JUDGMENT Per Rajiv Sharma, Judge. This Regular Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 21.5.2012, rendered by learned Additional District Judge, Mandi, H.P., in Civil Appeal No. 63 of 2010. 2. “Key facts” necessary for the adjudication of this Regular Second Appeal are that the respondents/plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as the “plaintiffs” for the sake of convenience) filed a suit for partition and separate possession of the suit land against the appellants/defendants (hereinafter referred to as the “defendants” for the sake of convenience). According to the plaintiffs, the suit land comprised in Khata/Khatauni No.16/23, Khasra Nos. 182, 183, 184, 185 and 186 Kita 5 measuring 212 sq. mts., situated in Mauza Mangwain, District Mandi, H.P., is jointly owned and possessed by plaintiff No.1 and in hissadari possession of defendants No. 1 and 2 as per copy of Jamabandi for the year 1984-85. Rup Lal and Najaku died and mutations No. 866 and 867 were attested regarding succession of their estates. Defendants No. 5 to 7 transferred their shares in favour of Rahul and Pardeep. According to the plaintiffs, the suit land was joint and un-partitioned property of the parties and the plaintiffs and proforma defendants had ten shares in it, but defendants No. 1 and 2 were threatening and attempting to alienate and change the nature of the suit land in order to grab the same. Hence, the suit. 3 The suit was contested by defendants No.1 and 2 taking preliminary objections. It was asserted that the suit land was built up area/house, situated in Mandi Town. It was exclusively owned and possessed by Khazan Singh. It was admitted that Chinti Devi had died and she was succeeded by defendants No. 6 to 9. It was also admitted that Rup Lal and Nazaku had died and their estate was succeeded by the plaintiffs and proforma defendants. It was asserted that Khazan Singh was working as driver in Mandi Transport Corporation. He acquired the part of the suit property out of his personal income in the name of his father Masadi and uncle Kapooru, to give honour to elders of the family and part of the suit property was acquired by him in his own name. It was agreed that the property at Mandi Town would be exclusively owned and possessed by Khazan Singh and the property at village would be exclusively owned and possessed by late Kapooru. It was agreed that the property at Mandi Town would be exclusively owned and possessed by Khazan Singh and the property at village would be exclusively owned and possessed by late Kapooru. The partition was effected in the year 1957. The parties and their successors started residing separately after the partition. Khazan Singh raised construction without any objection from any person. The map was approved by Municipal Council, Mandi, in the year 1961 and the construction was made in the year 1982-83. Defendants No. 3 and 5 transferred their interest in favour of Pardeep Kumar and Rahul. Plaintiff and proforma defendants wanted to take undue advantage of wrong entries in the revenue record. Khazan Singh and thereafter his successors were in exclusive, continuous and hostile possession of the suit property to the knowledge of the plaintiff and proforma defendants and they had acquired title by way of adverse possession. It was specifically denied that they wanted to alienate their share. 4 Defendants No. 6, 7 and 9 also contested the suit by filing separate written statement. According to them, Khazan Singh remained in possession of the suit property. It was admitted that Rup Lal and Najaku had died. However, it was denied that plaintiffs and proforma defendants were their successors. It was asserted that the suit property was acquired by Khazan Singh, but he had got the name of his father and uncle recorded in the sale deed. A family settlement was arrived at in the year 1957, in which it was agreed that the suit property in Mandi Town would be exclusively owned and possessed by Khazan Singh and the property in the villages at Sarkaghat would be exclusively owned and possessed by late Kapooru. The entries could not be corrected in the revenue record. 5 The plaintiffs filed replications to the written statements filed by defendants No. 1 and 2 and defendants No. 6, 7 and 9 separately. 6. Learned trial court framed the issues on 2.2.1994 and 15.6.1994. 7. The suit of the plaintiffs was decreed by the learned trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 3.3.1997. Civil Appeals No. 55/97 and 58/97 were preferred against the judgment and decree dated 3.3.1997. 6. Learned trial court framed the issues on 2.2.1994 and 15.6.1994. 