JUDGMENT Justice Rajiv Sharma, Judge. This appeal is instituted against the judgment dated 5.6.2013 rendered by the learned Additional District Judge, Hamirpur in HMA Petition No. 17 of 2010. 2. “Key facts” necessary for the adjudication of this petition are that petitioner has filed a petition under section 13 (1) (i-a) and (i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 against the respondent. According to the averments contained in the petition, marriage between the parties was solemnized as per Hindu Rites and Customs on 19.5.2006 at village Paniala, Post Office, Khiah, Tehsil and District Hamirpur. One daughter was born out of the wedlock on 29.3.2007. According to the averments contained in the petition, respondent initially performed her matrimonial obligations properly and she was treated with due dignity. However, she started picking up quarrels with the petitioner on trivial matters. In the month of February, 2007, parents of the respondent came to take her alongwith them. They abused the petitioner and his family members. He made unsuccessful attempt to bring back the respondent to matrimonial home on 27.7.2007, 20.6.2008 and 7.11.2008. According to the petitioner, respondent has deserted him without any reasonable ground. The conduct of respondent during her stay at the matrimonial home was cruel towards the petitioner and his family members. She was residing with her parents in village Paniala, P.O. Khiah, Tehsil and District Hamirpur. 3. The respondent has denied all the allegations contained in the petition. According to her, she was maltreated and harassed in the matrimonial home. She was treated as domestic help. She was ignored after the birth of female child. Dowry was demanded by the petitioner and his family members. 4. Rejoinder was filed by the petitioner to the reply filed by respondent. Learned Additional District Judge framed issues on 21.1.2011. He dismissed the petition on 5.6.2013. 5. Mr. K.D. Sood, learned Senior Advocate has vehemently argued that respondent has treated the petitioner with cruelty. He also contended that respondent has deserted the petitioner. 6. Mr. G.D. Verma, learned senior Advocate has supported the judgment dated 5.6.2013. 7. According to PW-1 Arun Kumar Katoch, he was tenant of the petitioner’s family from January, 2006 to July, 2007. She was looked after properly. She was provided with all the basic necessity of life. She was helped to pursue higher education. She was taken to District Hospital at the time of delivery. 7. According to PW-1 Arun Kumar Katoch, he was tenant of the petitioner’s family from January, 2006 to July, 2007. She was looked after properly. She was provided with all the basic necessity of life. She was helped to pursue higher education. She was taken to District Hospital at the time of delivery. Thereafter, she was referred to Regional Hospital, Hamirpur. She was taken to Zonal Hospital. Family of the petitioner also accompanied her. She went to her parents’ house after the delivery. He has admitted in cross-examination that he remained colleague of petitioner. He has also admitted that no quarrel has ever taken place in his presence when he was residing as a tenant. 8. PW-2 Sohan Singh has proved Ex.PW-2/A dated 20.6.2008, Ex. PW-2/B, Ex.PW-2/C and Ex.PW-2/D. 9. PW-3 Rattan Chand has deposed that a complaint Ex.PW-2/B was received by him on 6.6.2008. It was decided vide Ex.PW-2/A. 10. PW-4 Vivek Guatam has deposed that he had tried to resolve the matter between the parties. On 7.11.2008, he had gone with petitioner to respondent’s school. However, respondent did not cooperate. She refused to go with the petitioner. She has levelled allegations against petitioner about illicit relations with his Bhabhi. 11. PW-5 Sita Ram has deposed that respondent was never harassed by the petitioner. She used to level accusation that petitioner has illicit relations with his Bhabhi. 12. PW-6 Suresh Kumar Rana (petitioner) has deposed that the marriage was solemnized on 19.5.2006 according to Hindu Rites and Customs. She used to say that her marriage with the petitioner was solemnized forcibly. In the month of February, 2007, parents of respondent had come to their house. They misbehaved with his family members. The entire family was in the hospital when respondent gave birth to a child. She went to her parents’ house after the delivery. She never came back to her matrimonial house. She refused to come back to her matrimonial house. Parents of respondent told that she would come to matrimonial house after five months. However, respondent did not turn up even after five months. They went to bring her back after five months. Family members of respondent misbehaved with them. In the month of July, 2007, he again went to bring her back. Her parents misbehaved with him. He was forced to leave the house. He was compelled to walk for 6-7 KMs on foot. They went to bring her back after five months. Family members of respondent misbehaved with them. In the month of July, 2007, he again went to bring her back. Her parents misbehaved with him. He was forced to leave the house. He was compelled to walk for 6-7 KMs on foot. Again on 27.12.2007, he went to the house of respondent with his friends Shashi Bhushan, Harnam Singh and Ravinder Kumar. She refused to come to matrimonial house. He tried to contact her on telephone. However, she refused to talk with him. He according to decision dated 20.6.2008 Ex.PW-2/A had to bring her back to her matrimonial home. However, she told him on telephone not to come to bring her back. She used to say that he has illicit relations with Bhabhi. However, in his cross-examination, he has admitted that neither he has told his lawyer that respondent has levelled allegation against him to the effect that he has illicit relations with his Bhabhi nor it was stated in the petition. He has tried his level best to bring her back. He has denied the suggestion that demand of Rs. 75,000/- was raised. He has denied that respondent was harassed for bringing insufficient dowry. He has also denied the suggestion that respondent was maltreated after the birth of girl child. 13. RW-1 Reena Kumari has testified that her in-laws started harassing her for bringing insufficient dowry. She was neither properly fed nor provided with basic necessities of life. The family of petitioner demanded a sum of Rs. 75,000/-. She had filed a petition for maintenance. It was decided in her favour. No appeal was preferred against that decision. Petitioner visited her 2-3 times. He demanded money and used to pick up quarrel. She was ready and willing to go with him. In her cross-examination, she has denied that she started quarrelling with petitioner after 3-4 days of the marriage. She has never said that her marriage was solemnized forcibly. She has denied the suggestion that expenditure towards delivery was met by her husband. Nobody has visited her parents’ house to bring her back. She has denied that petitioner had come after five months to bring her back. She has denied that her husband had to walk 7-8 KMs. She has never said that her marriage was solemnized forcibly. She has denied the suggestion that expenditure towards delivery was met by her husband. Nobody has visited her parents’ house to bring her back. She has denied that petitioner had come after five months to bring her back. She has denied that her husband had to walk 7-8 KMs. She has also denied that Shashi Bhushan, Harnam Singh and her husband had come to her parents’ house to bring her back on 27.12.2007. She has also denied that she used to taunt her husband that she was more qualified than him. In her further cross-examination, she has categorically deposed that she has never accused her husband of his illicit relations with Bhabhi. 