JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. This Appeal is directed against the order dated 2.6.2014 rendered by the District Judge (F), Shimla in case No.RBT-28-S/10 of 2013/11. 2. “Key facts” necessary for the adjudication of this petition are that respondent No.1 had approached appellant, i.e. Mahindra and Mahindra Finance Limited for the grant of certain credit facilities for the purchase of Tata Spacio. The agreement was entered into between appellant and respondent No.1. The Loan-cum-hypothecation agreement No.B0042496 was executed on 24.9.2004 between appellant and respondent No.1 as borrower and respondent No.2 as guarantor. Clauses 29 and 30 of the loan agreement read as under: “ (29) Arbitration: All disputes, differences, and/or claim arising out of these presents or in any way touching or concerning the same or as to constructions, meaning or effect hereof or as to the right and liabilities of the parties hereunder shall be settled by arbitration to be held in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration and conciliation Act, 1996 or any statutory amendments thereof and shall be referred to the sole arbitrator to be nominated by the lender. In the event of death, refusal, negligent, inability or incapability of a person so appointed to act as an arbitrator, the lender may appoint a new arbitrator. The arbitrator shall not be required to give any reasons for the award and the award of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on all parties concerned. The arbitrations proceeding shall be held in Mumbai. (30) Jurisdiction: It is agreed by and between the parties hereto that the Courts at Mumbai alone shall have exclusive jurisdiction in respect of any matter, claims or dispute arising out of or in any way relating to these presents or to anything to be done under and pursuant to these presents or of any clause or provision thereof, notwithstanding that the whole or substantial part of the cause of action may not have arisen in Mumbai.” 3. Respondents made default in the payment of loan amount as a result of which, notices were issued by the appellant to the respondents on 6.12.2010 expressing intention to refer the matter to sole Arbitrator. Sh. Sanjay Aggarwal was appointed as sole Arbitrator. The parties were advised to attend the proceedings on 7.2.2011. The proceedings were held on 28.2.2011. Respondents did not attend the proceedings held on 28.2.2011. Respondents were proceeded ex parte. Sh. Sanjay Aggarwal was appointed as sole Arbitrator. The parties were advised to attend the proceedings on 7.2.2011. The proceedings were held on 28.2.2011. Respondents did not attend the proceedings held on 28.2.2011. Respondents were proceeded ex parte. The Sole Arbitrator made an award whereby respondents were directed to pay jointly and severally a sum of Rs. 3,64,732/- with future interest with effect from 3.1.2011 till the payment was received or recovered @ 18% per annum. Respondent No.1 was directed to hand over the vehicle/machine to the appellant in case the same was in possession of respondent No.1. In case the appellant has already re-possessed the vehicle, the appellant was at liberty to dispose of the same after giving due notice to the respondents and the sale proceed was to be adjusted in the awarded amount. 4. The appellant filed an application under order 21 rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the execution of the award. It was assigned RBT No. 28-S/10 of 2013/11 in the court of District Judge (Forest). Learned District Judge (Forest) returned the award to present the same before the competent authority vide order dated 2.6.2014. Hence, the present appeal. 5. The loan agreement was made on 24.9.2004. Registered office of appellant is situated at Gateway Building, Appollo Bunder, Mumbai. Clause 2 of the loan agreement reads as under: “2. The borrower agrees that so long as the loan shall continue the borrower shall; (a) Pay the lender at its office at Gateway Building, Appollo Bunder, Mumbai-400 001 or such other address as may from time to time be notified a down payment and other sums mentioned in Schedule-1 at the time of application. The borrower shall pay periodical installment mentioned in Schedule 1 payable periodically as per the due dates mentioned in Schedule 1; (b) Pay the lender, without prejudice to the right of the lender, on a demand made by the lender, as late charge an amount equal to 3% (three percent) per month of the amount that has remained outstanding beyond due date till payment shall be payable by the borrower to the lender, the late charge being calculated from the date the periodical installment was due and payable till the date of payment.” 6. It is evident from clause 29 of the loan agreement that the arbitration proceedings were to be conducted at Mumbai and as per clause 30, the courts at Mumbai alone were having the exclusive jurisdiction in respect of any matter, claims or dispute arising out of or in any way relating to the agreement or to anything to be done under and pursuant to these agreements or of any clause or provision thereof, notwithstanding that the whole or substantial part of the cause of action may not have arisen in Mumbai. 7. Mr. G.C. Gupta, learned Senior Advocate has vehemently argued that since the agreement was executed at Shimla and the money was sanctioned at Shimla, the principal court at Shimla had the jurisdiction to execute the award dated 11.3.2011. 8. According to clause 2 of the loan agreement, as quoted hereinabove, the borrower was to pay the lender installments at its office at Gateway Building, Appollo Bunder, Mumbai-400 001 or such other address as may from time to time be notified at the time of down payment and other sums mentioned in Schedule-1. The borrower was bound to pay periodical installment mentioned in Schedule 1 payable periodically as per the due dates mentioned in Schedule 1. There is no other address given in Schedule-1 where the payment was to be made. 9. Mr. G.C. Gupta has drawn the attention of the Court to sections 2 (e), 34, 35, 36, 40 and 42 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. In the instant case, parties have consciously entered into agreement dated 24.9.2004. In case of dispute, they have agreed to refer the matter to the Arbitrator and the arbitration proceedings were to be held in Mumbai. As per clause 29 of the loan agreement, the parties have also agreed to the exclusive jurisdiction of courts at Mumbai to resolve the disputes arising out of agreement. 10. Mr. G.C. Gupta has argued that clause 30 of the agreement is void. According to him, the parties cannot confer jurisdiction on the court which has no jurisdiction at all. Mr. G.C. Gupta has also argued that clause 30 of the agreement is violative of section 28 of the Contract Act. He has also referred to section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, fact of the matter is that the appellant is a company duly registered under the Companies Act. Mr. G.C. Gupta has also argued that clause 30 of the agreement is violative of section 28 of the Contract Act. He has also referred to section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, fact of the matter is that the appellant is a company duly registered under the Companies Act. Its registered office is at Gateway Building, Appollo Bunder, Mumbai. 11. According to plain language of section 2 (e) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, “court” means the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in a district having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to such principle civil court, or any court of small causes. Section 36 provides that where after the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under section 34 has expired, or such application having been made, it has been refused, the award shall be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the same manner as if it were a decree of the court. The appellant-company was liable to be sued where its head office or where its branch of business exists. It is settled law that expression “corporation” as per explanation-II would include company. What has happened in the present case is that the seat of Arbitrator was at Mumbai as agreed between the parties. The jurisdiction of the other courts has been excluded except at Mumbai. The expression “alone” finds mention in clause 30 of the agreement entered into between the parties on 24.9.2014. 12. Mr. G.C. Gupta, as noticed hereinabove, has argued that clause 30 of the loan agreement is violative of section 28 of the Contract Act. However, the court is of the view that the part of cause of action has also arisen in Mumbai and in Shimla. The installment was to be paid by respondent No.1 to appellant-company at Gateway Building, Appollo Bunder, Mumbai. The award has been made by the Arbitrator at Mumbai. It is an ex parte award. If the company was to be sued it could be sued where the principal office or subordinate office is situated. The installment was to be paid by respondent No.1 to appellant-company at Gateway Building, Appollo Bunder, Mumbai. The award has been made by the Arbitrator at Mumbai. It is an ex parte award. If the company was to be sued it could be sued where the principal office or subordinate office is situated. The parties have agreed to get the dispute tried and adjudicated upon by the courts at Mumbai alone and thus, the court mentioned in the agreement has the jurisdiction to execute the award also. 13. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hakam Singh vs. M/s Gammon (India) Limited, 1971 (1) SCC 286 have held that since the respondents have their principle office in Bombay they were liable in respect of a cause of action arising under the terms of the tender to be sued in the courts at Bombay. It was not open to the parties by agreement to confer by their agreement jurisdiction on a court which it does not possess under the Code. However, where two courts or more have under the Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction to try a suit or proceeding an agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of such courts is not contrary to public policy and does not contravene section 28 of the Contract Act. Their Lordships have further held that there is nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure that a corporation referred to under order 20 means only a statutory corporation and not a company registered under the Indian Companies Act. Their Lordships have held as under: “4. The Code of Civil Procedure in its entirety applies to proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The jurisdiction of the Courts under the Arbitration Act to entertain a proceeding for filing an award is accordingly governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. By Cl. 13 of the agreement it was expressly stipulated between the parties that the contract shall be deemed to have been entered into by the parties concerned in the City of Bombay. In any event the respondents have their principal office in Bombay and they were liable in respect of a cause of action arising under the terms of the tender to be sued in the Courts at Bombay. In any event the respondents have their principal office in Bombay and they were liable in respect of a cause of action arising under the terms of the tender to be sued in the Courts at Bombay. It is not open to the parties by agreement to confer by their agreement jurisdiction on a Court which it does not possess under the Code. But where two courts or more have under the Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction to try a suit or proceeding an agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of such Courts is not contrary to public policy. Such an agreement does not contravene S. 28 of the Contract Act. 5. Counsel for the appellant contended that merely because the respondent carried on business in Bombay the Courts at Bombay were not invested with jurisdiction to entertain any suit or a petition for filing an arbitration agreement. Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides : "Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction- (a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business. or personally works for gain; or (b) x x x x (c) the cause of action, wholly or In part, arises. * * * "Explanation II -A corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in India, or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place." Plainly by the terms of S. 20 (a) read with Explanation II, the respondent Company was liable to be sued at Bombay where it had its principal place of business. 6. The argument of counsel for the appellant that the expression "corporation" in Explanation II includes only a statutory corporation and not a company registered under the Indian Companies Act is, in our judgment, without substance. The Code of Civil Procedure uses the expression "corporation" as meaning a legal person and includes a company registered under the Indian Companies Act. 6. The argument of counsel for the appellant that the expression "corporation" in Explanation II includes only a statutory corporation and not a company registered under the Indian Companies Act is, in our judgment, without substance. The Code of Civil Procedure uses the expression "corporation" as meaning a legal person and includes a company registered under the Indian Companies Act. Order 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with suits by or against c corporation and there is nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure that a corporation referred to under S. 20 mean' only a statutory corporation and not a company registered under the Indian Companies Act.” 14. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Globe Transport Corporation vs. Triveni Engineering Works and another, (1983) 4 SCC 707 have held that the parties can by agreement opt for jurisdiction of courts at one particular place of suing excluding other places which are otherwise open to them for suing. Their Lordships have held as under: “2. This appeal by special leave is directed against an order made by the High court of Allahabad rejecting the revision application preferred by the appellant against an order made by the court of Civil Judge, Allahabad holding that it had jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the respondents against the appellant claiming damages for the loss suffered by them in respect of the goods carried by the appellant. The goods were entrusted by the consignor to the appellant for carriage at Baroda and under the consignment note issued by the appellant, the goods were to be carried to Naini. It appears that the truck in which the goods were carried met with an accident, as a result of which the goods were damaged and since the goods were delivered to the first respondent who were the endorsees of the consignment note, in damaged condition, the respondents fileld a suit claiming damages for the loss suffered by the first respondent. The consignment note contained various terms and conditions of the carriage and one of the terms and conditions was that set in Clause 17 which provided that "The court in Jaipur City alone shall have jurisdiction in respect of all claims and matters arising (sic) under the consignment or of the goods entrusted for transportation". The consignment note contained various terms and conditions of the carriage and one of the terms and conditions was that set in Clause 17 which provided that "The court in Jaipur City alone shall have jurisdiction in respect of all claims and matters arising (sic) under the consignment or of the goods entrusted for transportation". Notwithstanding this term of the Contract of Carriage, the suit was filed by the respondents in the court of the Civil Judge, Allahabad which had jurisdiction over Naini, being a place where goods were to be delivered and were in fact delivered to the first respondent. The appellant, therafore, raised an objection before the court of the Civil Judge, Allahabad contending that the court had no jurisdiction io entertain the suit since the court in Jaipur City alone had jurisdiction by reason of the term embodied in Clause 17 of the Contract of Carriage. The answer made by the respondents to this preliminary objection was that a part of the cause of action had arisen in Naini which was within the jurisdiction of the court of Civil Judge, Allahabad and that court had, therefore, jurisdiction to entertain the suit and Clause 17 did not have the effect of ousting the jurisdiction of the court of Civil Judge, Allahabad, because the court in Jaipur City had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and it was not competent to the parties by agreement to confer on the court jurisdiction which it did not possess. The court of Civil Judge, Allahabad rejected the preliminary objection of the appellant and held that since a part of the cause of action had arisen in Naini, the court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The appellant being aggrieved by this order made by the Civil Judge, Allahabad preferred a revision application in the High court, but the High Court agreed with the view taken by the court of Civil Judge, Allahabad and held that since no part of the cause of action had arisen in Jaipur, the Civil court in Jaipur had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and hence Clause 17 of the Contract of Carriage was ineffectual. The appellant thereupon preferred the present appeal by special leave obtained from this Court.” 15. The appellant thereupon preferred the present appeal by special leave obtained from this Court.” 15. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. and another vs. A.P. Agencies, Salem, (1989) 2 SCC 163 have considered sections 23 and 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and Section 20 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure and have held that agreement excluding court’s jurisdiction absolutely would be void. However, where more than one court has jurisdiction, agreement to submit to one, to the exclusion of the others is valid. Nature of exclusion intended to be determined on facts and circumstances of each case. Their Lordships have held as under: “2. The first appellant is a manufacturer and supplier of metallic yarn under the name and style 'Rupalon Metallic Yarn' having its registered office at Udyognagar, Mohamadabad, Gujarat within the jurisdiction of the civil Court of Kaira. The second appellant is a sister concern of the first appellant doing business with it. The respondent is a registered partnership firm doing business in metallic yarn and other allied products at Salem. 