JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. 1. This appeal is instituted under section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 against the judgment dated 15.9.2010 passed by learned Single Judge in Arbitration case No. 16 of 2006. 2. “Key facts” necessary for the adjudication of this petition are that on the night of 21.2.1992, when the Insurance Policy was in operation, a fire broke out in the insured house of the appellants. The house was gutted into fire completely alongwith fittings, fixtures etc. A claim of Rs. 36,00,000/- was preferred against the respondent-Insurance Company. Surveyor was deputed by the Insurance Company. Surveyor assessed the claim at Rs. 26,09,668/- vide his report 18.8.1992. Appellants were paid a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- on 18.2.1993 against receipt and another sum of Rs. 16,09,668/- vide receipt dated 23.8.1993. The appellants served a notice dated 5.9.1993 Ex. CR-1 upon the Insurance Company claiming a sum of Rs. 9,30,332/- as balance amount of the insurance claim. The appellants invoked arbitration clause and two arbitrators, i.e. one by the claimants and one by the Insurance Company were appointed. Appellants appointed Sh. R.L. Sood, as Arbitrator while Insurance Company appointed Maharaj Bakhash Singh. Sh. Maharaj Bakhash Singh gave his separate award on 24.7.2003. Thereafter, Sh. R.L. Sood gave his award on 28.4.2004. Sh. Maharaj Bakhash Singh did not award any amount to the appellants. Sh. R.L. Sood awarded a sum of Rs. 9,30,332/-, i.e. the difference of the claim made by the claimants, soon after the occurrence of incident of fire and the amount paid by the Insurance Company on the basis of Surveyor?s report. Since the Arbitrators did not agree, the matter was referred to the Umpire. The Umpire vide award dated 12.12.2004 has agreed with the award of Sh. R.L. Sood and awarded the amount together with interest and costs as awarded by Sh. R.L. Sood. 3. Objection petition under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was filed by the Insurance Company. The Court rejected the objections vide order dated 23.12.2005 holding that objections under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 were not maintainable as the provisions of the old Act, i.e. Arbitration Act, 1940, were applicable to the case. 4. Sh. R.L. Sood, being one of the Arbitrators, filed award in the Court under section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Notices were issued to both the parties by the Court. 4. Sh. R.L. Sood, being one of the Arbitrators, filed award in the Court under section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Notices were issued to both the parties by the Court. The appellants applied for making the award of the Umpire Rule of Court while Insurance Company filed objections. Learned Single Judge framed the following issues: 1. “Whether the Arbitrators and Umpire were entitled to file separate award as alleged, if so its effect? O.P.O. 2. Whether the Arbitrators have not filed the awards as per section 42 of the Arbitration Act, if so its effect? O.P.O. 3. Whether the award of the Arbitrator was filed beyond time as alleged, if so its effect? O.P.O. 4. Whether the objections have not been filed in time, if so its effect? OPR. 5. Whether the Arbitrator travelled beyond the scope as alleged, if so its effect? OPO 6. Whether the matter has been referred to the Arbitrator wrongly and has no jurisdiction to decide the same as alleged? OPO 7. Relief.” 5. Learned Single Judge accepted the objections filed by the Insurance Company and the award was set aside. It is in these circumstances the present appeal has been preferred under section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 against the judgment dated 15.9.2010. 6. According to Mr. K.D. Sood, learned Senior Advocate, learned Single Judge has misread and drawn a wrong inference from the facts proved on record. He has also contended that the findings of the learned Single Judge that there was no plea of coercion, fraud or misrepresentation, are contrary to record. According to him, the amount has been claimed specifically without prejudice and “WP” was written as the Insurance Company was not paying and releasing the amount. 7. Mr. Ashwani K. Sharma has supported the judgment dated 15.9.2010. 8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record carefully. 9. What emerges from the facts enumerated hereinabove is that the fire had taken place on the night of 21.2.1992. The ensured house was gutted into fire. Claim of Rs. 36,00,000/- was preferred. Surveyor submitted his report on 18.8.1993. He assessed the claim of Rs. 26,09,668/-. The appellants were paid Rs. 16,09,668/- vide receipt Ex.PW-4/C and another sum of Rs. 9. What emerges from the facts enumerated hereinabove is that the fire had taken place on the night of 21.2.1992. The ensured house was gutted into fire. Claim of Rs. 36,00,000/- was preferred. Surveyor submitted his report on 18.8.1993. He assessed the claim of Rs. 26,09,668/-. The appellants were paid Rs. 16,09,668/- vide receipt Ex.PW-4/C and another sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- on 18.2.1993 against receipt Ex.PW-4/D. It is evident from the contents of receipt Ex.PW-4/C that the amount has been received as full and final settlement of the claim arising from incident of fire which took place on 21.2.1992. 