JUDGMENT S. Talapatra, J.:- The appellants have been convicted by the judgment dated 05.09.2008 delivered in S.T. 90(WT/A) 2007 by the Assistant Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala for committing offence of cruelty punishable under Section 498-A of the I.P.C. having common intention in commission of the crime and also for committing abetment to suicide having common intention in commission of crime punishable under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the I.P.C. The appellants have thus sentenced to suffer 2(two) years rigorous imprisonment (R.I.) with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- each under Section 498-A/34 of the I.P.C. and R.I. for 7(seven) years with fine of Rs. 5,000/- each under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the I.P.C. It has been further directed that in the event of defaulting in payment of the fine, they shall suffer further imprisonment of 3(three) months on each account. The said judgment dated 05.09.2008 has been questioned in this appeal. 2. The appellant No. 1, Nandan Paul married Gopa Paul, elder daughter of the complainant, Haradhan Paul (PW-1), 7 to 8 years before the date of occurrence. In the wedlock, one male child was born. It has been alleged by PW-1 in his complaint that after birth of that male child, the appellant No. 1 had started torturing his daughter in various ways and means. Having failed to bear such torture, his daughters left the matrimonial home and took shelter in his house. Even the State Commission for Women had to interfere in the matter. On assurance of the appellant No. 1, her inmates and other relatives, his daughter had again joined the matrimonial home. But she was again subjected to physical torture by the appellants. His daughter used to be tortured for realizing hard cash from the complainant with a view to purchase an auto rickshaw. Even she was threatened not to show her face in that house, unless the money was fetched. On 03.01.2007, one sister of the appellant No. 1 came to the house of PW-1 on 5 pm. and informed him that his daughter had been admitted in the IGM hospital for illness. Immediately, PW-1 had rushed to the IGM hospital but he could not see his daughter alive. He learnt that his daughter was recovered hung from a noose. 3. and informed him that his daughter had been admitted in the IGM hospital for illness. Immediately, PW-1 had rushed to the IGM hospital but he could not see his daughter alive. He learnt that his daughter was recovered hung from a noose. 3. Based on the said complaint, Agartala Women P.S. case No. 01/2007 under Sections 498-A/306/34 of the I.P.C. was registered and taken up for investigation. After completion of the investigation, the charge sheet was filed against the appellants and having taken cognizance, the matter was committed to the court of Sessions and finally, the case was transferred to the court of the Assistant Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala, who framed the charge under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the I.P.C. and under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the I.P.C. The appellants pleaded innocence and claimed to face the trial. 4. To substantiate the charge, the prosecution has adduced as many as 17(seventeen) witnesses and introduced 11(eleven) pieces of documentary evidence. For the appellants 2(two) witnesses were examined to rebut the evidence of the prosecution. After the appellants were examined under Section 313of the Cr.P.C., they were convicted by the impugned judgment, whereby it has been observed as under: 27. The evidence as available in the case in our hand is sufficiently tilting in favour of the prosecution in so far in Section 34 of the IPC is concerned. Most of the prosecution witnesses have testifies so as to implicate accused mother-in-law along with the prime accused who is the husband of the deceased. PW-8, the 8-year-old child of the deceased has in specific terms testified in court that his grand mother (Shefali Paul) was the person to instigate his accused-father who assaulted the deceased for money from time to time. It is needless to that the evidence of this PW-5 has been discussed elaborately already and so this piece of evidence has to be given due consideration. The documentary evidence (Exbt. 10) as already mentioned is indirectly accusing the said mother in law of deceased because it contains the allegation that husband as well as members of the family of in-laws severely and physically tortured the deceased. In record there is no other person implicated excepting the accused-husband and the mother in law and so there is little doubt in the mind of this Court so as to hold that Exbt. In record there is no other person implicated excepting the accused-husband and the mother in law and so there is little doubt in the mind of this Court so as to hold that Exbt. 10 is a vital documentary evidence thus allowing the Court to arrive at a decision that the accused-husband in furtherance of the common intention of both of them committed the crime. Sufficient act has been established to have been done on the part of the said mother-in-law (accused Shefali Pal) which had nexus with the offence as committed and unfolded by prosecution. 