9. Section 28 of the contract Act, 1872 provides that every agreement by which any party thereto is restricted absolutely from enforcing his rights under or in respect of any contract, by the usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribunal, or which limits the time within which he may thus enforce his rights, is void to that extent. This is subject to exceptions, namely, (1) contract to refer to arbitration and to abide by its award, (2) as a matter of commercial law and practice to submit disputes on or in respect of the contract to agreed proper jurisdiction and not other jurisdictions though proper. The principle of Private International Law that the parties should be bound by the jurisdiction clause to which they have agreed unless there is some reason to contrary is being applied to municipal contracts., In Lee v. Showmen's Guild, (1952) 1 AN ER 1175 at p. 1181 Lord Denning said : "Parties cannot by contract oust the ordinary courts from their jurisdiction. They can, of course, agree to leave questions of law, as well as questions of fact, to the decision of the domestic tribunal. They can, indeed, make the tribunal the final arbiter on questions of fact, but they cannot make it the final arbiter on questions of law. They can, of course, agree to leave questions of law, as well as questions of fact, to the decision of the domestic tribunal. They can, indeed, make the tribunal the final arbiter on questions of fact, but they cannot make it the final arbiter on questions of law. They cannot prevent its decisions being examined by the courts. If parties should seek, by agreement, to take the law out of the hands of the courts and put it into the hands of a private tribunal, without any recourse at all to the courts in cases of error of law, then the agreement is to that extent contrary to public policy and void." 10. Under S. 23 of the Contract Act, the consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless it is opposed to public policy. Every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void. Hence there can be no doubt that an agreement to oust absolutely the jurisdiction of the Court will be unlawful and void being against the public policy. Ex dolo malo non oritur actio. If therefore it is found in this case that Clause 11 has absolutely ousted the jurisdiction of the Court it would be against public policy. However, such will be the result only if it can be shown that the jurisdiction to which the parties have agreed to submit had nothing to do with the contract. If on the other hand it is found that the jurisdiction agreed would also be a proper jurisdiction in the matter of the contract it could not be said that it ousted the jurisdiction of the Court. This leads to the question in the facts of this case as to whether Kaira would be proper jurisdiction in the matter of this contract. It would also be relevant to examine if some other courts than that of Kaira would also have had jurisdiction in the absence of Clause 11 and whether that would amount to ouster of jurisdiction of those courts and would thereby affect the validity of the clause. 15. In the matter of a contract there may arise causes of action of various kinds. 15. In the matter of a contract there may arise causes of action of various kinds. In a suit for damages for breach of contract the cause of action consists of the making of the contract, and of its breach, so that the suit may be filed either at the place where the contract was made or at the place where it should have been performed and the breach occurred. The making of the conttract is part of the cause of action. A suit on a contract, therefore, can be filed at the place where it was made. The determination of the place where the contract was made is part of the law of contract. But making of an offer on a particular place does not form cause of action in a suit for damages for breach of contract. Ordinarily, acceptance of an offer and its intimation result in a contract and hence a suit can be filed in a court within whose jurisdiction the acceptance was communicated. The performance of a contract is part of cause of action and a suit in respect of the breach can always be filed at the place where the contract should have (been) performed or its performance completed. If the contract is to be performed at the place where it is made, the suit on the contract is to be filed there and nowhere else. In suits for agency actions the cause of action arises at the place where the contract of agency was made or the place where actions are to be rendered and payment is to be made by the agent. Part of cause of action arises where money is expressly or impliedly payable under a contract. In cases of repudiation of a contract, the place where repudiation is received is the place where the suit would lie. If a contract is pleaded as part of the cause of action giving jurisdiction to the Court where the suit is filed and that contract is found to the invalid, such part of cause of the action disappears. The above are some of the connecting factors. 16. If a contract is pleaded as part of the cause of action giving jurisdiction to the Court where the suit is filed and that contract is found to the invalid, such part of cause of the action disappears. The above are some of the connecting factors. 16. So long as the parties to a contract do not oust the jurisdiction of all the Courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction to decide the cause of action under the law it cannot be said that the parties have by their contract ousted the jurisdiction of the Court. If under the law several Courts would have jurisdiction and the parties have agreed to submit to one of these jurisdictions and not to other or others of them it cannot be said, that there is total ouster of jurisdiction. In other words, where the parties to a contract agreed to submit the disputes arising from it to a particular jurisdiction which would otherwise also be a proper jurisdiction under the law their agreement to the extent they agreed not to submit to other jurisdictions cannot be said to be void as against public policy. If on the other hand the jurisdiction they agreed to submit to would not otherwise be proper jurisdiction to decide disputes arising out of the contract it must be declared void being against public policy. Would this be the position in the instant case? 18. In Hakam Singh v. M/s. Gammon (India) Ltd., (1971) 3 SCR 314 : ( AIR 1971 SC 740 ) the appellant agreed to do certain construction work for the respondent who had its principal place of business at Bombay on the terms and conditions of a written tender. Clause 12 of the tender provided for arbitration in case of dispute. Clause 13 provided that notwithstanding the place where the work under the contract was to be executed the contract shall be deemed to have been entered into by the parties at Bombay, and the Court in Bombay alone shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon. On dispute arising between the patties the appellant submitted a petition to the Court at Varanasi for an order under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 that the agreement be filed and an order of reference be made to an arbitrator or arbitrators appointed by the Court. On dispute arising between the patties the appellant submitted a petition to the Court at Varanasi for an order under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 that the agreement be filed and an order of reference be made to an arbitrator or arbitrators appointed by the Court. The respondent contended that in view of the Clause 13 of the arbitration agreement only the Courts at Bombay had jurisdiction. The Trial Court also held that the entire cause of action had arisen at Varanasi and the parties could not by agreement confer jurisdiction on the Courts at Bombay which they did not. otherwise possess. The High Court in revision held that the Courts at Bombay had jurisdiction under the general law and hence could entertain the petition and that in view of Clause 13 of the arbitration agreement the petition could not be entertained at Varanasi and directed the petition to be retruned for presentation to the proper Court. On appeal therefrom one of the questions that fell for consideration of 'this Court was whether the Courts at Bombay alone had jurisdiction over the dispute. It was held that the Code of Civil Procedure in its entirety. applied to' proceedings under the Arbitration Act by virtue of Section 41 of that Act. The jurisdiction of the Court under the Arbitration Act to entertain a proceeding for filing an award was accordingly governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. By the terms of Section 20 (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure read with explanation 11 thereto the respondent company which had its principal place of business at Bombay was liable to be sued at Bombay. It was held that it Was not open to the parties to agreement to confer by their agreement jurisdiction on a Court which it did not possess under the Code. But where two Courts or more have under the Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction to try suit or proceeding an agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of such Courts was not contrary to public policy and such an agreement did not contravene Section 28 of the Contract Act. Though this case arose out of an arbitration agreement there is no reason why the same rule should not apply to other agreements in so far as jurisdiction is concerned. Though this case arose out of an arbitration agreement there is no reason why the same rule should not apply to other agreements in so far as jurisdiction is concerned. Without referring to this decision a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Nanak Chand v. T. T. Electric Supply Co., AIR 1975 Mad 103 observed that competency of a Court to try an action goes to the root of the matter and when such comptency is not found, it has no jurisdiction at all to try the case. But objection based on jurisdiction is a matter which parties could waive and it is in this sense if such jurisdiction is exercised by Courts it does not go to the core of it so as to make the resultant judgment a nullity. Thus it is now a settled principle that where there may be two or more competent Courts which can entertain a suit consequent upon a part of the cause of action having arisen there within, if the parties to the contract agreed to vest jurisdiction in one such court to try the dispute which might arise as between themselves the agreement would be valid. If such a contract is clear, unambiguous and explicit and not vague it is not hit by Ss. 23 and 28 of the Contract Act. This cannot be understood as parties contracting against the Statute. Mercantile Law and practice permit such agreements.” 16. In the instant case as per clause 2 of the loan agreement, money was payable at Mumbai or as per the place mentioned in Schedule-1. However, there is no other place mentioned in Schedule-1 except Mumbai. 17. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in R.S.D.V. Finance Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. Shree Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. (1993) 2 SCC 130 have held that when the amount was deposited by the plaintiff with defendant company through cheque of bank at Bombay and the same was deposited in the bank account of defendant in Bombay branch of bank and the post-dated cheques payable to plaintiff at Bombay issued by defendant dishonoured by bank on maturity, suit filed in Bombay on the basis of the deposit receipt as well as the dishonoured cheques, in these circumstances the cause of action arose in Bombay and hence Bombay court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Their Lordships have held as under: “2. Their Lordships have held as under: “2. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated 24th October, 1991. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant R.S.D.V. Finance Company Private Limited (hereinafter referred to as 'the plaintiff') filed a summary suit against the respondent Sh. Vallabh Glass Works Limited (hereinafter referred to as 'the defendant') in the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court. The case of the plaintiff was that it had deposited a sum of Rupees 10,00,000/- with interest to be charged @ 19% per annum, with the defendant. The said deposit was to be for a period of 90 days. The aforesaid amount of Rupees 10,00,000/- was given to the defendant-company through Cheque No. 933251 dated 5th July, 1983 in the bank account of the defendant at Bombay. The defendant issued a deposit receipt for the aforesaid amount dated 11-7-1983. The aforesaid deposit receipt contained an endorsement to the effect 'Subject to Anand jurisdiction'. The date of maturity of the aforesaid amount was to expire on 3-10-1983. According to the plaintiff the defendant failed to pay the amount of Rupees 10,00,000/- and requested the plaintiff to continue the said deposit till the end of November, 1983 and for that purpose, handed over to the plaintiff 5 post dated cheques of Rs. 2,00,000/- each drawn on a Bombay bank. The defendant had also issued a cheque dated 30th November, 1983 for a sum of Rs. 22,288.32 by way of interest on the said amount of Rs. 10,00,000/-. This cheque was also drawn in favour of the plaintiff payable in Bombay. The plaintiff submitted the aforesaid 5 cheques for payment but the same were dishonoured for the reason "insufficient funds". The plaintiff in these circumstances filed a summary suit against the defendant for Rs. 10,00,000/- as principal and interest @ 19% per annum with 90 days rests. 9. We may also consider the effect of the endorsement 'Subject to Anand jurisdiction' made on the deposit receipt issued by the defendant. In the facts and circumstances of this case it cannot be disputed that the cause of action had arisen at Bombay as the amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- itself was paid through a cheque of the Bank at Bombay and the same was deposited in the bank account of the defendant in the Bank of Baroda at Nariman Point Bombay. In the facts and circumstances of this case it cannot be disputed that the cause of action had arisen at Bombay as the amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- itself was paid through a cheque of the Bank at Bombay and the same was deposited in the bank account of the defendant in the Bank of Baroda at Nariman Point Bombay. The five post dated cheques were also issued by the defendant being payable to the plaintiff at Bombay. The endorsement 'Subject to Anand jurisdiction' has been made unilaterally by the defendant while issuing the deposit receipt. The endorsement 'Subject to Anand jurisdiction' does not contain the ouster clause using the words like 'alone', 'only', 'exclusive' and the like. Thus the maxim 'expressio unius est exclusio alterius cannot be applied under the facts and circumstances of the case and it cannot be held that merely because the deposit receipt contained the endorsement 'Subject to Anand jurisdiction' it excluded the jurisdiction of all other courts who were otherwise competent to entertain the suit. The view taken by us finds support from a decision of this Court in A. B. C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. v. A.P. Agencies, Salem, (1989) 2 SCR 1 : ( AIR 1989 SC 1239 ).” 18. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Angile Insulations vs. Davy Ashmore India Ltd. and another, (1995) 4 SCC 153 have held that the territorial jurisdiction of court normally lies where cause of action arises, but it will be subject to terms of a valid contract between the parties and where two courts having jurisdiction consequent upon a part of the cause of action arising therewith, if parties stipulate in the contract to vest jurisdiction in one such court to try the disputes arising between themselves and if the contract is unambiguous, explicit and clear and is not pleaded to be void and opposed to section 23 of the Contract Act, then suit would lie in the court agreed to by the parties and the other court will have no jurisdiction even though cause of action arose partly within the territorial jurisdiction of that court. Their Lordships have held as under: “5. So, normally that court also would have jurisdiction where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. But it will be subject to the terms of the contract between the parties. Their Lordships have held as under: “5. So, normally that court also would have jurisdiction where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. But it will be subject to the terms of the contract between the parties. In this case, Clause (21) reads thus : "This work order is issued subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court situated in Bangalore in the State of Karnataka. Any legal proceeding will, therefore, fall within the jurisdiction of the above court only." A reading of this clause would clearly indicate that the work order issued by the appellant will be subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court situated in Bangalore in the State of Karnataka. Any legal proceeding will, therefore, be instituted in a Court of competent jurisdiction within the jurisdiction of High Court of Bangalore only. The controversy has been considered by this Court in A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. v. A. P. Agencies, Salem. (1989) 2 SCC 163 : ( AIR 1989 SC 1239 ). Considering the entire case law on the topic, this Court held that the citizen has the right to have his legal position determined by the ordinary Tribunal except, of course, subject to contract (a) when there is an arbitration clause which is valid and binding under the law, and (b) when parties to a contract agree as to the jurisdiction to which dispute in respect of the contract shall be subject. This is clear from S. 28 of the Contract Act. But an agreement to oust absolutely the jurisdiction of the Court will be unlawful and void being against the public policy under S. 23 of the Contract Act. We do not find any such invalidity of Clauses (21) of the Contract pleaded in this case. On the other hand, this Court laid that where there may be two or more competent courts which can entertain a suit consequent upon a part of the cause of action having arisen therewith, if the parties to the contract agreed to vest jurisdiction in one such court to try the dispute which might arise as between themselves, the agreement would be valid. If such a contract is clear, unambiguous and explicit and not vague, it is not hit by Ss. 23 and 28 of the Contract Act. This cannot be understood as parties contracting against the statute. Mercantile law and practice permit such agreements. 6. If such a contract is clear, unambiguous and explicit and not vague, it is not hit by Ss. 23 and 28 of the Contract Act. This cannot be understood as parties contracting against the statute. Mercantile law and practice permit such agreements. 6. In this view of the law and in view of the fact that the agreement under which Clause (21) was incorporated as one such clause, the parties are bound by the contract. The contract had not been pleaded to be void and being opposed to S. 23 of the Contract Act. As seen, Clause (21) is unambiguous and explicit and that, therefore, the parties having agreed to vest the jurisdiction of the Court situated within the territorial limit of High Court of Karnataka, the Court of subordinate Judge, Dhanbad in Bihar State has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit laid by the appellant. Therefore, the High Court was right in upholding the order of the Trial Court returning the plaint for presentation to the proper Court.” 19. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s Shriram City Union Finance Corporation Ltd. vs. Rama Mishra, AIR 2002 SC 2402 have held that it is open for parties to choose any one of two competent courts to decide their disputes and once parties bound themselves as such it is not open for them to choose a different jurisdiction. Their Lordships have held as under: “6. Two points which are up for our consideration is, first, regarding the arrears and its payment by the respondent, and the other regarding the jurisdiction of the Court namely, whether in view of the aforesaid specific clause under lease agreement, the Court of Bhubaneshwar or the Court at Calcutta would have jurisdiction to try the issues between the parties. So far the first point is concerned when the matter was listed earlier learned counsel for the respondent felt there was possibility of some settlement for which he took time. According to the instructions received by him, the term which is offered was acceptable to the appellant which was, if the respondent pays rupees five lacs in one instalment, the appellant will not pursue the matter in respect of any further claim over and above that. When the case is taken up today learned counsel for the respondent submits that his client is agreeable to pay the amount of Rs. When the case is taken up today learned counsel for the respondent submits that his client is agreeable to pay the amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- within two months which is acceptable to the appellant. In view of this it would be futile for us to enter into the first question raised. 