JUDGMENT : Indira Banerjee, J. This application has been filed by the plaintiff for directions on the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 to make payment of arrear service charges for use of the facilities at Raj Kamal building at 13, Camac Street, Kolkata-700 017, for appointment of a Receiver over an office space on the fourth floor of the said building and other reliefs. 2. It is the case of the plaintiff petitioner that by a Deed of Conveyance dated 4th August, 1955, his mother, Dankha Devi Agarwal, since deceased, the original plaintiff, purchased the said Premises No. 13, Camac Street, Kolkata - 700 017. 3. In 1973-1974, the said Dankha Devi Agarwal started construction of a multi storeyed building at Premises No. 13, Camac Street, Kolkata - 700017. The said building was promoted, constructed and maintained through a firm, Camac Development Corporation, which belonged to Dankha Devi Agarwal. 4. In March, 1977, Dankha Devi Agarwal, since deceased, the original plaintiff, entered into an agreement with the defendant nos. 1 and 2 for sale of an office space measuring about 2225 Sq. Ft. on the 4th Floor of the said building, which has been named Raj Kamal. 5. Pursuant to the aforesaid agreement, the defendant nos. 1 and 2 paid Rs. 1,78,000/- to the original plaintiff, Dankha Devi Agarwal, after which possession of the said office space was handed over to them. According to the plaintiff petitioner, the defendant nos.1 and 2 were liable to make further payments as recorded in the sale agreement. 6. It is alleged that the defendant nos.1 and 2 defaulted in payment of balance dues, whereupon Dankha Devi Agarwal, since deceased, instituted a suit being C.S. No. 715 of 1982 in this Court, seeking a decree for possession of the said office space, permanent injunction restraining the defendants from parking their car at premises no.13 Camac Street, mesne profits and other consequential and/or related reliefs. 7. It is further alleged that, while the said suit was pending, the defendant nos.1 and 2 tried to alienate the said office space in favour of one M/s. Parekh Marine Agency Private Ltd. and also tried to obtain separate electricity connection at the said office space. 8. 7. It is further alleged that, while the said suit was pending, the defendant nos.1 and 2 tried to alienate the said office space in favour of one M/s. Parekh Marine Agency Private Ltd. and also tried to obtain separate electricity connection at the said office space. 8. In the circumstances, Dankha Devi Agarwal, since deceased, instituted a suit being Title Suit No. 1629 of 1997 in the City Civil Court at Calcutta, inter alia, praying for a decree of declaration that the defendant Nos.1 and 2 were not entitled in law, to claim and/or demand any service or maintenance or amenities such as electricity, lift, water and other benefits at Premises No. 13, Camac Street, Kolkata - 700017. 9. In 1997 Dankha Devi Agarwal filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 in Title Suit No. 1629 of 1997, praying for an order of injunction restraining the defendant nos.1 and 2 from transferring, assigning and/or parting with possession of the said office space in favour of M/s Parekh Marine Agency Private Limited or any other person. 10. On 30th June the City Civil Court at Calcutta passed an order of injunction in terms of prayer (d) of the injunction application restraining Prahladh Rai Khaitan and Santosh Rai Khaitan, being the defendant nos. 1 and 2 herein from transferring and/or parting with possession of the office space in question to M/s Parekh Marine Agency Pvt. Ltd. or to any other person. 11. The defendant nos. 1 and 2 made an application under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent seeking transfer of TS No. 1629 of 1997, pending in the City Civil Court at Calcutta, to this Court. 12. By an Order dated 13th August, 1997, this Court was pleased to direct that the said TS No. 1629 of 1997 be transferred to this Court. By its aforesaid order dated 13th August, 1997, this Court made it clear that the transfer would not affect any of the interim orders that may have been passed by the Learned City Civil Court, Calcutta. 13. Pursuant to the aforesaid order dated 13th August, 1997, TS No. 1629/1997 was transferred to this Court and re-numbered EOS No. 3/1998. The plaintiff petitioner has submitted that the interim applications filed by the plaintiff in the said suit are pending and the interim orders are still in force. 14. 13. Pursuant to the aforesaid order dated 13th August, 1997, TS No. 1629/1997 was transferred to this Court and re-numbered EOS No. 3/1998. The plaintiff petitioner has submitted that the interim applications filed by the plaintiff in the said suit are pending and the interim orders are still in force. 