra from 29.11.2007. 4. The grievance of the Petitioners is that there is a circular dated 18.03.2009 issued by the State Government, copy of which is at Annexure-A. That circular states that the Repeal Act has been brought into force in the State of Maharashtra w.e.f. 29.11.2007. The same expressly saves the vesting of excess vacant land in the State as also validity of an exemption order passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act. Meaning thereby, the repeal of the Principal Act does not affect the vesting of excess vacant land in the State provided its possession has been taken, so also, validity of an exemption order passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act. Therefore, such excess vacant lands of which possession has not been taken, but which are subjected to certain concessions under the order of exemption passed in terms of Section 20(1) of the Principal Act and which are particularly to utilize the lands for residential purpose, for implementing residential housing scheme, for industry and it's expansion, shall not be transferred without prior permission of the State and there are restrictions placed on change of user thereof. The permission for change of user will not be granted unless premium is paid to the Government. 5. A reference is made in this circular and the steps taken to implement the Repeal Act. The steps include two communications from the Government dated 01.03.2008 and 03.03.2008 which outline the scheme for development of these lands or their transfer. 6. It has been revealed that the exempted lands are being dealt with and for the purpose of implementation of the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme, Rental Housing Scheme, etc.. Further, the reservations in respect of these lands have been changed or altered from industry/agriculture without any reference to the Government/Competent Authority. The permissions in that regard have been granted without any prior approval from the competent authorities under the Principal Act. Further, the reservations in respect of these lands have been changed or altered from industry/agriculture without any reference to the Government/Competent Authority. The permissions in that regard have been granted without any prior approval from the competent authorities under the Principal Act. Therefore, the Government has directed that the exempted lands cannot be used for any other purpose nor their reservation can be changed unless the approvals/remarks are called for from the competent authority under the Principal Act. Any violation of such requirement would visit the persons concerned with all consequences and at their costs. 7. Prior to this circular there are certain Government Resolutions and which enable utilization of Transferable Development Rights (TDR) so as to use the lands for construction of houses for weaker sections and equally to grant development permissions in relation thereto. This is a Government Resolution dated 30.06.2007. 8. There is also an order and which has been referred to because it is the case of the Petitioners that their members had to obtain several permissions from the Respondent Nos.1 and 2 for carrying out the development. It is contended that the Government Resolutions referred by us including dated 30.06.2007 and emphasis by the authorities on compliance of the same continues despite the Repeal Act brought into force with effect from 29.11.2007. There are several instances which have been given and copies of the exemption orders passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act are referred to in paragraph 7 of the memo of Writ Petition No.9872/2010. 9. The grievance is that though the order of exemption was passed exempting the excess vacant land from the purview of Chapter-III of the Principal Act, when that Act was in force, but now after it's repeal the exemption order would not survive. In other words, the steps taken by the Authorities to give effect to the order of exemption even after repeal of the Principal Act in the State of Maharashtra are wholly illegal. The Authorities cannot compel parties like the Petitioners to seek any extension of time to complete the scheme or to comply with the conditions on which the order of exemption under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act has been passed. The stand taken is that the Respondents have no powers to enforce the Principal Act directly or indirectly. Several instances of such alleged attempts are set out. The stand taken is that the Respondents have no powers to enforce the Principal Act directly or indirectly. Several instances of such alleged attempts are set out. There is reference made to the legal provisions and finally what is prayed is that this Court must restrain by an appropriate writ, order or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Respondents from enforcing the provisions of the Principal Act insofar as such exemption orders and their terms and conditions. 10. From the record, what transpires is that a Writ Petition being Writ Petition No.3815/2010 from this group or batch of petitions, appeared before a Division Bench of this Court and it pronounced its judgment on 22.12.2010 noting that two Division Benches in the cases of Sundersons and others v/s State of Maharashtra and others reported in 2008 (5) Bombay Cases Reporter 85 and Damodar Laxman Navre v/s State of Maharashtra in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 dated 08th July , 2010, take a view that certain steps in pursuance of the order of exemption or seeking to enforce the terms and conditions thereof cannot be taken, whereas a conflicting view has been rendered by another Division Bench of this Court in Mira Bhayandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s the Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration and others in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 dated 27th August, 2009. 11. The attention of the Division Bench in Writ Petition No.3815/2010 (Jayesh Tokarshi Shah v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration) was invited to all these judgments and orders and stated to be conflicting. The Division Bench, therefore, in its judgment dated 22nd December, 2010 in the aforesaid matter observed as under :- 15. This prompts an answer in favour of a premise that the Additional District Collector, Thane and Competent Authority was not competent to issue the said Circular, and as such the efficacy of the said Circular commanding the Registering Officer to refuse the registration of the documents referred to therein remains questionable. A view congenial to the said premise is found expressed in some of the judgments Sunderson & Ors Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2008(5) Bombay Cases Reporter 85, Damodar Laxman Navre & 4 others Vs. State of Maharashtra & 4 others Writ Petition No.6300 of 2009, delivered previously by the Division Bench of this Court. A view congenial to the said premise is found expressed in some of the judgments Sunderson & Ors Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2008(5) Bombay Cases Reporter 85, Damodar Laxman Navre & 4 others Vs. State of Maharashtra & 4 others Writ Petition No.6300 of 2009, delivered previously by the Division Bench of this Court. However, there is a conflicting view expressed in the judgments delivered by the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No.5745 of 2009 Mira Bhayander Builders & Developers Welfare Association Vs. Dy. Collector & Competent Authority, Thane and 3 others. The Circular dated 23.6.2008 was the epicentre of controversy in Mira Bhayander Builders & Developers Welfare Association (Supra). The State contended as in the present case that the scheme holders were trying to wriggle out of their obligations under the scheme sanctioned under Section 20 of U.L.C. Act, and therefore, the said Circular came to be issued to protect the schemes meant for economically weaker sections, and also the government. The Division Bench after considering the rival contentions observed thus :- “In our view, if the members of the petitioners’ association have taken benefit of the schemes under Section 20 of the said Act by constructing buildings, they now cannot wiggle out of their obligations to surrender flats to the government which the government could sell at fixed rate. The entire tenor of the above petitioners appears to be that the petitioners do not want to fulfil their obligations under the said Schemes viz. surrendering the flats to the State Government and taking advantage of the repeal of the said Act want to contend that their obligations under the said schemes do not survive. In our view the impugned letter as rightly contended by the learned AGP has been issued to protect the public interest and government revenue. It does not befit the Petitioners who have taken advantage of the said scheme now contend that their obligations do not survive, and therefore, there is no need for them to surrender flats to the government. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the challenge raised in the above petition which is accordingly dismissed.” 16. In the instant case similar situation is portrayed in the affidavit in reply filed by the State. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the challenge raised in the above petition which is accordingly dismissed.” 16. In the instant case similar situation is portrayed in the affidavit in reply filed by the State. Referring to the Mohan Gopal Mate case (Supra) reported in 2008(6) ALL MR 41, the learned Advocate for the Petitioner submitted that a pertinent question regarding the extent of power of the State under Sections 20 and 21 of U.L.C. Act in the case of breach of conditions of the scheme by the scheme holder has been clearly answered as follows: “Powers of the State under Section 20 in case of breach of condition of the order of exemption is limited to withdraw exemption order only and so far as Section 21 is concerned, declare the land which is not to be treated as excess land in view of the Sub-Section (1) in case of breach of condition State can declare such land to be excess in view of Sub-Section (2) of Section 21. Thereupon, the provisions of Chapter III will apply to the said land.” 17. Going by strict interpretation of the Sections 20 and 21 of the ULC Act, the power of the State in case of contravention of any of the conditions of the scheme by scheme holder remains limited to withdrawal of the exemption and declaring the exempted land as excess land and to application of the provisions of the Chapter III of the said Act for acquisition of the said land as contemplated under Sub-Section (2) of Section 21 therein. 18. This view is in conflict with the view expressed by the Division Bench in Mira Bhayander Builders & Developers Welfare Association (Supra), and as such the controversy raised by such conflict deserves to be resolved by the Full Bench of this Court. 19. This Petition is, therefore, referred to the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for passing appropriate directions in the matter.” 12. It is in view of these events that a Full Bench was constituted and the above formulated questions await an answer from us. 13. At the outset we must clarify that we would be only answering the question/s formulated and reproduced hereinabove. We would not be expressing any opinion on the rival contentions insofar as merits of individual petitions. It is in view of these events that a Full Bench was constituted and the above formulated questions await an answer from us. 13. At the outset we must clarify that we would be only answering the question/s formulated and reproduced hereinabove. We would not be expressing any opinion on the rival contentions insofar as merits of individual petitions. Each of these petitions thereafter would be placed before the appropriate Division Benches and for a decision on merits and in accordance with law. Our observations and findings, therefore, shall not be construed as expression of any opinion on the merits of the Writ Petitions referred above or pending in this Court. 14. The Petitioners' counsel have made an attempt to show us as to how the Division Bench judgment in the case of Mira Bhayander Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane (supra) does not lay down the correct law. They have all, more or less, urged that repeal of the Principal Act in the State of Maharashtra on 29.11.2007 results in the State and competent authorities being prevented from withdrawing the order of exemption passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act. Assuming that the order of exemption or any action taken there-under is valid notwithstanding anything contrary held in any judgment or order of the competent court, yet the Repeal Act saves only validity of the order of exemption and nothing more. Such saving would not permit the State Government or competent authority to withdraw the order of exemption or enforce the terms and conditions thereof or to subject the excess vacant land to the consequences under the Principal Act. The saving is thus not absolute, but restricted in nature. Thirdly, it is urged that there being a Repealing Act containing such restricted saving clause, the same rules out applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 or its parimateria provision in the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904. 15. We shall now elaborate these contentions as articulated by Mr. Naphade, learned Senior Counsel and adopted with some additions by Mr. Sathe, Mr. Sridharan, Mr. Devitre, Mr. Samdani, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Gangal, Mr. oshi and Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners. 16. Mr. Naphade firstly submitted that for understanding the Repeal Act we must have a look at the Principal Act. The Principal Act, according to Mr. Sathe, Mr. Sridharan, Mr. Devitre, Mr. Samdani, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Gangal, Mr. oshi and Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners. 16. Mr. Naphade firstly submitted that for understanding the Repeal Act we must have a look at the Principal Act. The Principal Act, according to Mr. Naphade, contains several provisions, but material there-from are Sections 3, 5, 6, 8, 10 and 38. Mr. Naphade also took us through Section 11 of the Principal Act before coming to Section 20. In his submission the scheme of the Principal Act is that no one shall hold the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. The return or statement has to be filed so as to determine the extent of excess vacant land. In other words, Mr. Naphade submits that except as otherwise provided in the Principal Act, on and from the commencement of the Act, no person shall be entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of ceiling limit in the territories to which the Principal Act applies. Mr. Naphade submits that Section 4 sets out the ceiling limit. He submits that the transfer of vacant land is also an aspect which is taken care of by Section 5. The persons holding the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit have to file the statement. He submits that further provisions enable scrutiny of particulars, preparing a draft statement as regards the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit and the final statement. Mr. Naphade submits that Section 10 is entitled “Acquisition of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit”. The extent of the vacant land held by a person in excess of ceiling limit has to be specified by subsection (1) of Section 10 and the purpose of same is to enable acquisition of the same eventually. That is an aspect dealt with by subsections (2) and (3) of Section 10. The vesting of such excess vacant land free from all encumbrances and with effect from the date of publication of a notification under subsection (3) results in enabling the Government to take possession of the land. In these circumstances, according to Mr. Naphade, only consequence of not filing a return or statement, but which is not accepted in totality is provided by Section 10. There is also a provision, namely, Section 38 which makes such act a punishable offence and Mr. In these circumstances, according to Mr. Naphade, only consequence of not filing a return or statement, but which is not accepted in totality is provided by Section 10. There is also a provision, namely, Section 38 which makes such act a punishable offence and Mr. Naphade invites our attention to subsections (1) to (4) of Section 38 in that regard. Mr. Naphade's attempt was to show that even if the vacant land is in excess of ceiling limit and there is no compliance with the provisions requiring filing a statement of such vacant land, still the owner is not deprived of his rights in the same. Mr. Naphade in that regard invites our attention to Section 15 of the Principal Act and submits that it reflects the legislative intent. There is no loss of ownership on promulgation of the Principal Act. In these circumstances all that the Principal Act does is to create some sort of clog or cloud on the rights of a person to hold the land. His ownership rights therein are not affected. 17. Mr. Naphade, therefore, submits that the power to exempt the excess vacant land from applicability of Chapter-III of the Principal Act is exercised by the Government either on its own motion or otherwise and that is also clear by Sections 21 and 22 which permits the excess vacant land not to be treated as such in certain cases and it's retention under certain circumstances. Therefore, merely because a holder of the excess vacant land seeks exemption from applicability of Chapter-III or the State exempts such vacant land from applicability thereof will not mean that the right and particularly ownership therein is surrendered much less waived. Mr. Naphade's attempt was to show that the State seeks to put the excess vacant land beyond application of Chapter-III, but keeping all his rights and options intact. The reference, therefore, will have to be answered by us bearing in mind this vital aspect, is the submission of Mr. Naphade. 18. Mr. Naphade elaborated this aspect by submitting that once the land is exempted, it is out of the purview of the Principal Act. The right to hold it conditionally remains unaffected. The power to exempt is limited in nature. It is legislative in character. Naphade. 18. Mr. Naphade elaborated this aspect by submitting that once the land is exempted, it is out of the purview of the Principal Act. The right to hold it conditionally remains unaffected. The power to exempt is limited in nature. It is legislative in character. By no stretch of imagination it is a right conferred in the Government nor exercise of powers to exempt creates any right in the Government in respect of such excess vacant land. In these circumstances and if Sections 20(2) and 21(2) are read together it would be apparent that neither any action under subsection (1) of Section 21 or the power under subsection (2) is saved by repeal of the Principal Act. In fact the Repeal Act does not save Section 21 at all. Hence, when the Repeal Act in Section 3(1)(b) refers to the validity of exemption order, it deliberately omits to include or refer subsection (2) of Section 20. Hence, there is no power to withdraw the exemption order under Section 20(1) after repeal of the Principal Act. Hence, even breach or violation of the condition in the exemption order will not result in its cancellation or withdrawal. Apart there-from any breach or violation of the condition on which the exemption order was granted does not result in automatic withdrawal or cancellation thereof. That is apparent from Section 20(2). It is, therefore, clear that the Repeal Act does not save this power and by omitting subsection (2) of Section 20 from clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. The legislature was aware that the power to withdraw the exemption order will have to be exercised only after giving a reasonable opportunity to such person who has violated the conditions subject to which the exemption under clause (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of Section 20 is granted. That reasonable opportunity is to make representation against the proposed withdrawal. It is the only consequence of either not complying with the conditions subject to which the exemption is granted or not being able to satisfy the Government that such exemption should not be withdrawn or from applicability of Chapter-III to the excess vacant land. Meaning thereby same is capable of being acquired and thereafter, vested in the Government. It is the only consequence of either not complying with the conditions subject to which the exemption is granted or not being able to satisfy the Government that such exemption should not be withdrawn or from applicability of Chapter-III to the excess vacant land. Meaning thereby same is capable of being acquired and thereafter, vested in the Government. Once that power cannot be exercised post repeal of the Principal Act, then, we would be in complete error if we hold that the repeal of the Principal Act does not affect the power to withdraw the exemption or to enforce the terms and conditions thereof. 