5. Ms. R. Guha, learned counsel appearing for the appellants has submitted that the trial court has abysmally failed to appreciate the improvements made by the witnesses while deposing in the trial. She has submitted that PW-1, Haradhan Paul, PW-3, Milan Das, PW-4, Suman Chakraborty and PW-6, Sabita Paul in particular have improved their version so substantially that those cannot be saved as omissions. 6. To buttress her contention, she has relied on a decision of the apex court in Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) and Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2010) 13 SCC 657 , where the apex court has held that: 30. While appreciating the evidence, the court has to take into consideration whether the contradictions/omissions had been of such magnitude that they may materially affect the trial. Minor contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements on trivial matters without effecting the core of the prosecution case should not be made a ground to reject the evidence in its entirety. The Trial Court, after going through the entire evidence, must form an opinion about the credibility of the witnesses and the appellate Court in normal course would not be justified in reviewing the same again without justifiable reasons. 31. Where the omission(s) amount to a contradiction, creating a serious doubt about the truthfulness of a witness and the other witness also makes material improvements before the court in order to make the evidence acceptable, it cannot be safe to rely upon such evidence. 7. Ms. Guha, learned counsel having reference to the testimony of the child witness, Rupam Paul, PW-5 has further contended that the trial court has committed serious illegality. It would be apparent that the said eye witness was brazenly tutored and it has been nowhere reflected that he understands the duty of speaking the truth and nothing but truth. 7. Ms. Guha, learned counsel having reference to the testimony of the child witness, Rupam Paul, PW-5 has further contended that the trial court has committed serious illegality. It would be apparent that the said eye witness was brazenly tutored and it has been nowhere reflected that he understands the duty of speaking the truth and nothing but truth. She has criticized also the procedure followed in recording his statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. by PW-8, Sampa Nath. The due procedure as to ascertain whether the witness of the tender age has the essential capability to understand the duty of speaking of truth has not been followed and thus, by relying on the testimony of PW-5, for purpose of returning the finding of conviction, the trial court has committed material irregularity. Further to buttress her contention, she has relied on two decisions of the apex court such as State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Ramesh and another, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 786 and K. Venkateshwarlu Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in (2012) 8 SCC 73 . 8. The apex court held as regards the general principles of appreciating the child witness having regard to Section 118 of the Evidence Act that the evidence of a child witness has to be subjected to the closest scrutiny and can be accepted only if the court comes to the conclusion that the child understands the question put to him and he is capable of giving the rational answers. A child witness, by reason of his tender age, is a pliable witness. He can be tutored easily either by threat, coercion or inducement. Therefore, the court must be satisfied that the attendant circumstances do not show that the child was acting under the influence of someone or was under a threat or coercion. Evidence of a child witness can be relied upon if the court, with its expertise and ability to evaluate the evidence, comes to the conclusion that the child is not tutored and his evidence has a ring of truth. Evidence of a child witness can be relied upon if the court, with its expertise and ability to evaluate the evidence, comes to the conclusion that the child is not tutored and his evidence has a ring of truth. It is safe and prudent to look for corroboration for the evidence of a child witness from the other evidence on record, because while giving evidence a child may give scope to his imagination and exaggerate his version or may develop cold feet and not tell the truth or may repeat what he has been asked to say not knowing the consequences of his deposition in the court. Careful evaluation of the evidence of a child witness in the background and the context of other evidence on record is inescapable before the court decides to rely upon it. According to Ms. Guha, learned counsel for the appellants no such exercise has been taken while relying on the said testimony of child witness. 9. While critically shedding light on the element of instigation for purpose of abetting suicide, Ms. Guha, learned counsel has submitted that instigation within the meaning of Section 107 of the I.P.C. cannot be available in the evidence as led by the prosecution. In absence of such element the finding on abetment to suicide cannot be sustained. In S.S. Chheena Vs. Vijay Kumar Mahajan and Anr., reported in (2010) 12 SCC 190 , the apex court has held as under: 23. In State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal : (1994) 1 SCC 73 , this Court has cautioned that: 17....The court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it appears to the court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty. 24. This Court in Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. 