14. On or about 21st January, 2001, Dankha Devi Agarwal died. After the death of Dankha Devi Agarwal, the petitioner was substituted as plaintiff in her place. According to the plaintiff petitioner, Dankha Devi Agarwal died intestate. However, the defendants contend that Late Dankha Devi Agarwal executed a will during her life time, of which the proforma defendant No. 4 is the executor, leaving the said office space to her grand daughter. 15. It is not in dispute that the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 were put in possession of an office space on the 4th floor of Raj Kamal building in or about 1977, pursuant to an agreement for sale of the said office space. 16. In the petition it is alleged that the defendant Nos.1 and 2 have transferred and/or parted with possession of the said office space, in favour of their agents or assigns, who are enjoying the benefit of services and maintenance in connection with the said office space, without paying maintenance or service charges. 17. Mr. Pradip K. Ghosh, Senior Advocate appearing with Mr. Dhruba Ghosh, submitted that in view of the order dated 30th June, 1997 of the City Civil Court restraining the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 from transferring the office space to M/s Parekh Marine Agency Private Ltd. or to any other person, the transfer of the office space by the defendants was illegal and void ab initio. The office space was liable to be restored to the plaintiff petitioner. In support of his submission Mr. Ghosh cited the following judgments:- (i) Surjit Singh & Ors. v. Harbans Singh & Ors., reported in (1995) 6 SCC 50 . (ii) Isaacs v. Robertson reported in, (1984) 3 All ER 140. (iv) Clarke and Ors. v. Chadburn and Ors. reported in, (1985) 1 All ER 211. (v) Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber Industries Ltd. reported in, (1997) 3 SCC 443 . (vi) Arjun Singh v. Punit Ahluwalia reported in, (2008) 8 SCC 348 . (vii) Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Company (P) Ltd. & Anr. reported in (1996) 4 SCC 622 . v. Chadburn and Ors. reported in, (1985) 1 All ER 211. (v) Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber Industries Ltd. reported in, (1997) 3 SCC 443 . (vi) Arjun Singh v. Punit Ahluwalia reported in, (2008) 8 SCC 348 . (vii) Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Company (P) Ltd. & Anr. reported in (1996) 4 SCC 622 . 18. Mr. Ghosh submitted that by a letter dated 18th August, 2006, one Mohan Lal Khaitan, the Constituted Attorney of the defendant No.2 admitted the liability of the said defendant to pay arrear maintenance charges to the plaintiff petitioner and stated that he would arrange to make payment. However, no payment of arrears was made. The admitted position is that the office space is in possession of Exterior & Interiors Private Limited who is continuously using the lift and other service facilities at the Raj Kamal building, without paying any service or maintenance charges to the plaintiff petitioner. Exterior & Interiors Private Limited pays service charges of Rs. 25,000/- per month to its immediate landlord, being one Madhav Mukhund Finance Private Limited, apart from rent. 19. This application has been filed by the plaintiff/petitioner for recovery of the arrear and the current service charges, as also for appointment of Receiver, Injunction and other reliefs. 20. The essence of the case of the plaintiff petitioner is that the defendants and/or their assigns ought not to enjoy the facilities of lift, maintenance and other services at the Raj Kamal building, without paying maintenance charges, in view of the 2nd Schedule, read with Clause 14(F) of the Agreement for Sale dated 31st March, 1977. 21. The defendant No.4, Bhagirath Agarwal claims that he is the sole executor of an alleged Will of Dhanka Devi Agarwal, and as such it is he, who is entitled to receive the maintenance charges, arrears as well as current, in respect of the said office space, in terms of the Section 211 of the Indian Succession Act. 22. The plaintiff petitioner has, however, challenged the validity of the alleged Will of Dhanka Devi Agarwal and the probate application has been marked as a contentious cause, being Testamentary Suit No.9 of 2007, which is pending. 23. Mr Ghosh submitted that Bhagirath Agarwal, who is party to the suit, has never questioned the authority of the plaintiff petitioner to continue the suit being Extraordinary Suit No.3 of 1998, in his name. 23. Mr Ghosh submitted that Bhagirath Agarwal, who is party to the suit, has never questioned the authority of the plaintiff petitioner to continue the suit being Extraordinary Suit No.3 of 1998, in his name. 24. Mr. Ghosh submitted that the costs of providing services at Raj Kamal building as well as its maintenance are incurred by the plaintiff petitioner and as such there can be no question of Bhagirath Agarwal receiving any compensation in respect of service charges. 