19. In that regard, Mr. Naphade has taken us through Sections 20(2), 21(2) and 22(2) of the Principal Act. He submits that subsection (2) of Section 20 confers discretion in the Government and it may not withdraw the exemption order despite the conditions subject to which the same is granted are not complied with by any person. Whereas, subsection (2) of Section 21 mandates declaring the vacant land to be excess. It is submitted that there are distinct consequences and which are taken care of by subsection (2) of Section 22. Thus, the power of exemption has different parameters and the legislature was aware that such power cannot survive the repeal of the Principal Act. Hence, in the teeth of this clear language of the Repeal Act recourse to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is impermissible. Once a different intention appears from the provisions contained in the Repeal Act, then, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 would not apply. The question of liberal construction of Section 3 of the Repeal Act, therefore, does not arise at all. 20. Mr. Naphade thereafter took us extensively through the Repeal Act to submit that what is saved is specific. By clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act the vesting of land of which possession has been taken by the State is saved. Meaning thereby, any vacant land which is subject matter of declaration under Section 10(3) of which possession has not been taken by the State Government, then its vesting is not saved by the Repeal Act. Meaning thereby, any vacant land which is subject matter of declaration under Section 10(3) of which possession has not been taken by the State Government, then its vesting is not saved by the Repeal Act. Such land of which possession has not been taken will have to be restored post repeal after the requirement stipulated in subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act is complied with. Therefore, there is no collision between clause (a) and clause (b). What clause (b) saves is only validity of the order granting exemption under Section 20(1) or any action taken thereunder. The power to withdraw the exemption is not saved. If it is held to be saved, then, clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act would be rendered redundant. Only consequence of exemption being withdrawn is to subject the land to applicability of Chapter-III of the Principal Act and particularly Section 10(3) thereof. If possession of such excess vacant land cannot be taken even after withdrawal of exemption in terms of subsection (2) of Section 20 of the Principal Act, then, there was no point in saving its validity. Therefore, the validity of the order of exemption is saved, but neither that saving will enable the State to withdraw the exemption post repeal nor will the State be in a position to give effect to the order of withdrawal of the exemption if cannot take possession of the excess vacant land. That is the reason why the power to withdraw the exemption has not been saved. Section 4 of the Repeal Act, therefore, would throw light on the interpretation of clauses (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. That Section 4 provides for abatement of legal proceedings. If the legal proceedings abate on the date on which the Repeal Act came into force, then, the intent could never be to save the power to withdraw the exemption. Therefore, the words, appearing in clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3, after Section 20 should be read accordingly and that would be consistent with the object and purpose sought to be achieved in enacting the Repeal Act. None of the proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the Principal Act pending immediately before commencement of the Repeal Act are saved. None of the proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the Principal Act pending immediately before commencement of the Repeal Act are saved. Even if they are pending before any court or tribunal or any other authority they shall abate. In these circumstances the Legislature clearly intended that any past or closed or conclusive action alone is saved. Anything in the pipeline or inchoate is affected and not saved. This is because the Principal Act is a self contained code. It contains substantive and procedural provisions and even creates a forum for the purpose of enforcing and exercising substantive rights and powers and equally procedural one. A forum is created so as to make and enact a complete code. Nothing beyond the Principal Act can be seen. If the Repeal Act is construed in this manner, then, it envisages complete destruction of the rights under the Principal Act. Any right which is crystallized and which is not a mere hope or chance is alone saved. 21. Mr. Naphade also submits that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act cannot be imported into and read when the Repeal Act is so specific and clear. Alternatively and without prejudice to this submission Mr. Naphade submits that if Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is analyzed, it by clauses (a) to (e) saves something which is in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect. It does not affect previous operation of the Act so repealed or anything duly done or suffered there-under. The repeal does not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the repealed enactment. Mr. Naphade submits that clause (b) would, therefore, refer to past or complete act and not something which is intended and incomplete. The liabilities that are crystallized under the enactment which is repealed alone are unaffected by repeal of the original or Principal Act and that is clarified by clause (c). This clause cannot be imported in the present Repealing Act for the simple reason that it would create inconsistency. Mr. Naphade submits that clause (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would have saved Section 20(2) of the Principal Act had Sections 3 and 4 been not enacted in the Repeal Act. This clause cannot be imported in the present Repealing Act for the simple reason that it would create inconsistency. Mr. Naphade submits that clause (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would have saved Section 20(2) of the Principal Act had Sections 3 and 4 been not enacted in the Repeal Act. That being clearly enacted there will be inconsistency if one imports clause (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act in Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act. For all these reasons Mr. Naphade would submit that the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, Delhi High Court and Madras High Court follows the Division Bench judgments of this Court from which Mira Bhayander (supra) differs. That is the only view possible in the present legal backdrop and we must, therefore, hold that Mira Bhayander (supra) does not lay down the correct law and should be overruled. Mr. Naphade submits that when three or four High Courts in the country have taken a consistent view of the provision contained in a Central Act, then, that view ought to be followed so as to bring comity and consistency in interpretation of a Parliamentary statute. The reference, therefore, be answered accordingly. 22. Mr. Naphade in support of the above submissions, has placed heavy reliance on the following decisions :- 1. Mohamed Ashref Noor v/s State of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.6856/2003 decided on 16.12.2009 by the Madras High Court. 2. Surendra Raj Jaiswal v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.26474/2009 decided on 24.08.2011 by a Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 3. The Principal Secretary to Government, Hyderabad v/s Surendra, in Writ Petition No.951/2012 decided on 25.07.2012 by the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 4. M/s Suri Industries v/s State of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.8610/2013 decided on 06.09.2010 by the Madras High Court. 5. Manik M. Ragit v/s State of Maharashtra reported in 2013 (2) Mh.L.J. 224 . (WP No.1290/2012 decided on 30.07.2012 Nagpur Bench). 6. M/s Nile Limited v/s State of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.23846/2008 decided on 06.11.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 7. State of Uttar Pradesh v/s Hari Ram reported in (2013) 4 SCC 280 . 8. M/s Tata Coffee Limited v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.11929/2013 decided on 22.07.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 9. M/s Nile Limited v/s State of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.23846/2008 decided on 06.11.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 7. State of Uttar Pradesh v/s Hari Ram reported in (2013) 4 SCC 280 . 8. M/s Tata Coffee Limited v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.11929/2013 decided on 22.07.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 9. Gajanan Kamlya Patil v/s Additional Collector and Competent Authority, in Civil Appeal Nos.2070, 2071/ 2014 arising out of SLP (C) Nos.14904, 14905 of 2011 decided on 14.02.2014 by the Honourable Supreme Court. 10. M/s L.G. Polymers India Private Limited v/s State of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.21934/2013 decided on 28.03.2014 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 11. Synco Industries Limited v/s Assessing Officer, Income Tax, Mumbai reported in (2008) 4 SCC 22 . 12. Tej Pratap Singh v/s Union of India, in Writ Petition (C) No.2455/1992 decided on 16.07.2009 by the Delhi High Court. 23. The submissions of Mr. Naphade have been adopted by Mr. Milind Sathe, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Writ Petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.2201/2009, 3815/2010 and 9703/2010. In addition, Mr. Sathe submits that the Preamble of the Principal Act provides for imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomeration, for acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit and to regulate the construction of buildings on such land. It is also to distribute the excess vacant land after it vests in the State. In these circumstances if the construction placed by the State on the provisions of the Repeal Act is accepted that would result in saving of the consequences following withdrawal of exemption. Section 20(2) of the Principal Act envisages withdrawal of exemption and after such withdrawal what follows is the vesting of the land in terms of Section 10(3) and its possession as envisaged by Section 10(5) and (6). This is specifically not saved by Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act. Having regard to the clear language of the Principal Act this is the only consequence which follows on withdrawal of exemption. If it is not expressly saved, then, by an indirect or oblique method the Court cannot save it. Mr. This is specifically not saved by Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act. Having regard to the clear language of the Principal Act this is the only consequence which follows on withdrawal of exemption. If it is not expressly saved, then, by an indirect or oblique method the Court cannot save it. Mr. Sathe's contention is that what is specifically saved is the validity of the order of exemption and the crucial words are to be found in clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act to this effect that the validity of any order granting exemption under Section 20 (1) or any action taken there-under is saved notwithstanding any judgment of any court to the contrary. Therefore, even if the Court declares the order of exemption or any action taken thereunder to be bad or invalid that is unaffected by repeal of the Principal Act. Beyond this nothing more can be read in the saving clause or the Repeal Act as a whole. The Reference, therefore, be answered accordingly. Mr. Sathe relies upon the following judgments : 1. Mukarram Ali Khan v/s State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2007) 11 SCC 90 . 2. Voltas Limited v/s Additional Collector and Competent Authority, reported in 2008 (5) Bom. C.R. 746. 3. Shanti Bhardwaj v/s State of U.P., reported in (2004) 10 SCC 130 . 4. Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, reported in (2012) 4 SCC 718 . 5. Ritesh Tewari v/s State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2010) 10 SCC 677 . 6. Simpson and General Finance Company Limited v/s State of State of Tamil Nadu, reported in (2006) 4 MLJ 1807 (Madras High Court). 7. Mohan Gopalrao Mate v/s Principal Secretary, reported in 2009 (1) Bom. C.R. 275. 8. Vithabai Bama Bhandari v/s State of Maharashtra, reported in 2009 (3) Bom. C.R. 663. 9. Tej Pratap Singh v/s Union of India, in Writ Petition (C) No.2455/1992 decided on 16.07.2009 by the Delhi High Court. 10. Mira Bhyandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s The Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration, in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 decided on 27.08.2009 by the Bombay High Court. 11. Kabbur Industries Private Limited v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.9890/2009 decided on 05.05.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 12. 10. Mira Bhyandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s The Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration, in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 decided on 27.08.2009 by the Bombay High Court. 11. Kabbur Industries Private Limited v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.9890/2009 decided on 05.05.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 12. Damodar Laxman Navare v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 decided on 08.07.2010 by the Bombay High Court : Reported in 2010(6) Bom. C.R. 611. 13. Waman Bandu Bhoir v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.4141/2010 decided on 11.10.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 14. Jayesh Tokarshi Shah v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane, in Writ Petition No.3815/2010 decided on 26.10.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 15. Maharaj Singh v/s State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (1977) 1 SCC 155 . 16. Union of India v/s Somasundaram Viswanath, reported in (1989) 1 SCC 175 . 17. John Thomas v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.38507/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 18. L. Kannappan and L. Thirunavukarasu v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.46091/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 19. Anil Nemichand Bafna v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.153/2008 decided on 06.05.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 20. Surendra Raj Jaiswal v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.26474/2009 decided on 24.08.2011 by a Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 21. Manik M. Ragit v/s State of Maharashtra reported in 2013 (2) Mh.L.J. 224 . (WP No.1290/2012 decided on 30.07.2012 Nagpur Bench). 22. State of Uttar Pradesh v/s Hari Ram reported in (2013) 4 SCC 280 . 24. Mr. Naphade's submissions then have been adopted by Mr. Gangal, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition No.5024/2013. He went further to contend that what is saved by virtue of Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act is the validity of the order of exemption, but not the conditions subject to which such exemption is granted. In that regard Mr. Gangal relied upon the following judgments :- 1. Shanti Bhardwaj v/s State of U.P., reported in (2004) 10 SCC 130 . 2. L. Kannappan and L. Thirunavukarasu v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.46091/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 3. In that regard Mr. Gangal relied upon the following judgments :- 1. Shanti Bhardwaj v/s State of U.P., reported in (2004) 10 SCC 130 . 2. L. Kannappan and L. Thirunavukarasu v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.46091/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 3. Surendra Raj Jaiswal v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.26474/2009 decided on 24.08.2011 by a Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 25. Then Mr. Sridharan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.2243/2011 and 2244/2011, argued that the Repeal Act envisages application of same in the first instance to the whole of the State of Haryana and Punjab and to all the Union territories. This is envisaged by Section 1(2) of the Repeal Act. The Repeal Act comes into force in other States after other States adopt the Repeal Act by resolution passed in that behalf under Article 252(2) of the Constitution of India. Mr. Sridharan, therefore, submits that this aspect must be borne in mind while considering the submission or stand of the State regarding applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Mr. Sridharan submits that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act applies only when either the General Clauses Act or any Central Act or Regulation made after commencement of the General Clauses Act repeals any enactment made prior to the General Clauses Act coming into force or thereafter. In the present case the State Government has adopted by resolution passed under Article 252 of the Constitution of India the Repeal Act in the State of Maharashtra with effect from 29.11.2007. In the light of such adoption by resolution of the State Assembly the Section 6 of the General Clauses Act cannot be resorted to or applied. That applies only when either the General Clauses Act or any Central Act or Regulation made after commencement of the General Clauses Act repeals any enactment made or to be made by the Parliament. Both are Parliamentary Statues and in such circumstances by virtue of Article 252(2) of the Constitution of India the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out. 26. Alternatively, Mr. Sridharan submits that Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act is a special saving clause demonstrating a clear different intention. Therefore, Section 3 of the Repeal Act saves only what is specifically mentioned therein. 26. Alternatively, Mr. Sridharan submits that Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act is a special saving clause demonstrating a clear different intention. Therefore, Section 3 of the Repeal Act saves only what is specifically mentioned therein. There is no room for applying Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 by implication or impliedly. Mr. Sridharan also submits that in true sense we are not construing a validating statute or clause. What is saved by clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 is an order under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act and the exemptions which are subject matter of the same. All actions under the same are saved, but that does not mean that the power to take action under Section 20(2) is also saved. The saving in the present case is only to protect the rights of innocent third parties. Even the actions under the exemption are saved with a view to ensure such protection. This is not a substantive provision and therefore, it cannot be construed with reference to the Principal Act. By no stretch of imagination it revives the Principal Act. This is apparent from reading of Section 4 of the Repeal Act because even the proceedings as initiated abate on Principal Act coming into force. By clause (c) of subsection (1) of Section 3 the liability incurred under the exemption order is not saved, but only the payment made to the State Government as a condition for granting exemption under Section 20(1) is unaffected and thus, saved. Beyond all this we should not read anything into the Repeal Act. Mr. Sridharan relied upon the following decisions in support of the above contentions :- 1. Kolhapur Cane-sugar Works Limited v/s Union of India, reported in (2000) 2 SCC 536 . 2. Air India v/s Union of India, reported in (1995) 4 SCC 734 . 3. Union of India v/s West Coast Paper Mills Limited, reported in 2004 (164) E.L.T. 375 (SC). 4. Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Limited v/s Broach Borough Municipality, reported in 2000 (123) ELT 3 (SC). 27. It is pertinent to note that Mr. Sridharan's main argument has not been supported or adopted by any counsel. It is clear that Mr. Naphade's contentions and submissions as adopted by Mr. Sathe are further adopted and elaborated by Mr. Devitre, learned Senior Counsel appearing in the Original Side Writ Petition No.37/2010 and Mr. 27. It is pertinent to note that Mr. Sridharan's main argument has not been supported or adopted by any counsel. It is clear that Mr. Naphade's contentions and submissions as adopted by Mr. Sathe are further adopted and elaborated by Mr. Devitre, learned Senior Counsel appearing in the Original Side Writ Petition No.37/2010 and Mr. Samdani, learned Senior Counsel appearing in Writ Petition No.346/2011. Both of them have urged that a different intention appears in clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act and therefore, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act has no application. The specific saving is for the benefit of the land holders and therefore, there is no scope for construing clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act on equitable principles. Once there is no room for equitable considerations and particularly as Mr. Samdani urges because of the Principal Act being ex-propriatory in nature and providing for compulsory acquisition, then, all the more any liberal construction is ruled out. Mr. Samdani submits that even the saving clause has to be strictly construed in this case and the repeal of the Principal Act wipes out the same and obliterates it from the statute book completely. For all these reasons the Reference should be answered accordingly. 28. Mr. Devitre and Mr. Samdani relied upon the following decisions :- 1. Mohan Gopalrao Mate v/s Principal Secretary, reported in 2009 (1) Bom. C.R. 275. 2. Parripati Chandrasekharrao and Sons v/s Alapati Jalaiah, reported in (1995) 3 SCC 709 . 3. Khub Chand v/s State of Rajasthan, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1074 . 4. Gujarat Electricity Board v/s Girdharlal Motilal, reported in AIR 1969 SC 267 . 5. State of Maharashtra v/s B.E. Billimoria, reported in (2003) 7 SCC 336 . 6. Corporation of the City of Victoria v/s Bishop of Vancouver Island, reported in AIR 1921 PC 240. 7. T.R. Thandur v/s Union of India, reported in (1996) 3 SCC 690 . 29. Mr. Aniruddha Joshi, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition No.9872/2010 invites our attention to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vithabai Bama Bhandari v/s State of Maharashtra (supra) and submits that there is nothing sacrosanct about Section 20 of the Principal Act. By indirect process we cannot, therefore, save what is not expressly saved by the Repeal Act. By indirect process we cannot, therefore, save what is not expressly saved by the Repeal Act. Once the power to exempt cannot be exercised and not available after the Repeal Act, then, merely because such power is exercised during the subsistence of the Principal Act and prior to the Repeal Act coming into force does not mean that further or incidental power envisaged by the primary power to exempt is saved. Even this incidental or ancillary power is unavailable after repeal of the Principal Act. This argument is built more or less on the wording of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. 30. Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition No.556/2010, while adopting all arguments of all the Senior Counsel only submitted that when more than one High Court in this country have placed an interpretation on the Parliamentary Statute or construed its provisions in a particular way, then, for the sake of consistency and certainty this Court must follow the reasoning of the Delhi High Court, Madras High Court and Andhra Pradesh High Court. 31. Mr. Joshi and Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha relied upon the following judgments in support of the above submissions :- 1. Damodar Laxman Navare v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 decided on 08.07.2010 by the Bombay High Court : Reported in 2010(6) Bom. C.R. 611. 2. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v/s Alcock Ashdown & Company Limited, reported in 1979 ITR page 164 : in Income Tax Reference No.40/1969 decided on 07.07.1978 by the Bombay High Court. 3. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v/s T. Maneklal Mfg. Co. Ltd., reported in 1978 ITR Vol.115 page 725. 4. Bhagwat Dharmaraj Radke v/s State of Maharashtra, in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.35883/2012 decided on 31.03.2014 by the Honourable Supreme Court. 5. Government of Karnataka v/s Gowramma and others, reported in AIR 2008 SC 863 . 32. On the other hand, Mr. Khambata, learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State submits that it is fallacious to assume that the State or other Respondents, namely, Authorities under the Principal Act are requesting this Court to go by any equitable consideration or liberal principle. 