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2014 DIGILAW 1987 (ALL)

Raj Kumar v. Union of India

2014-07-08

RITU RAJ AWASTHI

body2014
JUDGMENT Ritu Raj Awasthi, J. 1. Heard Mr. Sharve Singh and Mr. Neerja Singh, learned Counsel for appellants as well as Mr. A.K. Gaur, learned Counsel for the Union of India and Mr. Amit Manohar, learned Counsel for the Insurance Company and perused the records. Since common question of law is involved in these appeals as such they have been connected and heard together and are being decided by common judgment. 2. Learned Counsel for appellants submits that the alleged accident had taken place on 28th May, 1994 when the tractor trolley of the claimants was crossing at Chhitanpur Label Railway crossing (PS Katra, District Gonda). Due to rash and negligent driving of driver the train No. 5063 UP Gorakhpur-Bandra Express had hit the tractor trolley. It is submitted that the learned Tribunal while deciding the issues framed had come to conclusion that the alleged accident had taken place due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of train, however, while deciding the quantum of compensation it has come to conclusion that the Tribunal sitting at Allahabad does not have the territorial jurisdiction to award compensation. 3. Submission is that under the similar facts and circumstances, arising out of the same accident, several claim petitions were decided on merit by the Tribunal sitting at Allahabad and compensation was awarded. He has brought those judgments on record (17 in number) passed by the Tribunal, filed with supplementary affidavit. It is submitted that while deciding those claim petitions the Tribunal had the occasion to decide the question of territorial jurisdiction and in Claim Petition No. 575 of 1997 the Tribunal has categorically held, while deciding issue No. 3 in this regard, that the Tribunal has territorial jurisdiction under Section 166(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act') to decide the claim petitions. 4. Mr. A.K. Gaur, learned Counsel appearing for the Union of India submits that the accident had taken place within the territory of District Gonda and the claim petition should have been filed at Gonda as the cause of action had arisen in the territory of District Gonda. 5. Mr. 4. Mr. A.K. Gaur, learned Counsel appearing for the Union of India submits that the accident had taken place within the territory of District Gonda and the claim petition should have been filed at Gonda as the cause of action had arisen in the territory of District Gonda. 5. Mr. Amit Manohar, learned Counsel appearing for the Insurance Company submits that the learned Tribunal has rightly rejected the claim and has refused to grant any compensation as it does not have any jurisdiction to entertain claim with respect to accident which had taken place in district Gonda. 6. I have considered the submissions made by the 'parties' Counsel and gone through the records. The short question involved in these appeals which requires consideration is whether the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal at Allahabad had the jurisdiction to decide the claim petition arising out of an accident which had taken place in District Gonda. There is no dispute to the facts of the case. Before considering the aforesaid issue, it would be appropriate to first consider the relevant provision in this regard. Section 166(2) of the Act on reproduction reads as under: "166. Application for compensation--(2) Every application under Sub-section (1) shall be made, at the option of the claimant, either to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred, or to the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on business or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, and shall be in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed: Provided that where no claim for compensation under Section 140 is made in such application, the application shall contain a separate statement to that effect immediately before the signature of the applicant." As per aforesaid section, an application for compensation can be filed under Section 166(1) of the Act at the option of claimant either to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred, or to the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on business or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, and shall be in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed. As per the case of claimants they had business interest at Allahabad, as such, the claim petitions were filed before Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Allahabad. Moreover, it is relevant to observe here that the Apex Court in the case of Mantoo Sarkar v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and Others, I (2009) ACC 40 (SC): 2009 (1) T.A.C. 434 (S.C), has held that in case no prejudice was caused to the appellant by claim petition being tried at any particular Tribunal, the Court should not have normally entertain the appeal. Relevant paragraphs 17 and 18 of the judgment on reproduction read as under: "17. The Tribunal is a Court subordinate to the High Court. An appeal against the Tribunal lies before the High Court. The High Court, while exercising its appellate power, would follow the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure or akin thereto. In view of Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was, therefore, obligatory on the part of the appellate Court to pose unto itself the right question, viz., whether the first respondent has been able to show sufferance of any prejudice. If it has not suffered any prejudice or otherwise no failure of justice had occurred, the High Court should not have entertained the appeal on that ground alone. 