Kawadu v. Deputy Conservator of Forest, Pandharkawada Forest Division
2014-09-11
A.P.BHANGALE
body2014
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment : 1. Heard submissions at the Bar. 2. Petitioner (Original Complainant) has prayed to quash and set aside the Order, dt.17.11.2003 passed by the Industrial Court, Yavatmal in Revision U.L.P. No.114 of 1999, which was allowed setting aside the Judgment and Order, dt.26.4.1995 passed in Complaint U.L.P. No.341 of 1994 by the Labour Court at Yavatmal. The petitioner has prayed for his reinstatement and continuity of service with full back wages. According to the petitioner/Complainant, he had filed the Complaint under Section 28, Item No.la, b & d of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 against the respondent for reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages. The Complainant was working with the respondent with effect from 9.4.1984 at Umari Timber Depot. He was taking measurement of woods, giving numbers and maintaining the record. He was earning Rs.20.90 per day and was given one day break per 29 days by deducting wages of Sunday. The Complainant, however, states that, barring Diwali holidays during the period of 18.10.1990 to 21.10.1990, he was in uninterrupted service from 1.4.1984 till 3.1.1991. On 4.1.1991, petitioner’s services were terminated. The respondent, despite written representation, refused to reinstate him. 3. No prior notice was given as provided by Section 25 F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 while the respondent had retained services of Raju Shetty, Ramesh Misal, Sunil Erdele, who were juniors to the petitioner. The respondent, thus, violated the provisions of Section 25 G of the Industrial Disputes Act. 4. The respondent defended the Complaint denying the version of the Complainant on the ground that the Complainant/petitioner was working as a daily rated labourer on daily wages by Forest Guard from 1984. The petitioner was helping the Forest Guard for measurement of the woods, numbering them and maintaining the record. It is alleged that the Complainant/petitioner used to remain absent and was irregular in attending his work. He was abusing the Superior Forest Officer and did not improve despite warnings. From 17.12.1990 to 22.12.1990, he was not working because there was no work in the Depot because the Contractor had boycotted the auction. The Department had maintained the Seniority list of labourers and had absorbed 19 labourers out of 28 in the Depot while others were directed to go and work in Umari.
From 17.12.1990 to 22.12.1990, he was not working because there was no work in the Depot because the Contractor had boycotted the auction. The Department had maintained the Seniority list of labourers and had absorbed 19 labourers out of 28 in the Depot while others were directed to go and work in Umari. The Seniority list was displayed and the Complainant was at Serial No.22. The work was given, if available, to daily labourers; otherwise they were directed to go to other places. It is denied that the petitioner was permanent worker and was terminated. 5. The Labour Court, upon the evidence led, considering the rival contentions was pleased to order reinstatement of the Complainant with continuity of service holding that termination of the petitioner/Complainant from the service was illegal. Declaration was granted that the respondent was engaged in unfair labour practices within the meaning of item no. 1 a, b, d, f of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act directing the respondent to desist from indulging in unfair Labour practices and directing that the petitioner be reinstated with continuity of service and full back wages only up to 1.12.1992. 6. From the evidence led in the Labour Court, it appeared that the petitioner/Complainant was working with the respondent with effect from 9.4.1984 till 3.1.1991 with one day break given every month. Services of the petitioner were terminated with effect from 4.1.1991. No notice, as required, was given nor notice pay was paid at the time of termination. The Labour Court found on evidence that the petitioner was working continuously and that Section 25 F of the Industrial Disputes Act was not complied with. The evidence revealed that the Complainant did not remain absent from the work on his own accord, but for the unfair labour practices found indulged into on behalf of the respondent-employer. Termination of service was, thus, found unlawful. 7. Shri C.V.Jagdale, learned Counsel for the petitioner referred to the ruling in the case of Anoop Sharma vs. Executive Engineer Public Health Division No.1, Panipat (Haryana) reported in 2010 II CLR 1 to argue that the provision in Section 25 F (a) and (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are held mandatory and non-compliance thereof renders the retrenchment of the employee nugatory.
It is settled legal position that one months’ notice pay and retrenchment compensation must accompany with the letter of termination of services by way of retrenchment. In Paras 12 and 13 of the above ruling, it is stated thus:- “12--25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. – No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until – (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months. (c) xxxx xxxx xxxx” “13. An analysis of the above reproduced provisions shows that no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer can be retrenched by that employer until the conditions enumerated in Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25F of the Act are satisfied. In terms of Clause (a), the employer is required to give to the workman one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment or pay him wages in lieu of the notice. Clause (b) casts a duty upon the employer to pay to the workman at the time of retrenchment, compensation equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months. This Court has repeatedly held that Section 25F(a) and (b) of the Act is mandatory and noncompliance thereof renders the retrenchment of an employee nullity ” 8.