25. Finally Mr. Ghosh submitted that the dispute sought to be raised by Bhagirath Agarwal is inter se the heirs of the original plaintiff, and this cannot be the reason for the present occupants of the said office space not to make any payment to the plaintiff petitioner. 26. Mr. Ghosh argued that in the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the defendant Nos. 1 and 2, it is admitted that the plaintiff petitioner has been carrying out the common maintenance work and providing the agreed services in respect of the said office space. In any case, a Partition Suit being C.S. No.283 of 2002 (Chandra Prakash Agarwal v. Bhagirath Agarwal & Ors.) is pending between the plaintiff and the defendant No.4 and the ultimate beneficiaries of the said office space and/or service charges will be decided finally in the said partition suit. 27. Mr. Ghosh emphatically argued that the plaintiff petitioner has been receiving service and maintenance charges from all other occupants of Raj Kamal building, and has been maintaining essential services to the building through M/s Camac Development Corporation, without the assistance of Bhagirath Agarwal. 28. The instant application has been filed on 5th April, 2007 inter alia praying for leave to serve copies of this application on Exterior Interiors Pvt. Ltd. and further praying for appointment of Receiver and for orders on the defendant Nos. 1 or 2 and/or their assigns, to deposit all arrear service charges with the plaintiff petitioner or alternatively with the Receiver, attachment of the rent and/or occupation charges being paid by Exterior Interior Pvt. Ltd. and other reliefs. 29. Mr. Chakraborty submitted that it was evident that service charges had been claimed by M/s Camac Development Corporation, a separate legal entity, whereas the petitioner had substituted himself as plaintiff, as the legal heir of the original plaintiff, Dhanka Devi Agarwal, since deceased. 29. Mr. Chakraborty submitted that it was evident that service charges had been claimed by M/s Camac Development Corporation, a separate legal entity, whereas the petitioner had substituted himself as plaintiff, as the legal heir of the original plaintiff, Dhanka Devi Agarwal, since deceased. Thus, the plaintiff petitioner is not entitled to obtain any order on the instant application towards realisation of any alleged dues of the said Camac Development Corporation. 30. Mr. Chakraborty, further argued that the defendant No.1, being the brother of the plaintiff petitioner, and son of the original plaintiff, Dhanka Devi Agarwal, who is the executor of a Will left by her, bequeathing inter alia premises No. 13 Camac Street to her grand daughter, has not supported the plaintiff petitioner. It is not in dispute that probate proceedings are pending. 31. Mr. Chakraborty submitted that in view of the provisions of Section 211 read with Section 213 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, the plaintiff has no right whatsoever either to proceed with the above suit or to file any application in the above suit, far less to obtain any order on the instant application. All proceedings would necessarily have to be initiated and/or continued by the Executor named in the Will and/or the Administrator appointed by Court. 32. In support of his aforesaid submission, Mr. Chakraborty cited the judgments of this Court in Bali Ram Dhote v. Bhupendra Nath Banerjee and Ors. reported in AIR 1978 Cal 559 (para 7 and 8); and Mohal Lal Dungarmal Futnani v. V.D. Futnani and Ors. reported in AIR 2001 CAL 122 (Paras 27 to 41); and the judgment of the Bombay High Court Ramnik Lal Amritlal Shah v. Bhupendra Impex Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. reported in AIR 2001 Bom 224 (para 6 and 7). 33. Mr. Chakraborty further submitted that reliefs claimed in the instant application are far beyond the scope of the suit. The plaintiff is, thus, not entitled to obtain any order in this application, as no interim relief can be claimed, which is beyond the scope of the suit. In support of his submission Mr. 33. Mr. Chakraborty further submitted that reliefs claimed in the instant application are far beyond the scope of the suit. The plaintiff is, thus, not entitled to obtain any order in this application, as no interim relief can be claimed, which is beyond the scope of the suit. In support of his submission Mr. Chakraborty cited the following judgments :- (i) The State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal reported in AIR 1952 SC 12 (para 6 at p. 14); (ii) Cotton Corporation of India v. United Industrial Bank Ltd. reported in AIR 1983 SC 1272 ; (iii) Sree Jain Swetambar Terapanthi Vidyalaya v. Phundan Singh & Ors. reported in (1999) 2 SCC 377 (Para 19 at p.383). 