32. On the other hand, Mr. Khambata, learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State submits that it is fallacious to assume that the State or other Respondents, namely, Authorities under the Principal Act are requesting this Court to go by any equitable consideration or liberal principle. The State has throughout maintained that in terms of the Preamble of the Principal Act and Constitutional philosophy as enshrined by Articles 21 and 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution of India a ceiling has been placed by the Principal Act on the holding of vacant land within the urban agglomeration. This ceiling limit, as is reflected from the Principal Act and which cannot be disputed, is placed by a statutory prescription that is to be found in Section 4 of the Principal Act. Chapter-III of the Principal Act is titled as “ceiling on vacant land”. Except as otherwise provided in the Principal Act on and from the commencement of the Principal Act no person shall be entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit in the territories to which this Act applies under subsection (2) of Section 1. The obligation under the statute is, therefore, clear and absolute. It relates and dates back to the commencement of the Principal Act. None can dispute that what is exempted from the purview of Chapter-III and by a overriding power conferred in the State Government is the applicability of Chapter-III to the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. Therefore, when the excess vacant land is exempted in exceptional circumstances and which have been also specified by the statute, then, all that happens is that the excess vacant land is exempted from the provisions of Chapter-III either conditionally or unconditionally and in terms of the satisfaction in clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of Section 20 of the Principal Act. The power to exempt is exercised by the State suo-motu or otherwise meaning thereby on the Application of the person holding the excess vacant land. The request is not to apply the Chapter in the light of the factors and circumstances specified therein. This request is made and granted only on the satisfaction reached and not as a matter of course. Thus, application of the chapter is a rule and its non-application is an exception. The request is not to apply the Chapter in the light of the factors and circumstances specified therein. This request is made and granted only on the satisfaction reached and not as a matter of course. Thus, application of the chapter is a rule and its non-application is an exception. Despite repeal of the Principal Act if the validity of the order granting exemption under subsection (1) of Section 20 is saved by Section 3 of the Repeal Act and such validity remains unaffected notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the order of the competent court, then, full effect will have to be given to the language of the Repeal Act. Once the Repeal Act is so clear and does not evince anything contrary to the principles enshrined in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, then, on the strength of the wording of the Repeal Act and in any event with the assistance of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act it can safely be held that there is no intention to destroy the rights and liabilities or consequences which flow from a valid exemption order. In fact the language of Section 3 of the Repeal Act supplements Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Nothing in Section 3 of the Repeal Act takes away applicability of the Principal Act to the extent of enforcing the obligations in terms of the conditions imposed in the order of exemption. The learned Advocate General submits that the arguments of the Petitioners revolve around the saving clause enacted by Section 3 of the Repeal Act. The submissions are that the Repeal Act shows intention contrary to the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act inasmuch as neither the exemption order nor any of the terms and conditions therein can be enforced post repeal. 33. The learned Advocate General submitted that the provisions of the Repeal Act and particularly Section 3(1) clauses (b) and (c) require a harmonious interpretation. 33. The learned Advocate General submitted that the provisions of the Repeal Act and particularly Section 3(1) clauses (b) and (c) require a harmonious interpretation. By reading these clauses together what is apparent is that by clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act it is clarified that repeal of the Principal Act shall not affect the vesting of any vacant land under Section 10(3) of the Principal Act, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorized by the State in this behalf or by the competent authority. Thus, if the steps as contemplated by subsection (3) of Section 10 of the Principal Act and equally by subsections (5) and (6) thereof are taken, then, the vesting of excess vacant land referred to in a Notification published under Section 10(1) in terms of subsection (3) thereof is not affected by repeal of the Principal Act. No person then can claim that the excess vacant land to which the Principal Act admittedly applies and which is deemed to have been acquired by the State does not belong to it or the State is not entitled to it because the Principal Act has been repealed and the vesting comes to an end. The vesting is of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. Undisputedly, if the land in excess of ceiling limit can vest after the notification in terms of Section 10(1) is published in the official Gazette, then, the declaration which is postulated or contemplated by subsection (3) is in relation to such excess vacant land. What subsection (3) of Section 10 really contemplates and envisages is that the State can declare that the excess vacant land is deemed to have been acquired by it upon publication of the declaration and particularly with effect from the dates specified therein. By such deemed acquisition the land is further deemed to have vested absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances with effect from the date specified in the declaration. By such deemed acquisition the land is further deemed to have vested absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances with effect from the date specified in the declaration. By the repeal what has been clarified is that unless the State has taken over possession of such excess vacant land and as referred to in the Notification under Section 10(1) either by itself or through any person duly authorized by it in this behalf or by the competent authority, its plain and simple vesting will not enable the Government to take over possession of the excess vacant land after coming into force of the Repeal Act. This coming into force or commencing is reckoned in terms of subsections (2) and (3) of Section 1 of the Repeal Act. Thus, the State is disabled from taking possession of the excess vacant land which has already vested in it if it has failed to take possession. Thereupon the land can be restored and that is how subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act would read. Therefore, this is not a restricted or limited saving clause in any sense of the term. Though Section 3 is titled “saving” it contains the substantive provisions. The Legislature or the Parliament did not intend a vacuum. It did not stop by only stating that if possession of the land vested in the State in terms of Section 10(3) is not taken, then, that cannot be taken or the land cannot be made over to the Government after repeal of the Principal Act. It enacts a further provision by which it is possible for the State to restore the land to the holder and that is why restoration is contemplated by virtue of Section 3 (2). That restoration is conditional upon repayment of an amount to the State Government by the holder. Section 11 of the Principal Act talks of payment of amount for the vacant land acquired under Section 10(3). That payment can be claimed even without the land being handed over or without the possession of the excess vacant land being taken. The deemed acquisition by virtue of Section 10(3) enables the person or persons having interest in the excess vacant land to claim the amount under Section 11. That payment can be claimed even without the land being handed over or without the possession of the excess vacant land being taken. The deemed acquisition by virtue of Section 10(3) enables the person or persons having interest in the excess vacant land to claim the amount under Section 11. If any payment has been made after such deemed acquisition, then, that amount has to be returned to the Government and only then the excess vacant land of which possession has not been taken will be restored to any person or the holder as the case may be. If this was a complete obliteration or destruction of the rights and liabilities under the Principal Act, then, such substantive provision enabling restoration would not have been inserted or incorporated is the submission of the learned Advocate General. The refund of such amount and which has been paid to the person or persons interested in the excess vacant land in terms of Section 11 of the Principal Act alone entitles such person to claim restoration of the land to him. If the repeal had been simplicitor and without such substantive provision, then, it would not have been possible for the holder or any person interested in the excess vacant land to claim its restoration. It is, therefore, erroneous to urge that the Repeal Act evidences an intention contrary to the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. 34. Inviting our attention to clauses (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act the learned Advocate General submits that the true nature of the power to exempt under the Principal Act would have to be properly and completely appreciated. He submits that the basis on which the power to exempt is exercised is that the person is holding the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. It is in case of such vacant land that the State Government must be satisfied either on its own motion or otherwise that having regard to its location, purpose for which such land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require, it is necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do that the Government is conferred with discretion to pass an order exempting such vacant land from the provisions of Chapter-III either conditionally or otherwise. The learned Advocate General submits that it is not just having regard to location of the land, purpose for which the excess vacant land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require, but it is necessary and expedient in the public interest that the discretion to exempt such land has to be exercised. That is in terms of clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 20. Whereas, in terms of clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 20, the State is satisfied either on its own motion or otherwise that the application of the provisions of Chapter-III would cause undue hardship to the persons holding the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit that the Government may by order exempt conditionally or unconditionally the vacant land from the provisions of Chapter-III. Further the order under clause (b) cannot be made unless the reasons for doing so are recorded in writing. That is because clause (b) contemplates relieving the person holding the excess vacant land from undue hardship. Clause (a) necessarily postulates an exercise of powers to exempt the excess vacant land in public interest. When such is the ambit and scope of the powers and it is vacant land in excess of ceiling limit which is exempted from the provisions of Chapter-III that too in exceptional circumstances, then, it is futile to contend that the State Government despite validity of its Act or order being saved by the Repeal Act, would not be able to do anything in relation to such land post repeal of the Principal Act. The learned Advocate General submits that in this case the power of exemption and which is to be exercised for public good and in public interest is so exercised by making an order in that behalf. That the validity of such an order is saved though the Principal Act is repealed, but the legal consequences flowing from exercise of such clause are not saved, would be an incorrect, improper and legally untenable reading of the saving clause and the Repeal Act itself. The true nature of the power to exempt has not been appreciated in making such submissions. The true nature of the power to exempt has not been appreciated in making such submissions. The Petitioners' arguments proceed on an unsound and erroneous basis and namely that the power to exempt in terms of Section 20(1) of the Principal Act is exercised by the State Government only to benefit the holder. The argument is that it is to relieve the holder from the consequences of applicability of Chapter-III that the State exercises such power and therefore, nothing further can be done in pursuance of the valid order of exemption post repeal of the Principal Act. Judgment : S.C. Dharmadhikari, J. 1. The Honourable the Chief Justice has constituted this Full Bench in order to resolve a conflict between the conflicting views which have been expressed by two Division Benches of this Court. In our detailed order dated 24th April, 2014 we noticed that conflict and by consent of parties we formulated the questions which have to be answered by us. They read as under :- (1) Does Section 3(1)(b) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 read with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 r/w Section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 save the orders of exemption including all terms and conditions thereof passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act, namely, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and all actions taken there-under? (2) Whether, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 r/w Section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 apply to the repeal of the Principal Act by the Repealing Act, 1999? (3) Whether in view of Section 3(1)(b) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 and the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 : (a) the order of exemption including all its terms and conditions under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act, namely, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 can be continued and enforced in accordance with the provisions of the Principal Act; (b) all remedies and proceedings in respect of the order of exemption including all its terms and conditions may be instituted, continued and enforced? (4) Whether in view of the repeal of the Principal Act by the Repeal Act, the Government of Maharashtra can: (a) recall/cancel/modify the exemption order granted either under Section 20 of the Principal Act; (b) enforce circulars for implementation of exemption orders issued under Section 20 of the Principal Act prior to the repeal of the Principal Act; (c) acquire the land by issuing notification under Section 10(3) of the Principal Act; and (d) take any action of whatsoever nature on account of noncompliance/ breach of exemption order issued under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act? (5) Whether, the view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vithabai Bama Bhandari v/s State of Maharashtra and another reported in 2009(3) Bombay Cases Reporter 663 (Writ Petition No.4241/2008 decided on 31st March/16th April, 2009) and Damodar Laxman Navare and others v/s State of Maharashtra and others in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 dated 08th July, 2010 sets out the correct legal position as regards the ambit and scope of Section 3(1)(b) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 or whether, the view taken in Mira Bhayandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s the Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration and others in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 dated 27th August, 2009 to the contrary should be held to be laying down the correct principle of law? 2. Since both sides have canvassed arguments on legal issues, in order to appreciate them a few facts are required to be noted. We take the facts from a lead case, namely, Writ Petition No.9872/2010. That is a Writ Petition which has been filed by the Maharashtra Chamber of Housing Industry and its various Units. These are associations established to promote the housing and real estate industry. The Writ Petition is filed in the interest of members of these Associations and real estate industry and in the circumstances which are set out in paragraph 4 of the memo of Writ Petition. 3. It is the case of the Petitioners that the State of Maharashtra and Competent Authorities under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as “THE PRINCIPAL ACT”) continue to enforce and apply the provisions thereof despite enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “THE REPEAL ACT”). 3. It is the case of the Petitioners that the State of Maharashtra and Competent Authorities under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as “THE PRINCIPAL ACT”) continue to enforce and apply the provisions thereof despite enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “THE REPEAL ACT”). The Repeal Act has been brought into effect and is in force in the State of Maharashtra from 29.11.2007. 4. The grievance of the Petitioners is that there is a circular dated 18.03.2009 issued by the State Government, copy of which is at Annexure-A. That circular states that the Repeal Act has been brought into force in the State of Maharashtra w.e.f. 29.11.2007. The same expressly saves the vesting of excess vacant land in the State as also validity of an exemption order passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act. Meaning thereby, the repeal of the Principal Act does not affect the vesting of excess vacant land in the State provided its possession has been taken, so also, validity of an exemption order passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act. Therefore, such excess vacant lands of which possession has not been taken, but which are subjected to certain concessions under the order of exemption passed in terms of Section 20(1) of the Principal Act and which are particularly to utilize the lands for residential purpose, for implementing residential housing scheme, for industry and it's expansion, shall not be transferred without prior permission of the State and there are restrictions placed on change of user thereof. The permission for change of user will not be granted unless premium is paid to the Government. 5. A reference is made in this circular and the steps taken to implement the Repeal Act. The steps include two communications from the Government dated 01.03.2008 and 03.03.2008 which outline the scheme for development of these lands or their transfer. 6. It has been revealed that the exempted lands are being dealt with and for the purpose of implementation of the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme, Rental Housing Scheme, etc.. Further, the reservations in respect of these lands have been changed or altered from industry/agriculture without any reference to the Government/Competent Authority. The permissions in that regard have been granted without any prior approval from the competent authorities under the Principal Act. Further, the reservations in respect of these lands have been changed or altered from industry/agriculture without any reference to the Government/Competent Authority. The permissions in that regard have been granted without any prior approval from the competent authorities under the Principal Act. Therefore, the Government has directed that the exempted lands cannot be used for any other purpose nor their reservation can be changed unless the approvals/remarks are called for from the competent authority under the Principal Act. Any violation of such requirement would visit the persons concerned with all consequences and at their costs. 7. Prior to this circular there are certain Government Resolutions and which enable utilization of Transferable Development Rights (TDR) so as to use the lands for construction of houses for weaker sections and equally to grant development permissions in relation thereto. This is a Government Resolution dated 30.06.2007. 8. There is also an order and which has been referred to because it is the case of the Petitioners that their members had to obtain several permissions from the Respondent Nos.1 and 2 for carrying out the development. It is contended that the Government Resolutions referred by us including dated 30.06.2007 and emphasis by the authorities on compliance of the same continues despite the Repeal Act brought into force with effect from 29.11.2007. There are several instances which have been given and copies of the exemption orders passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act are referred to in paragraph 7 of the memo of Writ Petition No.9872/2010. 9. The grievance is that though the order of exemption was passed exempting the excess vacant land from the purview of Chapter-III of the Principal Act, when that Act was in force, but now after it's repeal the exemption order would not survive. In other words, the steps taken by the Authorities to give effect to the order of exemption even after repeal of the Principal Act in the State of Maharashtra are wholly illegal. The Authorities cannot compel parties like the Petitioners to seek any extension of time to complete the scheme or to comply with the conditions on which the order of exemption under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act has been passed. The stand taken is that the Respondents have no powers to enforce the Principal Act directly or indirectly. Several instances of such alleged attempts are set out. The stand taken is that the Respondents have no powers to enforce the Principal Act directly or indirectly. Several instances of such alleged attempts are set out. There is reference made to the legal provisions and finally what is prayed is that this Court must restrain by an appropriate writ, order or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Respondents from enforcing the provisions of the Principal Act insofar as such exemption orders and their terms and conditions. 10. From the record, what transpires is that a Writ Petition being Writ Petition No.3815/2010 from this group or batch of petitions, appeared before a Division Bench of this Court and it pronounced its judgment on 22.12.2010 noting that two Division Benches in the cases of Sundersons and others v/s State of Maharashtra and others reported in 2008 (5) Bombay Cases Reporter 85 and Damodar Laxman Navre v/s State of Maharashtra in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 dated 08th July , 2010, take a view that certain steps in pursuance of the order of exemption or seeking to enforce the terms and conditions thereof cannot be taken, whereas a conflicting view has been rendered by another Division Bench of this Court in Mira Bhayandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s the Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration and others in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 dated 27th August, 2009. 