24. This Court in Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi): (2009) 16 SCC 605 had an occasion to deal with this aspect of abetment. The Court dealt with the dictionary meaning of the words "instigation" and "goading". The Court opined that there should be intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter. Each person’s suicidality pattern is different from the other. Each person has his own idea of self-esteem and self-respect. Therefore, it is impossible to lay down any straitjacket formula in dealing with such cases. Each case has to be decided on the basis of its own facts and circumstances. 25. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide. [Emphasis added] 10. Ms. Guha, learned counsel has further contented that the trial court has committed serious error of law by relying on the statement of the deceased in regard to torture inasmuch as those statements cannot be exempted under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act and as such, those statements are hit by the hearsay rule provided in Section 60 of the Evidence Act. Even for purpose of res gestae within the ambit of Section 6 of the Evidence Act, those statements cannot be utilized for not being contemporaneous with the acts without any interval. 11. Having referred to Sukhar Vs. State of U.P., reported in (1999) 9 SCC 407, Ms. Even for purpose of res gestae within the ambit of Section 6 of the Evidence Act, those statements cannot be utilized for not being contemporaneous with the acts without any interval. 11. Having referred to Sukhar Vs. State of U.P., reported in (1999) 9 SCC 407, Ms. Guha, learned counsel has submitted that Section 6 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule whereunder the hearsay evidence becomes admissible but for bringing such hearsay evidence within the provision of Section 6, what is required to be established is that it must be almost contemporaneous with the acts and there should not be an interval which allowed for vacation. The statements sought to be admitted, therefore, forming part of res gestae were required to be contemporaneous with the act. By saying so perhaps Ms. Guha, learned counsel has laboured to underline that the communications of the deceased as regards the physical torture was not contemporaneous as to form res gestae. 12. Ms. Guha, learned counsel has relied on a decision of the apex court in Kantilal Martaji Pandor vs. State of Gujarat and another, reported in (2013) 8 SCC 781 to elucidate when a piece of evidence may be admitted under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. In Kantilal Martaji Pandor, the apex court has held as under: 18. For taking this view, we are supported by the decision of this Court in Inderpal v. State of M.P.: (2001) 10 SCC 736 . In this case, Inderpal was charged and tried for the offence under Section 306, IPC, and convicted by the trial court for the said offence of abetment of suicide. In appeal filed by Inderpal, the High Court found that the offence under Section 306, IPC was not made out as it could not be held that death of the deceased was due to commission of suicide, but the High Court held the appellant guilty of the offence under Section 498-A, IPC. This finding of the High Court was based on the evidence of the father, mother, sister and another relative of the deceased who deposed on the basis of inter alia the two letters (Exts. P-7 and P-8) written by the deceased Damyanti that Inderpal, her husband, had subjected her to beating. This finding of the High Court was based on the evidence of the father, mother, sister and another relative of the deceased who deposed on the basis of inter alia the two letters (Exts. P-7 and P-8) written by the deceased Damyanti that Inderpal, her husband, had subjected her to beating. This Court found that apart from the statement attributed to the deceased, none of the witnesses had spoken of anything which they had seen directly and the question that this Court had to decide was whether the statement attributed to the deceased could be used as evidence including the contents of Exts. P-7 and P-8 and this Court held that the contents of Exts. P-7 and P-8 written by the deceased could not be treated as proof of the acts of cruelty by Inderpal for the purpose of offence under Section 498-A, IPC. The reasons given by this Court in paragraph 7 of the judgment as reported in the SCC are as follows: 7. Unless the statement of a dead person would fall within the purview of Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act there is no other provision under which the same can be admitted in evidence. In order to make the statement of a dead person admissible in law (written or verbal) the statement must be as to the cause of her death or as to any of the circumstance of the transactions which resulted in her death, in cases in which the cause of death comes into question. By no stretch of imagination can the statements of Damyanti contained in Exhibit P-7 or Exhibit P-8 and those quoted by the witnesses be connected with any circumstance of the transaction which resulted in her death. Even that apart, when we are dealing with an offence Under Section 498-A IPC disjuncted from the offence under Section306 IPC the question of her death is not an issue for consideration and on that premise also Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act will stand at bay so far as these materials are concerned. 