14. RW-2 Prakasho Devi is the mother of respondent. According to her, family of petitioner has demanded a sum Rs. 75,000/-. Her daughter was not properly treated. They wanted her daughter to live peacefully in her matrimonial house. Petitioner has never tried to take her back. According to her, petitioner wanted to contact second marriage. She has also denied the suggestion in her cross-examination that expenditure of the delivery was borne by the petitioner’s family. 15. What emerges from the statements of the witnesses is that marriage between the parties was solemnized on 19.5.2006 according to Hindu Rites and Customs. According to PW-1 Arun Kumar Katoch, relations between the parties were cordial. It has come on record that the matter had also reached before the Gram Panchayat. The Gram Panchayat had passed necessary orders. Respondent was also constrained to move an application before the Gram Panchayat to get her certificates which were lying in her matrimonial house. PW-1 was colleague of petitioner. PW-2 Sohan Singh was a formal witness, who has proved the documents. PW-4 Vivek Gautam has deposed that he had gone with the petitioner on 7.11.2008 to the school where respondent was teaching. She refused to go with them. She repeatedly misbehaved with them and levelled allegations that petitioner has illicit relations with his Bhabhi. It is a very vague statement. Similarly, statement of PW-5 is also vague. He has not given the date, month or year when accusation was made by the respondent to the effect that petitioner has illicit relations with his Bhabhi. She repeatedly misbehaved with them and levelled allegations that petitioner has illicit relations with his Bhabhi. It is a very vague statement. Similarly, statement of PW-5 is also vague. He has not given the date, month or year when accusation was made by the respondent to the effect that petitioner has illicit relations with his Bhabhi. The ground taken by the petitioner that respondent has made accusation of illicit relation with his Bhabhi has not been taken by the petitioner in the petition. It has come on record that respondent was harassed by the petitioner and his family members for bringing insufficient dowry. Neither she was provided with basic necessities of life nor was the expenditure of delivery borne by the petitioner. He has never tried to bring her back to matrimonial house. It has come in the statement of RW-1 that she was ready and willing to go to matrimonial house. She has denied the suggestion that at any point of time she has made accusation against the character of petitioner. Allegations of cruelty levelled by the petitioner against respondent are very vague and unsubstantiated. Petitioner has also failed to prove that respondent has deserted him. There has to be animus deserendi. Respondent was living with her parents due to the wrong committed by the petitioner and his family members. A person cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. She has not left the matrimonial house voluntarily. Petitioner has failed to bring her back. She was forced to live in her parents’ house. Similarly, she was forced to file an application before the Gram Panchayat to get her certificates from the matrimonial house. She was always ready and willing to go to matrimonial house. 16. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bipinchandra Jaisinghbai Shah versus Prabhavati, AIR 1957 SC 176 have held that two essential conditions must be there to prove the desertion: (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Their Lordships have held that desertion is a matter of interference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of each case. Their Lordships have held as under: “What is desertion? Their Lordships have held that desertion is a matter of interference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of each case. Their Lordships have held as under: “What is desertion? "Rayden on Divorce" which is a standard work on the subject at p.128 (6th Edn.) has summarized the case-law on the subject in these terms:-"Desertion is the separation of one spouse from the other, with an intention on the part of the deserting spouse of bringing cohabitation permanently to an end without reasonable cause and without the consent of the other spouse; but the physical act of departure by one spouse does not necessarily make that spouse the deserting party". The legal position has been admirably summarised in paras 453 and 454 at pp. 241. to 243 of Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.), VoL 12, in the following words:- "In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. In view of the large variety of circumstances and of modes of life involved, the Court has discouraged attempts at defining desertion, there being no general principle applicable to all cases. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from the state of things, for what the law seeks to enforce is the recognition and discharge of the common obligations of the married state; the state of things may usually be termed, for short, 'the home'. There can be desertion without previous cohabitation by the parties, or without the marriage having been consummated. The person who actually withdraws from cohabitation is not necessarily the deserting party. The fact that a husband makes an allowance to a wife whom he has abandoned is no answer to a charge of desertion. The offence of desertion is a course of conduct which exists independently of its duration, but as a ground for divorce it must exist for a period of at least three years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition where the offence appears as a cross-charge, of the answer. Desertion as a ground of divorce differs from the statutory grounds of adultery and cruelty in that the offence founding the cause of action of desertion is not complete, but is inchoate, until the suit is constituted. Desertion is a continuing offence". Desertion as a ground of divorce differs from the statutory grounds of adultery and cruelty in that the offence founding the cause of action of desertion is not complete, but is inchoate, until the suit is constituted. Desertion is a continuing offence". Thus the quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which differentiates desertion from wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example anger or disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid. The petitioner for divorce bears the burden of proving those elements in the two spouses respectively. Here a difference between the English law and the law as enacted by the Bombay Legislature may be pointed out. Whereas under the English law those essential conditions must continue throughout the course of the three years immediately preceding the institution of the suit for divorce, under the Act, the period is four years without specifying that it should immediately precede the commencement of proceedings for divorce. Whether the omission of the last clause has any practical result need not detain us, as it does not call for decision in the present case. Desertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances to each case. The inference may be drawn from certain facts which may not in another case be capable of leading to the same inference; that is to say, the facts have to be viewed as to the purpose which is revealed by those acts or by conduct and expression of intention, both anterior and subsequent to the actual acts of separation. If in fact, there has been a separation, the essential question always is whether that act could be attributable to an animus deserendi. The offence of desertion commences when the fact of separation and the animus deserendi co- exist. If in fact, there has been a separation, the essential question always is whether that act could be attributable to an animus deserendi. The offence of desertion commences when the fact of separation and the animus deserendi co- exist. But it is not necessary that they should commence at the same time. The de facto separation may have commenced without the necessary animus or it may be that the separation and the (animus deserendi) coincide in point of time; for example, when the separating spouse abandons the marital home with the intention, express or implied of bringing cohabitation permanently to a close. The law in England has prescribed a three years period and the Bombay Act prescribed a period of four years as a continuous period during which the two elements must subsist. Hence, if a deserting spouse takes advantage of the locus poenitentiae thus provided by law and decides to come back to the deserted spouse by a bona fide offer of resuming the matrimonial home with all the implications of marital life, before the statutory period is out or even after the lapse of that period, unless proceedings for divorce have been commenced, desertion comes to an end, and if the deserted spouse unreasonably refuses to offer, the latter may be in desertion and not the former. Hence it is necessary that during all the period that there has been a desertion, the deserted spouse must affirm the marriage and be ready and willing to resume married life on such conditions as may be reasonable. It is also well settled that in proceedings for divorce the plaintiff must prove the offence of desertion, like and other matrimonial offence, beyond all reasonable doubt. Hence, though corroboration is not required as an absolute rule of law the courts insist upon corroborative evidence, unless its absence is accounted for to the satisfaction of the court. In this connection the following observations of Lord Goddard CJ. in the case of Lawson v. Lawson, 1955-1 All E R 341 at p. 342(A), may be referred to :-"These cases are not cases in which corroboration is required as a matter of law. It is required as a matter of precaution....... In this connection the following observations of Lord Goddard CJ. in the case of Lawson v. Lawson, 1955-1 All E R 341 at p. 342(A), may be referred to :-"These cases are not cases in which corroboration is required as a matter of law. It is required as a matter of precaution....... "With these preliminary observations we now proceed to examine the evidence led on behalf of the parties to find out whether desertion has been proved in this case and, if so, whether there was a bona fide offer by the wife to return to her matrimonial home with a view to discharging marital duties and, if so, whether there was an unreasonable refusal on the part of the husband to take her back. 17. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani versus Meena alias Mota, AIR 1964 SC 40 have held that in its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other’s consent and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. Their Lordships have further held that the burden of proving desertion the ‘factum’ as well as the ‘animus deserendi’ is on the petitioner and he or she has to establish beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court, the desertion throughout the entire period of two years before the petition as well as that such desertion was without just cause. Their Lordships have held as under: “The question as to what precisely constitutes "desertion" came up for consideration before this Court in an appeal for Bombay where the Court had to consider the provisions of S. 3(1) of the Bombay Hindu Divorce Act, 1947 whose language is in pari materia with that of S. 10(1) of the Act. In the judgment of this Court in Bipin Chandra v. Prabhavati, 1956 SCR 838 ; ((S) AIR 1957 SC 176 ) there is an elaborate consideration of the several English decisions in which the question of the ingredients of desertion were considered and the following summary of the law in Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.) Vol. 12 was cited with approval : "In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the order without that other's consent, and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. 12 was cited with approval : "In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the order without that other's consent, and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. In view of the large variety of circumstances and of modes of life involved, the Court has discouraged attempts at defining desertion, there being no general principle applicable to all cases." The position was thus further explained by this Court. "If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust, without intending permanently the cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention of bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserndi). Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned : (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid.. . . . . Desertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of each case. The inference may be drawn from certain facts which may not in another case be capable of leading to the same inference; that is to say, the facts have to be viewed as to the purpose which is revealed by those acts or by conduct and expression of intention, both anterior and subsequent to the actual acts of separation. If, in fact, there has been a separation, the essential question always is whether that act could be attributable to an animus deserendi. The offence of desertion commences when the fact of separation and the animus deserendi coexist. But it is not necessary that they should commence at the same time. The de facto separation may have commenced without the necessary animus or it may be that the separation and the animus deserendi coincide in point of time." Two more matters which have a bearing on the points in dispute in this appeal might also be mentioned. The first relates to the burden of proof in these cases, and this is a point to which we have already made a passing reference. The first relates to the burden of proof in these cases, and this is a point to which we have already made a passing reference. It is settled Law that the burden of proving desertion the "factum" as well as the "animus deserendi" -is on the petitioner; and he or she has to establish beyond reasonable doubt, to the satisfaction of the Court, the desertion throughout the entire period of two years before the petition as well as that such desertion was without just cause. In other words, even if the wife, where she is the deserting spouse, does not prove just cause for her living apart, the petitioner-husband has still to satisfy the Court that the desertion was without just cause. As Dunning, L. observed : (Dunn v. Dunn (1948) 2 All ER 822 at p. 823) : "The burden he (Counsel for the husband) said was on her to prove just cause (for living apart). The argument contains a fallacy which has been put forward from time to time in many branches of the law. The fallacy lies in a failure to distinguish between a legal burden of proof laid down by law and a provisional, burden raised by the state of the evidence . . . . . . . . . . . The legal burden throughout this case is on the husband, as petitioner, to prove that this wife deserted him without cause. To discharge that burden, he relies on the fact that he asked her to join him and she refused. That is a fact from which the court may infer that she deserted him without cause, but it is not bound to do so. Once he proves the fact of refusal, she may seek to rebut the inference of desertion by proving that she had just cause for her refusal; and, indeed, it is usually wise for her to do so, but there is no legal burden on her to do so. Even if she does not affirmatively prove just cause, the Court has still, at the end of the case, to ask itself: Is the legal burden discharged? Has the husband proved that she deserted him without cause? Take this case. The wife was very deaf, and for that reason could not explain to the Court her reasons for refusal. Even if she does not affirmatively prove just cause, the Court has still, at the end of the case, to ask itself: Is the legal burden discharged? Has the husband proved that she deserted him without cause? Take this case. The wife was very deaf, and for that reason could not explain to the Court her reasons for refusal. The judge thereupon considered reasons for her refusal which appeared from the facts in evidence, though she had not herself stated that they operated on her mind. Counsel for the husband says that the judge ought not to have done that. If there were a legal burden on the wife he would be right, but there was none. The legal burden was on the husband to prove desertion without cause, and the judge was right to ask himself at the end of the case: Has that burden been discharged?" 18. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Smt. Rohini Kumari versus Narendra Singh, AIR 1972 SC 459 have explained the expression ‘desertion’ to mean the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party and includes the willful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage. “Under Section 10 (1) (a) a decree for judicial separation can be granted on the ground that the other party has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. According to the Explanation the expression "desertion" with its grammatical variation and cognate expression means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party and includes the willful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage. The argument raised on behalf of the wife is that the husband had contracted a second marriage on May 17, 1955. The petition for judicial separation was filed on August 8, 1955 under the Act which came into force on May 18, 1955. The burden under the section was on the husband to establish that the wife had deserted him for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. The petition for judicial separation was filed on August 8, 1955 under the Act which came into force on May 18, 1955. The burden under the section was on the husband to establish that the wife had deserted him for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. In the presence of the Explanation it could not be said on the date on which the petition was filed that the wife had deserted the husband without reasonable cause because the latter had married Countess Rita and that must be regarded as a reasonable cause for her staying away from him. Our attention has been invited to the statement in Rayden on Divorce, 11th Edn. Page 223 with regard to the elements of desertion According to that statement for the offence of desertion there must be two elements present on the side of the deserting spouse namely, the factum, i.e. physical separation and the animus deserendi i.e. the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end. The two elements present on the side of the deserted spouse should be absence of consent and absence of conduct reasonably causing the deserting spouse to form his or her intention to bring cohabitation to an end. The requirement that the deserting spouse must intend to bring cohabitation to an end must be understood to be subject to the qualification that if without just cause or excuse a man persists in doing things which he knows his wife probably will not tolerate and which no ordinary woman would tolerate and then she leaves, he has deserted her whatever his desire or intention may have been. The doctrine of "constructive desertion" is discussed at page 229. It is stated that desertion is not to be tested by merely ascertaining which party left the matrimonial home first. If one spouse is forced by the conduct of the other to leave home, it may be that the spouse responsible for the driving out is guilty of desertion. There is no substantial difference between the case of a man who intends to cease cohabitation and leaves the wife and the case of a man who with the same intention compels his wife by his conduct to leave him.” 19. There is no substantial difference between the case of a man who intends to cease cohabitation and leaves the wife and the case of a man who with the same intention compels his wife by his conduct to leave him.” 19. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in A. Jayachandra versus Aneel Kaur, AIR 2005 SC 534 have held that expression ‘cruelty’ has been used in relation to human conduct or human behaviour. Their Lordships have held to constitute cruelty, conduct complained of should be grave and weighty for arriving at conclusion that petitioner spouse cannot be reasonably expected to live with other spouse. Their Lordships have further held that evidence showing that respondent wife asked husband to do certain things casting doubt on reputation, character and fidelity of her husband cannot be termed as simple advice but amounts to cruelty. Their Lordships have held as under: “The expression 'cruelty' has been used in relation to human conduct or human behaviour. It is the conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. Cruelty is a course or conduct of one, which is adversely affecting the other. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is physical, the Court will have no problem in determining it. It is a question of fact and degree. If it is mental, the problem presents difficulties. First, the enquiry must begin as to the nature of cruel treatment, second the impact of such treatment in the mind of the spouse, whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the other. Ultimately, it is a matter of inference to be drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct and its effect on the complaining spouse. However, there may be a case where the conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then the impact or injurious effect on the other spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted (See Sobh Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, AIR 1988 SC 121 ). To constitute cruelty, the conduct complained of should be "grave and weighty" so as to come to the conclusion that the petitioner spouse cannot be reasonably expected to live with the other spouse. In such cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted (See Sobh Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, AIR 1988 SC 121 ). To constitute cruelty, the conduct complained of should be "grave and weighty" so as to come to the conclusion that the petitioner spouse cannot be reasonably expected to live with the other spouse. It must be something more serious than "ordinary wear and tear of married life". The conduct, taking into consideration the circumstances and background has to be examined to reach the conclusion whether the conduct complained of amounts to cruelty in the matrimonial law. Conduct has to be considered, as noted above, in the background of several factors such as social status of parties, their education, physical and mental conditions, customs and traditions. It is difficult to lay down a precise definition or to give exhaustive description of the circumstances, which would constitute cruelty. It must be of the type as to satisfy the conscience of the Court that the relationship between the parties had deteriorated to such an extent due to the conduct of the other spouse that it would be impossible for them to live together without mental agony, torture or distress, to entitle the complaining spouse to secure divorce. Physical violence is not absolutely essential to constitute cruelty and a consistent course of conduct inflicting immeasurable mental agony and torture may well constitute cruelty within the meaning of Section 10 of the Act. Mental cruelty may consist of verbal abuses and insults by using filthy and abusive language leading to constant disturbance of mental peace of the other party. On reading of judgments of the trial Court and the High Court one thing is clear. While the trial Court analysed the evidence in great detail and found that the accepted stand of the respondent-wife regarding her behaviour and conduct caused mental agony and amounted to mental cruelty, the High Court did not discuss the evidence at all. On the specious ground that witnesses from the hospital were not examined and, therefore, adverse inference was to be drawn. There was not even any discussion as to how the evidence led was insufficient to establish mental cruelty. On the specious ground that witnesses from the hospital were not examined and, therefore, adverse inference was to be drawn. There was not even any discussion as to how the evidence led was insufficient to establish mental cruelty. The High Court's view that if at all it was a fact that respondent was using abusive language and making allegations of adultery with nursing staff, some witnesses from the hospital were necessary to be examined is clearly indefensible. That alone should not have been made the determinative factor to discard evidence on record. On that ground alone the judgment of the High Court is vulnerable. The evidence as led and which is practically undisputed is that the respondent had asked the husband to do certain things which cannot be termed to be a simple advice for proper behaviour. For example in her evidence respondent clearly accepted that she had said five things to be followed by him. Surprisingly, most of them related to ladies working in the hospital. Though respondent tried to show that they were simple and harmless advice, yet on a bare reading thereof it is clear that there were clear manifestations of her suspecting the husband's fidelity, character and reputation. By way of illustration, it may be indicated that the first so called advice was not to ask certain female staff members to come and work on off-duty hours when nobody else was available in the hospital. Second was not to work behind the closed doors with certain members of the staff. Contrary to what she had stated about having full faith in her husband, the so called advices were nothing but casting doubt on the reputation, character and fidelity of her husband. Constant nagging on those aspects, certainly amounted to causing indelible mental agony and amounts to cruelty. The respondent was not an ordinary woman. She was a doctor in the hospital and knew the importance of the nature of duty and the necessity of members of the staff working even during off hours and the working conditions. There was another instance which was specifically dealt with by the trial Court. Same related to the alleged extra marital relationships of the appellant with another married lady who was wife of his friend. Though the respondent tried to explain that she was not responsible for making any such aspersions, the inevitable conclusion is to the contrary. There was another instance which was specifically dealt with by the trial Court. Same related to the alleged extra marital relationships of the appellant with another married lady who was wife of his friend. Though the respondent tried to explain that she was not responsible for making any such aspersions, the inevitable conclusion is to the contrary. The matter can be looked at from another angle. If acts subsequent to the filing of the divorce petition can be looked into to infer condonation of the aberrations, acts subsequent to the filing of the petition can be taken note of to show a pattern in the behaviour and conduct. In the instant case, after filing of the divorce petition a suit for injunction was filed, and the respondent went to the extent of seeking detention of the respondent. She filed a petition for maintenance which was also dismissed. Several caveat petitions were lodged and as noted above, with wrong address. The respondent in her evidence clearly accepted that she intended to proceed with the execution proceedings, and prayer for arrest till the divorce case was finalized. When the respondent gives priority to her profession over her husband's freedom it points unerringly at disharmony, diffusion and disintegration of marital unity, from which the Court can deduce about irretrievable breaking of marriage. Several decisions, as noted above, cited by learned counsel for the respondent to contend even if marriage has broken down irretrievably decree of divorce cannot be passed. In all these cases it has been categorically held that in extreme cases the Court can direct dissolution of marriage on the ground that the marriage broken down irretrievably as is clear from paragraph 9 of Shiv Sunder's case (supra). The factual position in each of the other cases is also distinguishable. It was held that long absence of physical company cannot be a ground for divorce if the same was on account of husband's conduct. In Shiv Sunder's case (supra) it was noted that the husband was leading adulterous life and he cannot take advantage of his wife shunning his company. Though the High Court held by the impugned judgment that the said case was similar, it unfortunately failed to notice the relevant factual difference in the two cases. In Shiv Sunder's case (supra) it was noted that the husband was leading adulterous life and he cannot take advantage of his wife shunning his company. Though the High Court held by the impugned judgment that the said case was similar, it unfortunately failed to notice the relevant factual difference in the two cases. It is true that irretrievable breaking of marriage is not one of the statutory grounds on which Court can direct dissolution of marriage, this Court has with a view to do complete justice and shorten the agony of the parties engaged in long drawn legal battle, directed in those cases dissolution of marriage. But as noted in the said cases themselves those were exceptional cases. In the aforesaid legal and factual background the inevitable conclusion is that the appellant is entitled to a decree of divorce and we direct accordingly.” 20. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Smt. Mayadevi versus Jagdish Prasad, AIR 2007 SC 1426 have held that the concept of proof beyond reasonable doubt is not applicable to matrimonial disputes while proving cruelty. Their Lordships have held as under: “Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the foundation of decree for divorce is the alleged conviction for which the appeal is pending and, therefore, the High Court should not have disposed of the matter. In any event, it is submitted that it was the husband and his family members who were torturing her and being threatened by the husband she had not made any grievance with the police. Unfortunately, when she made the allegation, the police did not properly investigate the matter and gave a final report exonerating the husband. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that the instances highlighted by the trial Court and analysed in great detail by the High Court clearly made out a case for dowry and no interference is called for in this appeal. The expression "cruelty" has not been defined in the Act. Cruelty can be physical or mental. Cruelty which is a ground for dissolution of marriage may be defined as wilful and unjustifiable conduct of such character as to cause danger to life, limb or health, bodily or mental, or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such a danger. Cruelty can be physical or mental. Cruelty which is a ground for dissolution of marriage may be defined as wilful and unjustifiable conduct of such character as to cause danger to life, limb or health, bodily or mental, or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such a danger. The question of mental cruelty has to be considered in the light of the norms of marital ties of the particular society to which the parties belong, their social values, status, environment in which they live. Cruelty, as noted above, includes mental cruelty, which falls within the purview of a matrimonial wrong. Cruelty need not be physical. If from the conduct of his spouse same is established and/or an inference can be legitimately drawn that the treatment of the spouse is such that it causes an apprehension in the mind of the other spouse, about his or her mental welfare then this conduct amounts to cruelty. In delicate human relationship like matrimony, one has to see the probabilities of the case. The concept, a proof beyond the shadow of doubt, is to be applied to criminal trials and not to civil matters and certainly not to matters of such delicate personal relationship as those of husband and wife. Therefore, one has to see what are the probabilities in a case and legal cruelty has to be found out, not merely as a matter of fact, but as the effect on the mind of the complainant spouse because of the acts or omissions of the other. Cruelty may be physical or corporeal or may be mental. In physical cruelty, there can be tangible and direct evidence, but in the case of mental cruelty there may not at the same time be direct evidence. In cases where there is no direct evidence, Courts are required to probe into the mental process and mental effect of incidents that are brought out in evidence. It is in this view that one has to consider the evidence in matrimonial disputes.” 21. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sujata Udai Patil versus Uday Madhukar Patil, (2006) 13 SCC 272 have held that cruel treatment can be inferred from the entire course of conduct and incidents showing display of temperament, emotion and perversion by one spouse causing hurt and humiliation to the other spouse. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sujata Udai Patil versus Uday Madhukar Patil, (2006) 13 SCC 272 have held that cruel treatment can be inferred from the entire course of conduct and incidents showing display of temperament, emotion and perversion by one spouse causing hurt and humiliation to the other spouse. Their Lordships have further held that neither actual nor presumed intention to cause hurt to the other spouse is a necessary element in cruelty. Their Lordships have held as under: “The word "cruelty" and the kind or degree of "cruelty" necessary which may amount to a matrimonial offence has not been defined in the Act. What is cruel treatment is to a large extent a question of fact or a mixed question of law and fact and no dogmatic answer can be given to the variety of problems that arise before the court in these kind of cases. The law has no standard by which to measure the nature and degree of cruel treatment that may satisfy the test. It may consist of a display of temperament, emotion or pervasion whereby one gives vent to his or her feelings, without intending to injure the other. It need not consist of direct action against the other but may be misconduct indirectly affecting the other spouse even though it is not aimed at that spouse. It is necessary to weigh all the incidents and quarrels between the parties keeping in view the impact of the personality and conduct of one spouse upon the mind of the other. Cruelty may be inferred from the facts and matrimonial relations of the parties and interaction in their daily life disclosed by the evidence and inference on the said point can only be drawn after all the facts have been taken into consideration. Where there is proof of a deliberate course of conduct on the part of one, intended to hurt and humiliate the other spouse, and such a conduct is persisted, cruelty can easily be inferred. Neither actual nor presumed intention to hurt the other spouse is a necessary element in cruelty.” 22. Where there is proof of a deliberate course of conduct on the part of one, intended to hurt and humiliate the other spouse, and such a conduct is persisted, cruelty can easily be inferred. Neither actual nor presumed intention to hurt the other spouse is a necessary element in cruelty.” 22. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manisha Tyagi vs. Deepak Kumar (2010) 4 SCC 339 have held that to constitute cruelty it is enough that conduct of one of parties is so abnormal and below accepted norm that other spouse could not be reasonably be expected to put up with it. Their Lordships have held as under:- “26. At this stage we may notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Naveen Kohli vs. Neelu Kohli (2006) 4 SCC 558 . In this case the Court examined the development and evolution of the concept of mental cruelty in matrimonial causes. In paragraph 35 it is observed as follows: "35. The petition for divorce was filed primarily on the ground of cruelty. It may be pertinent to note that, prior to 1976 amendment in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 cruelly was not a ground for claiming divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act. It was only a ground for claiming judicial separation under Section 10 of the Act. By the 1976 amendment, cruelty was made a ground for divorce and the words which have been omitted from Section 10 are "as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it will be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the other party". Therefore, it is not necessary for a party claiming divorce to prove that the cruel treatment is of such a nature as to cause an apprehension-reasonable apprehension - that it will be harmful or injurious for him or her to live with the other party." 