7. This leads us to the second question, which counsel for the appellant submits with vehemence to be considered as this issue is being raised time and again and unless this is settled, the parties will continue to litigate for long in the various Courts. So we took up the second point for consideration. We heard the counsel for the parties in this regard. The submission for the appellant is strongly based on Cl. 34 of the aforesaid agreement which is quoted herein:- "34. Subject to the provisions of Cl. 32 above it is expressly agreed by and between the parties herein above that any suit, application and or any other legal proceeding with regard to any matter, claims, differences and for disputes arising out of this agreement shall be filed and for referred to the Courts in Calcutta for the purpose of jurisdiction." 9. In the present case the impugned order of the High Court and the order passed by the appellate Court arises out of the order passed by the Civil Judge, Bhubaneshwar. We have to keep in mind there is difference between inherent lack of jurisdiction of any Court on account of some statute and the other where parties through agreement bind themselves to have their dispute decided by any one of the Court having jurisdiction. Thus the question is not whether the Orissa Courts have the jurisdiction to decide respondent's suit but whether the respondent could have invoked the jurisdiction of that Court in view of the aforesaid Cl. 34. A party is bound either by provision of the Constitution, statutory provisions or any rule or under terms of any contract which is not against the public policy. It is open for a party for his convenience to fix the jurisdiction of any competent Court to have their dispute adjudicated by that Court alone. In other words if one or more Court has the jurisdiction to try any suit, it is open for the parties to choose any one of the two competent Courts to decide their disputes. It is open for a party for his convenience to fix the jurisdiction of any competent Court to have their dispute adjudicated by that Court alone. In other words if one or more Court has the jurisdiction to try any suit, it is open for the parties to choose any one of the two competent Courts to decide their disputes. In case parties under their own agreement expressly agrees that their dispute shall be tried by only one of them then the party can only file the suit in that Court alone to which they have so agreed. In the present case as we have said through Cl. 34 of the agreement, the parties have bound themselves that any matter arising between them under the said contract, it is the Courts in Calcutta alone which will have jurisdiction. Once parties bound themselves as such it is not open for them to choose a different jurisdiction as in the present case by filing the suit at Bhubaneshwar. Such a suit would be in violation of the said agreement. 10. For the said reasons we have no hesitation to hold that the suit filed by respondent in the Civil Court at Bhubaneshwar would not be valid, in view of the said agreement. Since an application for filing an award in respect of a dispute arising out of the terms of the agreement could be filed in the Courts in the City of Bombay, both because of the term of Cl. 13 of the agreement and because of the respondents had their Head Office where they carry on business at Bombay, the agreement between the parties that the Courts in Bombay alone shall have jurisdiction to try the proceedings relating to arbitration was binding between them." 12. Hence we hold this second question in favour of the appellant that in view of Cl. 34 of the agreement it is the courts at Calcutta alone would be competent Court to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and hence finding to the contrary given by the Courts below is hereby set aside.” 20. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in New Moga Transport Company vs. united India Insurance Co. Ltd. and others, AIR 2004 SC 2154 have held that choice of forum by agreement is not invalid. Their Lordships have held as under: “10. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in New Moga Transport Company vs. united India Insurance Co. Ltd. and others, AIR 2004 SC 2154 have held that choice of forum by agreement is not invalid. Their Lordships have held as under: “10. On a plain reading of the Explanation to Section 20, CPC it is clear that Explanation consists of two parts, (i) before the word "or" appearing between the words "office in India" and the word "in respect of and the other thereafter. The Explanation applies to a defendant which is a Corporation which term would include even a company. The first part of the Explanation applies only to such Corporation which has its sole or principal office at a particular place. In that event, the Court within whose jurisdiction the sole or principal office of the company is situate will also have jurisdiction inasmuch as even if the defendant may not actually be carrying on business at that place, it will be deemed to carry on business at that place because of the fiction created by the Explanation. The latter part of the Explanation takes care of a case where the defendant does not have a sole office but has a principal office at one place and has also a subordinate office at another place. The expression "at such place" appearing in the Explanation and the word "or" which is disjunctive clearly suggest that if the case falls within the latter part of the Explanation. It is not the Court within whose jurisdiction the principal office of the defendant is situate but the Court within whose jurisdiction it has a subordinate office which alone have the jurisdiction "in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office". 19. The intention of the parties can be culled out from use of the expressions "only", "alone", "exclusive" and the like with reference to a particular Court. But the intention to exclude a Court's jurisdiction should be reflected in clear, unambiguous, explicit and specific terms. In such case only the accepted notions of contract would bind the parties. The first appellate Court was justified in holding that it is only the Court at Udaipur which had jurisdiction to try the suit. The High Court did not keep the relevant aspects in view while reversing the judgment of the trial Court. In such case only the accepted notions of contract would bind the parties. The first appellate Court was justified in holding that it is only the Court at Udaipur which had jurisdiction to try the suit. The High Court did not keep the relevant aspects in view while reversing the judgment of the trial Court. Accordingly, we set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the first appellate Court. The Court at Barnala shall return the plaint to the plaintiff No. 1 (respondent No. 1) with appropriate endorsement under its seal which shall present it within a period of four weeks from the date of such endorsement of return before the proper Court at Udaipur. If it is so done, the question of limitation shall not be raised and the suit shall be decided on its own merits in accordance with law. The appeal is allowed. No costs.” 21. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s. Hanil Era Textiles Limited vs. M/s Puromatic Filters (P) Ltd., AIR 2004 SC 2432 have held that when part of cause of action accrued in both the places viz., Delhi and Bombay and there is a clause in agreement between parties, however, conferring jurisdiction in courts in Bombay, would not be opposed to public policy. Even though clause was not qualified by words like “alone” “only” or “exclusively”, but taking into consideration that purchase order was placed by the defendant at Bombay, the said order was accepted by the branch office of the plaintiff at Bombay, the advance payment was made by the defendant at Bombay and as per the plaintiffs’ case the final payment was to be made at Bombay, it can be inferred that courts in Bombay have jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. Their Lordships have held as under: “7. The effect of Clause 17 of the Purchase Order which mentions any legal proceedings arising out of the order shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts in Mumbai, has to be examined in the aforesaid background. Under sub-sections (a) and (b) of Section 20, the place of residence of the defendant or where he carries on business or works for gain is determinative of the local limits of jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit is to be instituted. Under sub-sections (a) and (b) of Section 20, the place of residence of the defendant or where he carries on business or works for gain is determinative of the local limits of jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit is to be instituted. Subsection (c) of Section 20 provides that the suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action, wholly or in part, accrues. As shown above, in the present case, a part of cause of action had accrued in both the places, viz., Delhi and Bombay. In Hakam Singh v. Gammon (India) Ltd. 1971 (1) SCC 286 , it was held that it is not open to the parties to confer by their agreement jurisdiction on a Court which it does not possess under the Code. But where two Courts or more have under the Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction to try a suit or a proceeding, an agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of such Courts is not contrary to public policy. It was also held that such an agreement does not contravene Section 28 of the Contract Act. 9. Clause 17 says - any legal proceedings arising out of the order shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts in Mumbai, The clause is no doubt not qualified by the words like "alone", "only" or "exclusively". Therefore, what is to be seen is whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it can be inferred that the jurisdiction of all other Courts except Courts in Mumbai is excluded. Having regard to the fact that the order was placed by the defendant at Bombay,; the said order was accepted by the branch office of the plaintiff at Bombay; the advance payment was made by the defendant at Bombay; and as per the plaintiffs case the final payment was to be made at Bombay; there was a clear intention to confine the jurisdiction of the Courts in Bombay to the exclusion of all other Courts. The Court of Additional District Judge, Delhi had, therefore, no territorial jurisdiction to try the suit.” 22. The Court of Additional District Judge, Delhi had, therefore, no territorial jurisdiction to try the suit.” 22. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shree Subhlaxmi Fabrics (P) Ltd. vs. Chand Mal Baradia and others, (2005) 10 SCC 704 have held that it is not open to the parties to confer by their agreement jurisdiction on a court which it does not possess under the Code of Civil Procedure. However, where two courts or more have under the Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction to try a suit or a proceeding, an agreement between the parties that the disputes between them shall be tried in one of such courts is not contrary to public policy and such an agreement does not contravene section 28 of the Contract Act. Their Lordships have taken into consideration that in this case both defendant No.1 and defendant No.2 have their offices at Bombay. Their Lordships have held as under: “16. The plaintiff wants that the Hindustan Chamber of Commerce (defendant No. 2) may be restrained from proceeding with arbitration of the dispute, which has been raised by the appellant Shree Subhlaxmi Fabrics Pvt. Ltd. (defendant No. 1). Both defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 have their offices at Bombay. Insofar as commencement of proceedings before defendant No. 2 by defendant No. 1 is concerned, no part of cause of action has accrued in Calcutta. 17. In Hakam Singh vs. Gammon (India) Ltd. ( 1971 (1) SCC 286 ,) it has been held that it is not open to the parties to confer by their agreement jurisdiction on a court which it does not possess under the Code. But where two courts or more have under the Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction to try a suit or a proceeding, an agreement between the parties that the disputes between them shall be tried in one of such courts is not contrary to public policy and that such an agreement does not contravene Section 28 of the Contract Act. In A.B.C. Laminart (P) Ltd. vs. A.P. Agencies ( 1989 (2) SCC 163 ,) it was held as under: - "When the court has to decide the question of jurisdiction pursuant to an ouster clause it is necessary to construe the ousting expression or clause properly. Often the stipulation is that the contract shall be deemed to have been made at a particular place. Often the stipulation is that the contract shall be deemed to have been made at a particular place. This would provide the connecting factor for jurisdiction to the courts of that place in the matter of any dispute on or arising out of that contract. It would not, however, ipso facto take away jurisdiction of other courts. Where an ouster clause occurs, it is pertinent to see whether there is ouster of jurisdiction of other courts. When the clause is clear, unambiguous and specific accepted notions of contract would bind the parties and unless the absence of ad idem can be shown, the other courts should avoid exercising jurisdiction. As regards construction of ouster clause when words like 'alone', 'only', 'exclusive' and the like have been used there may be no difficulty. Even without such words in appropriate cases the maxim 'expressio unius est exclusion alterius' expression of one is the exclusion of another may be applied. What is an appropriate case shall depend on the facts of the case. In such a case mention of one thing may imply exclusion of another. When certain jurisdiction is specified in a contract an intention to exclude all others from its operation may in such cases be inferred. It has therefore to be properly construed." This view has been reiterated in Angile Insulation vs. Davy Ashmore India Ltd. ( 1995 (4) SCC 153 .) 18. In the case on hand the clause in the indent is very clear, viz., "court of Bombay and no other court". The trial court on consideration of material on record held that the court at Calcutta had no jurisdiction to try the suit.” 23. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Electricity Board vs. Universal Petrol Chemicals Limited, (2009) 3 SCC 107 have held that where there may be two or more competent courts which can entertain a suit consequent upon a part of the cause of action having arisen therein, if parties to the contract agree to vest jurisdiction in one such court to try the dispute, such agreement is valid and binding. Their Lordships have further held that clauses in both agreements and purchase order specifically mentioned that contract was subject to jurisdiction of Jaipur courts only, thus, courts at Calcutta would not have territorial jurisdiction to try and decide such disputes. Their Lordships have held as under: “5. Their Lordships have further held that clauses in both agreements and purchase order specifically mentioned that contract was subject to jurisdiction of Jaipur courts only, thus, courts at Calcutta would not have territorial jurisdiction to try and decide such disputes. Their Lordships have held as under: “5. Before we proceed further it would be appropriate for us to extract herein the relevant clauses with respect to adjudication of the disputes, if any, which were common in both the agreements. Clause 30 of the General Conditions of the Contract inter alia stipulates as under:- "30.....The contract shall for all purposes be construed according to the laws of India and subject to jurisdiction of only at Jaipur in Rajasthan Courts only..........." 6. Clause 31 of the General Conditions of the Contract, which is an arbitration clause, reads as under:- "31. ARBITRATION (a) If at any time any question, dispute to difference whatsoever which may arise between the Purchaser and the Supplier upon or in relation to Contract, either party may forthwith to the order a notice in writing of the existence of such question (s)/dispute (s) differences and the same shall be referred to the Chairman, RSEB, Jaipur or any person appointed by him for the purpose (herein referred to the 'Arbitrator'). Such reference shall be deemed to be a submission to the arbitration within the meaning of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 and the statutory modifications made thereof. (b) The award of the Arbitrator shall be final and binding on both the parties. (c) Upon every or any such reference, the cost incidental to such reference and an award shall be in the discretion of the Arbitrator who may determine the amount thereof and direct the same to be borne and paid. (d) Work under the Contract shall, if reasonably possible, continue during the arbitration proceedings and no payment due or payable by the Purchaser shall be withheld on account of such proceedings." 7. (d) Work under the Contract shall, if reasonably possible, continue during the arbitration proceedings and no payment due or payable by the Purchaser shall be withheld on account of such proceedings." 7. In the second purchase order which is dated 02.12.1987, in addition to the above mentioned clauses, a clause was also incorporated which is with respect to the jurisdiction of the Court in case of disputes: "DISPUTES All disputes, differences or questions whatever which may arise between the Purchaser and the Supplier upon or in relation with or in connection with the contract shall be deemed to have arisen at Jaipur (Rajasthan) and no Court other than the Court at Jaipur (Rajasthan) shall have jurisdiction to entertain or try the same." 27. The aforesaid legal proposition settled by this Court in respect of territorial jurisdiction and applicability of Section 20 of the Code to Arbitration Act is clear, unambiguous and explicit. The said position is binding on both the parties who were contesting the present proceeding. Both the parties with their open eyes entered into the aforesaid purchase order and agreements thereon which categorically provide that all disputes arising between the parties out of the agreements would be adjudicated upon and decided through the process of arbitration and that no court other than the court at Jaipur shall have jurisdiction to entertain or try the same. In both the agreements in clause 30 of General Conditions of the Contract it was specifically mentioned that the contract shall for all purposes be construed according to the laws of India and subject to jurisdiction of only at Jaipur in Rajasthan Courts only and in addition in one of the purchase order the expression used was that the Court at Jaipur only would have jurisdiction to entertain or try the same. 29. The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court was aware of the clauses and stipulations in the agreements and was also aware of the abovementioned decisions of this Court, but the Division Bench held that the said forum selection clause agreed to and entered into between the parties would not apply in view of the specific provision of Section 31 (4) of the Act. The said provision as well as sub-Section (3) are extracted below:- "31. Jurisdiction. (1)..................... (2)..................... The said provision as well as sub-Section (3) are extracted below:- "31. Jurisdiction. (1)..................... (2)..................... (3) All applications regarding the conduct of arbitration proceedings or otherwise arising out of such proceedings shall be made to the Court where the award has been, or may be, filed, and to no other Court. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, where in any reference any application under this Act has been made in a Court competent to entertain it, that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that reference, and the arbitration proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court." 