18. We, however, while taking that factor into consideration must place on record that we are not oblivious of the fact that a decision rendered without jurisdiction would be coram non juris. Objection in regard to jurisdiction may be taken at any stage. (See Chief Engineer, Hydel Project v. Ravinder Nath, (2008) 2 S.C.C. 350 ) wherein inter alia the decision of this Court in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 340, was followed, stating: "26. The Court also relied upon the decision in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Pawan, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 340 and quoted (in Harshad Chiman Lal case {[ (2005) 7 S.C.C. 791 ], SCC pp. 804-805, para 33} therefrom: [Kiran Singh case (supra), AIR p.342, para 6 '6. ...It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. ...It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction,...strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties.' Though in the aforementioned decision these observations were made since the defendants before raising the objection to the territorial jurisdiction had admitted that the Court had the jurisdiction, the force of this decision cannot be ignored and it has to be held that such a decree would continue to be a nullity." The Apex Court in its conclusion has observed as under: "We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the appellant herein was a labourer. The justness or otherwise of the amount of compensation has not been disputed before us. If the High Court judgment is to be complied with, appellant would again have to initiate another proceeding either at Bareilly or Gurgaon or at Delhi or at Jabalpur. The same evidence would have to be rendered once again. The question of fact which was required to be determined in the proceeding before the Tribunal, namely whether the driver of the truck or the driver of the bus had been driving their respective vehicles rashly and negligently would have to be determined afresh. The factual finding recorded in this case is that the driver of the truck was driving the truck rashly and negligently. In our opinion, in a case of this nature, we may even exercise our extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. In New India Insurance Company v. Darshana Devi and Others, (2008) 7 S.C.C. 416 , this Court held: '20. Having said so, we must take notice of the fact that the deceased Baldev Singh was labourer. The Tribunal has found that besides being a labourer, he also used to deal in Safeda wood. He was the owner of the 'Safeda' wood which was being transported to the market for its sale. The first respondent, Darshana Devi, in her deposition, stated that the deceased used to purchase wood from the State of Himachal Pradesh on contract basis. The Tribunal has found that besides being a labourer, he also used to deal in Safeda wood. He was the owner of the 'Safeda' wood which was being transported to the market for its sale. The first respondent, Darshana Devi, in her deposition, stated that the deceased used to purchase wood from the State of Himachal Pradesh on contract basis. Only Gurdial Singh and Ravinder Singh were accompanying him as labourer. His income was assessed only at Rs. 2,400 per month.' 21. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that it is not a fit case where this Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Even in Brij Mohan this Court held--(SCC p. 64, paras 13-14) '13. However, Respondent No. 1 is a poor labourer. He had suffered grievous injuries. He had become disabled to a great extent. The amount of compensation awarded in his favour appears to be on a lower side. In the aforementioned situation, although we reject the other contentions of Ms. Indu Malhotra, we are inclined to exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India so as to direct that the award may be satisfied by the appellant but it would be entitled to realise the same from the owner of the tractor and the trolley wherefor it would not be necessary for it to initiate any separate proceedings for recovery of the amount as provided for under the Motor Vehicles Act. 14. It is well settled that in a situation of this nature this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India read with Article 136 thereof can issue suitable directions for doing complete justice to the parties.' 20. Reliance, however, has been placed on a decision of this Court in State of Punjab v. Rajesh Syal, (2002) 8 S.C.C. 158 , to contend that this Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Whether the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution shall be exercised or not would depend upon the fact of the each matter. Law in this case does not come in the way of exercise of such jurisdiction. 21. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly and the order of the Tribunal is restored. Law in this case does not come in the way of exercise of such jurisdiction. 21. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly and the order of the Tribunal is restored. The appeal is allowed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs. 10,000." There is no denying the fact that under similar facts and circumstances, arising out of the same accident, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal at Allahabad in Claim Petition No. 575 of 1997 has categorically held that the said Tribunal has territorial jurisdiction under Section 166(2) of the Act to entertain claim petition and decided it on merit. Similar issues have been decided in several other judgments of the Tribunal arising out of the same accident which have been brought on record. In view of above, I have no hesitation in coming to conclusion that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Allahabad has the territorial jurisdiction under Section166(2) of the Act to decide the claim petitions filed by the appellant-claimants on merit. Thus, the impugned judgments and award are hereby set-aside and the matters are remanded back to the Tribunal at Allahabad to decide the same in accordance with law on merit, expeditiously. With the aforesaid observations, the appeals stand disposed of.