13. According to Ms. Guha, learned counsel appearing for the appellants that ingredients of the cruelty as illustrated in Section 498-A of the I.P.C. could not be proved to the hilt for returning the finding of the conviction under Section 498-A of the I.P.C. against the appellants. To take nourishment, Ms. 13. According to Ms. Guha, learned counsel appearing for the appellants that ingredients of the cruelty as illustrated in Section 498-A of the I.P.C. could not be proved to the hilt for returning the finding of the conviction under Section 498-A of the I.P.C. against the appellants. To take nourishment, Ms. Guha, learned counsel has also relied on a few decisions of the apex court. In Manju Ram Kalita vs. State of Assam, reported in (2009) 13 SCC 330 , it has been held that: 21. "Cruelty" for the purpose of Section 498-A I.P.C. is to be established in the context of Section 498-A IPC as it may be a different from other statutory provisions. It is to be determined/inferred by considering the conduct of the man, weighing the gravity or seriousness of his acts and to find out as to whether it is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide etc. It is to be established that the woman has been subjected to cruelty continuously/persistently or at least in close proximity of time of lodging the complaint. Petty quarrels cannot be termed as ’cruelty’ to attract the provisions of Section 498-A IPC. Causing mental torture to the extent that it becomes unbearable may be termed as cruelty. 14. In Undavalli Narayana Rao vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in (2009) 14 SCC 588, the apex court has considered that aspect of the matter and reiterated the law in no uncertain terms that "cruelty" has to be understood having a specific statutory meaning provided in Section 498-AI.P.C. and there should be a case of continuous state of affairs of torture by one to another. In explanation (b), there is absence of physical injury but it includes coercive harassment for demand of dowry etc. therefore the aforesaid provisions deal with patent and latent acts of the husband or his family members. But both are equally serious in terms of the provisions of the statute. Provisions of Section 498AIPC were introduced by an amendment to curb the menace of harassment of a woman by her husband and/or his family members, for demand of dowry etc. under the garb of fulfilment of the customary obligations. 15. Ms. Guha, learned counsel has thereafter contended that there was no dowry demand and even going by the allegations as made the demand was for purchasing an auto rickshaw. under the garb of fulfilment of the customary obligations. 15. Ms. Guha, learned counsel has thereafter contended that there was no dowry demand and even going by the allegations as made the demand was for purchasing an auto rickshaw. The said demand cannot be held to be dowry in view of what has been decided in Appasaheb and Another vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 2007 SC 763 . 16. While closing her submission, Ms. Guha, learned counsel has stated that if the testimony of PW-5 is discarded, this case is bound to be categorized as a case based on circumstantial evidence but the circumstances or the episodes as proved by the prosecution do not form a chain completely excluding the hypothesis of innocence which is essentially required to prove a case based on the circumstantial evidence. She has referred to the celebrated case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 , where it has been held by the apex court thus: (1) Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a Court can convict, and the mental distance between ’may be’ and ’must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. (2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. (3) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. The apex court has restated those principles in Rumi Bora Dutta vs. State of Assam, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 417 . 17. Mr. A. Ghosh, learned P.P. appearing for the State has submitted that by a well reasoned judgment the appellants have been rightly convicted. He has submitted that while examining PW-5 both the trial judge and PW-8 have taken due care for finding capability of PW-5 of testifying the fact. 17. Mr. A. Ghosh, learned P.P. appearing for the State has submitted that by a well reasoned judgment the appellants have been rightly convicted. He has submitted that while examining PW-5 both the trial judge and PW-8 have taken due care for finding capability of PW-5 of testifying the fact. It would be apparent from this statement he has made that he was stating the truth and nothing but truth. Mr. Ghosh, learned P.P. thereafter has submitted that PWs-1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 have proved the