Judgment : 01. Around 2000 B.C., King of Heracleopolis wrote to his son, “Do justice, that you may live long upon earth. Calm the weeper, do not oppress the widow, do not oust the man from his father’s property, do not degrade magnates from their seats. Beware of punishing wrongly; do not kill, for it will not profit you.” These wise words apart, we have a written law which was breached in this case. 02. A widow, aged about 75 years, along with her two sons filed the present writ petition seeking compensation for their demolished house property bearing premises No.9-1-236 and 238, admeasuring about 100 square yards situated at St.Mary Road, Secunderabad for the purpose of widening the road connecting Clock Tower to Secunderabad Railway Station by the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad. In the said house property consisting of ground and first floor, they used to reside for the last 50 years. The house was constructed somewhere in 1934 by the great-grand father of the 2nd petitioner. They succeeded to the said property under deeds of will. While so, the respondents served a notice on them on 23-08-2005 seeking their consent for handing over advance possession of the property for the purpose of road widening. Before they could decide about giving consent or otherwise, the property was demolished between 28-08-2005 to 31-08-2005. The video photography sought to be taken by the petitioners was thwarted. However, they could take photographs of the demolition. It is their case that all their belongings remained in the house and they came out of the house in a state of distress. They were literally thrown out of the house to the streets. It was stated that they were invited for negotiations on 30-08-2005 and when they were in the office of the 2nd respondent-Additional Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, demolition of the house took place. They estimated the loss at Rs.48,64,000/- and claimed compensation as the respondents did not follow the procedure contained in Sections 146 or 147 of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporations Act,1955 (for brevity “the Act”) and violated the Constitutional guarantee under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. 03. They estimated the loss at Rs.48,64,000/- and claimed compensation as the respondents did not follow the procedure contained in Sections 146 or 147 of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporations Act,1955 (for brevity “the Act”) and violated the Constitutional guarantee under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. 03. After three (3) years, a counter-affidavit was filed by the Assistant City Planner, Town Planning Section, stating that the petitioners were given notice No.1/RW/SMR/L11/SD/2005, dated 18-01-2003 in terms of Section 146 of the Act for handing over of their property affected under road widening free of cost and on payment of structural value. Some owners came and handed over the property, whereas some others refused. The locality people formed into an association and requested to drop the proposed widening of the road to a width of 120 feet. In respect of the owners who did not cooperate to surrender their property free of cost, the Corporation was compelled to initiate land acquisition proceedings. Since the land acquisition proceedings may consume some considerable time, a meeting was held between the association people and the officials of the Municipal Corporation and it was decided to reduce the width of the road from 120 feet to 80 feet and 40 feet separately. The locality people accepted the same and they spontaneously came forward and handed over their affected portions. The petitioners house was also demolished but they did not raise any objection for the demolition at that point of time. The petitioners had participated in the negotiations along with other owners and agreed to surrender the affected portion. After demolition of the property, the petitioners started raising objections and refused to receive the cheques for the structural compensation though the cheques for structural compensation were ready. The other property owners have accepted their cheques. The entire property for road widening was acquired by way of negotiations only and structural compensation was paid and the owners were given the benefit of G.O.Ms.No.483, M&A, dated 24-08-1998. Since the petitioners raised objections and did not accept other benefits in lieu of compensation, a requisition was sent to the Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition, Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad for acquisition of the land under the Land Acquisition Act,1894 but the Special Deputy Collector on 18-04-2005 informed that the land is recorded in T.S.L.R record as ‘Sarkari Poramboke’ and, therefore, acquisition proceedings could not be initiated. 04. 04. Heard Sri Vedula Venkata Ramana, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and the learned Special Government Pleader representing the learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the respondents. 05. The learned Senior Counsel brought to the notice of this court, the sale deed dated 12-11-1930 under which the predecessor-intitle purchased the property and also a deed of Will dated 27-07-1991 executed by the daughter of the vendee under sale deed dated 12-11-1930 who got the property under a registered Will dated 13-02-1939. Under the said Will, she bequeathed the said property in favour of the petitioners. He also filed copies of the property tax and a notice dated 18-01-2003 said to have been issued by the 1st respondent seeking cooperation of the petitioners 1 and 2 for giving consent under Section 146 of the Act for the purpose of road widening. 