This Court has repeatedly held that Section 25F(a) and (b) of the Act is mandatory and noncompliance thereof renders the retrenchment of an employee nullity ” 8. In another ruling in the case of Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and another vs. Casteribe Rajya Karmachari Sanghatana, 2009 III CLR 262 principally, two questions which the Supreme Court was called upon to determine in the group of five Civil Appeals by Special Leave were thus: (1)Whether a direction to the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation (for short, "Corporation") by the Industrial Court, and confirmed by the High Court of giving status, wages and all other benefits of permanency, applicable to the post of Cleaners to the complainants is justified? It was answered thus: “34. The concerned employees having been exploited by the Corporation for years together by engaging them on piece rate basis, it is too late in the day for them to urge that procedure laid down in Standing Order No. 503 having not been followed, these employees could not be given status and principles of permanency. The argument of the Corporation, if accepted, would tantamount to putting premium on their unlawful act of engaging in unfair labour practice. It was strenuously urged by the learned Senior Counsel for the Corporation that industrial court having found that the Corporation indulged in unfair labour practice in employing the complainants as casuals on piece rate basis, the only direction that could have been given to the Corporation was to cease and desist from indulging into such unfair labour practice and no direction of according permanency to these employees could have been given. We are afraid, the argument ignores and overlooks the specific power given to the Industrial/Labour Court under Section 30(1)(b) to take affirmative action against the erring employer which as noticed above is of wide amplitude and comprehends within its fold a direction to the employer to accord permanency to the employees affected by such unfair labour practice. 35. Seen thus, the direction of giving status, wages and all other benefits of permanency applicable to the post of cleaners to the complainants, in the facts and circumstances, is justified and warrants no interference. Question (one) is answered accordingly.” Second question was raised thus: 2.
35. Seen thus, the direction of giving status, wages and all other benefits of permanency applicable to the post of cleaners to the complainants, in the facts and circumstances, is justified and warrants no interference. Question (one) is answered accordingly.” Second question was raised thus: 2. Whether the two complaints filed by Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmchari Sanghatana (for short, "Union"), an unrecognised union under Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions & Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (for short, "MRTU & PULP Act"), alleging unfair labour practice on the part of the employer under Item No. 6 of Schedule IV are maintainable? 9. The second question is not relevant for us to decide the present controversy. The material question arose as to whether the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 denude the Statutory status available to the workman under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 because of the ruling of the Constitution Bench in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others vs. Umadevi and Others reported in 2006 II CLR 261. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative. The reason being that the power given to the Industrial Court and the Labour Court under Section 30 is very wide and the affirmative action mentioned therein is inclusive and not exhaustive. 10. Looking into the facts and circumstances of the case in hand, the argument is acceptable that the employer cannot be justified to continue to engage the workman for years together by giving one day break in every month intending to avoid liability to pay wages payable according to law by resorting to unlawful termination of services of the workman. The plea of the employer that the workman concerned was frequently absent is not supported by any cogent and substantive evidence. Conclusions in the order by the Labour Court appear well reasoned based upon pros and cons of the facts and evidence led by the parties and in conformity with the legal position stated above. The Labour Court held that the respondent was engaged in unfair labour practice within the meaning of items no. 1, a, b, d and f of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act directing the respondent to desist from indulging in unfair labour practices proved and consequently directing the reinstatement of the Complainant (petitioner) with continuity of service and full back wages only upto 1.12.1992.
1, a, b, d and f of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act directing the respondent to desist from indulging in unfair labour practices proved and consequently directing the reinstatement of the Complainant (petitioner) with continuity of service and full back wages only upto 1.12.1992. The Industrial Court appears to have misled itself by ignoring the fact established on evidence and the wider scope of Section 25 F read with Section 30 of the Industrial Disputes Act and the legal position stated as above. Hence, for the Industrial Court, there was no satisfactory justification to brush aside the well-reasoned Judgment and Order based on facts and evidence being delivered by the Labour Court in exercise of the narrow powers of revisional jurisdiction. 11. In the result, therefore, the Writ Petition is allowed in terms that the impugned Judgment and Order passed by the Industrial Court is quashed and set aside and the Judgment and Order passed by the Labour Court, Yavatmal in Complaint U.L.P. Case No.341 of 1999 (old Case No.150 of 1995) is restored with costs.