11. The attention of the Division Bench in Writ Petition No.3815/2010 (Jayesh Tokarshi Shah v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration) was invited to all these judgments and orders and stated to be conflicting. The Division Bench, therefore, in its judgment dated 22nd December, 2010 in the aforesaid matter observed as under :- 15. This prompts an answer in favour of a premise that the Additional District Collector, Thane and Competent Authority was not competent to issue the said Circular, and as such the efficacy of the said Circular commanding the Registering Officer to refuse the registration of the documents referred to therein remains questionable. A view congenial to the said premise is found expressed in some of the judgments Sunderson & Ors Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2008(5) Bombay Cases Reporter 85, Damodar Laxman Navre & 4 others Vs. State of Maharashtra & 4 others Writ Petition No.6300 of 2009, delivered previously by the Division Bench of this Court. A view congenial to the said premise is found expressed in some of the judgments Sunderson & Ors Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2008(5) Bombay Cases Reporter 85, Damodar Laxman Navre & 4 others Vs. State of Maharashtra & 4 others Writ Petition No.6300 of 2009, delivered previously by the Division Bench of this Court. However, there is a conflicting view expressed in the judgments delivered by the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No.5745 of 2009 Mira Bhayander Builders & Developers Welfare Association Vs. Dy. Collector & Competent Authority, Thane and 3 others. The Circular dated 23.6.2008 was the epicentre of controversy in Mira Bhayander Builders & Developers Welfare Association (Supra). The State contended as in the present case that the scheme holders were trying to wriggle out of their obligations under the scheme sanctioned under Section 20 of U.L.C. Act, and therefore, the said Circular came to be issued to protect the schemes meant for economically weaker sections, and also the government. The Division Bench after considering the rival contentions observed thus :- “In our view, if the members of the petitioners’ association have taken benefit of the schemes under Section 20 of the said Act by constructing buildings, they now cannot wiggle out of their obligations to surrender flats to the government which the government could sell at fixed rate. The entire tenor of the above petitioners appears to be that the petitioners do not want to fulfil their obligations under the said Schemes viz. surrendering the flats to the State Government and taking advantage of the repeal of the said Act want to contend that their obligations under the said schemes do not survive. In our view the impugned letter as rightly contended by the learned AGP has been issued to protect the public interest and government revenue. It does not befit the Petitioners who have taken advantage of the said scheme now contend that their obligations do not survive, and therefore, there is no need for them to surrender flats to the government. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the challenge raised in the above petition which is accordingly dismissed.” 16. In the instant case similar situation is portrayed in the affidavit in reply filed by the State. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the challenge raised in the above petition which is accordingly dismissed.” 16. In the instant case similar situation is portrayed in the affidavit in reply filed by the State. Referring to the Mohan Gopal Mate case (Supra) reported in 2008(6) ALL MR 41, the learned Advocate for the Petitioner submitted that a pertinent question regarding the extent of power of the State under Sections 20 and 21 of U.L.C. Act in the case of breach of conditions of the scheme by the scheme holder has been clearly answered as follows: “Powers of the State under Section 20 in case of breach of condition of the order of exemption is limited to withdraw exemption order only and so far as Section 21 is concerned, declare the land which is not to be treated as excess land in view of the Sub-Section (1) in case of breach of condition State can declare such land to be excess in view of Sub-Section (2) of Section 21. Thereupon, the provisions of Chapter III will apply to the said land.” 17. Going by strict interpretation of the Sections 20 and 21 of the ULC Act, the power of the State in case of contravention of any of the conditions of the scheme by scheme holder remains limited to withdrawal of the exemption and declaring the exempted land as excess land and to application of the provisions of the Chapter III of the said Act for acquisition of the said land as contemplated under Sub-Section (2) of Section 21 therein. 18. This view is in conflict with the view expressed by the Division Bench in Mira Bhayander Builders & Developers Welfare Association (Supra), and as such the controversy raised by such conflict deserves to be resolved by the Full Bench of this Court. 19. This Petition is, therefore, referred to the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for passing appropriate directions in the matter.” 12. It is in view of these events that a Full Bench was constituted and the above formulated questions await an answer from us. 13. At the outset we must clarify that we would be only answering the question/s formulated and reproduced hereinabove. We would not be expressing any opinion on the rival contentions insofar as merits of individual petitions. It is in view of these events that a Full Bench was constituted and the above formulated questions await an answer from us. 13. At the outset we must clarify that we would be only answering the question/s formulated and reproduced hereinabove. We would not be expressing any opinion on the rival contentions insofar as merits of individual petitions. Each of these petitions thereafter would be placed before the appropriate Division Benches and for a decision on merits and in accordance with law. Our observations and findings, therefore, shall not be construed as expression of any opinion on the merits of the Writ Petitions referred above or pending in this Court. 14. The Petitioners' counsel have made an attempt to show us as to how the Division Bench judgment in the case of Mira Bhayander Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane (supra) does not lay down the correct law. They have all, more or less, urged that repeal of the Principal Act in the State of Maharashtra on 29.11.2007 results in the State and competent authorities being prevented from withdrawing the order of exemption passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act. Assuming that the order of exemption or any action taken there-under is valid notwithstanding anything contrary held in any judgment or order of the competent court, yet the Repeal Act saves only validity of the order of exemption and nothing more. Such saving would not permit the State Government or competent authority to withdraw the order of exemption or enforce the terms and conditions thereof or to subject the excess vacant land to the consequences under the Principal Act. The saving is thus not absolute, but restricted in nature. Thirdly, it is urged that there being a Repealing Act containing such restricted saving clause, the same rules out applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 or its parimateria provision in the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904. 15. We shall now elaborate these contentions as articulated by Mr. Naphade, learned Senior Counsel and adopted with some additions by Mr. Sathe, Mr. Sridharan, Mr. Devitre, Mr. Samdani, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Gangal, Mr. oshi and Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners. 16. Mr. Naphade firstly submitted that for understanding the Repeal Act we must have a look at the Principal Act. The Principal Act, according to Mr. Sathe, Mr. Sridharan, Mr. Devitre, Mr. Samdani, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Gangal, Mr. oshi and Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners. 16. Mr. Naphade firstly submitted that for understanding the Repeal Act we must have a look at the Principal Act. The Principal Act, according to Mr. Naphade, contains several provisions, but material there-from are Sections 3, 5, 6, 8, 10 and 38. Mr. Naphade also took us through Section 11 of the Principal Act before coming to Section 20. In his submission the scheme of the Principal Act is that no one shall hold the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. The return or statement has to be filed so as to determine the extent of excess vacant land. In other words, Mr. Naphade submits that except as otherwise provided in the Principal Act, on and from the commencement of the Act, no person shall be entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of ceiling limit in the territories to which the Principal Act applies. Mr. Naphade submits that Section 4 sets out the ceiling limit. He submits that the transfer of vacant land is also an aspect which is taken care of by Section 5. The persons holding the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit have to file the statement. He submits that further provisions enable scrutiny of particulars, preparing a draft statement as regards the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit and the final statement. Mr. Naphade submits that Section 10 is entitled “Acquisition of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit”. The extent of the vacant land held by a person in excess of ceiling limit has to be specified by subsection (1) of Section 10 and the purpose of same is to enable acquisition of the same eventually. That is an aspect dealt with by subsections (2) and (3) of Section 10. The vesting of such excess vacant land free from all encumbrances and with effect from the date of publication of a notification under subsection (3) results in enabling the Government to take possession of the land. In these circumstances, according to Mr. Naphade, only consequence of not filing a return or statement, but which is not accepted in totality is provided by Section 10. There is also a provision, namely, Section 38 which makes such act a punishable offence and Mr. In these circumstances, according to Mr. Naphade, only consequence of not filing a return or statement, but which is not accepted in totality is provided by Section 10. There is also a provision, namely, Section 38 which makes such act a punishable offence and Mr. Naphade invites our attention to subsections (1) to (4) of Section 38 in that regard. Mr. Naphade's attempt was to show that even if the vacant land is in excess of ceiling limit and there is no compliance with the provisions requiring filing a statement of such vacant land, still the owner is not deprived of his rights in the same. Mr. Naphade in that regard invites our attention to Section 15 of the Principal Act and submits that it reflects the legislative intent. There is no loss of ownership on promulgation of the Principal Act. In these circumstances all that the Principal Act does is to create some sort of clog or cloud on the rights of a person to hold the land. His ownership rights therein are not affected. 17. Mr. Naphade, therefore, submits that the power to exempt the excess vacant land from applicability of Chapter-III of the Principal Act is exercised by the Government either on its own motion or otherwise and that is also clear by Sections 21 and 22 which permits the excess vacant land not to be treated as such in certain cases and it's retention under certain circumstances. Therefore, merely because a holder of the excess vacant land seeks exemption from applicability of Chapter-III or the State exempts such vacant land from applicability thereof will not mean that the right and particularly ownership therein is surrendered much less waived. Mr. Naphade's attempt was to show that the State seeks to put the excess vacant land beyond application of Chapter-III, but keeping all his rights and options intact. The reference, therefore, will have to be answered by us bearing in mind this vital aspect, is the submission of Mr. Naphade. 18. Mr. Naphade elaborated this aspect by submitting that once the land is exempted, it is out of the purview of the Principal Act. The right to hold it conditionally remains unaffected. The power to exempt is limited in nature. It is legislative in character. Naphade. 18. Mr. Naphade elaborated this aspect by submitting that once the land is exempted, it is out of the purview of the Principal Act. The right to hold it conditionally remains unaffected. The power to exempt is limited in nature. It is legislative in character. By no stretch of imagination it is a right conferred in the Government nor exercise of powers to exempt creates any right in the Government in respect of such excess vacant land. In these circumstances and if Sections 20(2) and 21(2) are read together it would be apparent that neither any action under subsection (1) of Section 21 or the power under subsection (2) is saved by repeal of the Principal Act. In fact the Repeal Act does not save Section 21 at all. Hence, when the Repeal Act in Section 3(1)(b) refers to the validity of exemption order, it deliberately omits to include or refer subsection (2) of Section 20. Hence, there is no power to withdraw the exemption order under Section 20(1) after repeal of the Principal Act. Hence, even breach or violation of the condition in the exemption order will not result in its cancellation or withdrawal. Apart there-from any breach or violation of the condition on which the exemption order was granted does not result in automatic withdrawal or cancellation thereof. That is apparent from Section 20(2). It is, therefore, clear that the Repeal Act does not save this power and by omitting subsection (2) of Section 20 from clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. The legislature was aware that the power to withdraw the exemption order will have to be exercised only after giving a reasonable opportunity to such person who has violated the conditions subject to which the exemption under clause (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of Section 20 is granted. That reasonable opportunity is to make representation against the proposed withdrawal. It is the only consequence of either not complying with the conditions subject to which the exemption is granted or not being able to satisfy the Government that such exemption should not be withdrawn or from applicability of Chapter-III to the excess vacant land. Meaning thereby same is capable of being acquired and thereafter, vested in the Government. It is the only consequence of either not complying with the conditions subject to which the exemption is granted or not being able to satisfy the Government that such exemption should not be withdrawn or from applicability of Chapter-III to the excess vacant land. Meaning thereby same is capable of being acquired and thereafter, vested in the Government. Once that power cannot be exercised post repeal of the Principal Act, then, we would be in complete error if we hold that the repeal of the Principal Act does not affect the power to withdraw the exemption or to enforce the terms and conditions thereof. 19. In that regard, Mr. Naphade has taken us through Sections 20(2), 21(2) and 22(2) of the Principal Act. He submits that subsection (2) of Section 20 confers discretion in the Government and it may not withdraw the exemption order despite the conditions subject to which the same is granted are not complied with by any person. Whereas, subsection (2) of Section 21 mandates declaring the vacant land to be excess. It is submitted that there are distinct consequences and which are taken care of by subsection (2) of Section 22. Thus, the power of exemption has different parameters and the legislature was aware that such power cannot survive the repeal of the Principal Act. Hence, in the teeth of this clear language of the Repeal Act recourse to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is impermissible. Once a different intention appears from the provisions contained in the Repeal Act, then, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 would not apply. The question of liberal construction of Section 3 of the Repeal Act, therefore, does not arise at all. 20. Mr. Naphade thereafter took us extensively through the Repeal Act to submit that what is saved is specific. By clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act the vesting of land of which possession has been taken by the State is saved. Meaning thereby, any vacant land which is subject matter of declaration under Section 10(3) of which possession has not been taken by the State Government, then its vesting is not saved by the Repeal Act. Meaning thereby, any vacant land which is subject matter of declaration under Section 10(3) of which possession has not been taken by the State Government, then its vesting is not saved by the Repeal Act. Such land of which possession has not been taken will have to be restored post repeal after the requirement stipulated in subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act is complied with. Therefore, there is no collision between clause (a) and clause (b). What clause (b) saves is only validity of the order granting exemption under Section 20(1) or any action taken thereunder. The power to withdraw the exemption is not saved. If it is held to be saved, then, clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act would be rendered redundant. Only consequence of exemption being withdrawn is to subject the land to applicability of Chapter-III of the Principal Act and particularly Section 10(3) thereof. If possession of such excess vacant land cannot be taken even after withdrawal of exemption in terms of subsection (2) of Section 20 of the Principal Act, then, there was no point in saving its validity. Therefore, the validity of the order of exemption is saved, but neither that saving will enable the State to withdraw the exemption post repeal nor will the State be in a position to give effect to the order of withdrawal of the exemption if cannot take possession of the excess vacant land. That is the reason why the power to withdraw the exemption has not been saved. Section 4 of the Repeal Act, therefore, would throw light on the interpretation of clauses (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. That Section 4 provides for abatement of legal proceedings. If the legal proceedings abate on the date on which the Repeal Act came into force, then, the intent could never be to save the power to withdraw the exemption. Therefore, the words, appearing in clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3, after Section 20 should be read accordingly and that would be consistent with the object and purpose sought to be achieved in enacting the Repeal Act. None of the proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the Principal Act pending immediately before commencement of the Repeal Act are saved. None of the proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the Principal Act pending immediately before commencement of the Repeal Act are saved. Even if they are pending before any court or tribunal or any other authority they shall abate. In these circumstances the Legislature clearly intended that any past or closed or conclusive action alone is saved. Anything in the pipeline or inchoate is affected and not saved. This is because the Principal Act is a self contained code. It contains substantive and procedural provisions and even creates a forum for the purpose of enforcing and exercising substantive rights and powers and equally procedural one. A forum is created so as to make and enact a complete code. Nothing beyond the Principal Act can be seen. If the Repeal Act is construed in this manner, then, it envisages complete destruction of the rights under the Principal Act. Any right which is crystallized and which is not a mere hope or chance is alone saved. 21. Mr. Naphade also submits that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act cannot be imported into and read when the Repeal Act is so specific and clear. Alternatively and without prejudice to this submission Mr. Naphade submits that if Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is analyzed, it by clauses (a) to (e) saves something which is in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect. It does not affect previous operation of the Act so repealed or anything duly done or suffered there-under. The repeal does not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the repealed enactment. Mr. Naphade submits that clause (b) would, therefore, refer to past or complete act and not something which is intended and incomplete. The liabilities that are crystallized under the enactment which is repealed alone are unaffected by repeal of the original or Principal Act and that is clarified by clause (c). This clause cannot be imported in the present Repealing Act for the simple reason that it would create inconsistency. Mr. Naphade submits that clause (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would have saved Section 20(2) of the Principal Act had Sections 3 and 4 been not enacted in the Repeal Act. This clause cannot be imported in the present Repealing Act for the simple reason that it would create inconsistency. Mr. Naphade submits that clause (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would have saved Section 20(2) of the Principal Act had Sections 3 and 4 been not enacted in the Repeal Act. That being clearly enacted there will be inconsistency if one imports clause (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act in Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act. For all these reasons Mr. Naphade would submit that the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, Delhi High Court and Madras High Court follows the Division Bench judgments of this Court from which Mira Bhayander (supra) differs. That is the only view possible in the present legal backdrop and we must, therefore, hold that Mira Bhayander (supra) does not lay down the correct law and should be overruled. Mr. Naphade submits that when three or four High Courts in the country have taken a consistent view of the provision contained in a Central Act, then, that view ought to be followed so as to bring comity and consistency in interpretation of a Parliamentary statute. The reference, therefore, be answered accordingly. 22. Mr. Naphade in support of the above submissions, has placed heavy reliance on the following decisions :- 1. Mohamed Ashref Noor v/s State of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.6856/2003 decided on 16.12.2009 by the Madras High Court. 2. Surendra Raj Jaiswal v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.26474/2009 decided on 24.08.2011 by a Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 3. The Principal Secretary to Government, Hyderabad v/s Surendra, in Writ Petition No.951/2012 decided on 25.07.2012 by the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 4. M/s Suri Industries v/s State of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.8610/2013 decided on 06.09.2010 by the Madras High Court. 5. Manik M. Ragit v/s State of Maharashtra reported in 2013 (2) Mh.L.J. 224 . (WP No.1290/2012 decided on 30.07.2012 Nagpur Bench). 6. M/s Nile Limited v/s State of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.23846/2008 decided on 06.11.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 7. State of Uttar Pradesh v/s Hari Ram reported in (2013) 4 SCC 280 . 8. M/s Tata Coffee Limited v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.11929/2013 decided on 22.07.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 9. M/s Nile Limited v/s State of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.23846/2008 decided on 06.11.