7. The suit of the plaintiffs was decreed by the learned trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 3.3.1997. Civil Appeals No. 55/97 and 58/97 were preferred against the judgment and decree dated 3.3.1997. The civil suit No. 59/1989 was remanded back vide orders dated 28.5.2001 to the learned Sub Judge, 1st Class, Court No.II, Mandi for finally deciding whether due to death of Smt. Durga and Smt. Devku, suit stood abetted or not. Civil Suit No.59/1989 was again decreed by the learned Sub Judge, Court No.2, Mandi, vide judgment and decree dated 16.10.2001. An appeal bearing Civil Appeal No. 36 of 2002 was preferred against the judgment and decree dated 16.10.2001, which was allowed by the then learned Addition District Judge, Mandi, vide judgment and decree dated 30.9.2004, who reversed the findings recorded by the learned trial court on issue No.3 relating to valuation of the suit for the purpose of court fee and remanded back the suit permitting the parties to lead evidence on issue No.3 and decide the matter afresh. Thereafter, statements of DW7 Jagdish Chand, DW8 Murari Lal and DW9 Harinder Kumar were recorded. 8. The learned Civil Judge, (Junior Division), Court No.2, Mandi, decreed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 10.12.2008. 9. Defendants feeling aggrieved by judgment and decree dated 10.12.2008 filed an appeal before learned first appellate court, who vide judgment and decree dated 21.5.2012 dismissed the same. Hence, this Regular Second Appeal. It was admitted on following substantial question of law on 28.9.2012:- “What is the effect on the judgment of the Courts below on the point of ouster and adverse plea which was only a plea in the alternative the main defence and main plea of the appellant being family partition/family settlement in the year 1957 qua the joint properties between Shri Massadi and Shri Kapooru?” 10. Mr. G.R. Palsra, learned Advocate, appearing on behalf of respondents No. 2, 4, 5 and 6, has supported the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the courts below. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records carefully. 12. PW1, Vidya Sagar, has testified that the suit land measuring 212 sq. mts.. was situated in Mauza Mangwain. It was joint property. The contesting defendants had tried to alienate the suit land in the year 1989. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records carefully. 12. PW1, Vidya Sagar, has testified that the suit land measuring 212 sq. mts.. was situated in Mauza Mangwain. It was joint property. The contesting defendants had tried to alienate the suit land in the year 1989. They were requested not to do so, but all in vain. In these circumstances, the suit was filed. In his cross-examination, he deposed that the suit land was vacant. He denied the suggestion that the house was constructed on the entire suit land. He also denied suggestion that they agreed to take the land in village and relinquish the land at Mandi to the defendants. He also denied the suggestion that he had not objected when the construction of the house was raised by the defendants. 13. PW2, Nand Lal, deposed that he knew the forefathers of the parties. 14. DW1, Ramesh Chand, deposed that the house was constructed in the year 1961. No vacant land was situated around the house. The house was constructed by Khazan Singh. The suit land was purchased by Khazan Singh. He proved on record receipts Ext.DW1/A, Ext. DW1/B, Ext.DW1/C, Ext. DW1/D and Ext. DW1/F. He also proved on record copy of jamabandi for the year 1989-90 vide Ext.DW1/F. Khazan Singh got entered the suit property in the names of his father and uncle, to give them respect. His uncle Kapooru relinquished his share in the suit land. In his cross-examination, he deposed that no document was prepared to relinquish the land at Mandi. The land situated in Damsera and Bahru was joint. The land at Mandi was left for Khazan Singh. However, no mutation was attested to this effect. He did not know measurement of the house. 15. DW2, Makar Dhwaj, deposed that he knew Khazan Singh as he was from his Department. Khazan Singh had constructed the house about 30-35 years ago. According to him, no vacant land existed around the house. 16. DW3, R.P. Mastana, deposed that there was no vacant land around the house, which was owned by Khazan Singh and thereafter by the defendants. 17. DW4, Nagender Sharma, deposed that permission for construction of the house was granted by Municipal Council, Mandi in favour of Khazan Singh on 20.5.1961. 18. DW5, Trilok Chand, proved on record Tatima, Ext. DW5/A. 19. DW3, R.P. Mastana, deposed that there was no vacant land around the house, which was owned by Khazan Singh and thereafter by the defendants. 17. DW4, Nagender Sharma, deposed that permission for construction of the house was granted by Municipal Council, Mandi in favour of Khazan Singh on 20.5.1961. 18. DW5, Trilok Chand, proved on record Tatima, Ext. DW5/A. 19. DW6, Pratap Thakur, deposed that there was no vacant land around the house. In cross-examination, he deposed that defendants owned only one house, which was constructed in the year 1961-62. 20. DW7, Gattu Ram, deposed that he had supplied construction material to Khazan Singh about 35-40 years back. The house comprised of 30-40 rooms. There was no vacant land around the house. It is three storeyed house. 