06. The learned Senior Counsel while relying on judgments of this Court in M/s.Ushodaya Publications vs. The Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad and another ( AIR 2001 A.P. 345 ), K.Sai Reddy and others vs. Deputy Executive Engineer, Command Area Development, Nampally, Hyderabad and others (AIR 1995 A.P.208), Tuljaram Singh(died) by LRs vs. District Collector, Hyderabad and others ( 2004(5) ALD 660 ) and of the Supreme Court in State of U.P and others vs. Manohar (2005) 2 SCC 126 ), contended that the property of the petitioners cannot be taken away without recourse to the provisions of law. 07. On the other hand, the learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the learned Advocate General sought further time when the case was taken up in the morning on 22-01-2014 after several adjournments in the past at the instance of the learned Standing Counsel for Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad and his request was declined in the facts and circumstances of the case and the case was adjourned to afternoon. After perusing the record, he relented and stated that the record reveals that a proposal was put up on 10-09-2004 deciding to file land acquisition proposals in respect of 18 properties and communicated a letter to the Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition, Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad. But no document, in respect of the averment made in the counter-affidavit that the Land Acquisition Officer addressed a letter to the City Planner, Secunderabad on 18-04-2005 stating that the land was recorded in TSLR record as Sarkari Poramboke, is made available. 08. But no document, in respect of the averment made in the counter-affidavit that the Land Acquisition Officer addressed a letter to the City Planner, Secunderabad on 18-04-2005 stating that the land was recorded in TSLR record as Sarkari Poramboke, is made available. 08. Section.146 of the Act deals with acquisition of immovable property by agreement. Section 147 of the Act deals with the procedure when immovable property cannot be acquired by agreement and it reads as follows:- “147. Procedure when immovable property cannot be acquired by agreement:-- (1) Whenever the Commissioner is unable to acquire any immovable property under the last preceding section by agreement, the Government may, in their discretion, upon the application of the Commissioner, made with the approval of the Standing Committee and subject to the other provisions of this Act, order proceedings to be taken for acquiring the same on behalf of the Corporation [in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act,1894 as amended from time to time as if such property were land needed for a public purpose within the meaning of the provisions of the said Act]. (2) The amount of compensation awarded and all other charges incurred in acquisition of any such property shall, subject to all other provisions of this Act, be forthwith paid by the Commissioner and thereupon the said property shall vest in the Corporation. 09. In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the petitioners never agreed for surrender of their property by negotiations. In the circumstances, the only course left open to the Commissioner, in the absence of agreement, is to take recourse under Section 147 of the Act. Once a recourse is taken under Section 147 of the Act, the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act,1894 (since replaced by The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013) comes into picture. The provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 never authorized the demolition of the property without tendering any amount of compensation. In the case of advance possession and urgency, the Collector shall tender payment of the 80% of the compensation for such land as estimated by him to the persons interested and entitled thereto. The provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 never authorized the demolition of the property without tendering any amount of compensation. In the case of advance possession and urgency, the Collector shall tender payment of the 80% of the compensation for such land as estimated by him to the persons interested and entitled thereto. The said act also has to be taken only after publication of a notification under Section 4(1) and a declaration under Sec.6 of the Land Acquisition Act,1894 followed by a notice to the persons interested under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act,1894 thereof. In QamarSultana Vs. Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad and other ( AIR 1995 A.P. 230 ) this court considered the issue of demolition of structures without following the procedure under Section 406 of the Act and held that without issuing notice under Section 406 of the Act, structures cannot be removed. Incidentally, the power of the court to award damages for unreasonable, high-handed, unauthorized and illegal action of the 1st respondent was considered and held that the petitioners are entitled to be compensated by way of damages. 10. In this case, the entire procedure is sought to be avoided and compensation is also sought to be denied on the sole ground that the land was recorded in TSLR as ‘Sarkari Poramboke’. The respondents on the one hand stated that the cheques for structural compensation were made ready but the petitioners refused to take the same and on the other hand stated that the land was recorded in TSLR as ‘Sarkari Poramboke.’. These contradictory statements were made by the respondents only to justify their inaction. No copy of the record of the Town Survey Land Record (TSLR) was produced in support of their contention and in the instant case there is evidence to show prima facie title of the petitioners at least since 1930. 