10. We have gone through the notice dated 5.9.1993 Ex.CR-1 which is at page 289, volume-III of the paper book. It is though mentioned in the notice that the amount of compensation has been received by the appellants without prejudice to their rights and under protest, however, it is not stated in the notice Ex.CR-1 that the appellants were coerced to give the receipt, i.e. Ex.PW-4/C. We have also gone through notice Ex.CR-2 dated 5.9.1993 whereby a request was made for the appointment of Arbitrator. In this notice also there is no mention of the coercion or undue influence or fraud or misrepresentation by the Insurance Company in obtaining receipt Ex.PW-4/C. We have also gone through the statement of claim filed before the Arbitrators dated 14.2.1993 and the written statement filed by the Insurance Company dated 24.2.1994. There is no allegation in the claim petition that the Insurance Company has exercised undue influence, coercion, fraud or misrepresentation at the time of issuance of receipt Ex.PW-4/C. 11. Mr. K.D. Sood, learned Senior Advocate has drawn the attention of the Court to Ex.AW-4/A in order to prove that the Insurance Company has exercised undue influence, coercion, fraud and misrepresentation. Affidavit filed by AW-4 Sanjay Kumar is at page 86, Volume-II of the paper book. There is no averment in the affidavit that the Insurance Company has exercised undue influence while obtaining receipt Ex.PW-4/C. While appearing as DW-4 Sanjay Kumar has specifically deposed that his affidavit may be read in examination-inchief, which is at page 116, Volume-II of the paper book. He has admitted in his cross-examination that after receipt of second payment of Rs. 16,09,668/-, they did not lodge any written protest with the Insurance Company/higher authorities regarding the compensation paid to them nor they contacted them. He has admitted in his cross-examination that after receipt of second payment of Rs. 16,09,668/-, they did not lodge any written protest with the Insurance Company/higher authorities regarding the compensation paid to them nor they contacted them. He has also admitted categorically that at the time of issuance of receipt they were not threatened. Volunteered that they were told that they be only made the payment if the form Ex.PW-4/B is signed by them. He has never refused to accept the payment. According to him, he has signed blank papers. His qualification was B.Com and he knew the consequences of signing the blank papers. He has also admitted that it was not pleaded in the claim petition that form Ex.PW-4/B was got signed from them. As noticed hereinabove, no objection has been taken in Ex.CR-1 and Ex. CR-2 in the claim petition and also in the affidavit filed with the claim petition. Appellant Sanjay Madan is B.Com graduate. It is not expected that a graduate person would sign the blank papers. He has admitted that he was not threatened at the time of receipt of payment nor they have lodged complaint with the higher authorities. Thus, the learned Single Judge has rightly come to the conclusion that Ex.PW-4/C was not the outcome of coercion, fraud and misrepresentation. Appellant Sanjay Madan has not uttered even a single word that Ex.PW-4/C was the outcome of coercion while appearing as AW-4. We have also noticed that as per Ex.PW-4/C, the money has been received by the appellants as full and final settlement of their claim arising out of fire incident dated 21.2.1992. Thus, they have been given complete discharge to the respondent Insurance Company in regard to liability of insurance policy. Once the Insurance Company has given complete discharge, as noticed by the learned Single Judge as per receipt Ex.PW-4/C, there was no dispute subsisting which was required to be referred to the Arbitrator under the insurance policy. The learned Single Judge has correctly appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence and has come to a right conclusion that the Arbitrator has come to a wrong conclusion that receipt Ex.PW-4/C was the result of coercion. 12. Mr. The learned Single Judge has correctly appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence and has come to a right conclusion that the Arbitrator has come to a wrong conclusion that receipt Ex.PW-4/C was the result of coercion. 12. Mr. K. D. Sood, learned Senior Advocate has vehemently argued that the claimants have received the payment under protest as per receipt Ex.PW-4/C. Merely writing words “WP” would not entitle the appellants to reagitate the claim when they had executed Ex.PW-4/C in which it is clearly and specifically written that the money has been received as full and final settlement of their claim arising out of the incident under insurance policy. 13. Their Lordships of the Hon?ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Nav Bharat Builders, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 83 have held that when the contractor acknowledged the receipt of the amount paid to him and stated that he was unconditionally withdrawing his claim in the suit in respect of labour escalation, there was full and final settlement of the claim and thereby there was no arbitral dispute in respect of labour escalation. Their Lordships have held as under: “4. It is seen that as regards the escalation of labour claims are concerned, the report of the sub-committee constituted by the government expressly mentioned in paragraph 8 thus: "This decision is also subject to the following conditions: (I) The contractor shall furnish to government a letter of acceptance in the prescribed form to the effect that the contractor agrees to accept the amount offered to him in full and final settlement of the said claim and by way of mutual arrangement between the contractor and government on the terms and conditions herein contained. (II) The letter of acceptance shall form part and shall always be deemed to have formed part of the contract. (III) Irrespective of the fact whether the contractor accepts this offer of government or not, in no event the contractor, shall be entitled to claim or take a plea in any dispute that the contractor may raise before the arbitrator, court or any authority in respect of the said claim to the effect that the sum offered by the government under this letter is the one agreed to be paid by the government to the contractor or to treat that sum as basis for adjudicating the claim by the said arbitrator, court or authority. (IV) The offer shall be open for acceptance by the contractor till 10/3/1989. If the contractor fails to communicate acceptance or rejection of offer by him in writing to the secretary (I) I.D., Government of Maharashtra on or before 10/3/1989 then the same shall automatically lapse on the aforesaid date and shall not be binding on Government vis-a-vis the contractor thereafter. (V) The final amount to be paid to the contractor shall be arrived at only after actual calculations to be made on the basis of the principles enunciated in para 7 above. The amount that would be payable to the contractor in future shall also be regulated accordingly. (9) You are requested to consider the offer and communicate your decision regarding acceptance or otherwise of the offer to the secretary (1 Irrigation Department, government of Maharashtra on or before the aforesaid date in the prescribed form annexed hereto. As soon as your acceptance letter is received by government, payment will be made after calculation of the actual amount of claim as aforesaid." Pursuant thereto in paragraph 9, when an option was given to the respondent to consider the offer and communicate his decision regarding acceptance or otherwise of the offer, in his letter dated 3/3/1989, he specifically stated that: "I agree to receive such amount for the price escalation on account of labour component as would be worked out on the principles as offered under the aforesaid government letter as and by way of full and final settlement of my claim submitted by me under my letter No. NBB/Dimbhe/1013/322/864, dated 18/9/1986 for the payment of the price escalation towards the labour component based on minimum wages. I further agree to accept the payment as decided by government till completion of the work." Thereafter the amount was paid and he acknowledged the receipt of the amount and also stated as earlier that unconditionally he was withdrawing his claim in the suit in respect of labour escalation. Thus we hold that there is full and final settlement of the claim and the respondent has accepted the accord and satisfaction, thereby there is no arbitrable dispute in respect of labour escalation. 6. Thus we hold that there is full and final settlement of the claim and the respondent has accepted the accord and satisfaction, thereby there is no arbitrable dispute in respect of labour escalation. 6. Shri Madhava Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant contended that in view of the letter dated 3/3/1989 the respondent had accepted to withdraw the entire claim in respect of Item 1 and that therefore there is no arbitrable dispute in that behalf. We find no substance in the contention. In all the letters the respondent had specifically referred at various stages that his acceptance was only in respect of labour escalation. Therefore, any other claims which the respondent made in the suit, the court is to consider whether arbitrable disputes arose under the contract for reference to arbitration and if so whether the respondent is entitled to any amount so claimed. These are the matters to be gone into. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in part as stated earlier, but in the circumstances, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.” 