21. PW1, Beas Dev, who appeared in rebuttal, deposed that construction was carried out by the defendants after 1989. He had obtained the stay orders from the court. He also proved on record photographs, Ext. PA and Ext. PB, negatives whereof are Ext.PC and Ext.PD. 22. PW2, Nanak Chand, who also appeared in rebuttal, deposed that he had taken the photographs, Ext. PA and Ext. PB. 23. One Jagdish Chand, Patwari, was also examined as DW7. He proved on record Ext.PW7/A and Ext.PW7/B respectively. 24. DW8, Murari Lal Sharma, deposed that he prepared the building map vide Ext. DW8/A and the construction was raised according to the same. 25. According to Misal Haquiat Bandobast Jadid, Ext.P1, Khazan Singh was recorded to be exclusive owner in possession of Khasra Nos. 187 and 198 and shown to be joint owner in possession of Khasra Nos. 182, 183, 184, 185 and 186. Statement of DW1 Ramesh Chand that Khazan Singh had purchased the suit land and got entered the same in the names of his father and uncle, to give them respect, cannot be believed. There is no tangible evidence that the land at Mandi was to be relinquished in favour of Khazan Singh and the land in the village was to be delivered to the forefathers of the plaintiffs. DW1, Ramesh Chand testified that he was 39 years old in the year 1994. Thus, he was born in the year 1955. The specific case of the defendants was that the suit land was partitioned in the year 1957. DW1 Ramesh Chand at that time was only 2 years old. DW1, Ramesh Chand testified that he was 39 years old in the year 1994. Thus, he was born in the year 1955. The specific case of the defendants was that the suit land was partitioned in the year 1957. DW1 Ramesh Chand at that time was only 2 years old. He could not be the witness to the fact that the suit land was purchased by Khazan Singh in the name of his father and uncle. There is presumption of truth attached to the Jamabandi. The presumption has not been rebutted by the defendants. DW1 Ramesh Chand categorically admitted that the lands in villages Damsera and Bahru was joint. He also admitted that no paper or document was ever prepared regarding relinquishment of property at Mandi and no mutation was attested to this effect. There is only self-speaking statement of DW1 Ramesh Chand qua partition. The partition has not been specifically proved. Even assuming hypothetically, the partition had taken place, however, the same was required to be reported to the Patwari concerned for preparing the revenue entries as per Section 135 of the Land Revenue Act. The defendants have also failed to prove ingredients of adverse possession. They have also not led any evidence on the question of ouster. DW1 Ramesh Chand has not testified that Khazan Singh had asserted the hostile title over the suit land. According to him, the land was purchased by Khazan Singh in the name of his father and uncle. He had spent money for the construction of the house. The land at Mandi was left for Khazan Singh by Kapooru prior to the construction. The court has already observed that this cannot be believed in the absence of any evidence. Mere payment of electricity and water charges will not make the possession adverse qua the joint owners. 26 It has come in the evidence that the house was constructed on the suit land after 1989. The vacant land is also existing around the house. DW1 Ramesh Chand has admitted neither any mutation was attested nor he knew about any settlement. 27. Mr. Ajay Kumar, learned Senior Advocate, has argued that the house has already been constructed on the suit land and his clients are entitled to compensation. The learned courts below have rightly relied on R.S. Manannappu vs. Chanamma, AIR 1965 SC 1812 . DW1 Ramesh Chand has admitted neither any mutation was attested nor he knew about any settlement. 27. Mr. Ajay Kumar, learned Senior Advocate, has argued that the house has already been constructed on the suit land and his clients are entitled to compensation. The learned courts below have rightly relied on R.S. Manannappu vs. Chanamma, AIR 1965 SC 1812 . The defendants have failed to prove the partition and the ouster of the plaintiffs in order to prove plea of adverse possession. The revenue entries remained un-rebutted. 28. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohammad Baqar and others Vs. Naim-un-Nisa Bibi and others, 1956 S.C.548{(S) AIR V 43 C 96 Aug.