JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—This writ petition has been preferred by State of U.P. assailing an order dated 25.2.2012 passed by the State’s own officer, i.e., Additional District Magistrate (Finance and Revenue), Agra (hereinafter referred to as the “ADM (F&R)” in Case No. 93/2011-12 in purported exercise of powers under Section 31 of Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act, 1899”). 2. This Court issued notices to respondents. I have perused the office report dated 18.11.2013. Service upon respondent No. 1 is deemed sufficient. Sri H.P. Dube, Advocate has put in appearance on behalf of respondent Nos. 5 and 6, i.e., ADM (F&R), who has also been impleaded in person. Sri Swapnil Kumar, Advocate has put in appearance on behalf of respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4. 3. The short question up for consideration is, “whether Section 31 of Act, 1899 is attracted to the case in hand or not”. 4. It appears that respondent No. 1 M/s. Nalanda Serv Infraventure Pvt. Ltd. filed an application (undated) before ADM (F&R) under Section 31 of Act, 1899 stating that it proposes to purchase an immoveable property, i.e., No. 2/83/2/84 total area 4470 sq. yards, i.e., 3737.367 sq. mater, out of which 2125 sq. yards shall be jointly sold by Vijay Nijhavan, Sandeep Kochar and Naveen Lamba to respondent No. 1 and 2354 sq. yards would be sold by M/s. Cheetarmal Ramdayal, hence the ADM (F&R) was requested to determine market value of aforesaid property proposed to be purchased by respondent No. 1. The ADM (F&R) vide order dated 21.2.2012 directed Tehsildar (Judicial) to make inquiry and submit valuation report. It was submitted by Tehsildar (Judicial) concerned on 24.2.2012 and on the very next day, i.e., 25.2.2012 the ADM (F&R) passed impugned order. 5. It is contended that the instrument of purchase, i.e., draft sale-deed was never placed or brought before ADM (F&R) and, therefore, he had no jurisdiction or authority to proceed under Section 31 since bringing of instrument before Collector is the condition precedent to attract Section 31 of Act, 1899. 6. Learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 did not dispute that instrument in any manner was not placed before Collector of ADM (F&R) till he passed the order dated 25.2.2012, impugned in this writ petition. 6. Learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 did not dispute that instrument in any manner was not placed before Collector of ADM (F&R) till he passed the order dated 25.2.2012, impugned in this writ petition. On the contrary, in para 10 of the counter-affidavit, it is averred that there is no requirement, in any case, for availability of instrument before Collector for adjudicating upon the market value of the property and duty payable on the instrument for the purpose of attracting Section 31 of Act, 1899. In para 11 it is also said that even respondent No. 5 did not call for the instrument executed in favour of aforesaid respondent. 7. During course of oral argument also Sri Swapnil Kumar, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4, did not dispute that the instrument was never brought before Collector either when application was submitted under Section 31 or even subsequently, at any stage, till the impugned order was passed. 8. In my view it is the instrument itself which brings jurisdiction of Collector, in, to determine the duty with which the said instrument is chargeable. In other words if the instrument itself is not brought before Collector, he has no occasion, authority or jurisdiction to determine the duty chargeable since no instrument is before him. This is evident from a bare reading of Section 31(1) of Act, 1899, which reads as under: “31. Adjudication as to proper stamp.—(1) When any instrument whether executed or not, and whether previously stamped or not, is brought to the Collector, and the person bringing it applies to have the opinion of that officer as to the duty (if any), with which it is chargeable, and pays the fee of such amount as may be fixed by the State Government by notification in the official Gazette the Collector shall determine the duty (if any) with which, in his judgment, the instrument is chargeable.” (emphasis added) 9. Sub-section (2) further provides, that the Collector may require the party concerned to furnish with an abstract of instrument and also with such affidavit or other evidence, as he may deem necessary to prove that “all the facts and circumstances affecting chargeability of instrument with duty or the amount of duty with which it is chargeable are fully and truly set forth therein”. 10. 10. The jurisdiction of Collector under Section 31(1) is not invoked by a mere application but it is the instrument which is brought before Collector and in respect thereof when Collector’s opinion is required as to what should be the appropriate duty chargeable thereon, the Collector shall determine the same. When the instrument itself is not before Collector, the question of such determination obviously cannot arise. It is not a hypothetical determination which is required to be made by Collector. It is in respect of an instrument which is placed before him, in regard whereto, he has to render his opinion about the appropriate duty chargeable on such instrument and considered. 