elements of cruelty and abetment of suicide beyond reasonable doubt. So far the evidence of cruelty is concerned, Mr. Ghosh, learned P.P. has reiterated that those are not merely based on the statement of the deceased but also on the documentary evidence, Exbt. 10 which has come in the record from the Tripura State Commission for Women and from that document it is apparent that the deceased, Gopa Paul was compelled to leave her matrimonial home on account of severe physical torture by the accused husband and the inmates. However, Mr. Ghosh, learned P.P. has admitted that in the said document the name of appellant No. 2, Shephali Paul was not appearing. The independent witnesses (PWs-2, 3 & 4) have categorically stated how they were informed by PW-1 immediately after the occurrence of such physical torture. Therefore, there is no substance in the submission of the learned counsel of the appellants. He has submitted that the demand of money from the deceased was unlawful. It is immaterial whether such demand does come within the ambit of dowry or not, so far the commission of offence under Section 498-A is concerned. It has to be seen whether such demand was unlawful or the torture was so brutal that in the course of human behaviour the woman is expected to commit suicide. Finally, Mr. Ghosh, learned P.P. has submitted that the menace of battering the wives by cruelty for realizing unlawful demand is alarmingly increasing in the society which needs to be deterred firmly. The court may not show any leniency against the offenders, rather the courts proactive role would be instrumental to curb that menace. 18. For purpose of appreciating the rival contentions of the learned counsel of the parties, a brief scrutiny of the evidence as placed by the prosecution on record appears essential. 19. Mr. The court may not show any leniency against the offenders, rather the courts proactive role would be instrumental to curb that menace. 18. For purpose of appreciating the rival contentions of the learned counsel of the parties, a brief scrutiny of the evidence as placed by the prosecution on record appears essential. 19. Mr. Ghosh, learned P.P. has correctly submitted that the entire prosecution case to a larger extent hinges on the oral testimonies of PWs-1, 3, 4 5 & 6. The testimony of PW-2 according to this Court is also equally relevant as he advised PW-1 to apprise Tripura State Commission for Women about the torture that her daughter Gopa had been facing in her matrimonial home. He has also stated that he had tried to impress upon PW-1 to send his daughter back to the matrimonial home. After death of Gopa, he wrote the complaint as dictated by PW-1. But he has denied in cross-examination that he made any statement to the police. He has frankly admitted that he did not tell the police that he saw Gopa living with a child in the house of PW-1. 20. PW-7, Smt. Arati Chakraborty was declared hostile as she did not support her statement as recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. 21. PW-8, Sampa Nath, the Judicial Magistrate who recorded the statement of the PW-5 under Section164 of the Cr.P.C. She has stated that on preliminary examination, she was satisfied that the child witness was capable of understanding his duty to speak the truth but failed to understand the consequence of oath. Thus, statement of PW-5 was recorded without administering oath. 22. PW-9, Dr. Saroj Kr. Das simply stated that the victim was brought dead in the hospital. He had informed the police in writing. 23. PW-10, Sri Bhaskar Das is a professional photographer, who took the photographs of the deceased in the I.G. M hospital. 24. PW-11, Smt. Jaya Bhattacharjee prepared the inquest report in presence of two witnesses namely, Mukul Paul and Sajal Paul. She has categorically stated that she found only one injury mark on her throat. After the inquest was complete, the body of the victim was sent for post-mortem examination. She had also caused the seizure of the wearing apparels of the victim, Exbt. M.O. 6 series. She had recorded the statement of Mukul Paul and Sajal Paul. 25. She has categorically stated that she found only one injury mark on her throat. After the inquest was complete, the body of the victim was sent for post-mortem examination. She had also caused the seizure of the wearing apparels of the victim, Exbt. M.O. 6 series. She had recorded the statement of Mukul Paul and Sajal Paul. 25. PW-12, Sri Rasharaj Debnath, who escorted the dead body of the victim to the BRAM hospital for post-mortem examination. He has collected the wearing apparels (Exbt. M.O. 6 series) for purpose of seizure and handed over those materials to PW-11. 26. PW-13, Sajal Paul was a chance witness who signed as the witness over the inquest report. 