11. The effect of entry in TSLR was considered in Hyderabad Potteries Pvt. Ltd., Vs. Collector, Hyderabad District and another ( 2001(3) ALT 200 ). This court held that disputing the title for the sake of raising a dispute would not be enough to conclude that there is a dispute with regard to the title as such. 11. The effect of entry in TSLR was considered in Hyderabad Potteries Pvt. Ltd., Vs. Collector, Hyderabad District and another ( 2001(3) ALT 200 ). This court held that disputing the title for the sake of raising a dispute would not be enough to conclude that there is a dispute with regard to the title as such. It was held that as against the preponderance of evidence and material available on record, a mere entry in the TSLR cannot alter the right, title and interest of the petitioner-company in the land in question. This court also held that there is no presumption that every entry made in the TSLR shall be presumed to be true until contrary is proved as in the case of entries made in the record of rights under the provisions of A.P. Record of rights in Land Act,1971. It is not a record of right. This court further held in paras 22 to 25 of the judgment as under:- “22. The question as to the nature and scope of entries in TSLR had fallen for consideration in WA Nos.115 and 160 of 2000 before a Division Bench of this Court. The Division Bench observed that "the entries in TSLR are no doubt relevant. But they are not conclusive. It is common knowledge that there may be many instances where the owners of land in urban areas will not be in a position to correlate the house numbers or ward numbers to the survey numbers or the entries may not be upto date and that may introduce some practical difficulties in obtaining TSLR extracts.....The TSLR cannot be regarded as a sole guiding factor." 23. Whether the Municipal Corporation is entitled to reject the application for grant of building permission solely on the ground of an adverse entry made in the TSLR? Justice P. Venkatrama Reddi, (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the Division Bench while adverting to the very question in WA Nos.115 and 160 of 2000 observed: "The controversy does not rest there. Assuming that the TSLR extract is not available in respect of a particular property or TSLR entries do not go to substantiate the writ petitioners' case, the question then is whether the building permission should be refused automatically. The answer in our View should be in the negative. Assuming that the TSLR extract is not available in respect of a particular property or TSLR entries do not go to substantiate the writ petitioners' case, the question then is whether the building permission should be refused automatically. The answer in our View should be in the negative. We have to read the bye-laws in harmony with the relevant section viz., Section 429. What is stressed by Section 429 (aa) is the document proving title to the property. TSLR may be one such document. There are also other documents which are mentioned in the bye-law No.4 (2) (v). The insistence on the production of these documents is only to facilitate the competent authority to satisfy itself that the application has prima facie title and legal authority to erect or re-erect the building. There can be no hard and fast rule as to how to establish the title or lawful authority of the applicant and the basis on which the prima facie satisfaction should be reached by the competent authority. Entries in TSLR are no doubt relevant. But they are not conclusive. It is common knowledge that there may be many instances where the owners of land in urban areas will not be in a position to correlate the house numbers or ward numbers to the survey numbers or the entries may not be upto date and that may introduce some practical difficulties in obtaining TSLR extracts. Therefore, the mere non-production of TSLR extract, if a valid reason could be given for such non-production, does not clinch the issue. The TSLR cannot be regarded as a sole guiding factor to the competent authority while dealing with the building applications. TSLR entries have to be considered in conjunction with other documents which the applicants would like to place reliance upon. The stand taken by the Municipal Corporation that the proof of ownership/possession in the form of TSLR is an essential pre-requisite cannot be upheld though as we have already observed, such document is a relevant piece of evidence. It will have to be considered in combination with other documents which will have bearing on the title and possession of the applicant for building permission. At best, it can be said that insistence on the extracts from TSLR register may be a rule of prudence. But, it cannot be a rule of rigid and mechanical application." 24. It will have to be considered in combination with other documents which will have bearing on the title and possession of the applicant for building permission. At best, it can be said that insistence on the extracts from TSLR register may be a rule of prudence. But, it cannot be a rule of rigid and mechanical application." 24. It is further held that "the question of title and lawful possession of the applicants cannot be solely decided on the basis of TSLR entries, but also on the basis of any other relevant evidence that may be furnished by the applicants." 