} have held that under the law, possession of one co-sharer is possession of all co-sharers and it cannot be adverse to them, unless there is a denial of their right to their knowledge by the person in possession, and exclusion and ouster following thereon for the statutory period. Their Lordships have held as under: “3. Against this judgment, the defendants preferred an appeal to the High Court of Allahabad contending that the suit was liable to be dismissed on all the three grounds put forward in the trial court, and further that the decree for rendition of accounts from 1892 was bad. The plaintiffs preferred a cross-appeal claiming that they were entitled also to their share of the profits from the estate from the date of the institution of the suit until they were put in separate possession. By their judgment dated 22-10-1943 the learned Judges of the High Court agreed with the Subordinate Judge that the defendants had failed to establish the family custom excluding female heirs from inheritance, that further the family settlement which was alleged to have been entered in 1893 was not proved, and that on the facts no question of limitation arose. They, however, set aside the decree in so far as it directed rendition of accounts by the first defendant from 1892, but awarded the plaintiffs a decree for future mesne profits from the date of the plaint to be ascertained in further proceedings under O. 20, R. 12. They also held - and that was accepted by both parties - that the correct share to which the plaintiffs were entitled was 153/672 and not 34/168, as decreed by the Subordinate Judge. They also held - and that was accepted by both parties - that the correct share to which the plaintiffs were entitled was 153/672 and not 34/168, as decreed by the Subordinate Judge. It is against this judgment that the present appeal by the defendants is directed.” 29 The Division Bench of this Court in Shiam Sunder and others Vs. Tara Chand and others, 1978 S.L.C.111 has reiterated the principle laid down by their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above-cited judgment that in the absence of clear proof of ouster, the possession of one sharer must be regarded as possession on behalf of all. It is not reasonably possible to hold that the ouster from possession of the respondents has been established. The Division Bench has further held that there is nothing to show that for a period of twelve years or more there has been a disclaimer by the appellants of the rights of the respondents by any open and unequivocal assertions of hostile title. 30 In Shiv Saran Singh Thakur Vs. Shri Ram Sarup Thakur and others 1989 (1) Sim. L.C. 119, the Division Bench of this Court has held that for upholding the plea of adverse possession, where parties are co-owners of the property and, more so, where the relationship between them is that of husband and wife, law requires strict proof. The Division Bench has further held that the essential elements for upholding such a plea, in a case where it is founded upon ouster of a co-owner, are that there should be “evidence of open assertions of hostile title, coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment by one of them to the knowledge of other so as to constitute ouster. The Division Bench has further held that the plea of ouster pre-supposes that the right of the co-owner in the property in dispute is not in doubt or is admitted by the parties setting up the plea of ouster. The Division Bench has laid down the following three principles to establish the plea of ouster. Firstly, there should be a declaration of a hostile animus, secondly, there should be uninterrupted and long possession of the party setting up the plea of ouster and thirdly, the rights of ownership should be exercised openly by the party setting up the plea of ouster. The Division Bench has held as under: “19. Firstly, there should be a declaration of a hostile animus, secondly, there should be uninterrupted and long possession of the party setting up the plea of ouster and thirdly, the rights of ownership should be exercised openly by the party setting up the plea of ouster. The Division Bench has held as under: “19. For upholding the plea of adverse possession, where parties are co-owners of the property and more so, where the relationship between them is that of husband and wife, law requires strict proof. The essential elements for upholding such a plea, in a case where it is founded upon ouster of a co-owner, are that there should be “evidence of open assertions of hostile title, coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment by one of them to the knowledge of other so as to constitute ouster. 22. The plea of ouster pre-supposes that the right of the co-owner in the property in dispute is not in doubt or is admitted by the parties setting up the plea of ouster. The gift which was made by plaintiff Ram Swarup in favour of Smt. Sarla Devi in regard to 1/16th share in the property was characterized by him as a paper transaction not only in the earlier suit but also in the present suit. While filing a written statement in suit No. 121 of 1955 what was said by plaintiff Ram Swarup was that Smt. Sarla Devi was not a necessary party as she had no share in the property for the partition whereof that suit had been brought. That plea was negatived. The learned Senior Sub-Judge held that Smt. Sarla Devi was a necessary party for the reasons that she was a coowner having 1/16th