27. PW-14, Smt. Dipa Saha had brought the record from Tripura State Commission for Women having been authorised to do so. She has stated from the records that the Commission had received one written complaint from Gopa Paul about physical and mental torture on her by her husband and in-laws. The Commission had accordingly summoned both the parties for their counselling. In the course of counselling, Gopa refused to return to her matrimonial home as the torture was so severe. She has further stated from the records that the appellant No. 1 had admitted before the Commission that there was torture on the victim and he had assured that there would not be further tortured on her. She has further stated that photocopy of the said proceeding minutes were seized by the Investigating Officer. On identification, the said minute records are admitted as Exbt. 8. But in the cross-examination, she has stated that she did not tell the police that the appellant No. 1 had confessed before them about the torture on his wife and that he would not repeat the torture. She has also given a brief description how Exbt. 8 has come in the evidence. She has also stated that she recorded the statement of the victim on 28.08.2000, Exbt. 10. 28. PW-15, Smt. Gouri Das not examined by the prosecution or by the defence. 29. PW-16, Dr. Ranjit Kr. Das, the forensic expert has stated that the cause of death was asphyxia as a result of hanging. He has introduced post-mortem report as Exbt. 9. 30. PW-17, Smt. Ela Deb is the Investigating Officer as well as the recording officer. 28. PW-15, Smt. Gouri Das not examined by the prosecution or by the defence. 29. PW-16, Dr. Ranjit Kr. Das, the forensic expert has stated that the cause of death was asphyxia as a result of hanging. He has introduced post-mortem report as Exbt. 9. 30. PW-17, Smt. Ela Deb is the Investigating Officer as well as the recording officer. She has stated that on 03.01.2007 she registered the Women P.S. Case No. 01/2007 under Sections 498-A and 306/34 of the I.P.C. against the appellants having received the written complaint from PW-1. She had visited the place of occurrence, prepared the site map with index (Exbt. 11), recorded the statements of the witnesses and seized blue colour nylon ropes. She had seized the letter dated 23.03.2000 and also the statement of the victim recorded on 28.08.2000. After completion of the investigation when she had found a prima-facie case, she filed the charge sheet. But she has categorically stated that witness "Rupam Paul, (PW-5) did not state to me that his father assaulted his mother for money for purchasing auto rickshaw." She has further stated that "witness Smt. Sabita Paul (PW-6) did not tell me that one day she found lying on the courtyard after torture and the mother-in-law pouring water on her head." However, she has confirmed that Sabita Paul, PW-6 told her that the appellant No. 1 made a statement in presence of PW-6 that the victim (Gopa) would be killed with the help of acid. 31. PW-1, Sri Haradhan Paul, who had lodged the complaint in the police station has replicated what he had stated in the complaint. He has stated that failing to tolerate the torture of the appellants, the victim returned to his house with his grand child. Immediately the Councillor, Smt. Milan Das, PW-3 was informed. At the advice of the villagers, the matter was informed to Tripura State Commission for Women but no solution could be found. As a result, for 6 years his daughter stayed in his house. But after about 6 years, the appellant No. 1 came to take the victim to her matrimonial home. The victim was reluctant but for the assurance, PW-1 sent her daughter to her matrimonial home. But after few days, he was again informed that the torture on the victim by the appellants had resumed. But after about 6 years, the appellant No. 1 came to take the victim to her matrimonial home. The victim was reluctant but for the assurance, PW-1 sent her daughter to her matrimonial home. But after few days, he was again informed that the torture on the victim by the appellants had resumed. On 03.01.2007 when he received the information that his daughter was hospitalized, he had rushed to the IGM hospital where he found his daughter dead. Thereafter, at his instance, the police reached the house of the appellants, where the appellant No. 2 had informed him that the victim had committed suicide by hanging herself. Thereafter, a written Ejahar (Exbt. 1) was filed. He has further stated that at the relevant point of time, the son of the victim was 7 years old. After filing of the complaint, the said child was taken to his house for proper care and maintenance. As the seizure witness, he has identified Exbt. M.O. 1, Exbt. 3, Exbt. 2 series and Exbt. 4. In the cross-examination, he has admitted that the victim lived with the accused for 8 months. Having been confronted, PW-1 could not find any previous statement as regards the physical torture by the appellants. 32. PW-3, Milan Das, a local Councillor has corroborated that PW-1 had informed her that after birth of a child, Gopa was physically tortured by the appellant No. 1 in presence of the mother of the victim, PW-6. Gopa used to be tortured on demand of money for business. Tripura State Commission for Women was informed. After about 6 years, the appellant No. 1 took Gopa back to her matrimonial home. She was also informed that on assurance that the appellants would torture Gopa even, she was taken to the matrimonial home. After some days, both PW-1 and PW-6 had informed her that Gopa had started facing the torture again for money for purchasing an auto rickshaw. She had advised both PW-1 and PW-6 to inform the father and elder brother of the appellant No. 1. But she could not find any statement that she had stated to the police that after birth of the child, the victim was made target of the physical torture. In the cross-examination she has stated that ’it is not a fact that I did not inform the police as such. But she could not find any statement that she had stated to the police that after birth of the child, the victim was made target of the physical torture. In the cross-examination she has stated that ’it is not a fact that I did not inform the police as such. I told police that parents of Gopa informed me that Gopa was tortured for money again for the purpose of purchasing one auto rickshaw. (Attention drawn to the statement containing no mention of source of information but the statement contains husband of Gopa again tortured Gopa for bringing money from the parents of Gopa for purchasing auto rickshaw).’ She has admitted that she did not tell the police that she had advised PW-1 to inform father and elder brother of the appellant No. 1. 33. PW-4, Sri Suman Chakraborty is a villager. He has stated that he heard about the dispute between Gopa and her husband for the husband demanded money from the parents of Gopa. After 18 months of marriage, Gopa came to her father with a child because of the torture unleashed by the appellants in the matrimonial home. Gopa lived there for about 6 years. One day, the appellant No. 1 went to the house of the complainant for taking Gopa back to her matrimonial home. He asserted that ’after some days Gopa informed me that accused Nandan torturing her for money for purchasing one auto rickshaw’. Thereafter, I heard that Gopa had committed suicide as she could not bear the torture of the husband and the mother-in-law. As a seizure witness, he had identified Exbt. M.O. 1 series. In the cross-examination, he has further clarified the statement with further details. He has stated that he told the police that he was present during the time when Nandan, the appellant No. 1 and others came to the house of the complainant to take back Gopa with the assurance of not torturing in future. But he could not find out any such statement in his previous statement as recorded by the Investigating Officer. 34. PW-5, Master Rupam Paul, son of the victim and the appellant No. 1. He was only aged about 7 years at the time of recording his deposition. He has stated that after coming to his father’s house, one day his father asked his mother to get money for purchasing one auto rickshaw. 34. PW-5, Master Rupam Paul, son of the victim and the appellant No. 1. He was only aged about 7 years at the time of recording his deposition. He has stated that after coming to his father’s house, one day his father asked his mother to get money for purchasing one auto rickshaw. His father assaulted his mother time and again. His grandmother instigated his father for realizing money. One afternoon, his father quarrelled with his mother. According to him, it was 3rd January. He has further stated that his father assaulted his mother and he had raised objection. At that time, his father hit him on his left arm with a fire wood. The witness has exposed an old injury mark over his left arm to be noticed by the trial Judge. At that time his grandmother (the appellant No. 2) took him to the room of his grandfather and made him to sleep with the grandfather and locked the door. At about 4 pm., he heard the cry of his grandmother and called him to say that his mother was dead. He found his mother hanging in the room of his mother. His grandmother immediately cut the nylon rope around the neck of his mother by a dao. His uncle and others then took his mother to the hospital. He has stated that after the occurrence he was taken to the court and the statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C., Exbt. 5 series was recorded. In the cross-examination, he has failed to give the date when the court had recorded his deposition. He has also failed to give the date of another occasion. But he has stated that he gave statement to the police before he was taken to the court. He has asserted that he told the police and the court that his father had assaulted his mother for money for purchasing auto rickshaw but he could not find any such statement in the statement recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. or in the statement recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. He has further stated that his grandmother had instigated his father for demanding money but no such statement was found out in his previous statement. He however has denied that he was tutored. 35. PW-6, Smt. Sabita Paul, mother of the victim has almost replicated the statement of PW-1. He however has denied that he was tutored. 