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 7. State of Uttar Pradesh v/s Hari Ram reported in (2013) 4 SCC 280 . 8. M/s Tata Coffee Limited v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.11929/2013 decided on 22.07.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 9. Gajanan Kamlya Patil v/s Additional Collector and Competent Authority, in Civil Appeal Nos.2070, 2071/ 2014 arising out of SLP (C) Nos.14904, 14905 of 2011 decided on 14.02.2014 by the Honourable Supreme Court. 10. M/s L.G. Polymers India Private Limited v/s State of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.21934/2013 decided on 28.03.2014 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 11. Synco Industries Limited v/s Assessing Officer, Income Tax, Mumbai reported in (2008) 4 SCC 22 . 12. Tej Pratap Singh v/s Union of India, in Writ Petition (C) No.2455/1992 decided on 16.07.2009 by the Delhi High Court. 23. The submissions of Mr. Naphade have been adopted by Mr. Milind Sathe, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Writ Petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.2201/2009, 3815/2010 and 9703/2010. In addition, Mr. Sathe submits that the Preamble of the Principal Act provides for imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomeration, for acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit and to regulate the construction of buildings on such land. It is also to distribute the excess vacant land after it vests in the State. In these circumstances if the construction placed by the State on the provisions of the Repeal Act is accepted that would result in saving of the consequences following withdrawal of exemption. Section 20(2) of the Principal Act envisages withdrawal of exemption and after such withdrawal what follows is the vesting of the land in terms of Section 10(3) and its possession as envisaged by Section 10(5) and (6). This is specifically not saved by Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act. Having regard to the clear language of the Principal Act this is the only consequence which follows on withdrawal of exemption. If it is not expressly saved, then, by an indirect or oblique method the Court cannot save it. Mr. This is specifically not saved by Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act. Having regard to the clear language of the Principal Act this is the only consequence which follows on withdrawal of exemption. If it is not expressly saved, then, by an indirect or oblique method the Court cannot save it. Mr. Sathe's contention is that what is specifically saved is the validity of the order of exemption and the crucial words are to be found in clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act to this effect that the validity of any order granting exemption under Section 20 (1) or any action taken there-under is saved notwithstanding any judgment of any court to the contrary. Therefore, even if the Court declares the order of exemption or any action taken thereunder to be bad or invalid that is unaffected by repeal of the Principal Act. Beyond this nothing more can be read in the saving clause or the Repeal Act as a whole. The Reference, therefore, be answered accordingly. Mr. Sathe relies upon the following judgments : 1. Mukarram Ali Khan v/s State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2007) 11 SCC 90 . 2. Voltas Limited v/s Additional Collector and Competent Authority, reported in 2008 (5) Bom. C.R. 746. 3. Shanti Bhardwaj v/s State of U.P., reported in (2004) 10 SCC 130 . 4. Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, reported in (2012) 4 SCC 718 . 5. Ritesh Tewari v/s State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2010) 10 SCC 677 . 6. Simpson and General Finance Company Limited v/s State of State of Tamil Nadu, reported in (2006) 4 MLJ 1807 (Madras High Court). 7. Mohan Gopalrao Mate v/s Principal Secretary, reported in 2009 (1) Bom. C.R. 275. 8. Vithabai Bama Bhandari v/s State of Maharashtra, reported in 2009 (3) Bom. C.R. 663. 9. Tej Pratap Singh v/s Union of India, in Writ Petition (C) No.2455/1992 decided on 16.07.2009 by the Delhi High Court. 10. Mira Bhyandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s The Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration, in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 decided on 27.08.2009 by the Bombay High Court. 11. Kabbur Industries Private Limited v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.9890/2009 decided on 05.05.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 12. 10. Mira Bhyandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s The Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration, in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 decided on 27.08.2009 by the Bombay High Court. 11. Kabbur Industries Private Limited v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.9890/2009 decided on 05.05.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 12. Damodar Laxman Navare v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 decided on 08.07.2010 by the Bombay High Court : Reported in 2010(6) Bom. C.R. 611. 13. Waman Bandu Bhoir v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.4141/2010 decided on 11.10.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 14. Jayesh Tokarshi Shah v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane, in Writ Petition No.3815/2010 decided on 26.10.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 15. Maharaj Singh v/s State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (1977) 1 SCC 155 . 16. Union of India v/s Somasundaram Viswanath, reported in (1989) 1 SCC 175 . 17. John Thomas v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.38507/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 18. L. Kannappan and L. Thirunavukarasu v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.46091/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 19. Anil Nemichand Bafna v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.153/2008 decided on 06.05.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 20. Surendra Raj Jaiswal v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.26474/2009 decided on 24.08.2011 by a Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 21. Manik M. Ragit v/s State of Maharashtra reported in 2013 (2) Mh.L.J. 224 . (WP No.1290/2012 decided on 30.07.2012 Nagpur Bench). 22. State of Uttar Pradesh v/s Hari Ram reported in (2013) 4 SCC 280 . 24. Mr. Naphade's submissions then have been adopted by Mr. Gangal, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition No.5024/2013. He went further to contend that what is saved by virtue of Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act is the validity of the order of exemption, but not the conditions subject to which such exemption is granted. In that regard Mr. Gangal relied upon the following judgments :- 1. Shanti Bhardwaj v/s State of U.P., reported in (2004) 10 SCC 130 . 2. L. Kannappan and L. Thirunavukarasu v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.46091/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 3. In that regard Mr. Gangal relied upon the following judgments :- 1. Shanti Bhardwaj v/s State of U.P., reported in (2004) 10 SCC 130 . 2. L. Kannappan and L. Thirunavukarasu v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.46091/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 3. Surendra Raj Jaiswal v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.26474/2009 decided on 24.08.2011 by a Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 25. Then Mr. Sridharan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.2243/2011 and 2244/2011, argued that the Repeal Act envisages application of same in the first instance to the whole of the State of Haryana and Punjab and to all the Union territories. This is envisaged by Section 1(2) of the Repeal Act. The Repeal Act comes into force in other States after other States adopt the Repeal Act by resolution passed in that behalf under Article 252(2) of the Constitution of India. Mr. Sridharan, therefore, submits that this aspect must be borne in mind while considering the submission or stand of the State regarding applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Mr. Sridharan submits that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act applies only when either the General Clauses Act or any Central Act or Regulation made after commencement of the General Clauses Act repeals any enactment made prior to the General Clauses Act coming into force or thereafter. In the present case the State Government has adopted by resolution passed under Article 252 of the Constitution of India the Repeal Act in the State of Maharashtra with effect from 29.11.2007. In the light of such adoption by resolution of the State Assembly the Section 6 of the General Clauses Act cannot be resorted to or applied. That applies only when either the General Clauses Act or any Central Act or Regulation made after commencement of the General Clauses Act repeals any enactment made or to be made by the Parliament. Both are Parliamentary Statues and in such circumstances by virtue of Article 252(2) of the Constitution of India the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out. 26. Alternatively, Mr. Sridharan submits that Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act is a special saving clause demonstrating a clear different intention. Therefore, Section 3 of the Repeal Act saves only what is specifically mentioned therein. 26. Alternatively, Mr. Sridharan submits that Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act is a special saving clause demonstrating a clear different intention. Therefore, Section 3 of the Repeal Act saves only what is specifically mentioned therein. There is no room for applying Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 by implication or impliedly. Mr. Sridharan also submits that in true sense we are not construing a validating statute or clause. What is saved by clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 is an order under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act and the exemptions which are subject matter of the same. All actions under the same are saved, but that does not mean that the power to take action under Section 20(2) is also saved. The saving in the present case is only to protect the rights of innocent third parties. Even the actions under the exemption are saved with a view to ensure such protection. This is not a substantive provision and therefore, it cannot be construed with reference to the Principal Act. By no stretch of imagination it revives the Principal Act. This is apparent from reading of Section 4 of the Repeal Act because even the proceedings as initiated abate on Principal Act coming into force. By clause (c) of subsection (1) of Section 3 the liability incurred under the exemption order is not saved, but only the payment made to the State Government as a condition for granting exemption under Section 20(1) is unaffected and thus, saved. Beyond all this we should not read anything into the Repeal Act. Mr. Sridharan relied upon the following decisions in support of the above contentions :- 1. Kolhapur Cane-sugar Works Limited v/s Union of India, reported in (2000) 2 SCC 536 . 2. Air India v/s Union of India, reported in (1995) 4 SCC 734 . 3. Union of India v/s West Coast Paper Mills Limited, reported in 2004 (164) E.L.T. 375 (SC). 4. Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Limited v/s Broach Borough Municipality, reported in 2000 (123) ELT 3 (SC). 27. It is pertinent to note that Mr. Sridharan's main argument has not been supported or adopted by any counsel. It is clear that Mr. Naphade's contentions and submissions as adopted by Mr. Sathe are further adopted and elaborated by Mr. Devitre, learned Senior Counsel appearing in the Original Side Writ Petition No.37/2010 and Mr. 27. It is pertinent to note that Mr. Sridharan's main argument has not been supported or adopted by any counsel. It is clear that Mr. Naphade's contentions and submissions as adopted by Mr. Sathe are further adopted and elaborated by Mr. Devitre, learned Senior Counsel appearing in the Original Side Writ Petition No.37/2010 and Mr. Samdani, learned Senior Counsel appearing in Writ Petition No.346/2011. Both of them have urged that a different intention appears in clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act and therefore, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act has no application. The specific saving is for the benefit of the land holders and therefore, there is no scope for construing clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act on equitable principles. Once there is no room for equitable considerations and particularly as Mr. Samdani urges because of the Principal Act being ex-propriatory in nature and providing for compulsory acquisition, then, all the more any liberal construction is ruled out. Mr. Samdani submits that even the saving clause has to be strictly construed in this case and the repeal of the Principal Act wipes out the same and obliterates it from the statute book completely. For all these reasons the Reference should be answered accordingly. 28. Mr. Devitre and Mr. Samdani relied upon the following decisions :- 1. Mohan Gopalrao Mate v/s Principal Secretary, reported in 2009 (1) Bom. C.R. 275. 2. Parripati Chandrasekharrao and Sons v/s Alapati Jalaiah, reported in (1995) 3 SCC 709 . 3. Khub Chand v/s State of Rajasthan, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1074 . 4. Gujarat Electricity Board v/s Girdharlal Motilal, reported in AIR 1969 SC 267 . 5. State of Maharashtra v/s B.E. Billimoria, reported in (2003) 7 SCC 336 . 6. Corporation of the City of Victoria v/s Bishop of Vancouver Island, reported in AIR 1921 PC 240. 7. T.R. Thandur v/s Union of India, reported in (1996) 3 SCC 690 . 29. Mr. Aniruddha Joshi, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition No.9872/2010 invites our attention to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vithabai Bama Bhandari v/s State of Maharashtra (supra) and submits that there is nothing sacrosanct about Section 20 of the Principal Act. By indirect process we cannot, therefore, save what is not expressly saved by the Repeal Act. By indirect process we cannot, therefore, save what is not expressly saved by the Repeal Act. Once the power to exempt cannot be exercised and not available after the Repeal Act, then, merely because such power is exercised during the subsistence of the Principal Act and prior to the Repeal Act coming into force does not mean that further or incidental power envisaged by the primary power to exempt is saved. Even this incidental or ancillary power is unavailable after repeal of the Principal Act. This argument is built more or less on the wording of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. 30. Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition No.556/2010, while adopting all arguments of all the Senior Counsel only submitted that when more than one High Court in this country have placed an interpretation on the Parliamentary Statute or construed its provisions in a particular way, then, for the sake of consistency and certainty this Court must follow the reasoning of the Delhi High Court, Madras High Court and Andhra Pradesh High Court. 31. Mr. Joshi and Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha relied upon the following judgments in support of the above submissions :- 1. Damodar Laxman Navare v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 decided on 08.07.2010 by the Bombay High Court : Reported in 2010(6) Bom. C.R. 611. 2. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v/s Alcock Ashdown & Company Limited, reported in 1979 ITR page 164 : in Income Tax Reference No.40/1969 decided on 07.07.1978 by the Bombay High Court. 3. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v/s T. Maneklal Mfg. Co. Ltd., reported in 1978 ITR Vol.115 page 725. 4. Bhagwat Dharmaraj Radke v/s State of Maharashtra, in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.35883/2012 decided on 31.03.2014 by the Honourable Supreme Court. 5. Government of Karnataka v/s Gowramma and others, reported in AIR 2008 SC 863 . 32. On the other hand, Mr. Khambata, learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State submits that it is fallacious to assume that the State or other Respondents, namely, Authorities under the Principal Act are requesting this Court to go by any equitable consideration or liberal principle. 32. On the other hand, Mr. Khambata, learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State submits that it is fallacious to assume that the State or other Respondents, namely, Authorities under the Principal Act are requesting this Court to go by any equitable consideration or liberal principle. The State has throughout maintained that in terms of the Preamble of the Principal Act and Constitutional philosophy as enshrined by Articles 21 and 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution of India a ceiling has been placed by the Principal Act on the holding of vacant land within the urban agglomeration. This ceiling limit, as is reflected from the Principal Act and which cannot be disputed, is placed by a statutory prescription that is to be found in Section 4 of the Principal Act. Chapter-III of the Principal Act is titled as “ceiling on vacant land”. Except as otherwise provided in the Principal Act on and from the commencement of the Principal Act no person shall be entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit in the territories to which this Act applies under subsection (2) of Section 1. The obligation under the statute is, therefore, clear and absolute. It relates and dates back to the commencement of the Principal Act. None can dispute that what is exempted from the purview of Chapter-III and by a overriding power conferred in the State Government is the applicability of Chapter-III to the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. Therefore, when the excess vacant land is exempted in exceptional circumstances and which have been also specified by the statute, then, all that happens is that the excess vacant land is exempted from the provisions of Chapter-III either conditionally or unconditionally and in terms of the satisfaction in clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of Section 20 of the Principal Act. The power to exempt is exercised by the State suo-motu or otherwise meaning thereby on the Application of the person holding the excess vacant land. The request is not to apply the Chapter in the light of the factors and circumstances specified therein. This request is made and granted only on the satisfaction reached and not as a matter of course. Thus, application of the chapter is a rule and its non-application is an exception. The request is not to apply the Chapter in the light of the factors and circumstances specified therein. This request is made and granted only on the satisfaction reached and not as a matter of course. Thus, application of the chapter is a rule and its non-application is an exception. Despite repeal of the Principal Act if the validity of the order granting exemption under subsection (1) of Section 20 is saved by Section 3 of the Repeal Act and such validity remains unaffected notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the order of the competent court, then, full effect will have to be given to the language of the Repeal Act. Once the Repeal Act is so clear and does not evince anything contrary to the principles enshrined in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, then, on the strength of the wording of the Repeal Act and in any event with the assistance of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act it can safely be held that there is no intention to destroy the rights and liabilities or consequences which flow from a valid exemption order. In fact the language of Section 3 of the Repeal Act supplements Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Nothing in Section 3 of the Repeal Act takes away applicability of the Principal Act to the extent of enforcing the obligations in terms of the conditions imposed in the order of exemption. The learned Advocate General submits that the arguments of the Petitioners revolve around the saving clause enacted by Section 3 of the Repeal Act. The submissions are that the Repeal Act shows intention contrary to the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act inasmuch as neither the exemption order nor any of the terms and conditions therein can be enforced post repeal. 33. The learned Advocate General submitted that the provisions of the Repeal Act and particularly Section 3(1) clauses (b) and (c) require a harmonious interpretation. 