Share in the property. The result of the decision recorded by the learned Sub-Judge was that that the plea that Smt. Sarla Devi had no share in the property or the assertion to that effect by plaintiff Ram Swarup was negative by the Court and it was found that she was co-owner, along with plaintiff Ram Swarup, of the property. The assertion of hostile animus by plaintiff Ram Swarup in respect of 1/16th share of Smt. Sarla Devi in the property was negatived in the sense that it was found that this assertion was incorrect and that, in reality Smt. Sarla Devi was a co-owner of the property with plaintiff Ram Swarup. The assertion of hostile animus by plaintiff Ram Swarup in respect of 1/16th share of Smt. Sarla Devi in the property was negatived in the sense that it was found that this assertion was incorrect and that, in reality Smt. Sarla Devi was a co-owner of the property with plaintiff Ram Swarup. No challenge to the recognition of Smt. Sarla Devi, being a co-owner, in the property by the decree passed in suit No. 121 of 1955 was made by the plaintiff Ram Swarup. Obviously, therefore, he will be treated to have acquiesced in the situation that Smt. Sarla Devi was a co-owner of the property. 27. The principle underlying these decisions is that the interruption of a hostile animus on the part of one of the co-owners, inter-alia, by intervention of a judicial decision will have to be followed by a fresh expression of hostile animus on the part of that co-owner for sustaining any claim founded upon the plea of adverse possession against another co-owner. It is not open to him to take advantage of the hostile animus expressed by him, prior to the stage of interruption, for setting up the plea of adverse possession against the other co owner. Thus viewed, the alleged expression of hostile animus by plaintiff Ram Swarup by asserting, in the written statement filed by him in the earlier suti No. 121 of 1955, that Smt. Sarla Devi had no interest in the property, cannot be pleaded by him as expression of hostile animus, for purposes of the plea of adverse possession taken by him in the present suit. He will have to point to some other expression of hostile animus on his part in relation to 1/16th share of Sarla Devi. He has failed to do so. The consequence is obvious. His exclusive possession of the share of Smt. Sarla Devi and exercise by him of the rights of ownership in regard thereto, for a long period would not make his possession to be adverse. In law it would be deemed to be on behalf of the co-owners. Consequentially, the plea that plaintiff Ram Swarup had perfected his title even in respect of 1/16th share of Smt. Sarla Devi by adverse possession must fail.” 31. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vidya Devi alias Vidya Vati (Dead) by LRs. Vs. In law it would be deemed to be on behalf of the co-owners. Consequentially, the plea that plaintiff Ram Swarup had perfected his title even in respect of 1/16th share of Smt. Sarla Devi by adverse possession must fail.” 31. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vidya Devi alias Vidya Vati (Dead) by LRs. Vs. Prem Prakash and others, (1995) 4 Supreme Court Cases 496 have held that broadly speaking, three elements are necessary for establishing the plea of ouster in the case of co-owner. They are (i) declaration of hostile animus, (ii) long and uninterrupted possession of the person pleading ouster and (iii) exercise of right of exclusive ownership openly and to the knowledge of other co-owner. Their Lordships have held as under: “27. From the underlined portion extracted above, it will be seen that in order that the possession of co-owner may be adverse to others, it is necessary that there should be ouster or something equivalent to it. This was also the observation of the Supreme Court in P. Lakshmi Reddy's case ( AIR 1957 SC 314 ) (supra) which has since been followed in Mohd. Zain-ul-Abdin v. Syed Ahmad Mohiuddin, AIR 1990 SC 507 . 28. "Ouster" does not mean actual driving out of the co-sharer from the property. It will, however, not be High Court of H.P. complete unless it is coupled with all other ingredients required to constitute adverse possession, Broadly speaking, three elements are necessary for establishing the plea of ouster in the case of co-owner. They are(i) declaration of hostile animus(ii) long and uninterrupted possession of the person pleading ouster and (iii) exercise of right of exclusive ownership openly and to the knowledge of other co-owners. Thus co-owner, can under law, claim title by adverse possession against another co-owner who can, of course, file appropriate suit including suit for joint possession within time prescribed by law.” 32. Accordingly, in view of the observations and analysis made hereinabove, there is no merit in the Regular Second Appeal and the same is dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, also stands dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.