11. Though the parties have not been able to place any direct authority on the subject in question but I find some support from certain authorities in which Section 31 has been read. 12. In Chunni Lal Burman v. Board of Revenue, U.P. and others, AIR 1951 All 851 , a Division Bench of this Court while reading Sections 31 and 32 of Act, 1899 says that aforesaid provisions make it clear that when an instrument is presented to Collector for his opinion as to the duty chargeable upon it, the question of impounding the document by him would not arise if the instrument is not sufficiently stamped. The only duty caste upon Collector is to determine stamp duty payable upon the instrument. If thereafter the applicant decides to pay such stamp duty or deficient stamp duty, as the case may be, and other conditions under Section 32 are fulfilled, the Collector would make an endorsement on the document/instrument that it is sufficiently stamped but he cannot impound the document and impose penalty for the reason that Section 33 of Act, 1899 is not attracted at the stage when Collector is required to determine stamp duty payable on an instrument brought before him by invoking jurisdiction under Section 31 or 32 of Act, 1899. This decision clearly contemplates the bringing of instrument before Collector to attract Section 31. 13. Again in Mohd. Amir Ahmad v. Dy. Commissioner and others, AIR 1956 All 453 , a Full Bench of this Court considered the intra-relation and scope of Sections 31, 32 and 33 of Act, 1899. This decision clearly contemplates the bringing of instrument before Collector to attract Section 31. 13. Again in Mohd. Amir Ahmad v. Dy. Commissioner and others, AIR 1956 All 453 , a Full Bench of this Court considered the intra-relation and scope of Sections 31, 32 and 33 of Act, 1899. It observed: “The procedure, in cases to which Sections 31 and 32 apply is that when in instrument is brought before the Collector, he proceeds to give his opinion. After the Collector has given his opinion it is left entirely to the applicant to pay the duty or not . . . . .” (emphasis added) 14. In appeal this matter was taken to Apex Court and the decision of this Court has been affirmed in State of U.P. v. Mohd. Amir Ahmad, AIR 1971 SC 787. The Court said that Section 33 does not extend to determination of question as to what the duty payable is. Such function comes within the scope of Section 31, which is complete by itself and ends by saying that “the Collector shall determine the duty with which, in his judgment, the instrument is chargeable, if it is chargeable at all”. The Court then said: “The scheme of the Act shows that where a person is simply seeking the opinion of the Collector as to the proper duty in regard to an instrument, he approaches him under Section 31. If it is not properly stamped and the person executing the document wants to proceed with effectuating the document or using it for the purpose of evidence, he is to make up the duty under Section 32 the Collector will then make an endorsement and the instrument will be treated as if it was duly stamped from the very beginning. But if he does not want to proceed any further than the seeking the determination of the duty payable; then, ‘no consequence will follow, ‘and an executed document is in the same position as instrument which is unexecuted and unstamped and after the determination of the duty the Collector becomes functus officio and the provisions of Section 33 have no application. The provisions of that section are a subsequent stage when something more than mere assessing of the opinion of the Collector is to be done.” 15. The provisions of that section are a subsequent stage when something more than mere assessing of the opinion of the Collector is to be done.” 15. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, made a reference to a judgment dated 9.5.2007 of this Court passed in Writ Petition No. 21535 of 2006, whereby the writ petition was dismissed challenging an order determining stamp duty payable on an application filed and contended that in that matter also, the document/instrument was not placed before Collector yet this Court declined to interfere and dismissed the writ petition. I have gone through the aforesaid order and finds that this question, whether Section 31 can be attracted if no instrument is brought before Collector at any point of time, was neither raised, nor argued, nor decided and, therefore, aforesaid order does not constitute a precedent deciding an issue which is up for consideration in this case and hence is not binding on this Court. A decision would be binding on the coordinate Court if an issue has been raised therein, argued and decided since it is the ratio laid down in the decision which binds a Court and not what actually has been done ultimately by the Court. A case is decided in various ways and many a times under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court declines to interfere for different reasons since it is a discretionary extraordinary jurisdiction. It is the ratio which binds having the precedential value and not what has actually been done by the Court. I do not find that any exposition of law has been settled in above case that if no instrument is brought before Collector, still he can proceed to determine market value of the property, in one or the other manner, by taking recourse to Section 31 of Act, 1899. 16. Reliance is also placed on a recent decision of Apex Court in Raymond Ltd. and another v. State of Chhattisgarh and others, 2007(3) SCC 79 . 