33. The learned Advocate General submitted that the provisions of the Repeal Act and particularly Section 3(1) clauses (b) and (c) require a harmonious interpretation. By reading these clauses together what is apparent is that by clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act it is clarified that repeal of the Principal Act shall not affect the vesting of any vacant land under Section 10(3) of the Principal Act, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorized by the State in this behalf or by the competent authority. Thus, if the steps as contemplated by subsection (3) of Section 10 of the Principal Act and equally by subsections (5) and (6) thereof are taken, then, the vesting of excess vacant land referred to in a Notification published under Section 10(1) in terms of subsection (3) thereof is not affected by repeal of the Principal Act. No person then can claim that the excess vacant land to which the Principal Act admittedly applies and which is deemed to have been acquired by the State does not belong to it or the State is not entitled to it because the Principal Act has been repealed and the vesting comes to an end. The vesting is of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. Undisputedly, if the land in excess of ceiling limit can vest after the notification in terms of Section 10(1) is published in the official Gazette, then, the declaration which is postulated or contemplated by subsection (3) is in relation to such excess vacant land. What subsection (3) of Section 10 really contemplates and envisages is that the State can declare that the excess vacant land is deemed to have been acquired by it upon publication of the declaration and particularly with effect from the dates specified therein. By such deemed acquisition the land is further deemed to have vested absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances with effect from the date specified in the declaration. By such deemed acquisition the land is further deemed to have vested absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances with effect from the date specified in the declaration. By the repeal what has been clarified is that unless the State has taken over possession of such excess vacant land and as referred to in the Notification under Section 10(1) either by itself or through any person duly authorized by it in this behalf or by the competent authority, its plain and simple vesting will not enable the Government to take over possession of the excess vacant land after coming into force of the Repeal Act. This coming into force or commencing is reckoned in terms of subsections (2) and (3) of Section 1 of the Repeal Act. Thus, the State is disabled from taking possession of the excess vacant land which has already vested in it if it has failed to take possession. Thereupon the land can be restored and that is how subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act would read. Therefore, this is not a restricted or limited saving clause in any sense of the term. Though Section 3 is titled “saving” it contains the substantive provisions. The Legislature or the Parliament did not intend a vacuum. It did not stop by only stating that if possession of the land vested in the State in terms of Section 10(3) is not taken, then, that cannot be taken or the land cannot be made over to the Government after repeal of the Principal Act. It enacts a further provision by which it is possible for the State to restore the land to the holder and that is why restoration is contemplated by virtue of Section 3 (2). That restoration is conditional upon repayment of an amount to the State Government by the holder. Section 11 of the Principal Act talks of payment of amount for the vacant land acquired under Section 10(3). That payment can be claimed even without the land being handed over or without the possession of the excess vacant land being taken. The deemed acquisition by virtue of Section 10(3) enables the person or persons having interest in the excess vacant land to claim the amount under Section 11. That payment can be claimed even without the land being handed over or without the possession of the excess vacant land being taken. The deemed acquisition by virtue of Section 10(3) enables the person or persons having interest in the excess vacant land to claim the amount under Section 11. If any payment has been made after such deemed acquisition, then, that amount has to be returned to the Government and only then the excess vacant land of which possession has not been taken will be restored to any person or the holder as the case may be. If this was a complete obliteration or destruction of the rights and liabilities under the Principal Act, then, such substantive provision enabling restoration would not have been inserted or incorporated is the submission of the learned Advocate General. The refund of such amount and which has been paid to the person or persons interested in the excess vacant land in terms of Section 11 of the Principal Act alone entitles such person to claim restoration of the land to him. If the repeal had been simplicitor and without such substantive provision, then, it would not have been possible for the holder or any person interested in the excess vacant land to claim its restoration. It is, therefore, erroneous to urge that the Repeal Act evidences an intention contrary to the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. 34. Inviting our attention to clauses (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act the learned Advocate General submits that the true nature of the power to exempt under the Principal Act would have to be properly and completely appreciated. He submits that the basis on which the power to exempt is exercised is that the person is holding the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. It is in case of such vacant land that the State Government must be satisfied either on its own motion or otherwise that having regard to its location, purpose for which such land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require, it is necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do that the Government is conferred with discretion to pass an order exempting such vacant land from the provisions of Chapter-III either conditionally or otherwise. The learned Advocate General submits that it is not just having regard to location of the land, purpose for which the excess vacant land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require, but it is necessary and expedient in the public interest that the discretion to exempt such land has to be exercised. That is in terms of clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 20. Whereas, in terms of clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 20, the State is satisfied either on its own motion or otherwise that the application of the provisions of Chapter-III would cause undue hardship to the persons holding the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit that the Government may by order exempt conditionally or unconditionally the vacant land from the provisions of Chapter-III. Further the order under clause (b) cannot be made unless the reasons for doing so are recorded in writing. That is because clause (b) contemplates relieving the person holding the excess vacant land from undue hardship. Clause (a) necessarily postulates an exercise of powers to exempt the excess vacant land in public interest. When such is the ambit and scope of the powers and it is vacant land in excess of ceiling limit which is exempted from the provisions of Chapter-III that too in exceptional circumstances, then, it is futile to contend that the State Government despite validity of its Act or order being saved by the Repeal Act, would not be able to do anything in relation to such land post repeal of the Principal Act. The learned Advocate General submits that in this case the power of exemption and which is to be exercised for public good and in public interest is so exercised by making an order in that behalf. That the validity of such an order is saved though the Principal Act is repealed, but the legal consequences flowing from exercise of such clause are not saved, would be an incorrect, improper and legally untenable reading of the saving clause and the Repeal Act itself. The true nature of the power to exempt has not been appreciated in making such submissions. The true nature of the power to exempt has not been appreciated in making such submissions. The Petitioners' arguments proceed on an unsound and erroneous basis and namely that the power to exempt in terms of Section 20(1) of the Principal Act is exercised by the State Government only to benefit the holder. The argument is that it is to relieve the holder from the consequences of applicability of Chapter-III that the State exercises such power and therefore, nothing further can be done in pursuance of the valid order of exemption post repeal of the Principal Act. Judgment : S.C. Dharmadhikari, J. 1. The Honourable the Chief Justice has constituted this Full Bench in order to resolve a conflict between the conflicting views which have been expressed by two Division Benches of this Court. In our detailed order dated 24th April, 2014 we noticed that conflict and by consent of parties we formulated the questions which have to be answered by us. They read as under :- (1) Does Section 3(1)(b) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 read with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 r/w Section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 save the orders of exemption including all terms and conditions thereof passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act, namely, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and all actions taken there-under? (2) Whether, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 r/w Section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 apply to the repeal of the Principal Act by the Repealing Act, 1999? (3) Whether in view of Section 3(1)(b) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 and the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 : (a) the order of exemption including all its terms and conditions under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act, namely, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 can be continued and enforced in accordance with the provisions of the Principal Act; (b) all remedies and proceedings in respect of the order of exemption including all its terms and conditions may be instituted, continued and enforced? (4) Whether in view of the repeal of the Principal Act by the Repeal Act, the Government of Maharashtra can: (a) recall/cancel/modify the exemption order granted either under Section 20 of the Principal Act; (b) enforce circulars for implementation of exemption orders issued under Section 20 of the Principal Act prior to the repeal of the Principal Act; (c) acquire the land by issuing notification under Section 10(3) of the Principal Act; and (d) take any action of whatsoever nature on account of noncompliance/ breach of exemption order issued under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act? (5) Whether, the view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vithabai Bama Bhandari v/s State of Maharashtra and another reported in 2009(3) Bombay Cases Reporter 663 (Writ Petition No.4241/2008 decided on 31st March/16th April, 2009) and Damodar Laxman Navare and others v/s State of Maharashtra and others in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 dated 08th July, 2010 sets out the correct legal position as regards the ambit and scope of Section 3(1)(b) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 or whether, the view taken in Mira Bhayandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s the Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration and others in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 dated 27th August, 2009 to the contrary should be held to be laying down the correct principle of law? 2. Since both sides have canvassed arguments on legal issues, in order to appreciate them a few facts are required to be noted. We take the facts from a lead case, namely, Writ Petition No.9872/2010. That is a Writ Petition which has been filed by the Maharashtra Chamber of Housing Industry and its various Units. These are associations established to promote the housing and real estate industry. The Writ Petition is filed in the interest of members of these Associations and real estate industry and in the circumstances which are set out in paragraph 4 of the memo of Writ Petition. 3. It is the case of the Petitioners that the State of Maharashtra and Competent Authorities under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as “THE PRINCIPAL ACT”) continue to enforce and apply the provisions thereof despite enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “THE REPEAL ACT”). 3. It is the case of the Petitioners that the State of Maharashtra and Competent Authorities under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as “THE PRINCIPAL ACT”) continue to enforce and apply the provisions thereof despite enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “THE REPEAL ACT”). The Repeal Act has been brought into effect and is in force in the State of Maharashtra from 29.11.2007. 4. The grievance of the Petitioners is that there is a circular dated 18.03.2009 issued by the State Government, copy of which is at Annexure-A. That circular states that the Repeal Act has been brought into force in the State of Maharashtra w.e.f. 29.11.2007. The same expressly saves the vesting of excess vacant land in the State as also validity of an exemption order passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act. Meaning thereby, the repeal of the Principal Act does not affect the vesting of excess vacant land in the State provided its possession has been taken, so also, validity of an exemption order passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act. Therefore, such excess vacant lands of which possession has not been taken, but which are subjected to certain concessions under the order of exemption passed in terms of Section 20(1) of the Principal Act and which are particularly to utilize the lands for residential purpose, for implementing residential housing scheme, for industry and it's expansion, shall not be transferred without prior permission of the State and there are restrictions placed on change of user thereof. The permission for change of user will not be granted unless premium is paid to the Government. 5. A reference is made in this circular and the steps taken to implement the Repeal Act. The steps include two communications from the Government dated 01.03.2008 and 03.03.2008 which outline the scheme for development of these lands or their transfer. 6. It has been revealed that the exempted lands are being dealt with and for the purpose of implementation of the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme, Rental Housing Scheme, etc.. Further, the reservations in respect of these lands have been changed or altered from industry/agriculture without any reference to the Government/Competent Authority. The permissions in that regard have been granted without any prior approval from the competent authorities under the Principal Act. Further, the reservations in respect of these lands have been changed or altered from industry/agriculture without any reference to the Government/Competent Authority. The permissions in that regard have been granted without any prior approval from the competent authorities under the Principal Act. Therefore, the Government has directed that the exempted lands cannot be used for any other purpose nor their reservation can be changed unless the approvals/remarks are called for from the competent authority under the Principal Act. Any violation of such requirement would visit the persons concerned with all consequences and at their costs. 7. Prior to this circular there are certain Government Resolutions and which enable utilization of Transferable Development Rights (TDR) so as to use the lands for construction of houses for weaker sections and equally to grant development permissions in relation thereto. This is a Government Resolution dated 30.06.2007. 8. There is also an order and which has been referred to because it is the case of the Petitioners that their members had to obtain several permissions from the Respondent Nos.1 and 2 for carrying out the development. It is contended that the Government Resolutions referred by us including dated 30.06.2007 and emphasis by the authorities on compliance of the same continues despite the Repeal Act brought into force with effect from 29.11.2007. There are several instances which have been given and copies of the exemption orders passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act are referred to in paragraph 7 of the memo of Writ Petition No.9872/2010. 9. The grievance is that though the order of exemption was passed exempting the excess vacant land from the purview of Chapter-III of the Principal Act, when that Act was in force, but now after it's repeal the exemption order would not survive. In other words, the steps taken by the Authorities to give effect to the order of exemption even after repeal of the Principal Act in the State of Maharashtra are wholly illegal. The Authorities cannot compel parties like the Petitioners to seek any extension of time to complete the scheme or to comply with the conditions on which the order of exemption under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act has been passed. The stand taken is that the Respondents have no powers to enforce the Principal Act directly or indirectly. Several instances of such alleged attempts are set out. The stand taken is that the Respondents have no powers to enforce the Principal Act directly or indirectly. Several instances of such alleged attempts are set out. There is reference made to the legal provisions and finally what is prayed is that this Court must restrain by an appropriate writ, order or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Respondents from enforcing the provisions of the Principal Act insofar as such exemption orders and their terms and conditions. 10. From the record, what transpires is that a Writ Petition being Writ Petition No.3815/2010 from this group or batch of petitions, appeared before a Division Bench of this Court and it pronounced its judgment on 22.12.2010 noting that two Division Benches in the cases of Sundersons and others v/s State of Maharashtra and others reported in 2008 (5) Bombay Cases Reporter 85 and Damodar Laxman Navre v/s State of Maharashtra in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 dated 08th July , 2010, take a view that certain steps in pursuance of the order of exemption or seeking to enforce the terms and conditions thereof cannot be taken, whereas a conflicting view has been rendered by another Division Bench of this Court in Mira Bhayandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s the Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration and others in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 dated 27th August, 2009. 11. The attention of the Division Bench in Writ Petition No.3815/2010 (Jayesh Tokarshi Shah v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration) was invited to all these judgments and orders and stated to be conflicting. The Division Bench, therefore, in its judgment dated 22nd December, 2010 in the aforesaid matter observed as under :- 15. This prompts an answer in favour of a premise that the Additional District Collector, Thane and Competent Authority was not competent to issue the said Circular, and as such the efficacy of the said Circular commanding the Registering Officer to refuse the registration of the documents referred to therein remains questionable. A view congenial to the said premise is found expressed in some of the judgments Sunderson & Ors Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2008(5) Bombay Cases Reporter 85, Damodar Laxman Navre & 4 others Vs. State of Maharashtra & 4 others Writ Petition No.6300 of 2009, delivered previously by the Division Bench of this Court. A view congenial to the said premise is found expressed in some of the judgments Sunderson & Ors Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2008(5) Bombay Cases Reporter 85, Damodar Laxman Navre & 4 others Vs. State of Maharashtra & 4 others Writ Petition No.6300 of 2009, delivered previously by the Division Bench of this Court. However, there is a conflicting view expressed in the judgments delivered by the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No.5745 of 2009 Mira Bhayander Builders & Developers Welfare Association Vs. Dy. Collector & Competent Authority, Thane and 3 others. The Circular dated 23.6.2008 was the epicentre of controversy in Mira Bhayander Builders & Developers Welfare Association (Supra). The State contended as in the present case that the scheme holders were trying to wriggle out of their obligations under the scheme sanctioned under Section 20 of U.L.C. Act, and therefore, the said Circular came to be issued to protect the schemes meant for economically weaker sections, and also the government. The Division Bench after considering the rival contentions observed thus :- “In our view, if the members of the petitioners’ association have taken benefit of the schemes under Section 20 of the said Act by constructing buildings, they now cannot wiggle out of their obligations to surrender flats to the government which the government could sell at fixed rate. The entire tenor of the above petitioners appears to be that the petitioners do not want to fulfil their obligations under the said Schemes viz. surrendering the flats to the State Government and taking advantage of the repeal of the said Act want to contend that their obligations under the said schemes do not survive. In our view the impugned letter as rightly contended by the learned AGP has been issued to protect the public interest and government revenue. It does not befit the Petitioners who have taken advantage of the said scheme now contend that their obligations do not survive, and therefore, there is no need for them to surrender flats to the government. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the challenge raised in the above petition which is accordingly dismissed.” 16. In the instant case similar situation is portrayed in the affidavit in reply filed by the State. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the challenge raised in the above petition which is accordingly dismissed.” 16. In the instant case similar situation is portrayed in the affidavit in reply filed by the State. Referring to the Mohan Gopal Mate case (Supra) reported in 2008(6) ALL MR 41, the learned Advocate for the Petitioner submitted that a pertinent question regarding the extent of power of the State under Sections 20 and 21 of U.L.C. Act in the case of breach of conditions of the scheme by the scheme holder has been clearly answered as follows: “Powers of the State under Section 20 in case of breach of condition of the order of exemption is limited to withdraw exemption order only and so far as Section 21 is concerned, declare the land which is not to be treated as excess land in view of the Sub-Section (1) in case of breach of condition State can declare such land to be excess in view of Sub-Section (2) of Section 21. Thereupon, the provisions of Chapter III will apply to the said land.” 17. Going by strict interpretation of the Sections 20 and 21 of the ULC Act, the power of the State in case of contravention of any of the conditions of the scheme by scheme holder remains limited to withdrawal of the exemption and declaring the exempted land as excess land and to application of the provisions of the Chapter III of the said Act for acquisition of the said land as contemplated under Sub-Section (2) of Section 21 therein. 18. This view is in conflict with the view expressed by the Division Bench in Mira Bhayander Builders & Developers Welfare Association (Supra), and as such the controversy raised by such conflict deserves to be resolved by the Full Bench of this Court. 19. This Petition is, therefore, referred to the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for passing appropriate directions in the matter.” 12. It is in view of these events that a Full Bench was constituted and the above formulated questions await an answer from us. 13. At the outset we must clarify that we would be only answering the question/s formulated and reproduced hereinabove. We would not be expressing any opinion on the rival contentions insofar as merits of individual petitions. It is in view of these events that a Full Bench was constituted and the above formulated questions await an answer from us. 13. At the outset we must clarify that we would be only answering the question/s formulated and reproduced hereinabove. We would not be expressing any opinion on the rival contentions insofar as merits of individual petitions. Each of these petitions thereafter would be placed before the appropriate Division Benches and for a decision on merits and in accordance with law. Our observations and findings, therefore, shall not be construed as expression of any opinion on the merits of the Writ Petitions referred above or pending in this Court. 