27. Therefore, it is not necessary for a party claiming divorce to prove that the cruel treatment is of such a nature as to cause an apprehension-reasonable apprehension - that it will be harmful or injurious for him or her to live with the other party." 27. The classic example of the definition of cruelty in the pre-1976 era is given in the well known decision of this Court in the case of N.G. Dastane vs. S. Dastane (1975) 2 SCC 326 , wherein it is observed as follows: ”30........The enquiry has to be whether the conduct charged as cruelty is of such a character as to cause in the mind of the petitioner as reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious for him to live with the respondent". This is no longer the required standard. Now it would be sufficient to show that the conduct of one of the spouses is so abnormal and below the accepted norm that the other spouse could not reasonably be expected to put up with it. The conduct is no longer required to be so atrociously abominable which would cause a reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to continue the cohabitation with the other spouse. Therefore to establish cruelty it is not necessary that physical violence should be used. However continued ill-treatment cessation of marital intercourse, studied neglect, indifference of one spouse to the other may lead to an inference of cruelty. However in this case even with aforesaid standard both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court had accepted that the conduct of the wife did not amount to cruelty of such a nature to enable the husband to obtain a decree of divorce.” 23. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ravi Kumar vs. Julmidevi, (2010) 4 SCC 476 have held that cruelty in matrimonial behaviour defies any definition and can be of infinite variety, categories, wherefor can never be closed. Cruelty has to be judged taking into account entire facts and circumstances of case and not by any predetermined rigid formula. Their Lordships have held as under: “19. It may be true that there is no definition of cruelty under the said Act. Cruelty has to be judged taking into account entire facts and circumstances of case and not by any predetermined rigid formula. Their Lordships have held as under: “19. It may be true that there is no definition of cruelty under the said Act. Actually such a definition is not possible , In matrimonial relationship, cruelty would obviously mean absence of mutual respect and understanding between the spouses which embitters the relationship and often leads to various outbursts of behaviour which can be termed as cruelty. Sometime cruelty in a matrimonial relationship may take the form of violence, some time it may take a different form. At times, it may be just an attitude or an approach. Silence in some situations may amount to cruelty. 20. Therefore, cruelty in matrimonial behaviour defies any definition and its category can never be closed. Whether husband is cruel to his wife or the wife is cruel to her husband has to be ascertained and judged by taking into account the entire facts and circumstances of the given case and not by any predetermined rigid formula. Cruelty in matrimonial cases can be of infinite variety -it may be subtle or even brutal and may be by gestures and words. That possibly explains why Lord Denning in Sheldon v. Sheldon [1966 (2) All E.R. 257] held that categories of cruelty in matrimonial cases are never closed. 21. This Court is reminded of what was said by Lord Reid In Gollins v. Gollins [1963 (2) All. E.R. 966] about judging cruelty in matrimonial cases. The pertinent observations are: "In matrimonial cases we are not concerned with the reasonable man, as we are in cases of negligence, We are dealing with this man and this woman and the fewer a priori assumptions we make about them the better. In cruelty cases one can hardly ever start with a presumption that the parties are reasonable people, because it is hard to imagine any cruelty case ever arising if both the spouses think and behave as reasonable people." The aforesaid passage was quoted with approval by this Court in Dastane v. Dastane [ 1975 (2) SCC 326 ]. 22. In cruelty cases one can hardly ever start with a presumption that the parties are reasonable people, because it is hard to imagine any cruelty case ever arising if both the spouses think and behave as reasonable people." The aforesaid passage was quoted with approval by this Court in Dastane v. Dastane [ 1975 (2) SCC 326 ]. 22. About changing perception of cruelty in matrimonial cases, this Court observed in Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi [JT 1987 (4) SC 433 : AIR 1988 SC 121 ] at page 123 of the report: "It will be necessary to bear in mind that there has been a marked change in the life around us. In matrimonial duties and responsibilities in particular, we find a sea change. They are of varying degrees from house to house or person to person. Therefore, when a spouse makes complaint about the treatment of cruelty by the partner in life or relations, the court should not search for standard in life. A set of facts stigmatised as cruelty in one case may not be so in another case. The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social conditions. It may also depend upon their culture and human values to which they attach importance. We, the judges and lawyers, therefore, should not import our own notions of life. We may not go in parallel with them. There may be a generation gap between us and the parties". 24. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gurbux Singh vs. Harminder Kaur, (2010) 14 SCC 301 have held that though a single act of violence which is of grievous and inexcusable nature, married life should be assessed as a whole and a few isolated instances over certain period will not amount to cruelty. Their Lordships have further held that onus to prove that particular conduct or behaviour resulted in cruelty is on the person who claims relief. Their Lordships have held as under:- “14. Cruelty has not been defined under the Act. It is quite possible that a particular conduct may amount to cruelty in one case but the same conduct necessarily may not amount to cruelty due to change of various factors, in different set of circumstances. Their Lordships have held as under:- “14. Cruelty has not been defined under the Act. It is quite possible that a particular conduct may amount to cruelty in one case but the same conduct necessarily may not amount to cruelty due to change of various factors, in different set of circumstances. Therefore, it is essential for the appellant, who claims relief, to prove that a particular/part of conduct or behaviour resulted in cruelty to him. No prior assumptions can be made in such matters. Meaning thereby that it cannot be assumed that a particular conduct will, under all circumstances, amount to cruelty, vis-a-vis the other party. The aggrieved party has to make a specific case that the conduct of which exception is taken amounts to cruelty. 