30. Having noticed the aforesaid provision of Section 31 (4), the Division Bench held that since the aforesaid provision starts with a non-obstantive clause, the said provisions would only apply and would come into operation. The Division Bench finally held thus: "The said argument cannot be sustained after a plain reading of Section 31 (4) of the Act. It is clear from the language used therein that where in any application has been made in a court, competent to entertain, in that case that court alone shall have jurisdiction. The requirement is not that the application should be allowed. Since in the instant case admittedly an application under Section 20 has been made, which is an application in a reference, Calcutta High Court will have jurisdiction." The said findings were rendered by the Division Bench upsetting the findings of the learned Single Judge who had held that the non-obstantive clause appearing in sub-Section (4) of Section 31 would not be attracted in the present case where the parties by an agreement had agreed to a particular forum having jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties for adjudication. 24. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shree Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Private Limited vs. Praveen Bhatia and others, (2009) 8 SCC 779 have held that if parties to the contract conferred jurisdiction on one of the courts which would have otherwise jurisdiction to deal with the matter, the same should ordinarily be given effect to. Their Lordships have held as under: “13. The parties hereto are governed by the terms of the contract. Their Lordships have held as under: “13. The parties hereto are governed by the terms of the contract. If, in terms of the provisions of the contract, they by agreement conferred jurisdiction on one of the courts which would have otherwise jurisdiction to deal with the matter, the same should ordinarily be given effect to. In A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. A.P. Agencies, Salem [ (1989) 2 SCC 163 ], this Court held that when the Court has to decide the question of jurisdiction pursuant to an ouster clause, it is necessary to construe the same properly. In such an event, it was opined that other courts should avoid exercise of jurisdiction. [See also Hanil Era Textiles Ltd. v. Puromatic Filters (P) Ltd. [ (2004) 4 SCC 671 ] 15. It is not in dispute that two awards have been made by two different arbitrators. Objections to the said awards have been filed by both the parties. One of the questions which, thus, is required to be taken into consideration is as to whether the appointment of respective arbitrators by the parties was valid and, thus, whether the arbitrators had acted within the four corners of the arbitration agreement. 17. The cases mentioned in Annexure-I thereto are directed to be transferred to Jhansi. The Court concerned should send the records of the respective cases to the District Judge, Jhansi who shall in turn transfer them to the courts having appropriate jurisdiction in this behalf. The transferee court therefore should issue notices to the parties after fixing date (s) of hearing in the matters transferred to their courts.” 25. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balaji Coke Industry Private Limited vs. Maa Bhagwati Coke Gujarat Private Limited, (2009) 9 SCC 403 have held that where two or more competent courts have jurisdiction to entertain a suit, parties to contract can agree to vest jurisdiction in one such court to try the dispute and such agreement is valid. Their Lordships have held as under: “28. Their Lordships have held as under: “28. This Court in A.B.C. Laminart case went on to observe that where there may be two or more competent courts which can entertain a suit consequent upon a part of the cause of action having arisen therewithin, if the parties to the contract agree to vest jurisdiction in one such court to try the dispute which might arise between them, the agreement would be valid. 30. In the instant case, the parties had knowingly and voluntarily agreed that the contract arising out of the High Seas Sale Agreement would be subject to Kolkata jurisdiction and even if the courts in Gujarat also had jurisdiction to entertain any action arising out of the agreement, it has to be held that the agreement to have the disputes decided in Kolkata by an Arbitrator in Kolkata, West Bengal, was valid and the Respondent- Company had wrongly chosen to file its application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act before the Bhavnagar Court (Gujarat) in violation of such agreement. The decisions of this Court in A.B.C. Laminart (P) Ltd. (supra) as also Hakam Singh (supra) are very clear on the point.” 26. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Swastik Gases Private Limited vs Indian Oil Corporation Limited, (2013) 9 SCC 32 , have surmised the entire case law and have held that by inserting a clause that courts at Kolkata shall have jurisdiction, courts at Kolkata alone shall have jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts. Exclusion of jurisdiction clause in agreement should be given its natural and plain meaning, lest very existence of said clause would be rendered meaningless. Their Lordships have held as under: “7. We have heard Mr. Uday Gupta, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Sidharth Luthra, learned Additional Solicitor General for the company. Learned Additional Solicitor General and learned counsel for the appellant have cited many decisions of this Court in support of their respective arguments. Before we refer to these decisions, it is apposite that we refer to the two clauses of the agreement which deal with arbitration and jurisdiction. Clause 17 of the agreement is an arbitration clause which reads as under: 17.0. Before we refer to these decisions, it is apposite that we refer to the two clauses of the agreement which deal with arbitration and jurisdiction. Clause 17 of the agreement is an arbitration clause which reads as under: 17.0. Arbitration If any dispute or difference (s) of any kind whatsoever shall arise between the parties hereto in connection with or arising out of this Agreement, the parties hereto shall in good faith negotiate with a view to arriving at an amicable resolution and settlement. In the event no settlement is reached within a period of 30 days from the date of arising of the dispute (s)/difference (s), such dispute (s)/difference (s) shall be referred to 2 (two) Arbitrators, appointed one each by the parties and the Arbitrators, so appointed shall be entitled to appoint a third Arbitrator who shall act as a presiding Arbitrator and the proceedings thereof shall be in accordance with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 or any statutory modification or re-enactment thereof in force. The existence of any dispute (s)/difference (s) or initiation/continuation of arbitration proceedings shall not permit the parties to postpone or delay the performance of or to abstain from performing their obligations pursuant to this Agreement. 8. The jurisdiction clause 18 in the agreement is as follows: 18.0. Jurisdiction The Agreement shall be subject to jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata. 9. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that even though clause 18 confers jurisdiction to entertain disputes inter se parties at Kolkata, it does not specifically bar jurisdiction of courts at Jaipur where also part of the cause of action has arisen. It is the submission of the learned counsel that except execution of the agreement, which was done at Kolkata, though it was signed at Jaipur, all other necessary bundle of facts forming 'cause of action' have arisen at Jaipur. It is the submission of the learned counsel that except execution of the agreement, which was done at Kolkata, though it was signed at Jaipur, all other necessary bundle of facts forming 'cause of action' have arisen at Jaipur. This is for the reason that: (i) The regional office of the respondent - company is situate at Jaipur; (ii) the agreement was signed at Jaipur; (iii) the consignment agency functioned from Jaipur; (iv) all stock of lubricants was delivered by the company to the appellant at Jaipur; (v) all sales transactions took place at Jaipur; (vi) the godown, showroom and office of the appellant were all situated in Jaipur; (vii) various meetings were held between the parties at Jaipur; (viii) the company agreed to lift the stock and make payment in lieu thereof at a meeting held at Jaipur and (ix) the disputes arose at Jaipur. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit that since part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of the courts at Jaipur and clause 18 does not expressly oust the jurisdiction of other courts, Rajasthan High Court had territorial jurisdiction to try and entertain the petition under Section 11 of the 1996 Act. He vehemently contended that clause 18 of the agreement cannot be construed as an ouster clause because the words like, 'alone', 'only', 'exclusive' and 'exclusive jurisdiction' have not been used in the clause. 32. For answer to the above question, we have to see the effect of the jurisdiction clause in the agreement which provides that the agreement shall be subject to jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata. It is a fact that whilst providing for jurisdiction clause in the agreement the words like 'alone', 'only', 'exclusive' or 'exclusive jurisdiction' have not been used but this, in our view, is not decisive and does not make any material difference. The intention of the parties - by having clause 18 in the agreement - is clear and unambiguous that the courts at Kolkata shall have jurisdiction which means that the courts at Kolkata alone shall have jurisdiction. It is so because for construction of jurisdiction clause, like clause 18 in the agreement, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius comes into play as there is nothing to indicate to the contrary. This legal maxim means that expression of one is the exclusion of another. It is so because for construction of jurisdiction clause, like clause 18 in the agreement, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius comes into play as there is nothing to indicate to the contrary. This legal maxim means that expression of one is the exclusion of another. By making a provision that the agreement is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata, the parties have impliedly excluded the jurisdiction of other courts. Where the contract specifies the jurisdiction of the courts at a particular place and such courts have jurisdiction to deal with the matter, we think that an inference may be drawn that parties intended to exclude all other courts. A clause like this is not hit by Section 23 of the Contract Act at all. Such clause is neither forbidden by law nor it is against the public policy. It does not offend Section 28 of the Contract Act in any manner. 