JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. CMP (M) No. 52 of 2014 & Arb. Appeal No. 9 of 2014. 1. The applicant-appellant has instituted an appeal against the judgment dated 23.11.2013 rendered in Arbitration Case No. 6-S/2 of 2013/05 by the learned District Judge (Forests), Shimla, H.P. as well as Arbitration Award dated 3.6.2003, rendered by the sole Arbitrator Sh. Amardeep Singh, DGM (F&A), BSNL, Hamirpur. The appeal is barred by 326 days. 2. The applicant-appellant has sought condonation of delay by way of present petition. The impugned judgment was rendered by the learned District Judge (Forests), Shimla, H.P. on 23.11.2013. The certified copy of the same was applied on 24.11.2013. It was attested on 29.11.2013 and delivered to the applicant-appellant on 11.12.2013. The applicant-appellant has sought the legal opinion to assail the impugned judgment. It was decided, as per the averments contained in the petition, to file an appeal against the judgment dated 23.11.2013, in the last week of October, 2014. Thereafter, the appeal was drafted and filed on 15.11.2014. 3. There is a gross delay in filing the appeal. The Courts ought to be liberal while dealing with the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, but at the same time, cannot be oblivious of the rights which have accrued to the parties. The delay has to be explained after the expiry of the period of limitation. The impugned judgment is dated 23.11.2013. The certified copy was obtained on 11.12.2013. The applicant-appellant has not explained the delay of about 10 months from December, 2013 up to October, 2014. 4. There is no contemporaneous material placed on record how the case was processed up to October, 2014 except a bald assertion in the petition. Moreover, no cogent reason is assigned for condonation of delay in the present petition. 5. Their Lordships of the Hon?ble Supreme Court in Maniben Devraj Shah versus Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 have held that expression “sufficient cause” used in section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which serves the ends of justice. Their Lordships of the Hon?ble Supreme Court in Maniben Devraj Shah versus Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 have held that expression “sufficient cause” used in section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which serves the ends of justice. Their Lordships have further held that even though a liberal and justice oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statues, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. Their Lordships have also held that expression “sufficient cause” would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. Their Lordships have also held that a distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of few days and whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor, in the latter case no such consideration arises. Their Lordships have held as under: “14. We have considered the respective arguments/submissions and carefully scrutinized the record. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The Limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the Court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the Legislature. At the same time, the Courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation. 15. The expression 'sufficient cause? used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and other statutes is elastic enough to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which serve the ends of justice. 15. The expression 'sufficient cause? used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and other statutes is elastic enough to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which serve the ends of justice. No hard and fast rule has been or can be laid down for deciding the applications for condonation of delay but over the years this Court has advocated that a liberal approach should be adopted in such matters so that substantive rights of the parties are not defeated merely because of delay. 20. In Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil, (2001) 9 SCC 106 , the Court observed that a distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of few days and whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor, in the latter case no such consideration arises. 23. What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and justice oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the Courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. 24. What colour the expression 'sufficient cause? would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay. 25. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay. 25. In cases involving the State and its agencies/instrumentalities, the Court can take note of the fact that sufficient time is taken in the decision making process but no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities and the applications filed by them for condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting the plea that dismissal of the matter on the ground of bar of limitation will cause injury to the public interest.” 6. Accordingly, in view of the settled legal position, as discussed hereinabove, I find no sufficient cause in the present petition to condone the delay. The same is dismissed. 7. Consequently, the appeal bearing No. 9 of 2014 is also dismissed.