25. It is thus clear that an entry in TSLR itself cannot be the conclusive proof of title or lack of it, and the decision either to grant or refuse permission cannot be taken solely on the basis of an entry made in the TSLR. It may be one of the factors that may have to be taken into consideration along with the other material available on record. An entry made in TSLR per se could not create any doubt or cloud on the right, title and interest of a person in respect of any land. 12. The said decision was followed in B.N.MangaDevi and another vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others ( 2011(6) ALD 283 ) andwhile considering the issue whether the entries in TSLR would confer a conclusive title or not, it was held that it is put beyond any pale of doubt by this court that entries contained in TSLR cannot be the fountainhead for doubting the right, title and interest of any person in respect of any land. 13. Had the respondents given an opportunity, the petitioners would have provided proof of their title. The respondents kept quiet after demolishing the property of the petitioners in August 2005 and no effort was made to settle the matter even after filing of the writ petition by the petitioners in 2005. The petitioners have been waiting for an order from this court for all these years. The agony of persons who lost their property without receiving any compensation has to be felt rather than expressed in words. Though no precedents are required for offering remedy to petitioners due to the high-handed action of the respondents, a perusal of the decisions cited by the learned Senior Counsel would not be out of place. The agony of persons who lost their property without receiving any compensation has to be felt rather than expressed in words. Though no precedents are required for offering remedy to petitioners due to the high-handed action of the respondents, a perusal of the decisions cited by the learned Senior Counsel would not be out of place. In Manoharcase (4th supra) the land of the petitioners was forcibly taken without following due process of law. The High Court of Allahabad ordered for payment of compensation. The State challenged the order of the High Court in the Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court noticing the untenable arguments of the State observed as follows:- “6. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellants, we are satisfied that the case projected before the court by the appellants is utterly untenable and not worthy of emanating from any State which professes the least regard to being a welfare State. When we pointed out to the learned counsel that, at this state at least, the State should be gracious enough to accept its mistake and promptly pay the compensation to the respondent, the State has taken an intractable attitude and persisted in opposing what appears to be a just and reasonable claim of the respondent. 7. Ours is a constitutional democracy and the rights available to the citizens are declared by the Constitution. Although Article 19(1)(f) was declared by the Forty-Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, Article 300-A has been placed in the Constitution, which reads as follows:- “300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law,--- No personal shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.” 8. This is a case where we find utter lack of legal authority for deprivation of the respondent’s property by the appellants who are State authorities. In our view, this case was an eminently fit one for exercising the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In our view, the High Court was somewhat liberal in not imposing exemplary costs on the appellants. We would of the Constitution. In our view, the High Court was somewhat liberal in not imposing exemplary costs on the appellants. We would have perhaps followed suit, but for the intransigence displayed before us. Ultimately, the above case was dismissed with exemplary costs of Rs.25,000/-. 14. We would of the Constitution. In our view, the High Court was somewhat liberal in not imposing exemplary costs on the appellants. We would have perhaps followed suit, but for the intransigence displayed before us. Ultimately, the above case was dismissed with exemplary costs of Rs.25,000/-. 14. A learned single Judge of this court in the case of K.SaiReddy (2nd supra) came down heavily upon the Officers who took possession of the petitioners’ agricultural land in flagrant violation of the law and directed initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the concerned Officers. 15. A Full Bench of this court in M/s. Ushodaya Publications (1st supra) examined the issue whether the possession of the land in occupation of a lessee can be acquired by the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad without recourse to compulsory acquisition on the basis of the consent given by the land lady and held that it cannot do so without taking recourse to the provisions of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporations Act,1955 or the Land Acquisition Act,1894. 16. Another learned single Judge of this court in TuljaramSingh case (3rd supra) considered the case of acquisition of land for public purpose without payment of compensation and held that it is a clear case of violation of Article 300-A of the Constitution and allowed the writ petition with exemplary costs of Rs.20,000/- apart from directing payment of an amount of Rs.1 lakh by way of damages for deprivation of the petitioners’ right to enjoy the property for a period of 15 years. 17. This Court, way back in 2000, in KeshavPrashad V. Commissioner and Special Officer, MCH, Hyderabad and others ( 2001 (2) ALD 182 (DB) considered the issue as to whether the constructions raised by the owners could have been demolished for the purpose of widening of the road without their consent. 