14. Their Lordships of the Hon?ble Supreme Court in M/s. P.K. Ramaih and Company vs. Chairman and Managing Director, National Thermal Power Corporation, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 126 have held that when there is voluntary and unconditional written acceptance of payment in full and final settlement of the contract, subsequent claim for further amounts in respect of the same work is not arbitrable dispute. Their Lordships have held as under: “6. The reading of the above arbitration clause would clearly establish that all questions and disputes relating to the meaning of the specifications, designs, drawings and instructions hereinbefore mentioned and as to the quality of workmanship or materials used on the work or as to any other question, claims, right, matter or things whatsoever in any way arising out of or relating to the contract, designs, drawings, specifications, estimates, instructions, orders or these conditions or otherwise concerning the works, or the execution or failure to execute the same whether arising during the progress of the work or after the completion or abandonment thereof shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the General Manager of the N.T.P.C. Ltd. On his inability or unwillingness, another arbitrator appointed by C.M.D. alone has to arbitrate the dispute. Thus it is clear that if there is an arbitrable dispute, it shall be referred to the named arbitrator. Thus it is clear that if there is an arbitrable dispute, it shall be referred to the named arbitrator. But there must exist a subsisting dispute. Admittedly the appellant acknowledged in writing accepting the correctness of the measurements as well as the final settlement and received the amount. Thereafter no arbitrable dispute arises for reference. 8. On those facts, this court held that although there was alleged payment as final satisfaction of the contract, yet as the respondent did not give any receipt accepting the settlement of the claim, the payment was unilateral, so the dispute still subsisted and therefore it was arbitrable dispute and the reference was valid. In Bhan Prakash case also there was no full and final settlement and payment was not received under a receipt. In L.K. Ahuja & Co. case this court while laying the general law held that if the bill was prepared by the department, the claim gets weakened. That was not a case of accord and satisfaction but one of pleading bar of limitation without prior rejection of the claim. Therefore, the ratio therein is of little assistance. The Calcutta High court merely followed the statement of law laid in Ahuja & Co. case .It is not shown to us that the Chief Construction Manager was competent to acknowledge the liability or an authority to refer the dispute for arbitration. So neither his letter binds the respondent nor operates as an estoppel. Admittedly the full and final satisfaction was acknowledged by a receipt in writing and the amount was received unconditionally. Thus there is accord and satisfaction by final settlement of the claims. The subsequent allegation of coercion is an afterthought and a devise to get over the settlement of the dispute, acceptance of the payment and receipt voluntarily given. In Russell on Arbitration, 19th Edn., p. 396 it is stated that "an accord and satisfaction may be pleaded in an action on award and will constitute a good defence". Accordingly, we hold that the appellant having acknowledged the settlement and also accepted measurements and having received the amount in full and final settlement of the claim, there is accord and satisfaction. There is no existing arbitrable dispute for reference to the arbitration. The High court is, therefore, right in its finding in this behalf. The appeals are dismissed but in the circumstances without costs.” 15. There is no existing arbitrable dispute for reference to the arbitration. The High court is, therefore, right in its finding in this behalf. The appeals are dismissed but in the circumstances without costs.” 15. Their Lordships of the Hon?ble Supreme Court in Nathani Steels Ltd. vs. Associated Constructions, 1995 Supp (3) SCC 324 have again reiterated that once there is a full and final settlement in respect of any particular dispute or difference in relation to a matter covered under the arbitration clause in the contract and that dispute or difference is finally settled by and between the parties, such a dispute or difference does not remain to be an arbitrable dispute and the arbitration clause cannot be invoked even though for certain other matters, the contract may be in subsistence. Their Lordships have held as under: “3 .The appellant has invited our attention to two decisions of this court. The first dated 1/10/1993 in P.K. Ramaiah and Co. v. Chairman & Managing Director, National Thermal Power Corpn and second, dated 4/2/1994 in State of Maharashtra v. Nav Bharat Builders'. In the first mentioned case the parties had resolved their disputes and differences by a settlement pursuant whereto the payment was agreed and accepted in full and final settlement of the contract. Thereafter, brushing aside that settlement the Arbitration clause was sought to be invoked and this court held that under the said clause certain matters mentioned therein could be settled through Arbitration but once those were settled amicably by and between the parties and there was full and final payment as per the settlement, there existed no arbitrable dispute whatsoever and, therefore, it was not open to invoke the Arbitration clause. In the second mentioned case the respondent-contractor acknowledged the receipt of the amount paid to him and stated that there was unconditional withdrawal of his claim in the suit in respect of the labour escalation. There was, thus, full and final settlement of the claim and it was contended that no arbitrable dispute survived in relation thereto. Other claims, if