34. In the State Of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta reported in AIR 1952 SC 12 the Supreme Court held that an interim relief can be granted only in aid of and ancillary to the main relief which may be available to the party, on final determination of his rights in the suit. 35. In Cotton Corporation of India Limited v. United Industrial Bank Limited (supra) the Supreme Court held that the power of the Court to grant temporary injunction, is in aid of the final relief that may be granted. If the final relief cannot be granted in terms as prayed for, temporary relief in the same terms can hardly, if at all, be granted. 36. In Sree Jain Swetambar Terapanthi Vid (S) v. Phundan Singh And Ors. reported in (1999) 2 SCC 377 the Supreme Court held that no relief beyond the scope of the suit should be granted in interlocutory proceedings. 37. As pointed out by Mr. Chakraborty, the plaintiff/petitioner has prayed for inter alia attachment of monthly rent paid by Exterior Interiors Pvt. Ltd to Madhav Mukund Finance Pvt. Ltd. However, neither Exterior Interiors Pvt. Ltd nor Madhav Mukund Finance Pvt. Ltd., is party to the suit. 38. Mr. Chakraborty very rightly argued that, it is a well settled principle of law that no decree or order can be passed by any Court of law, against any person who is not a party to the suit, only by serving a copy of the application upon him/her. There is also substance in Mr. 38. Mr. Chakraborty very rightly argued that, it is a well settled principle of law that no decree or order can be passed by any Court of law, against any person who is not a party to the suit, only by serving a copy of the application upon him/her. There is also substance in Mr. Chakrabortys contention that the suit having been filed for a declaration that the answering defendants are not entitled to claim any services from the owner of the building, and there being no money claim, there can be no order in this interim application for payment of service charges or for attachment of monthly rent. 39. Mr. Chakraborty next referred to the affidavit-in-opposition affirmed by the defendant No. 2 wherein it has categorically been stated that the plaintiff petitioner has not been providing any service/facility to the occupiers of the said flat and the plaintiff petitioner has also not raised any bill on any of the answering defendants. 40. Mr. Chakraborty refuted the contention of the plaintiff/petitioners of providing maintenance and services in respect of said office space. Mr. Chakraborty submitted that the answering defendants as also Exterior Interiors Pvt. Ltd had, in their affidavit-in-opposition made a categorical assertion that no maintenance and/or services were provided to the office space in question. 41. Mr. Chakraborty also argued that the plaintiff petitioner had not disclosed any document to substantiate his contention of carrying out maintenance work and/or providing services at the said building. No document has been produced to show that any expenditure has been incurred by the plaintiff petitioner. Nor has any document been disclosed to show that the plaintiff petitioner has, in fact, been receiving service charges from the other occupiers of the building. 42. Mr. Chakraborty argued that the original plaintiff, Dhanka Devi Agarwal, as also the plaintiff petitioner had all along claimed that the occupiers of the office space were not entitled to enjoy any common facilities and they, in fact, did not provide any facility. There could, thus, be no question of claiming charges. No bill was ever raised on any of the answering defendants. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pandurang Dhondi Chougule & Ors. v. Maruti Hari Jadhav & Ors. reported in AIR 1966 SC 153 Mr. There could, thus, be no question of claiming charges. No bill was ever raised on any of the answering defendants. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pandurang Dhondi Chougule & Ors. v. Maruti Hari Jadhav & Ors. reported in AIR 1966 SC 153 Mr. Chakraborty argued that the service charge arrears from January, 1978 onwards, which were hopelessly barred by limitation, could not be claimed. Mr. Chakraborty also submitted that there was no agreement for payment of any interest. 43. Mr. Sen, appearing on behalf of Exterior and Interiors Private Limited adopted the submissions of Mr. Chakraborty. There was also some repetition of arguments, which have not separately been recorded to avoid prolixity. 44. It is well-settled, that any action, in violation of an order of injunction of a competent Court, is a nullity in the eye of law, not binding and of no effect. Any transfer of property, in violation of the order of injunction passed by the City Civil Court and continued by this Court would thus be, of no effect, not binding and the transferee would be liable to be evicted in appropriate proceedings. 