16. Reliance is also placed on a recent decision of Apex Court in Raymond Ltd. and another v. State of Chhattisgarh and others, 2007(3) SCC 79 . Referring to para 13 thereof that on mere application filed by a person the Collector is competent to determine stamp duty, payable, even if no instrument is placed before him, an attempt was made to read para 13 of the judgment as if Section 31 of Act, 1899 provides power to Collector to determine duty with which the instrument would be chargeable only if an application in this behalf is made. The phrase “application in this behalf made” is stressed to argue that the Apex Court has read Section 31 in the manner as if the Collector would be justified in determining stamp duty payable even if no instrument in whatever manner is brought before him. 17. From a careful reading of the judgment, however, I find that this argument is totally fallacious and even otherwise is incorrect. From the facts stated in initial part of the judgment, i.e., paras 2 and 3, it is evident that alongwith application instrument was also available before Collector. Thus there was no dispute on this aspect. The application was filed by appellant-company with a view to pre-assess the stamp duty payable on the instrument on sale and the impact thereof. The Collector constituted a valuation committee who assessed property and submitted report. Thereafter the Collector passed an order determining stamp duty chargeable on the instrument under Section 31 of Act, 1899. Para 3 of the judgment makes it clear that the said order was accepted by appellant, M/s. Raymond Ltd. and the amount of stamp duty and registration charges were deposited, whereupon Collector made an endorsement on 16.1.2001, on the deed of conveyance, by way of a certificate, in terms of Section 31, whereupon the instrument was duly stamped. Therefore, a deed of conveyance/instrument was already available before Collector on which he made assessment and passed order though it was not executed at that time but executed subsequently on 19.1.2001 and was registered on 21.1.2001. Therefore, it is factually incorrect on the part of petitioner, in the present case, that the aforesaid decision has interpreted Section 31 as if determination of stamp duty can be made by Collector even if no instrument is brought before him and only an application is filed. Therefore, it is factually incorrect on the part of petitioner, in the present case, that the aforesaid decision has interpreted Section 31 as if determination of stamp duty can be made by Collector even if no instrument is brought before him and only an application is filed. Moreover, in para 13 also the Court further said: “13. . . . .The power to determine the amount of stamp duty chargeable for the instrument is, thus, contained in Section 31. . . . . . ” 18. In para 18 of the judgment the Court further said: “18. Section 31 of the Act contemplates two situations viz. where the Collector determines that the instrument brought before him was already fully stamped or an additional amount of stamp duty is required to be paid. The question of issuance of a certificate by way of an endorsement in either of the cases would arise when the additional stamp duty, if any, is paid.” (emphasis added) 19. It is then argued that, Section 31(1) if read as if the instrument in its entirety must be brought before Collector then sub-section (2), as such, would render superfluous and redundant which permits the Collector to be furnished with an “abstract of instrument”. It is contended that under sub-section (2) the Collector may require applicant to furnish with an abstract of instrument, meaning thereby, when an application is filed it is open to applicant not to place any instrument before Collector and simply require his opinion with regard to stamp duty chargeable on an instrument which has yet to see light of the day. 20. In my view, this argument is nothing but a gross misinterpretation of scheme of statute. Sub-section (1) is applicable only when an applicant brings an instrument before Collector irrespective of the fact, whether the instrument is executed or not but the bringing of instrument before Collector is a condition precedent. However, sub-section (2) may come into picture when an instrument formally has not been drafted and an application is filed seeking opinion of Collector about the chargeability of stamp but in such a case an abstract of instrument has to be placed containing all the fact and circumstances which may affect the chargeability of instrument with duty. 21. It cannot be doubted that stipulations and conditions settled in instrument are relevant for determining the chargeability of stamp duty on an instrument. 21. It cannot be doubted that stipulations and conditions settled in instrument are relevant for determining the chargeability of stamp duty on an instrument. The mere location of land and the fact that somebody wants to sale or purchase the said land, is not sufficient. 22. In the present case, neither any instrument was brought before Collector so as to attract sub-section (1) of Section 31 nor at any point of time any abstract of instrument was placed before him. Therefore, in my view, here is not a case where Section 31 could have been invoked. 23. Since in the present case no such instrument was ever placed before authority concerned, in my view, exercise of power by ADM (F&R) by passing impugned order without having any instrument before him, is patently illegal and without jurisdiction. 24. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 25.2.2012 is hereby quashed. 25. No costs.