57. For the reasons mentioned above, I agree with my learned Brother that in the jurisdiction clause of an agreement, the absence of words like “alone”, “only”, “exclusive” or “exclusive jurisdiction” is neither decisive nor does it make any material difference in deciding the jurisdiction of a court. The very existence of a jurisdiction clause in an agreement makes the intention of the parties to an agreement quite clear and it is not advisable to read such a clause in the agreement like a statute. In the present case, only the Courts in Kolkata had jurisdiction to entertain the disputes between the parties.” 27. Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh in M/s Libra Mining Works vs Baldota Brothers, Importers and Exports and others, AIR 1962 AP 452 has held that where agreement limited recourse to one of several competent courts, it is not hit by section 28 and clause in contract entered into at Bombay that contract was subject to Bombay jurisdiction, the parties held intended to give exclusive jurisdiction to Bombay courts. The Division Bench has held as under: “ (10) Do the provisions of the Act warrant the submission that agreements of this description would in any way violate that Section? We do not think that this argument is well-founded. The Division Bench has held as under: “ (10) Do the provisions of the Act warrant the submission that agreements of this description would in any way violate that Section? We do not think that this argument is well-founded. It is manifest that the object of the section is to render illegal, agreements which absolutely restrict the enforcement of rights arising under the Contract which a party has under the ordinary law and confines such vitiated by reason of Section 28. Consequently, Section 28 does not cause any impediment in the way of the parties agreeing to limit recourse to one of several competent courts. The agreement merely amounts to selection of one o the several jurisdictions and it does not deprive any Court of its inherent jurisdiction. Surely, it is open to the parties to agree to such a course and it is not hit by Section 28. There is abundant authority for this proposition. (Vide Hossen Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd., ILR (1954) Mad 855: ( AIR 1954 Mad 845 ) Achratial Kesavlal Mehta and Co. v. Vijayam and Co., 49 Mad LJ 189 : (AIR 1925 Lah 57) (FB). It is too late now to contend that Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act stands in the way of the parties entering into an agreement providing for a Forum for the determination of disputes arising under the contract. (13) To the same effect is the judgment of Lahore High Court in ILLR (1945) Lah 281: (AIR 1945 Lah 57) (FB). The agreement relating to jurisdiction, which fell to be considered by the Full bench of the Lahore High Court, was in these words: “If however, it be deemed necessary to apply to the Court of law, the suit can only be filed in the Court at Karachi and through no other Court”. This case also contains an elaborate discussion in such agreements. Their Lordships held that an agreement did not fall within the mischief of Section 28, that the only Court that was competent to take cognizance of the suit was Court at Karachi and that the suit founded upon a contract with a clause like that Court not be instituted at Lahore. The principle adumbrated in A.K. Kalliyappa Chettiar and Sons v. Currimbhoy Laljee and Co., AIR 1954 Tra-Co. 461 is in accord with the above-mentioned cases. The principle adumbrated in A.K. Kalliyappa Chettiar and Sons v. Currimbhoy Laljee and Co., AIR 1954 Tra-Co. 461 is in accord with the above-mentioned cases. While not disputing the correctness of the proposition enunciated in the above cases, Sri Suryanarayana sought to distinguish them on the ground that while in those cases the parties intended to give exclusive jurisdiction to one of the two competent courts in the instant case, such a course was not within the contemplation of the parties. We do not think that we can assent to this proposition. Though the phraseology in the present case is different from that adopted in the cases under citation, in our opinion, the import is the same. The clause clearly denotes that the parties agreed to have the disputes arising out of the contract settled by the Courts in Bombay. The absence of the word “only” cannot form the ground of distinction. If we would accept the interpretation sought to be placed upon this clause by the learned counsel for the appellant that term is otiose and unmeaning. Without the existence of such an agreement, the Bombay court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of suits for the enforcement of rights arising under the contract for the reason that these agreements were entered into at Bombay, having regard to the context in which it occurs, there can be little doubt that clause constitutes contracting out of the right to bring actions in other competent courts. We are not persuaded that eth connotation of this clause is different from these embodied in the cases referred to above.” 28. Learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court in M/s. Rai Bahadur Basakha Singh and Sons (Contractors) Pvt. Ltd. vs. M/s Indian Drugs and Pharmaceutical Limited, AIR 1979 Delhi 220 has held that where two courts have jurisdiction to try a proceeding or suit, the parties may agree that the disputes between them shall be tried in one of such courts. Learned Single Judge has held as under: “4. It is well settled that parties by agreement cannot confer jurisdiction on any court which it did not otherwise possess. But where two courts have jurisdiction to try a proceeding or suit the parties may agree that the disputes between them shall be tried in one of such courts. Learned Single Judge has held as under: “4. It is well settled that parties by agreement cannot confer jurisdiction on any court which it did not otherwise possess. But where two courts have jurisdiction to try a proceeding or suit the parties may agree that the disputes between them shall be tried in one of such courts. It is admitted that the courts at Dehradun have jurisdiction in the matter under section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure as the construction of the building in question was done within the jurisdiction of that court, Clause 3 o the Special Conditions of the Contract is as under:- 3. Jurisdiction of Court:- Except as provided in Clause 25 of the bond, all the disputes arising out of the contract bond, Dehradun Courts alone will have the jurisdiction.” 29. Learned Single Judge of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Computer Sciences Corporation India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Harishchandra Lodwal and another, AIR 2006 MP 34 while interpreting sections 37 and 39 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has held as under: “6. Learned counsel further submits that section 37 of the Code defines the Court which passes the decree and section 39 laid down the procedure for transfer of decree. It is submitted that unless and until the decree is sent for execution by the Court it passed the decree for execution to another court of competent jurisdiction the transferee court cannot execute decree under sections 37 and 39 of the Act. 7. Learned court below has disposed of the application holding that the petitioner is competent to execute the decree at Delhi. 8. In view of the aforesaid position of law, since award is passed at Indore therefore unless and until the Court at Indore transfer the decree to the Court at Delhi, it cannot be executed. In view of this decree dated 24-1-2003, is set aside with the direction to the Court below to consider the application for transfer so as to enable the petitioner to proceed with the execution of decree at Delhi.” 30. There is no merit in the contention of Mr. G.C. Gupta, learned Senior Advocate that clause 30 of the loan agreement is void. It is always open to the parties to get the dispute adjudicated upon in one court by excluding other if part of cause of action arose in jurisdiction’s of both the courts. There is no merit in the contention of Mr. G.C. Gupta, learned Senior Advocate that clause 30 of the loan agreement is void. It is always open to the parties to get the dispute adjudicated upon in one court by excluding other if part of cause of action arose in jurisdiction’s of both the courts. The appellant knew that though part of cause of action has arisen at Shimla, but has decided to get the matter adjudicated upon from the courts at Mumbai where the part of cause of action has also arisen. The parties cannot be permitted to exclude one clause of the agreement. All the clauses are required to be read harmoniously. In the present case, as per clause 29 of the loan agreement, arbitration proceedings were to be held in Mumbai and the same in fact were held in Mumbai and the award was passed in Mumbai. However, the application under order 21 rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed at Shimla. The company knew from the very beginning that it has principal office at Mumbai and subordinate office at Shimla and despite that has agreed to exclude territorial jurisdiction of all the courts except at Mumbai for adjudicating upon any dispute arising under the agreement. Clause 30 of the loan agreement, in view of the discussion, made hereinabove cannot be held to be violative of section 28. It is valid clause agreed consciously between the parties. 31. Accordingly, in view of the analysis and discussion made hereinabove, there is no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of. No costs.