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2014 DIGILAW 20 (KER)

Shailamma Issac v. Returning Officer

2014-01-06

K.ABRAHAM MATHEW, K.M.JOSEPH

body2014
JUDGMENT : K.M. Joseph, J. The appellant and the 5th respondent polled six votes in the election held for electing the President of the 3rd respondent Panchayat. The first respondent Returning Officer proceeded to draw lots. The appellant was declared elected and sworn in as the President of the Panchayat. The 5th respondent complained to the first respondent that the procedure adopted was illegal. The appellant is informed by Ext.P2 that she could assume the office of the 4th respondent (State Election Commission). By Ext.P3, the 4th respondent found that the procedure adopted for selecting the appellant was wrong in purported exercise of supervisory powers of the 4th respondent and the declaration of the results as well as the selection of the appellant was found to be ab initio void. Ext.P4 was issued notifying that the 5th respondent would be sworn in as the President of the Panchayat on 3.1.2014. This Writ Petition is filed seeking to quash Exts.P3 and P4. The learned Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petition. 2. We heard the matter at the admission stage itself. We heard the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned Standing Counsel for respondents 1 and 4 and the learned counsel for the 5th respondent. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the result of the election was declared and the appellant was elected as a President. She took oath as contemplated in section 1S. 153(13) of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 herein after referred to as ‘the Act. The oath was taken by her before the officer authorised by the Government and not by the Election Commission. After declaration of the result and what is more even taking of the oath the Election Commissioner has no jurisdiction to interfere with the election for returned candidate. He further draw our attention to section 153(13a) which reads as follows: (13a) The State Election Commission may declare the office of the president or vice-president, as the case may be, as vacated on his own motion where the person has not entered upon his office without sufficient cause by taking oath or affirmation within a period of fifteen days from the date he was declared as elected as president or Vice-President of a Panchayat of any level." 4. He would point out that such contingency does not arise in this case. He would point out that such contingency does not arise in this case. It would further point out that the learned Single Judge has proceeded to proceed on lines of judgment of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 3538 of 2009. He made available a copy of the judgment. He would point out that a perusal of the judgment would show that was not a case where the Election Commission had interfered with the election. He reiterates the Election Commission has no jurisdiction after the declaration of the result and what is more in the facts of the case with the taking of oath by the appellant. The Learned counsel for the appellant however not dispute fairly the finding of the learned Single Judge that the result of the draw of the lot was decided by the Returning Officer with reference to the wrong rule and it was on a misconception that the Returning Officer applied the wrong rule. But that is not to say that once the result of the election is declared and what is more oath is taken the Election Commission would have still the authority to undo the result of the election. It is a question of lack of power. In order to buttress his argument he draws our attention to the decision reported in Ram Phal Kundu v. Kamal Sharma, (2004) 2 SCC 759 . In paragraph 24, the Apex Court held inter alia as follows: 24. It may be noticed that the petition by Kamal Sharma was filed on 6.2.2000 and the same was allowed by the Election Commission the very next day i.e., on 7.2.2000 by which a direction was issued to the Retuning Officer to hold a fresh scrutiny. There is nothing on record to indicate nor it appears probable that before passing the order, the Election Commission issued any notice to Bachan Singh. Apparently, the order was passed behind his back. The order of the Election Commission to the effect that the Returning Officer shall take further consequential steps as may become necessary, by treating all earlier proceedings in relation to the said candidates, as void ab initio and redraw the list of validly nominated candidates, could not have been passed without giving an opportunity of hearing to Bachan Singh. The order of the Election Commission to the effect that the Returning Officer shall take further consequential steps as may become necessary, by treating all earlier proceedings in relation to the said candidates, as void ab initio and redraw the list of validly nominated candidates, could not have been passed without giving an opportunity of hearing to Bachan Singh. That apart, it has been held by a catena of decisions of this Court that once the nomination paper of a candidate is rejected, the Act provides for only one remedy, that remedy being by an election petition to be presented after the election is over, and there is no remedy provided at any intermediate stage. (See N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commission of India v. Shivaji. Therefore, the order passed by the Election Commission on 7.2.2000 was not only illegal but was also without jurisdiction and the respondent Kamal Sharma can get no advantage from the same. The inference drawn and the findings recorded by the High Court on the basis of the order of the Election Commission, therefore, cannot be sustained. 5. Still he further draws our attention to the judgment of the Allahabad High Court reported in Anita Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2011 (2) ADJ 201 . In paragraph 16 it is held as follows. 16. In view of the settled legal position, the election commences from issuance of the notification of the election and culminates in the declaration of the returned candidate and thereafter the State Election Commission, the District Magistrate and the Election Officer becomes functus officio and cease to have any jurisdiction over that election and only authority which can deal with and decide a complaint regarding the illegality or irregularity of the election is the Election Tribunal. 6. He further draws our attention to the judgment of the Apex Court rendered by 3 judges reported in Boddula Krishnaiah and another v. State Election Commissioner, A.P. and others, (1996) 3 SCC Page 416. In paragraph 7 it is held as follows: 7. Article 243-0 of the Constitution envisages bar on interference by courts in election matters. 6. He further draws our attention to the judgment of the Apex Court rendered by 3 judges reported in Boddula Krishnaiah and another v. State Election Commissioner, A.P. and others, (1996) 3 SCC Page 416. In paragraph 7 it is held as follows: 7. Article 243-0 of the Constitution envisages bar on interference by courts in election matters. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution, under sub-clause (b) "no election to any Panchayat shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as is provided for by or under any law made by the Legislature of a State". Thus there is a constitutional bar on interference with the election process except by an election petition, presented to an Election Tribunal as may be made by or under law by the competent legislature and in the manner provided thereunder. Power of the court granting stay of the election process is no longer res integra. 7. He also sought to draw support from the following paragraph found in the Apex Court judgment reported in Jaspal Singh Arora v. State of M.P. & Ors., (1998) 9 SCC 594 . 3. These appeals must be allowed on a short ground. In view of the mode of challenging the election by an election petition being prescribed by the M.P. Municipalities Act, it is clear that the election could not be called in question except by an election petition as provided under that Act. The bar to interference by courts in electoral matters contained in Article 243-ZG of the Constitution was apparently overlooked by the High Court in allowing the Writ Petition. Apart from the bar under Article 243-ZG, on settled principles interference under Article 226 of the Constitution for the purpose of setting aside election to a municipality was not called for because of the statutory provision for election petition and also the fact that an earlier Writ Petition for the same purpose by a defeated candidate had been dismissed by the High Court. 8. Lastly he submitted due to the invulnerability of the electoral process from judicial review was reported in the judgment of the Apex Court in Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors., (1978) 1 SCC 405 . In paragraph 92 it is held as follows: 92. 8. Lastly he submitted due to the invulnerability of the electoral process from judicial review was reported in the judgment of the Apex Court in Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors., (1978) 1 SCC 405 . In paragraph 92 it is held as follows: 92. Diffusion, even more elaborate discussion, tends to blur the precision of the conclusion in a judgment and so it is meet that we synopsize the formulations. Of course, the condensed statement we make is for convenience, not for exclusion of the relevance or attenuation of the binding impact of the detailed argumentation. For this limited purpose, we set down our holdings: (1)(a) Article 329(b) is a blanket ban on litigative challenges, to electoral steps taken by the Election Commission and its officers for carrying forward the process of election to its culmination in the formal declaration of the result. (b) Election, in this context, has a very wide connotation commencing from the Presidential notification calling upon the electorate to elect and culminating in the final declaration of the returned candidate. (2)(a) The Constitution contemplates a free and fair election and vests comprehensive responsibilities of superintendence, direction and control of the conduct of elections in the Election Commission. This responsibility may cove powers, duties and functions of many sorts, administrative or other, depending on the circumstances. (b) Two limitations at least are laid on its plenary character in the exercise thereof. Firstly, when Parliament or any State Legislature has made valid law relating to or in connection with elections, the Commission, shall act in conformity with, not in violation of such provisions but where such law is silent Article 324 is a reservoir of power to act for the avowed purpose of, not divorced from, pushing forward a free and fair election with expedition. Secondly, the Commission shall be responsible to the rule of law, act bona fide and be amenable to the norms of natural justice in so far as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it as fairplay-in-action in a most important area of the constitutional order, viz. elections. Fairness does import an obligation to see that no wrong-doer candidate benefits by his own wrong. elections. Fairness does import an obligation to see that no wrong-doer candidate benefits by his own wrong. To put the matter beyond doubt, natural justice enlivens and applies to the specific case of order for total re-poll, although not in full panoply but in flexible practicability. Whether it has been complied with is left open for the Tribunals adjudication. (3) The conspectus of provisions bearing on the subject of elections clearly expresses the rule that there is a remedy for every wrong done during the election in progress although it is postponed to the post-election stage and procedure as predicated in Article 329(b) and the 1951 Act. The Election Tribunal has, under the various provisions of the Act, large enough powers to give relief to an injured candidate if he makes out a case and such processual amplitude of power extends to directions to the Election Commission or other appropriate agency to hold a poll, to bring up the ballots or do other thing necessary for fulfillment of the jurisdiction to undo illegality and injustice and do complete justice within the parameters set by the existing law. 9. The learned Standing Counsel for the Election Commission would submit that this is a case where a mistake was committed by the Returning officer and the mistake was realised. However after the result is declared on a complaint filed he referred the matter to the 4th respondent seeking directions. The Election Commission found that a mistake was committed. He would however very fairly submit before us that the Election Commission has no jurisdiction in the matter once the election process culminated in the declaration of the results. He would submit that the decision cited by the learned counsel for the appellant relying on Article 243(0) cannot apply, as in this case we are concerned not with the election to the Panchayat but to the office of President of the Panchayat. He would point out that the learned Single Judge refused to interfere as it would amount to perpetration of illegality. 10. The learned counsel for the 5th respondent also supports the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 11. As far as the decision reported in ( (2004) 2 SCC 759 ) is concerned it is no doubt true that the Apex Court has laid down what we have already extracted. 10. The learned counsel for the 5th respondent also supports the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 11. As far as the decision reported in ( (2004) 2 SCC 759 ) is concerned it is no doubt true that the Apex Court has laid down what we have already extracted. However, that is a case where on a petition before the Election Commission of India rejecting the application of petitioners nomination and alleged wrongful acceptance of the nomination of another an order was passed which adversely affected another without an opportunity of being heard. It is found to be illegal. Thereafter, the Apex Court proceeded to pronounce on the absence of jurisdiction. As far as the decision reported in ( (1996) 3 SCC 416 ) and ( (1998) 9 SCC 594 ) are concerned both cases forbid interference with the election. The decision reported in ( (1978) 1 SCC 405 ) also delienates limitations on the exercise of the powers by the court in interfering with the electoral process. 12. We must note that this is not a case where the learned Single Judge interfered with the election of the returned candidate. The learned Single Judge was called upon to interfere with the action of the Election Commission rectifying a mistake which is committed by the Returning Officer. 13. There can be no quarrel with the position which has been canvassed before us by the learned counsel for the appellant that after the declaration of the election the Election Commission becomes functus officio. This is a case wherein the aforesaid principle is not even disputed by the learned Standing Counsel for the Election Commission. The electoral laws invariably provides for remedy to the defeated candidate. As far as the present case is concerned remedy is provided under section 153(14a) i.e., defeated candidate could approach the Court of the Munsiff and seek remedy therein. We would also reiterate that the Election Commission has no jurisdiction once a result is declared to interfere with the election process and what is more disturbing in this case no doubt after the returned candidate took oath. The oath was taken before the Returning Officer who in this case happened to be an officer of the Government fulfilling the requirements under section 153(13). 14. But the crucial question is having declared the law should we interfere with the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The oath was taken before the Returning Officer who in this case happened to be an officer of the Government fulfilling the requirements under section 153(13). 14. But the crucial question is having declared the law should we interfere with the judgment of the learned Single Judge. As already noticed this is a case where two candidates polled equal number of votes. Admittedly a draw was taken as mandated. A draw is the mandate under both the rules in question. The only difference is that in the case of one rule which was wrongly applied by the Returning Officer a person whose name is first drawn will stand eliminated. That was wrongly applied. The actual rule which is applicable in this case was the person whose name is drawn first will stand returned. If only the Returning Officer had not committed this mistake, the 5th respondent would have been originally returned as the elected candidate. This is a case where there is absolutely no scope for any investigation into any dispute. There is no scope for any debate at all. No argument could possibly be raised as we have already noticed the fair stand adopted before us by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Returning Officer had committed a mistake. Therefore, this is a case where a mistake or illegality committed by the Returning Officer is beyond dispute. In such a case if we were to allow the appeal and grant the relief sought for by the appellant in the Writ Petition, the result would be though a person did not deserve under the rules to be declared as a President he will govern. The election dispute before the court being the remedy provided as suggested by the learned counsel for the appellant would necessarily take time. By the time the election dispute is resolved the term itself would end. In the special facts of this case, it would amount to a miscarriage of justice. The learned Single Judge having taken a view in the facts we would think that we need not in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction interfere with the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Needless to say, we reiterate that the Election Commission has no jurisdiction in the matter. The learned Single Judge having taken a view in the facts we would think that we need not in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction interfere with the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Needless to say, we reiterate that the Election Commission has no jurisdiction in the matter. We are refusing to interfere with the matter in view of the special facts of the case and we also notice in this regard that consequent upon the dismissal of the Writ Petition the 5th respondent has already been took oath and has taken charge as the President. We dismiss the appeal.