35. PW-6, Smt. Sabita Paul, mother of the victim has almost replicated the statement of PW-1. She has added that one month before the death of Gopa, Gopa came to their house and had informed that she was being tortured by her husband for realising money. She had also informed that the mother-in-law abused her and instigated her husband for realising money. Ultimately, Gopa had committed suicide as they could not pay the money. In respect of the episode as stated that one day Gopa was found lying on the courtyard after torture, when PW-6 confronted in the cross-examination she could not find out any such statement in her previous statement. The same situation was repeated when she could not find in her previous statement that she has stated to the police that the mother-in-law told her that she should take Gopa back or she would be killed with acid. 36. Strangely enough, out of the two defence witnesses as adduced for the appellants, one of them was the cited witness of the prosecution but was not examined. He has only stated that nothing was noticeably wrong in the relation of the victim and the appellant No. 1. DW-1, Promode Roy did not state anything further to support the defence. DW-2, Mukul Paul, is brother-in-law of the appellant No. 1. He has stated that 8-9 months prior to the death of Gopa, the relationship between Gopa and Nandan was good and there was no complaint against Nandan. However, in the cross-examination, he has categorically stated that he had no link with his in laws after 3 years of his marriage. 37. Thus emerges two pertinent questions, such as, (i) whether there was any instigation to the victim on 03.01.2007 with mens rea for abetting the commission of suicide and (ii) whether there are elements of cruelty in the evidence against the appellants? 38. On close scrutiny of the records, except the statement of PW-5, child witness there is no statement that on the day of occurrence, the appellants had instigated to abet the suicide. The statement of the PW-5 as recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. (Exbt. 5), therefore, may carefully be examined. On 05.02.2007 that statement was recorded by the Judicial Magistrate, PW-8, whereas the occurrence took place on 03.01.2007. The statement of the PW-5 as recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. (Exbt. 5), therefore, may carefully be examined. On 05.02.2007 that statement was recorded by the Judicial Magistrate, PW-8, whereas the occurrence took place on 03.01.2007. Thus the statement of PW-5 that after the occurrence he was taken to the court and his statement was recorded in the court is fluid and it cannot purport that immediately after the occurrence, the said statement was recorded. That statement was recorded after more than a month bringing PW-5 from the custody of PW-1 and PW-6. That aspect of the matter cannot be overlooked by this Court. He has stated that his mother used to be assaulted by his father and everyday his father used to beat his mother by a firewood for bringing money. One day, the 3rd January, his father beaten his mother and when he came there, his father kicked him off and he was taken to another room. After a couple of hours when he was awake at the call of his grandmother he saw body of his mother was hanging from the bamboo strung overhead. He has categorically stated that his father had killed his mother by way of ’strangulating her’. His grandmother has stated that there was no need to see his evil mother. The grandmother had managed deliberately the space so that his father could flee away from the place of occurrence. But in the Court, he has embellished the story with further details and the contradiction has been successfully placated by the defence in the evidence. There is no corroboration regarding the torture on the day of occurrence not even from the post-mortem examination report and on wholesome scrutiny of the statement of the child witness it has appeared that in all probability those statements are tutored and those cannot be relied for purpose of returning conviction under Section 306 of the I.P.C. At the cost of repetition it may further be observed that unless PW-5 is entirely believed there is no evidence of instigation to constitute the offence of abetment of suicide. 39. Having held so, both the appellants are liable to get the benefit of doubt and accordingly, they are acquitted from the charge under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the I.P.C. 40. 39. Having held so, both the appellants are liable to get the benefit of doubt and accordingly, they are acquitted from the charge under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the I.P.C. 40. On further scrutiny it has appeared that there is no convincing evidence as to the commission of cruelty within the explanations noted in Section 498-A of the I.P.C. against the appellant No. 2. There are general and bald statements such as, she used to instigate the appellant No. 1 for realising money. But this piece of evidence is not adequate to convict someone under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the I.P.C. Accordingly, the appellant No. 2, Shefali Paul is also acquitted from the charge under Section498-A read with Section 34 of the I.P.C. on benefit of doubt. However, on over all assessment of the evidence including the res gestae as brought within the ambit of Section 6 of the Evidence Act, this Court is satisfied that the prosecution has succeeded in proving the charge under Section 498-A of the I.P.C. to the hilt against the appellant No. 1. Thus, the conviction and sentence passed against the appellant No. 1 under Section 498-A of the I.P.C. is affirmed. 41. In the result, the appeal stands allowed to the extent as indicated above. Send down the LCRs forthwith. This Court places on record that Ms. R. Guha, learned counsel has provided commendable assistance while placing her submissions for the appellants.