15. It is true that even a single act of violence which is of grievous and inexcusable nature satisfies the test of cruelty. Persistence in inordinate sexual demands or malpractices by either spouse can be cruelty if it injures the other spouse. There is no such complaint by the appellant. In the case on hand, as stated earlier, the appellant has projected few instances in which, according to him, the respondent abused his parents. We have verified all the averments in the petitions, reply statement, written submissions as well as the evidence of both parties. We are satisfied that on the basis of such instances, marriage cannot be dissolved. 16. The married life should be assessed as a whole and a few isolated instances over certain period will not amount to cruelty. The ill-conduct must be precedent for a fairly lengthy period where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and behaviour of a spouse, one party finds it extremely difficult to live with the other party no longer may amount to mental cruelty. Making certain statements on the spur of the moment and expressing certain displeasure about the behaviour of elders may not be characterized as cruelty. Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of married life which happens in day to day life in all families would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of cruelty. Sustained unjustifiable and reprehensible conduct affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse may lead to mental cruelty. Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of married life which happens in day to day life in all families would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of cruelty. Sustained unjustifiable and reprehensible conduct affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse may lead to mental cruelty. Both the appellant and respondent being highly qualified persons, the appellant being Principal in ITI College, the respondent working as a Librarian in a Government Institute, an isolated friction on some occasion like festival of Lohri even in the presence of others cannot be a valid ground for dissolving the marriage.” 25. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pankaj Mahajan vs. Dimple & Kajal, 2011 (12) SCC 1 have held that repeated threats to commit suicide amounts to cruelty. Their Lordships have further held that onus to prove grounds of divorce was on the husband to prove the grounds put forth by him. Their Lordships have held as under:- “10. Section 13 specifies the grounds on which a decree of divorce may be obtained by either party to the marriage. The onus of proving that the other spouse is incurably of unsound mind or is suffering from mental disorder lies on the party alleging it. It must be proved by cogent and clear evidence. 11. In the case on hand, since the appellant-husband has approached the District Court for a decree of divorce, the onus is on him to prove the grounds put-forth by him. As regards the ground alleged by the appellant-husband for a decree of divorce i.e. the respondent-wife is suffering from unsound mind/mental disorder/schizophrenia, apart from his own evidence as PW-4, various Doctors, who treated her and other witnesses were also examined. From the side of the appellant-husband, Dr. Paramjit Singh (PW-1), Dr. Ravinder Mohan Sharma (PW-2), Dr. Virendra Mohan (PW-3) and Dr. Gurpreet Inder Singh Miglani (PW-7), who had given treatment to the respondent-wife for mental disorder, were examined. 35. It is well settled that giving repeated threats to commit suicide amounts to cruelty. When such a thing is repeated in the form of sign or gesture, no spouse can live peacefully. In the case on hand, the appellant-husband has placed adequate materials to show that the respondent-wife used to give repeated threats to commit suicide and once even tried to commit suicide by jumping from the terrace. When such a thing is repeated in the form of sign or gesture, no spouse can live peacefully. In the case on hand, the appellant-husband has placed adequate materials to show that the respondent-wife used to give repeated threats to commit suicide and once even tried to commit suicide by jumping from the terrace. Cruelty postulates a treatment of a spouse with such cruelty as to create reasonable apprehension in his mind that it would be harmful or injurious for him to live with the other party. The acts of the respondent-wife are of such quality or magnitude and consequence as to cause pain, agony and suffering to the appellant-husband which amounted to cruelty in matrimonial law.” 26. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vishwantah Agrawal vs. Sarla Vishwanthan Agarwal, (2012) 7 SCC 288 have explained expression “cruelty” and “mental cruelty” as under:- “22. The expression “cruelty” has an inseparable nexus with human conduct or human behaviour. It is always dependent upon the social strata or the milieu to which the parties belong, their ways of life, relationship, temperaments and emotions that have been conditioned by their social status.” 27. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. Srinivas Rao vs. D.A. Deepa (2013) 5 SCC 226 have explained expression “mental cruelty” as under:- “10. Under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, a marriage can be dissolved by a decree of divorce on a petition presented either by the husband or the wife on the ground that the other party has, after solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty. In a series of judgments this Court has repeatedly stated the meaning and outlined the scope of the term 'cruelty'. Cruelty is evident where one spouse has so treated the other and manifested such feelings towards her or him as to cause in her or his mind reasonable apprehension that it will be harmful or injurious to live with the other spouse. Cruelty may be physical or mental. 16. Thus, to the instances illustrative of mental cruelty noted in Samar Ghosh, we could add a few more. Cruelty may be physical or mental. 16. Thus, to the instances illustrative of mental cruelty noted in Samar Ghosh, we could add a few more. Making unfounded indecent defamatory allegations against the spouse or his or her relatives in the pleadings, filing of complaints or issuing notices or news items which may have adverse impact on the business prospect or the job of the spouse and filing repeated false complaints and cases in the court against the spouse would, in the facts of a case, amount to causing mental cruelty to the other spouse.” 28. Mr. K.D. Sood, learned Senior Advocate has also relied upon Ramesh Kumar Sharma v. Smt. Akash Sharma (2008) 1 Shim.L.C. 399 . In this case, wife had made allegations of sexual involvement with Bhabhi against her husband. However, in the instant case, no specific averment has been made in the pleadings. Thus, this judgment is distinguishable. CMP No. 19587/2013 29. Respondent has moved an application seeking maintenance and expenses of litigation. Respondent has already been granted maintenance by the Civil Judge (Senior Division) vide order dated 12.1.2012 whereby respondent was allowed a sum of Rs. 2,000/-per month and Kumari Sindhuja was allowed a sum of Rs. 1500/- per month. In view of this, no further orders are required to be passed. Moreover, it has come on record that respondent is working as a teacher. 30. Now, as far as litigation expenses are concerned, respondent is held entitled to a sum of Rs. 10,000/-towards litigation expenses. Application stands disposed of. 31. Accordingly, in view of discussion and analysis made hereinabove, there is no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed.