Judgment : 1. This appeal arises out of judgment and award passed on 07/4/2003 in Claim Petition No.369 of 2002 by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Nagpur. The appellant is insurer of the offending truck involved in the accident. Respondents No. 1 and 2 are the parents of deceased Dilip, who died in the vehicular accident, and respondent No.3 is driver of the offending truck. 2. Respondents No. 1 and 2 lost their son, Dilip, in a road accident which occurred on 22/5/2002. On 22/5/2002 deceased Dilip was driving motorcycle bearing registration No. MH-31/AZ-649 and was proceeding towards his village Kothurna. When his motorcycle came near Khapa-Parshivani road, one truck bearing registration No. GJ-6/V-4681 being driven rashly and negligently, gave a violent dash to the motorcycle of deceased Dilip. Deceased Dilip sustained grievous injuries and died on the spot. He was 27 years of age at that time and was earning about Rs. 7,000/-per month from milk business. Respondents No. 1 and 2 were dependent upon his income. The appellant and respondent No.3 being insurer and owner respectively of the offending truck, were sought to be held liable to pay compensation by a petition filed under Sec. 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act by respondents No. 1 and 2. 3. The petition was resisted by both the insurer and owner respectively of the truck by filing their separate written statements, but their defence was almost similar. They denied that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the offending truck by its driver. They submitted that the insurer of the motorcycle involved in the accident was a necessary party. They denied the income of the deceased. 4. On the rival claims, four issues were framed by the Tribunal, which, after considering the evidence available on record and arguments of both the sides, found that the driver of the offending truck was solely responsible for causing of accident as he had driven the vehicle rashly and negligently, that the insurer and owner of the motorcycle involved in the accident were not necessary parties and that respondents No.1 and 2 were entitled to receive the compensation from the appellant and respondent No.3 jointly and severally. Thus, by judgment and award dated 07/4/2003, the Tribunal granted compensation of Rs.5,00,000/-with interest to respondents No. 1 and 2. Not satisfied with this order, the appellant is before this Court in this appeal. 5. Thus, by judgment and award dated 07/4/2003, the Tribunal granted compensation of Rs.5,00,000/-with interest to respondents No. 1 and 2. Not satisfied with this order, the appellant is before this Court in this appeal. 5. I have heard Shri Pophlay learned Counsel for the appellant and Ms Pathade holding for Shri P. S. Mirache, learned Counsel for respondents No.1 and 2. Now, the points which arise for my determination are: (1) Whether the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Nagpur was justified in granting compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/-with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of petition till realisation of the amount? (2) Whether the Tribunal was justified in awarding penal interest @ 12% per annum upon commission of default to pay the compensation amount to respondents No. 1 and 2 by the appellant and respondent No.3 within stipulated period? 6. Learned Counsel for the appellant has forcefully submitted that in this case there was no evidence convincingly showing that deceased Dilip was earning some fixed amount of income and, therefore, his notional income at Rs.3,000/- per month ought to have been taken by the Tribunal. He submits that there have been admissions given by respondent No.1, the father of deceased Dilip in his cross-examination, that even after the death of Dilip, he continued to own ten cows and ten she-buffalos and that the milch animals were not owned by his son Dilip. He has submitted that these admissions would show that there has been no total loss of income and that even respondent No.1 was carrying on milk business since beginning. He further submits that the certificate issued by the President of Society vide Exh.38 should not have been relied upon by the Tribunal to assess the income of deceased Dilip as admittedly, no record of said milk society was brought before the Court by the Secretary, Dhanraj (Exh.37), who was examined as petitioner's witness. He submits that this evidence would be sufficient to hold that there was no complete loss of income for respondent No.1. Learned Counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2 has submitted that the evidence tendered by these respondents is self explanatory and sufficiently establishes separate income of deceased Dilip as well as dependency of these respondents upon the income of deceased Dilip. 7. Learned Counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2 has submitted that the evidence tendered by these respondents is self explanatory and sufficiently establishes separate income of deceased Dilip as well as dependency of these respondents upon the income of deceased Dilip. 7. A perusal of evidence of Bhaiyyaji, respondent No.1 vide Exh.30, does show that he has given admissions in his cross-examination that he owned ten cows and ten she buffalos and that the animals were not owned by his son Dilip. He also admitted that he had raised money for purchase of milch animals from the income he generated by selling milk of one of the two cows initially owned by him. But, there is no admission given by him to the effect that he himself was carrying on the milk business or in someway or the other contributed to the milk business of his son. In his examination-in-chief, he has stated that it was his son who was doing the milk business and this assertion of the fact has remained unshattered all throughout. It has also not been denied by the appellant by giving a suggestion of denial of the same to P.W.1 Bhaiyyaji Kanhole. This evidence, therefore, establishes the fact that the milk business was being carried on not by respondent No.1 but by his son Dilip and that capital for the milk business in the nature of milch animals was provided by respondent No.1. Without management skills and labour being applied to such capital, no generation of income could have been there. Therefore, it has to be held that whatever income was generated through the dairy business carried on by Dilip was only by dint of his own efforts. At the most, some deduction towards premium or dividend for the capital investment payable to respondent No.1 could be made, in addition to what is already made for production cost. In this case, it could be assumed to be at 10% of the sale proceeds of milk sold by deceased Dilip. Therefore, I find no substance in the argument of learned Counsel for the appellant that there is no evidence in this case to show that deceased Dilip earned any fixed income. 8. As regards income of Dilip, the Tribunal has fixed it by relying on Income Certificate vide Ex.38. This certificate was proved through the evidence of witness no. Therefore, I find no substance in the argument of learned Counsel for the appellant that there is no evidence in this case to show that deceased Dilip earned any fixed income. 8. As regards income of Dilip, the Tribunal has fixed it by relying on Income Certificate vide Ex.38. This certificate was proved through the evidence of witness no. 2 Dhanraj (Ex.37), the Secretary of Dattatreya Milk Co-operative Society. When it was exhibited in evidence, no objection was taken by appellant for its being admitted in evidence. It is well settled law that when an objection does not relate to the admissibility of a document but is about mode of proof of a document, such an objection has to be taken at the time when the document is tendered in evidence and when it is not taken, it is deemed to be waived. [See Dayamathi Bai v. K.M. Shaffi (2004) 7 SCC 107 ]. The objection in this case is not the one relating to the admissibility of the income certificate and, therefore, now appellant cannot be allowed to raise it for the first time in appeal. For this reason, the objection cannot be sustained now. 9. The Tribunal has found that the amount of sale proceeds per month was on an average of Rs.6,596/-, which was rounded off to Rs.6,600/-. The Tribunal has deducted 30% from this amount as cost of the production. I have already found that 10% further deduction would be reasonable on account of the premium or dividend upon capital investment payable to respondent No.1. So, the annual income of deceased Dilip after deduction of 40% made therefrom for the purpose of determination of quantum of compensation would come to Rs. 47,520/-. 10. Learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that since deceased Dilip was a bachelor at the time of his death, 50% deduction from his annual income should be made. In support, he places his reliance upon the cases of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs. Shri Laxman Iyer & another AIR 2003 SC 4182 and Syed Basheer Ahamed & others Vs. Mohammed Jameel & another 2009 (4) Mh. L. J. 328. On the other hand, learned Counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2 has submitted that the deduction for personal expenses should not be more than one-third of the annual income. 11. Shri Laxman Iyer & another AIR 2003 SC 4182 and Syed Basheer Ahamed & others Vs. Mohammed Jameel & another 2009 (4) Mh. L. J. 328. On the other hand, learned Counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2 has submitted that the deduction for personal expenses should not be more than one-third of the annual income. 11. In the case of SyedBasheer (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that deduction on account of personal expenses by the unmarried deceased, in the absence of any contrary evidence, should be one-half of his income. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the percentage of deduction would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and if no evidence is led on this point, the normal practice would be to deduct towards personal and living expenses of the deceased one-third of the income in case he was married and one-half of the income if he was a bachelor. 12. In the case of Amrit Bhanu Shali & others Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & others – 2012 (4) T.A.C. 775 (S.C.), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has followed the principles laid down in the case of Sarla Verma (Smt.) and others Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation & another – (2009) 6 SCC 121 for making deduction for personal and living expenses. In SarlaVerma's case, it has been held that in regard to a bachelor, 50% amount is deducted as personal and living expenses as it is assumed that a bachelor would spend more on himself and after his marriage, his contribution to the parents would most likely be reduced drastically. 13. In the case at hand, it is seen that the Tribunal has made only one-third deduction for personal and living expenses of the deceased, which is inconsistent with the law settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In this case, no evidence has been led on the point of amount spent by deceased Dilip out of his income towards his personal and living expenses. Therefore, following the law laid down in cases of Syed(supra) and AmritBhanu Shali (supra), half of the amount from the annual income of the deceased would have to be deducted. Thus, annual dependency of respondents No. 1 and 2 would be Rs. 23,760/- . 14. Now, let us consider the question of application of appropriate multiplier. Therefore, following the law laid down in cases of Syed(supra) and AmritBhanu Shali (supra), half of the amount from the annual income of the deceased would have to be deducted. Thus, annual dependency of respondents No. 1 and 2 would be Rs. 23,760/- . 14. Now, let us consider the question of application of appropriate multiplier. While, learned Counsel of the appellant submits that it should be related to the age of the parents as the deceased was unmarried, learned Counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2 submits that it should be based upon the age of the deceased. Learned Counsel for the appellant seeks to draw support from the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of LaxmanIyer (supra), whereas learned Counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2 relies upon the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of AmritBhanu Shali (supra). 15. In the case of LaxmanIyer (supra), in paragraph-9, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that for determination of quantum of compensation, it is not the age of the deceased alone but the age of the claimants as well, which are the relevant factors. It is also held that in case of an unmarried deceased, there is a possibility of reduction in contribution once a person get married and, therefore, keeping in view this factor, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that age of the parents, who are claimants, should also be considered while fixing the quantum of compensation. 16. There is, however, a subsequent case, the case of AmritBhanu Shali (Supra), in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court, considering the law laid down by it in the case of SarlaVerma (supra), held that the multiplier to be used should be as mentioned in column-4 of the table given in the said case of SarlaVerma. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in this case, further laid down that the selection of multiplier should be based on the age of the deceased and not on the age of the dependents. The relevant observations appearing in paragraph-17 of AmritBhanu Shali's case are reproduced as below.: “....The selection of multiplier is based on the age of the deceased and not on the basis of the age of dependent. The relevant observations appearing in paragraph-17 of AmritBhanu Shali's case are reproduced as below.: “....The selection of multiplier is based on the age of the deceased and not on the basis of the age of dependent. There may be a number of dependents of the deceased whose age may be different and, therefore, the age of dependents has no nexus with the computation of compensation...” 17. So, what emerges from the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases of LaxmanIyer and AmritBhanu shali commonly is that the age of the deceased is certainly an important criterion to be considered for fixing the amount of compensation. While this criterion, in the case of LaxmanIyer, has been coupled with the age of the parents or other dependents, in the case of AmritBhanu Shali, it is delinked with the age of the dependents when the Apex Court ruled that age of dependents has nothing to do with the computation of compensation. The decision rendered in the case of AmritBhanu Shali is in the later point of time, and it brings about some change in the principle to be adopted for determination of compensation and, therefore, this Court would have to follow the said decision of AmritBhanu Shali. 18. Applying the law laid down in the said case of AmritBhanu Shali, I find, the proper multiplier to be adopted in this case would be of 17 considering the fact that age of the deceased was 27 years at the time of his death. By application of this multiplier to the amount determined to be the annual loss of dependency, total amount comes to Rs.4,03,920/- and this amount is payable for total loss of dependency. In addition to this, the amounts as fixed by the Tribunal towards loss of estate, loss of love and affection and funeral expenses would also be due and payable to respondents No. 1 and 2. Thus, total compensation payable to respondents No.1 and 2 would come to Rs. 4,38,920/-and this amount shall be liable to be paid to them by the appellant and respondent No.3 jointly and severally together with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of claim petition till its realisation. 19. Thus, total compensation payable to respondents No.1 and 2 would come to Rs. 4,38,920/-and this amount shall be liable to be paid to them by the appellant and respondent No.3 jointly and severally together with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of claim petition till its realisation. 19. Learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that there is no provision in law to impose any penalty by way of charging higher interest upon failure to pay compensation amount within the time stipulated by the Court. I think, he is right. Learned Counsel for respondents No.1 and 2 has also not shown to me any provision of law on the basis of which the direction issued by the Tribunal regarding charging of interest @12% p.a. from the date of petition till realisation of the amount upon commission of default to pay within certain time limit, could be justified. Such a direction is in the nature of a penalty and it cannot be issued by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, which is a creation of a special statute, except under express authority of law. This direction, therefore, has to go. 20. In the result, the appeal deserves to be allowed partly with costs. I. The appeal is partly allowed with proportionate costs. II. The direction regarding quantum of compensation in the impugned judgment and award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Nagpur is modified and substituted by the direction that the appellant and respondent No.3 shall jointly and severally pay compensation of Rs.4,38,920/-(rupees four lac thirty eight thousand nine hundred & twenty only) inclusive of compensation on account of no fault liability to respondents No.1 and 2 with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of the petition till the date of final payment. III. The direction regarding payment of interest @ 12% per annum in case of failure to pay the amount directed, within forty-five days, issued in the impugned judgment and award, stands quashed and set aside. IV. Decree be drawn up accordingly.