17. This Court, way back in 2000, in KeshavPrashad V. Commissioner and Special Officer, MCH, Hyderabad and others ( 2001 (2) ALD 182 (DB) considered the issue as to whether the constructions raised by the owners could have been demolished for the purpose of widening of the road without their consent. When the owner approached this Court seeking compensation for the demolished portion of the building, the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad put forward a plea of consent of the owner before demolishing the property and when the owner denied such consent before this Court, this Court accepted the plea of the owner and held that the action of the respondent Municipal Corporation was wholly illegal and held that “having regard to the provisions of Article 300(A) of the Constitution of India, such a constitutional right could not have been taken away except in accordance with law i.e., by taking recourse to the statutory provisions of acquisition by the State, by invoking the Doctrine of Eminent Domain or by purchasing the land upon holding the negotiations thereon”. 18. In view of the unimpeachable evidence adduced by the petitioners with regard to their prima facie title to the property from 1930, the plea of the respondents that they could not take action on the basis of the communication of the Land Acquisition Officer that the property was recorded in the TSLR as ‘Sarkari Poramboke’ is totally untenable. The law laid down by this court where the respondents were parties also indicates that such a plea is not available to them. Consequently, the writ petition is liable to be allowed. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed with costs and the respondents are directed to pay an amount of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand Only) to the Writ Petitioners towards damages within one(1) month from the date of receipt of a copy of the order for unlawful deprivation of their property and further directed to take proceedings under Section 147 of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporations Act,1955 and complete the same within a period of six(6) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and also initiate appropriate departmental proceedings to fix the responsibility on the Officers responsible for negligence in their duties in payment of compensation to the Petitioners and recover the amount of damages of Rs.50,000/- from them personally. This case requires a post script. This case requires a post script. The writ petition came up for admission in 2005. Thereafter, it was listed in 2009 and could not be taken up for hearing and was heard in 2011. On 19-11-2011 the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents took time for getting instructions with regard to payment of compensation and nothing happened. Thereafter, it was listed again on 03-04-2013, 04-04- 2013 and came up before me on 08-11-2013. The case was posted under the caption “for orders” on 11-11-2013 in order to enable the respondents to take action for payment of compensation but was listed on 22-11-2013. At the request of the learned Standing Counsel, it was adjourned to 02-12-2013 and 06-12-2013. When nothing came out for settlement of the compensation and adjournments were being taken from time to time, the Deputy Commissioner of Circle 18 was directed to appear, by order dated 06-12-2013, to come up with an additional affidavit and record, for finally disposing of the matter on 16-12-2013. He appeared on 16-12-2013 and undertook to file additional affidavit and look for settlement of the problem. The case was adjourned to 30-12-2013. On the said date again further time was sought by the learned Standing Counsel and incidentally the Commissioner of Municipal Corporation, Hyderabad was present in court in connection with another case and the situation in the present was also brought to his notice and the case was adjourned to after Pongal-2014 vacation. When this case was listed on 22-01-2014 and called in the forenoon, the services of the learned Advocate General were engaged and the learned Special Government Pleader representing him sought further time for production of the record. In view of the number of adjournments as afore-stated, the request was declined and the case was posted after lunch. The learned Special Government Pleader was fair enough for agreeing for disposal of the case after going through the record and that is how the case was reserved for orders on 22-01-2014. A perusal of the above docket proceedings show utter lack of concern by the Officers of the Corporation as well as by the learned Standing Counsel in finding a solution to the problem. A perusal of the above docket proceedings show utter lack of concern by the Officers of the Corporation as well as by the learned Standing Counsel in finding a solution to the problem. The Standing Counsel are Officers of the court and they owe a duty in justice delivery system to cooperate in disposal of the cases in the best possible manner instead of acting as mouth pieces to their clients. Some officers representing the Government or Corporations are lacking concern for the grievances of the citizens. It is a well known fact that Government and its Corporations are the biggest litigants in this court and this type of cases contribute to the docket explosion. A little effort by the respondents and the Counsel would go a long way in early disposal of the cases, instead of keeping the cases pending for long time as in this case for eight (8) years. One has to think of the plight of the people whose roof was taken away all of a sudden and were left with no alternative. Any justice after eight years is no justice to such people. In this backdrop, the above order was passed with a hope such type of cases would be solved at the level of the authorities in a pragmatic way instead of driving the parties to the courts for redressal of grievances.