14. The Petitioners' counsel have made an attempt to show us as to how the Division Bench judgment in the case of Mira Bhayander Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane (supra) does not lay down the correct law. They have all, more or less, urged that repeal of the Principal Act in the State of Maharashtra on 29.11.2007 results in the State and competent authorities being prevented from withdrawing the order of exemption passed under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act. Assuming that the order of exemption or any action taken there-under is valid notwithstanding anything contrary held in any judgment or order of the competent court, yet the Repeal Act saves only validity of the order of exemption and nothing more. Such saving would not permit the State Government or competent authority to withdraw the order of exemption or enforce the terms and conditions thereof or to subject the excess vacant land to the consequences under the Principal Act. The saving is thus not absolute, but restricted in nature. Thirdly, it is urged that there being a Repealing Act containing such restricted saving clause, the same rules out applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 or its parimateria provision in the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904. 15. We shall now elaborate these contentions as articulated by Mr. Naphade, learned Senior Counsel and adopted with some additions by Mr. Sathe, Mr. Sridharan, Mr. Devitre, Mr. Samdani, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Gangal, Mr. oshi and Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners. 16. Mr. Naphade firstly submitted that for understanding the Repeal Act we must have a look at the Principal Act. The Principal Act, according to Mr. Sathe, Mr. Sridharan, Mr. Devitre, Mr. Samdani, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Gangal, Mr. oshi and Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners. 16. Mr. Naphade firstly submitted that for understanding the Repeal Act we must have a look at the Principal Act. The Principal Act, according to Mr. Naphade, contains several provisions, but material there-from are Sections 3, 5, 6, 8, 10 and 38. Mr. Naphade also took us through Section 11 of the Principal Act before coming to Section 20. In his submission the scheme of the Principal Act is that no one shall hold the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. The return or statement has to be filed so as to determine the extent of excess vacant land. In other words, Mr. Naphade submits that except as otherwise provided in the Principal Act, on and from the commencement of the Act, no person shall be entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of ceiling limit in the territories to which the Principal Act applies. Mr. Naphade submits that Section 4 sets out the ceiling limit. He submits that the transfer of vacant land is also an aspect which is taken care of by Section 5. The persons holding the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit have to file the statement. He submits that further provisions enable scrutiny of particulars, preparing a draft statement as regards the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit and the final statement. Mr. Naphade submits that Section 10 is entitled “Acquisition of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit”. The extent of the vacant land held by a person in excess of ceiling limit has to be specified by subsection (1) of Section 10 and the purpose of same is to enable acquisition of the same eventually. That is an aspect dealt with by subsections (2) and (3) of Section 10. The vesting of such excess vacant land free from all encumbrances and with effect from the date of publication of a notification under subsection (3) results in enabling the Government to take possession of the land. In these circumstances, according to Mr. Naphade, only consequence of not filing a return or statement, but which is not accepted in totality is provided by Section 10. There is also a provision, namely, Section 38 which makes such act a punishable offence and Mr. In these circumstances, according to Mr. Naphade, only consequence of not filing a return or statement, but which is not accepted in totality is provided by Section 10. There is also a provision, namely, Section 38 which makes such act a punishable offence and Mr. Naphade invites our attention to subsections (1) to (4) of Section 38 in that regard. Mr. Naphade's attempt was to show that even if the vacant land is in excess of ceiling limit and there is no compliance with the provisions requiring filing a statement of such vacant land, still the owner is not deprived of his rights in the same. Mr. Naphade in that regard invites our attention to Section 15 of the Principal Act and submits that it reflects the legislative intent. There is no loss of ownership on promulgation of the Principal Act. In these circumstances all that the Principal Act does is to create some sort of clog or cloud on the rights of a person to hold the land. His ownership rights therein are not affected. 17. Mr. Naphade, therefore, submits that the power to exempt the excess vacant land from applicability of Chapter-III of the Principal Act is exercised by the Government either on its own motion or otherwise and that is also clear by Sections 21 and 22 which permits the excess vacant land not to be treated as such in certain cases and it's retention under certain circumstances. Therefore, merely because a holder of the excess vacant land seeks exemption from applicability of Chapter-III or the State exempts such vacant land from applicability thereof will not mean that the right and particularly ownership therein is surrendered much less waived. Mr. Naphade's attempt was to show that the State seeks to put the excess vacant land beyond application of Chapter-III, but keeping all his rights and options intact. The reference, therefore, will have to be answered by us bearing in mind this vital aspect, is the submission of Mr. Naphade. 18. Mr. Naphade elaborated this aspect by submitting that once the land is exempted, it is out of the purview of the Principal Act. The right to hold it conditionally remains unaffected. The power to exempt is limited in nature. It is legislative in character. Naphade. 18. Mr. Naphade elaborated this aspect by submitting that once the land is exempted, it is out of the purview of the Principal Act. The right to hold it conditionally remains unaffected. The power to exempt is limited in nature. It is legislative in character. By no stretch of imagination it is a right conferred in the Government nor exercise of powers to exempt creates any right in the Government in respect of such excess vacant land. In these circumstances and if Sections 20(2) and 21(2) are read together it would be apparent that neither any action under subsection (1) of Section 21 or the power under subsection (2) is saved by repeal of the Principal Act. In fact the Repeal Act does not save Section 21 at all. Hence, when the Repeal Act in Section 3(1)(b) refers to the validity of exemption order, it deliberately omits to include or refer subsection (2) of Section 20. Hence, there is no power to withdraw the exemption order under Section 20(1) after repeal of the Principal Act. Hence, even breach or violation of the condition in the exemption order will not result in its cancellation or withdrawal. Apart there-from any breach or violation of the condition on which the exemption order was granted does not result in automatic withdrawal or cancellation thereof. That is apparent from Section 20(2). It is, therefore, clear that the Repeal Act does not save this power and by omitting subsection (2) of Section 20 from clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. The legislature was aware that the power to withdraw the exemption order will have to be exercised only after giving a reasonable opportunity to such person who has violated the conditions subject to which the exemption under clause (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of Section 20 is granted. That reasonable opportunity is to make representation against the proposed withdrawal. It is the only consequence of either not complying with the conditions subject to which the exemption is granted or not being able to satisfy the Government that such exemption should not be withdrawn or from applicability of Chapter-III to the excess vacant land. Meaning thereby same is capable of being acquired and thereafter, vested in the Government. It is the only consequence of either not complying with the conditions subject to which the exemption is granted or not being able to satisfy the Government that such exemption should not be withdrawn or from applicability of Chapter-III to the excess vacant land. Meaning thereby same is capable of being acquired and thereafter, vested in the Government. Once that power cannot be exercised post repeal of the Principal Act, then, we would be in complete error if we hold that the repeal of the Principal Act does not affect the power to withdraw the exemption or to enforce the terms and conditions thereof. 19. In that regard, Mr. Naphade has taken us through Sections 20(2), 21(2) and 22(2) of the Principal Act. He submits that subsection (2) of Section 20 confers discretion in the Government and it may not withdraw the exemption order despite the conditions subject to which the same is granted are not complied with by any person. Whereas, subsection (2) of Section 21 mandates declaring the vacant land to be excess. It is submitted that there are distinct consequences and which are taken care of by subsection (2) of Section 22. Thus, the power of exemption has different parameters and the legislature was aware that such power cannot survive the repeal of the Principal Act. Hence, in the teeth of this clear language of the Repeal Act recourse to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is impermissible. Once a different intention appears from the provisions contained in the Repeal Act, then, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 would not apply. The question of liberal construction of Section 3 of the Repeal Act, therefore, does not arise at all. 20. Mr. Naphade thereafter took us extensively through the Repeal Act to submit that what is saved is specific. By clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act the vesting of land of which possession has been taken by the State is saved. Meaning thereby, any vacant land which is subject matter of declaration under Section 10(3) of which possession has not been taken by the State Government, then its vesting is not saved by the Repeal Act. Meaning thereby, any vacant land which is subject matter of declaration under Section 10(3) of which possession has not been taken by the State Government, then its vesting is not saved by the Repeal Act. Such land of which possession has not been taken will have to be restored post repeal after the requirement stipulated in subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act is complied with. Therefore, there is no collision between clause (a) and clause (b). What clause (b) saves is only validity of the order granting exemption under Section 20(1) or any action taken thereunder. The power to withdraw the exemption is not saved. If it is held to be saved, then, clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act would be rendered redundant. Only consequence of exemption being withdrawn is to subject the land to applicability of Chapter-III of the Principal Act and particularly Section 10(3) thereof. If possession of such excess vacant land cannot be taken even after withdrawal of exemption in terms of subsection (2) of Section 20 of the Principal Act, then, there was no point in saving its validity. Therefore, the validity of the order of exemption is saved, but neither that saving will enable the State to withdraw the exemption post repeal nor will the State be in a position to give effect to the order of withdrawal of the exemption if cannot take possession of the excess vacant land. That is the reason why the power to withdraw the exemption has not been saved. Section 4 of the Repeal Act, therefore, would throw light on the interpretation of clauses (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. That Section 4 provides for abatement of legal proceedings. If the legal proceedings abate on the date on which the Repeal Act came into force, then, the intent could never be to save the power to withdraw the exemption. Therefore, the words, appearing in clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3, after Section 20 should be read accordingly and that would be consistent with the object and purpose sought to be achieved in enacting the Repeal Act. None of the proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the Principal Act pending immediately before commencement of the Repeal Act are saved. None of the proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the Principal Act pending immediately before commencement of the Repeal Act are saved. Even if they are pending before any court or tribunal or any other authority they shall abate. In these circumstances the Legislature clearly intended that any past or closed or conclusive action alone is saved. Anything in the pipeline or inchoate is affected and not saved. This is because the Principal Act is a self contained code. It contains substantive and procedural provisions and even creates a forum for the purpose of enforcing and exercising substantive rights and powers and equally procedural one. A forum is created so as to make and enact a complete code. Nothing beyond the Principal Act can be seen. If the Repeal Act is construed in this manner, then, it envisages complete destruction of the rights under the Principal Act. Any right which is crystallized and which is not a mere hope or chance is alone saved. 21. Mr. Naphade also submits that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act cannot be imported into and read when the Repeal Act is so specific and clear. Alternatively and without prejudice to this submission Mr. Naphade submits that if Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is analyzed, it by clauses (a) to (e) saves something which is in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect. It does not affect previous operation of the Act so repealed or anything duly done or suffered there-under. The repeal does not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the repealed enactment. Mr. Naphade submits that clause (b) would, therefore, refer to past or complete act and not something which is intended and incomplete. The liabilities that are crystallized under the enactment which is repealed alone are unaffected by repeal of the original or Principal Act and that is clarified by clause (c). This clause cannot be imported in the present Repealing Act for the simple reason that it would create inconsistency. Mr. Naphade submits that clause (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would have saved Section 20(2) of the Principal Act had Sections 3 and 4 been not enacted in the Repeal Act. This clause cannot be imported in the present Repealing Act for the simple reason that it would create inconsistency. Mr. Naphade submits that clause (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would have saved Section 20(2) of the Principal Act had Sections 3 and 4 been not enacted in the Repeal Act. That being clearly enacted there will be inconsistency if one imports clause (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act in Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act. For all these reasons Mr. Naphade would submit that the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, Delhi High Court and Madras High Court follows the Division Bench judgments of this Court from which Mira Bhayander (supra) differs. That is the only view possible in the present legal backdrop and we must, therefore, hold that Mira Bhayander (supra) does not lay down the correct law and should be overruled. Mr. Naphade submits that when three or four High Courts in the country have taken a consistent view of the provision contained in a Central Act, then, that view ought to be followed so as to bring comity and consistency in interpretation of a Parliamentary statute. The reference, therefore, be answered accordingly. 22. Mr. Naphade in support of the above submissions, has placed heavy reliance on the following decisions :- 1. Mohamed Ashref Noor v/s State of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.6856/2003 decided on 16.12.2009 by the Madras High Court. 2. Surendra Raj Jaiswal v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.26474/2009 decided on 24.08.2011 by a Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 3. The Principal Secretary to Government, Hyderabad v/s Surendra, in Writ Petition No.951/2012 decided on 25.07.2012 by the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 4. M/s Suri Industries v/s State of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.8610/2013 decided on 06.09.2010 by the Madras High Court. 5. Manik M. Ragit v/s State of Maharashtra reported in 2013 (2) Mh.L.J. 224 . (WP No.1290/2012 decided on 30.07.2012 Nagpur Bench). 6. M/s Nile Limited v/s State of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.23846/2008 decided on 06.11.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 7. State of Uttar Pradesh v/s Hari Ram reported in (2013) 4 SCC 280 . 8. M/s Tata Coffee Limited v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.11929/2013 decided on 22.07.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 9. M/s Nile Limited v/s State of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.23846/2008 decided on 06.11.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 7. State of Uttar Pradesh v/s Hari Ram reported in (2013) 4 SCC 280 . 8. M/s Tata Coffee Limited v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.11929/2013 decided on 22.07.2013 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 9. Gajanan Kamlya Patil v/s Additional Collector and Competent Authority, in Civil Appeal Nos.2070, 2071/ 2014 arising out of SLP (C) Nos.14904, 14905 of 2011 decided on 14.02.2014 by the Honourable Supreme Court. 10. M/s L.G. Polymers India Private Limited v/s State of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.21934/2013 decided on 28.03.2014 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 11. Synco Industries Limited v/s Assessing Officer, Income Tax, Mumbai reported in (2008) 4 SCC 22 . 12. Tej Pratap Singh v/s Union of India, in Writ Petition (C) No.2455/1992 decided on 16.07.2009 by the Delhi High Court. 23. The submissions of Mr. Naphade have been adopted by Mr. Milind Sathe, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Writ Petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.2201/2009, 3815/2010 and 9703/2010. In addition, Mr. Sathe submits that the Preamble of the Principal Act provides for imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomeration, for acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit and to regulate the construction of buildings on such land. It is also to distribute the excess vacant land after it vests in the State. In these circumstances if the construction placed by the State on the provisions of the Repeal Act is accepted that would result in saving of the consequences following withdrawal of exemption. Section 20(2) of the Principal Act envisages withdrawal of exemption and after such withdrawal what follows is the vesting of the land in terms of Section 10(3) and its possession as envisaged by Section 10(5) and (6). This is specifically not saved by Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act. Having regard to the clear language of the Principal Act this is the only consequence which follows on withdrawal of exemption. If it is not expressly saved, then, by an indirect or oblique method the Court cannot save it. Mr. This is specifically not saved by Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act. Having regard to the clear language of the Principal Act this is the only consequence which follows on withdrawal of exemption. If it is not expressly saved, then, by an indirect or oblique method the Court cannot save it. Mr. Sathe's contention is that what is specifically saved is the validity of the order of exemption and the crucial words are to be found in clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act to this effect that the validity of any order granting exemption under Section 20 (1) or any action taken there-under is saved notwithstanding any judgment of any court to the contrary. Therefore, even if the Court declares the order of exemption or any action taken thereunder to be bad or invalid that is unaffected by repeal of the Principal Act. Beyond this nothing more can be read in the saving clause or the Repeal Act as a whole. The Reference, therefore, be answered accordingly. Mr. Sathe relies upon the following judgments : 1. Mukarram Ali Khan v/s State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2007) 11 SCC 90 . 2. Voltas Limited v/s Additional Collector and Competent Authority, reported in 2008 (5) Bom. C.R. 746. 3. Shanti Bhardwaj v/s State of U.P., reported in (2004) 10 SCC 130 . 4. Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, reported in (2012) 4 SCC 718 . 5. Ritesh Tewari v/s State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2010) 10 SCC 677 . 6. Simpson and General Finance Company Limited v/s State of State of Tamil Nadu, reported in (2006) 4 MLJ 1807 (Madras High Court). 7. Mohan Gopalrao Mate v/s Principal Secretary, reported in 2009 (1) Bom. C.R. 275. 8. Vithabai Bama Bhandari v/s State of Maharashtra, reported in 2009 (3) Bom. C.R. 663. 9. Tej Pratap Singh v/s Union of India, in Writ Petition (C) No.2455/1992 decided on 16.07.2009 by the Delhi High Court. 10. Mira Bhyandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s The Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration, in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 decided on 27.08.2009 by the Bombay High Court. 11. Kabbur Industries Private Limited v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.9890/2009 decided on 05.05.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 12. 10. Mira Bhyandar Builders and Developers Welfare Association v/s The Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration, in Writ Petition No.5745/2009 decided on 27.08.2009 by the Bombay High Court. 11. Kabbur Industries Private Limited v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.9890/2009 decided on 05.05.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 12. Damodar Laxman Navare v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 decided on 08.07.2010 by the Bombay High Court : Reported in 2010(6) Bom. C.R. 611. 13. Waman Bandu Bhoir v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.4141/2010 decided on 11.10.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 14. Jayesh Tokarshi Shah v/s Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Thane, in Writ Petition No.3815/2010 decided on 26.10.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 15. Maharaj Singh v/s State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (1977) 1 SCC 155 . 16. Union of India v/s Somasundaram Viswanath, reported in (1989) 1 SCC 175 . 17. John Thomas v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.38507/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 18. L. Kannappan and L. Thirunavukarasu v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.46091/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 19. Anil Nemichand Bafna v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.153/2008 decided on 06.05.2010 by the Bombay High Court. 20. Surendra Raj Jaiswal v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.26474/2009 decided on 24.08.2011 by a Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 21. Manik M. Ragit v/s State of Maharashtra reported in 2013 (2) Mh.L.J. 224 . (WP No.1290/2012 decided on 30.07.2012 Nagpur Bench). 