45. However, in this application, the plaintiff petitioner has prayed for appointment of a Receiver to take possession of the said office space, but the persons occupying the said office space have not been impleaded as defendants in the suit. There can be no question of dispossession of any person who is in possession, without impleading him/her as party. 46. An interim order is binding irrespective of whether the interim order has been passed ex parte or on contest, and irrespective of whether the interim order has rightly or wrongly been passed. An interim order has to be obeyed as long as the interim order is in force as held by the Supreme Court in Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla & Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited (supra) cited by Mr. Ghosh. In the aforesaid case the Supreme Court held, that even if the question of jurisdiction of the Court to pass the order was in issue and the said question was ultimately decided against the party obtaining the interim order, even then violation of the interim order would be punishable, provided the violation was committed before the decision of the Court, on the question of jurisdiction. 47. 47. In Isaacs v. Robertson reported in [1984] 3 All ER 140, cited by Mr. Ghosh, the Privy Council held that orders made by a court of unlimited jurisdiction in the course of contentious litigation are either regular or irregular. It is misleading to seek to draw distinction between orders that are void, in the sense that they can be ignored with impunity by those persons to whom they are addressed, and orders which are voidable, in the sense that they may be enforced until set aside, since any order must be obeyed unless and until it is set aside and there are no orders which are void ipso facto without the need for proceedings to set them aside. 48. In Clarke and Ors. v. Chadburn and Ors. reported in [1985] 1 All ER 211 cited by Mr. Ghosh the Chancery Division held that an act done in wilful disobedience of an injunction or Court order was not only a contempt of Court but also an illegal and invalid act which could not effect any change in the rights and liabilities of others. 49. The proposition of law laid down by the Privy Council in Isaacs v. Robertson (supra) and by the Chancery Division in Clarke and Ors. v. Chadburn and Ors. is unexceptionable. There can hardly be any doubt that all Court orders have to be obeyed until they are vacated or set aside. 50. In Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Company (P) Ltd. (supra), cited by Mr. Ghosh, the Supreme Court held that imposition of penalty for contempt does not denude the Court of its powers to issue directions to remove the wrong done by the contemnor. 51. In Arjun Singh v. Punit Alluwalia (supra) cited by Mr. Ghosh the Supreme Court held that the Court, in exercise of its inherent power, may in case of breach of a restraint order, bring back the parties to the same position, as if the order of injunction had not been violated. 52. The proposition of law, which emerges from the judgments cited by Mr. Ghosh, referred to above, are that an order of injunction is binding for as long as that order is in force and/or until the said order is set aside and/or vacated. 52. The proposition of law, which emerges from the judgments cited by Mr. Ghosh, referred to above, are that an order of injunction is binding for as long as that order is in force and/or until the said order is set aside and/or vacated. Any action in violation of an order of injunction with knowledge thereof is non est and cannot affect the rights of the parties to a litigation. When any action is taken in breach of a restraint order, the Court may issue appropriate order to nullify the action and restore the position that existed prior to the breach. 53. In this case, however, there is nothing to show that the Exterior and Interiors Pvt. Ltd. entered the said premises in violation of the order of injunction with knowledge of the said order. The exact point of time, when Exterior and Interiors Pvt. Ltd. entered the said office space, whether the entry of Exterior and Interiors Pvt. Ltd. was in violation of any order of Court or not, would necessarily have to be adjudicated in proceedings to which Exterior and Interiors Pvt. Ltd. is made party. The plaintiff petitioner may make an application for impleading Exterior and Interiors Pvt. Ltd. as party and amend the plaint. However, until such time as the plaint is amended and Exterior and Interiors Pvt. Ltd. is impleaded party, there can be no question of its dispossession from the office space. 54. It is true that Surjit Singh & Ors. v. Harbans Singh & Ors. (supra) cited by Mr. Ghosh the Supreme Court held that where an alienation or an assignment of property was made in defiance of an order of Court, the Court was obliged to treat the alienation and/or assignment as non est, for which the assignees were not entitled to be impleaded. 