22. State of Uttar Pradesh v/s Hari Ram reported in (2013) 4 SCC 280 . 24. Mr. Naphade's submissions then have been adopted by Mr. Gangal, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition No.5024/2013. He went further to contend that what is saved by virtue of Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act is the validity of the order of exemption, but not the conditions subject to which such exemption is granted. In that regard Mr. Gangal relied upon the following judgments :- 1. Shanti Bhardwaj v/s State of U.P., reported in (2004) 10 SCC 130 . 2. L. Kannappan and L. Thirunavukarasu v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.46091/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 3. In that regard Mr. Gangal relied upon the following judgments :- 1. Shanti Bhardwaj v/s State of U.P., reported in (2004) 10 SCC 130 . 2. L. Kannappan and L. Thirunavukarasu v/s The Government of Tamil Nadu, in Writ Petition No.46091/2002 decided on 29.01.2007 by the Madras High Court. 3. Surendra Raj Jaiswal v/s Government of Andhra Pradesh, in Writ Petition No.26474/2009 decided on 24.08.2011 by a Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court. 25. Then Mr. Sridharan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.2243/2011 and 2244/2011, argued that the Repeal Act envisages application of same in the first instance to the whole of the State of Haryana and Punjab and to all the Union territories. This is envisaged by Section 1(2) of the Repeal Act. The Repeal Act comes into force in other States after other States adopt the Repeal Act by resolution passed in that behalf under Article 252(2) of the Constitution of India. Mr. Sridharan, therefore, submits that this aspect must be borne in mind while considering the submission or stand of the State regarding applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Mr. Sridharan submits that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act applies only when either the General Clauses Act or any Central Act or Regulation made after commencement of the General Clauses Act repeals any enactment made prior to the General Clauses Act coming into force or thereafter. In the present case the State Government has adopted by resolution passed under Article 252 of the Constitution of India the Repeal Act in the State of Maharashtra with effect from 29.11.2007. In the light of such adoption by resolution of the State Assembly the Section 6 of the General Clauses Act cannot be resorted to or applied. That applies only when either the General Clauses Act or any Central Act or Regulation made after commencement of the General Clauses Act repeals any enactment made or to be made by the Parliament. Both are Parliamentary Statues and in such circumstances by virtue of Article 252(2) of the Constitution of India the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out. 26. Alternatively, Mr. Sridharan submits that Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act is a special saving clause demonstrating a clear different intention. Therefore, Section 3 of the Repeal Act saves only what is specifically mentioned therein. 26. Alternatively, Mr. Sridharan submits that Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act is a special saving clause demonstrating a clear different intention. Therefore, Section 3 of the Repeal Act saves only what is specifically mentioned therein. There is no room for applying Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 by implication or impliedly. Mr. Sridharan also submits that in true sense we are not construing a validating statute or clause. What is saved by clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 is an order under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act and the exemptions which are subject matter of the same. All actions under the same are saved, but that does not mean that the power to take action under Section 20(2) is also saved. The saving in the present case is only to protect the rights of innocent third parties. Even the actions under the exemption are saved with a view to ensure such protection. This is not a substantive provision and therefore, it cannot be construed with reference to the Principal Act. By no stretch of imagination it revives the Principal Act. This is apparent from reading of Section 4 of the Repeal Act because even the proceedings as initiated abate on Principal Act coming into force. By clause (c) of subsection (1) of Section 3 the liability incurred under the exemption order is not saved, but only the payment made to the State Government as a condition for granting exemption under Section 20(1) is unaffected and thus, saved. Beyond all this we should not read anything into the Repeal Act. Mr. Sridharan relied upon the following decisions in support of the above contentions :- 1. Kolhapur Cane-sugar Works Limited v/s Union of India, reported in (2000) 2 SCC 536 . 2. Air India v/s Union of India, reported in (1995) 4 SCC 734 . 3. Union of India v/s West Coast Paper Mills Limited, reported in 2004 (164) E.L.T. 375 (SC). 4. Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Limited v/s Broach Borough Municipality, reported in 2000 (123) ELT 3 (SC). 27. It is pertinent to note that Mr. Sridharan's main argument has not been supported or adopted by any counsel. It is clear that Mr. Naphade's contentions and submissions as adopted by Mr. Sathe are further adopted and elaborated by Mr. Devitre, learned Senior Counsel appearing in the Original Side Writ Petition No.37/2010 and Mr. 27. It is pertinent to note that Mr. Sridharan's main argument has not been supported or adopted by any counsel. It is clear that Mr. Naphade's contentions and submissions as adopted by Mr. Sathe are further adopted and elaborated by Mr. Devitre, learned Senior Counsel appearing in the Original Side Writ Petition No.37/2010 and Mr. Samdani, learned Senior Counsel appearing in Writ Petition No.346/2011. Both of them have urged that a different intention appears in clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act and therefore, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act has no application. The specific saving is for the benefit of the land holders and therefore, there is no scope for construing clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act on equitable principles. Once there is no room for equitable considerations and particularly as Mr. Samdani urges because of the Principal Act being ex-propriatory in nature and providing for compulsory acquisition, then, all the more any liberal construction is ruled out. Mr. Samdani submits that even the saving clause has to be strictly construed in this case and the repeal of the Principal Act wipes out the same and obliterates it from the statute book completely. For all these reasons the Reference should be answered accordingly. 28. Mr. Devitre and Mr. Samdani relied upon the following decisions :- 1. Mohan Gopalrao Mate v/s Principal Secretary, reported in 2009 (1) Bom. C.R. 275. 2. Parripati Chandrasekharrao and Sons v/s Alapati Jalaiah, reported in (1995) 3 SCC 709 . 3. Khub Chand v/s State of Rajasthan, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1074 . 4. Gujarat Electricity Board v/s Girdharlal Motilal, reported in AIR 1969 SC 267 . 5. State of Maharashtra v/s B.E. Billimoria, reported in (2003) 7 SCC 336 . 6. Corporation of the City of Victoria v/s Bishop of Vancouver Island, reported in AIR 1921 PC 240. 7. T.R. Thandur v/s Union of India, reported in (1996) 3 SCC 690 . 29. Mr. Aniruddha Joshi, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition No.9872/2010 invites our attention to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vithabai Bama Bhandari v/s State of Maharashtra (supra) and submits that there is nothing sacrosanct about Section 20 of the Principal Act. By indirect process we cannot, therefore, save what is not expressly saved by the Repeal Act. By indirect process we cannot, therefore, save what is not expressly saved by the Repeal Act. Once the power to exempt cannot be exercised and not available after the Repeal Act, then, merely because such power is exercised during the subsistence of the Principal Act and prior to the Repeal Act coming into force does not mean that further or incidental power envisaged by the primary power to exempt is saved. Even this incidental or ancillary power is unavailable after repeal of the Principal Act. This argument is built more or less on the wording of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. 30. Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition No.556/2010, while adopting all arguments of all the Senior Counsel only submitted that when more than one High Court in this country have placed an interpretation on the Parliamentary Statute or construed its provisions in a particular way, then, for the sake of consistency and certainty this Court must follow the reasoning of the Delhi High Court, Madras High Court and Andhra Pradesh High Court. 31. Mr. Joshi and Ms. Gadre Rajyadhyaksha relied upon the following judgments in support of the above submissions :- 1. Damodar Laxman Navare v/s State of Maharashtra, in Writ Petition No.6300/2009 decided on 08.07.2010 by the Bombay High Court : Reported in 2010(6) Bom. C.R. 611. 2. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v/s Alcock Ashdown & Company Limited, reported in 1979 ITR page 164 : in Income Tax Reference No.40/1969 decided on 07.07.1978 by the Bombay High Court. 3. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v/s T. Maneklal Mfg. Co. Ltd., reported in 1978 ITR Vol.115 page 725. 4. Bhagwat Dharmaraj Radke v/s State of Maharashtra, in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.35883/2012 decided on 31.03.2014 by the Honourable Supreme Court. 5. Government of Karnataka v/s Gowramma and others, reported in AIR 2008 SC 863 . 32. On the other hand, Mr. Khambata, learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State submits that it is fallacious to assume that the State or other Respondents, namely, Authorities under the Principal Act are requesting this Court to go by any equitable consideration or liberal principle. 32. On the other hand, Mr. Khambata, learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State submits that it is fallacious to assume that the State or other Respondents, namely, Authorities under the Principal Act are requesting this Court to go by any equitable consideration or liberal principle. The State has throughout maintained that in terms of the Preamble of the Principal Act and Constitutional philosophy as enshrined by Articles 21 and 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution of India a ceiling has been placed by the Principal Act on the holding of vacant land within the urban agglomeration. This ceiling limit, as is reflected from the Principal Act and which cannot be disputed, is placed by a statutory prescription that is to be found in Section 4 of the Principal Act. Chapter-III of the Principal Act is titled as “ceiling on vacant land”. Except as otherwise provided in the Principal Act on and from the commencement of the Principal Act no person shall be entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit in the territories to which this Act applies under subsection (2) of Section 1. The obligation under the statute is, therefore, clear and absolute. It relates and dates back to the commencement of the Principal Act. None can dispute that what is exempted from the purview of Chapter-III and by a overriding power conferred in the State Government is the applicability of Chapter-III to the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. Therefore, when the excess vacant land is exempted in exceptional circumstances and which have been also specified by the statute, then, all that happens is that the excess vacant land is exempted from the provisions of Chapter-III either conditionally or unconditionally and in terms of the satisfaction in clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of Section 20 of the Principal Act. The power to exempt is exercised by the State suo-motu or otherwise meaning thereby on the Application of the person holding the excess vacant land. The request is not to apply the Chapter in the light of the factors and circumstances specified therein. This request is made and granted only on the satisfaction reached and not as a matter of course. Thus, application of the chapter is a rule and its non-application is an exception. The request is not to apply the Chapter in the light of the factors and circumstances specified therein. This request is made and granted only on the satisfaction reached and not as a matter of course. Thus, application of the chapter is a rule and its non-application is an exception. Despite repeal of the Principal Act if the validity of the order granting exemption under subsection (1) of Section 20 is saved by Section 3 of the Repeal Act and such validity remains unaffected notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the order of the competent court, then, full effect will have to be given to the language of the Repeal Act. Once the Repeal Act is so clear and does not evince anything contrary to the principles enshrined in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, then, on the strength of the wording of the Repeal Act and in any event with the assistance of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act it can safely be held that there is no intention to destroy the rights and liabilities or consequences which flow from a valid exemption order. In fact the language of Section 3 of the Repeal Act supplements Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Nothing in Section 3 of the Repeal Act takes away applicability of the Principal Act to the extent of enforcing the obligations in terms of the conditions imposed in the order of exemption. The learned Advocate General submits that the arguments of the Petitioners revolve around the saving clause enacted by Section 3 of the Repeal Act. The submissions are that the Repeal Act shows intention contrary to the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act inasmuch as neither the exemption order nor any of the terms and conditions therein can be enforced post repeal. 33. The learned Advocate General submitted that the provisions of the Repeal Act and particularly Section 3(1) clauses (b) and (c) require a harmonious interpretation. 33. The learned Advocate General submitted that the provisions of the Repeal Act and particularly Section 3(1) clauses (b) and (c) require a harmonious interpretation. By reading these clauses together what is apparent is that by clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act it is clarified that repeal of the Principal Act shall not affect the vesting of any vacant land under Section 10(3) of the Principal Act, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorized by the State in this behalf or by the competent authority. Thus, if the steps as contemplated by subsection (3) of Section 10 of the Principal Act and equally by subsections (5) and (6) thereof are taken, then, the vesting of excess vacant land referred to in a Notification published under Section 10(1) in terms of subsection (3) thereof is not affected by repeal of the Principal Act. No person then can claim that the excess vacant land to which the Principal Act admittedly applies and which is deemed to have been acquired by the State does not belong to it or the State is not entitled to it because the Principal Act has been repealed and the vesting comes to an end. The vesting is of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. Undisputedly, if the land in excess of ceiling limit can vest after the notification in terms of Section 10(1) is published in the official Gazette, then, the declaration which is postulated or contemplated by subsection (3) is in relation to such excess vacant land. What subsection (3) of Section 10 really contemplates and envisages is that the State can declare that the excess vacant land is deemed to have been acquired by it upon publication of the declaration and particularly with effect from the dates specified therein. By such deemed acquisition the land is further deemed to have vested absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances with effect from the date specified in the declaration. By such deemed acquisition the land is further deemed to have vested absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances with effect from the date specified in the declaration. By the repeal what has been clarified is that unless the State has taken over possession of such excess vacant land and as referred to in the Notification under Section 10(1) either by itself or through any person duly authorized by it in this behalf or by the competent authority, its plain and simple vesting will not enable the Government to take over possession of the excess vacant land after coming into force of the Repeal Act. This coming into force or commencing is reckoned in terms of subsections (2) and (3) of Section 1 of the Repeal Act. Thus, the State is disabled from taking possession of the excess vacant land which has already vested in it if it has failed to take possession. Thereupon the land can be restored and that is how subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act would read. Therefore, this is not a restricted or limited saving clause in any sense of the term. Though Section 3 is titled “saving” it contains the substantive provisions. The Legislature or the Parliament did not intend a vacuum. It did not stop by only stating that if possession of the land vested in the State in terms of Section 10(3) is not taken, then, that cannot be taken or the land cannot be made over to the Government after repeal of the Principal Act. It enacts a further provision by which it is possible for the State to restore the land to the holder and that is why restoration is contemplated by virtue of Section 3 (2). That restoration is conditional upon repayment of an amount to the State Government by the holder. Section 11 of the Principal Act talks of payment of amount for the vacant land acquired under Section 10(3). That payment can be claimed even without the land being handed over or without the possession of the excess vacant land being taken. The deemed acquisition by virtue of Section 10(3) enables the person or persons having interest in the excess vacant land to claim the amount under Section 11. That payment can be claimed even without the land being handed over or without the possession of the excess vacant land being taken. The deemed acquisition by virtue of Section 10(3) enables the person or persons having interest in the excess vacant land to claim the amount under Section 11. If any payment has been made after such deemed acquisition, then, that amount has to be returned to the Government and only then the excess vacant land of which possession has not been taken will be restored to any person or the holder as the case may be. If this was a complete obliteration or destruction of the rights and liabilities under the Principal Act, then, such substantive provision enabling restoration would not have been inserted or incorporated is the submission of the learned Advocate General. The refund of such amount and which has been paid to the person or persons interested in the excess vacant land in terms of Section 11 of the Principal Act alone entitles such person to claim restoration of the land to him. If the repeal had been simplicitor and without such substantive provision, then, it would not have been possible for the holder or any person interested in the excess vacant land to claim its restoration. It is, therefore, erroneous to urge that the Repeal Act evidences an intention contrary to the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. 34. Inviting our attention to clauses (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act the learned Advocate General submits that the true nature of the power to exempt under the Principal Act would have to be properly and completely appreciated. He submits that the basis on which the power to exempt is exercised is that the person is holding the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. It is in case of such vacant land that the State Government must be satisfied either on its own motion or otherwise that having regard to its location, purpose for which such land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require, it is necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do that the Government is conferred with discretion to pass an order exempting such vacant land from the provisions of Chapter-III either conditionally or otherwise. The learned Advocate General submits that it is not just having regard to location of the land, purpose for which the excess vacant land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require, but it is necessary and expedient in the public interest that the discretion to exempt such land has to be exercised. That is in terms of clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 20. Whereas, in terms of clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 20, the State is satisfied either on its own motion or otherwise that the application of the provisions of Chapter-III would cause undue hardship to the persons holding the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit that the Government may by order exempt conditionally or unconditionally the vacant land from the provisions of Chapter-III. Further the order under clause (b) cannot be made unless the reasons for doing so are recorded in writing. That is because clause (b) contemplates relieving the person holding the excess vacant land from undue hardship. Clause (a) necessarily postulates an exercise of powers to exempt the excess vacant land in public interest. When such is the ambit and scope of the powers and it is vacant land in excess of ceiling limit which is exempted from the provisions of Chapter-III that too in exceptional circumstances, then, it is futile to contend that the State Government despite validity of its Act or order being saved by the Repeal Act, would not be able to do anything in relation to such land post repeal of the Principal Act. The learned Advocate General submits that in this case the power of exemption and which is to be exercised for public good and in public interest is so exercised by making an order in that behalf. That the validity of such an order is saved though the Principal Act is repealed, but the legal consequences flowing from exercise of such clause are not saved, would be an incorrect, improper and legally untenable reading of the saving clause and the Repeal Act itself. The true nature of the power to exempt has not been appreciated in making such submissions. The true nature of the power to exempt has not been appreciated in making such submissions. The Petitioners' arguments proceed on an unsound and erroneous basis and namely that the power to exempt in terms of Section 20(1) of the Principal Act is exercised by the State Government only to benefit the holder. The argument is that it is to relieve the holder from the consequences of applicability of Chapter-III that the State exercises such power and therefore, nothing further can be done in pursuance of the valid order of exemption post repeal of the Principal Act.