55. The judgment is clearly distinguishable on facts in as much as the registered deed of alienation in that case had patently been executed after the passing of the preliminary decree in which the assignor had been allotted ?rd share. The defiance of the verdict of Court was apparent on the face of the materials on record, unlike this case. 56. The judgment is clearly distinguishable on facts in as much as the registered deed of alienation in that case had patently been executed after the passing of the preliminary decree in which the assignor had been allotted ?rd share. The defiance of the verdict of Court was apparent on the face of the materials on record, unlike this case. 56. So far as the claim for arrears of maintenance charges are concerned, the arrears from 1978 onwards till three years before the date of filing of this application appears to be barred by limitation, as argued by Mr. Chakraborty. This Court cannot in an interim application direct deposit of arrear service and maintenance charges, at least, arrears up to the period of 3 years before the date on which the application was filed in this Court. 57. As held by the Supreme Court in Pandurang Dhondi Chougule and Ors. Appellants v. Maruti Hari Yadhav and Ors. (supra), cited by Mr. Chakraborty, a plea of limitation is a plea of law which concerns the jurisdiction of the Court which tries the proceedings. A finding on this plea, in favour of the party which raises it, would oust the jurisdiction of the Court. 58. The plea raised by Mr. Chakraborty that service charges till three years prior to the date of application are barred by limitation, has to be adjudicated on trial. This Court cannot in an application for interlocutory relief direct payment of arrears to the plaintiff petitioner. 59. So far as current maintenance charges are concerned, a dispute has been raised with regard to the liability of the defendants to pay such service charges on the alleged ground that all services in respect of the said office space have long been withdrawn. There appears to be serious disputes as to whether any service was at all provided to Exterior and Interiors Pvt. Ltd. These are issues which require adjudication upon evidence. The claim to service charges either arrear or current, cannot be allowed in summary interlocutory proceedings, circumventing trial. 60. There being an alleged will, in respect of which probate proceedings are pending, it would not be appropriate for this Court to direct payment of maintenance charges to the plaintiff petitioner at the interlocutory stage. There are inter se disputes between the heirs of the original plaintiffs. 60. There being an alleged will, in respect of which probate proceedings are pending, it would not be appropriate for this Court to direct payment of maintenance charges to the plaintiff petitioner at the interlocutory stage. There are inter se disputes between the heirs of the original plaintiffs. The proforma defendant No. 4 being the executor named in the alleged will, and in any case, another heir of the original plaintiff, has not acquiesced to payment of charges in respect of the office space in question to the plaintiff petitioner. As argued by Mr. Chakraborty, M/s. Camac Development Corporation, responsible for providing services and maintenance at Raj Kamal building is apparently a separate legal entity. There is nothing on record to show that M/s. Camac Development Corporation has either assigned its receivables to the plaintiff petitioner or has authorised the plaintiff petitioner to collect its dues on its behalf. 61. As rightly argued by Mr. Chakraborty, the reliefs sought in this application, particularly directions for payment of maintenance charges to the plaintiff petitioner is apparently beyond the scope of the suit, in which there is no money claim. On the other hand, the plaintiff has sought a declaration that the defendants are not entitled to any services at the premises in question. 62. In any case, the suit filed on the City Civil Court in 1997 and transferred to this Court in 1997 is still pending. It is imperative that the suit should be finally heard and disposed of forthwith. All the issues raised in this application may be considered in the suit on the basis of materials and evidence brought on record. 63. On the basis of the pleadings, and after hearing the respective Counsel, this Court is prima facie satisfied that the plaintiff/petitioner is prima facie entitled to withdraw all maintenance and other services and facilities provided to the occupants of the said office. However, the plaintiff petitioner has not been able to make out a clear right to any of the reliefs claimed in this application. No relief can, therefore, be granted to the plaintiff petitioner at this interlocutory stage. 64. This application is disposed of accordingly.