any, and which were not settled by and between the parties could be raised and it would be open to consider whether the arbitrable dispute arose under the contract necessitating reference to arbitration. There was, thus, full and final settlement of the claim and it was contended that no arbitrable dispute survived in relation thereto. Other claims, if any, and which were not settled by and between the parties could be raised and it would be open to consider whether the arbitrable dispute arose under the contract necessitating reference to arbitration. Dealing with this question also this court after referring to the decision in P.K. Ramaiah case concluded that in relation to the claim under the head 'labour escalation' there did not remain any arbitrable dispute which could be referred to arbitration. It would thus be seen that once there is a full and final settlement in respect of any particular dispute or difference in relation to a matter covered under the Arbitration clause in the contract and that dispute or difference is finally settled by and between the parties, such a dispute or difference does not remain to be an arbitrable dispute and the Arbitration clause cannot be invoked even though for certain other matters, the contract may be in subsistence. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, placed great emphasis on an earlier decision of this court in Damodar Valley Corpn. v. K.K. Kar and in particular to the observations made in paras 11 to 13 of the judgment. It may, at the outset, be pointed out that a similar argument was advanced based on the observations made in this decision, in Ramaiah case also (vide para 7 but the same was rejected holding that on the facts since the , respondent did not give any receipt accepting the settlement of the claim, the payment made by the other side was only unilateral and hence the dispute subsisted and the Arbitration clause in the contract could be invoked. Therefore, that decision can be distinguished on facts. Even otherwise we feel that once the parties have arrived at a settlement in respect of any dispute or difference arising under a contract and that dispute or the difference is amicably settled by way of a final settlement by and between the parties, unless that settlement is set aside in proper proceedings, it cannot lie in the mouth of one of the parties to the settlement to spurn it on the ground that it was a mistake and proceed to invoke the Arbitration clause. If this is permitted the sanctity of contract, the settlement also being a contract, would be wholly lost and it would be open to one party to take the benefit under the settlement and then to question the same on the ground of mistake without having the settlement set aside. In the circumstances, we think that in the instant case since the dispute or difference was finally settled and payments were made as per the settlement, it was not open to the respondent unilaterally to treat the settlement as non est and proceed to invoke the Arbitration clause. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was wrong in the view that it took.” 16. Their Lordships of the Hon?ble Supreme Court in United India Insurance vs. Ajmer Singh Cotton and General Mills and others, (1999) 6 SCC 400 have held that mere execution of the discharge voucher would not always deprive the consumer from preferring claim with respect to the deficiency in service or consequential benefits arising out of the amount paid in default of the service rendered. Despite execution of the discharge voucher, the consumer may be in a position to satisfy the Tribunal or the Commission under the Act that such discharge voucher or receipt had been obtained from him under the circumstances which can be termed as fraudulent or exercise of undue influence or by misrepresentation or the like. Their Lordships have held as under: “6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. It is true that the award of interest is not specifically authorised under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter called 'the Act') but in view of our judgment in Sovintorg (India) Ltd. v. State Bank of India (Civil Appeal No. 823 of 1992) decided on 11th August, 1999 (reported in 1999 AIR SCW 2878) we are of the opinion that in appropriate cases the forum and the commissions under the Act are authorised to grant reasonable interest under the facts and circumstances of each case. The mere execution of the discharge voucher would not always deprive the consumer from preferring claim with respect to the deficiency in service or consequential benefits arising out of the amount paid in default of the service rendered. The mere execution of the discharge voucher would not always deprive the consumer from preferring claim with respect to the deficiency in service or consequential benefits arising out of the amount paid in default of the service rendered. Despite execution of the discharge voucher, the consumer may be in a position to satisfy the Tribunal or the Commission under the Act that such discharge voucher or receipt had been obtained from him under the circumstances which can be termed as fraudulent or exercise of undue influence or by misrepresentation or the like. If in a given case the consumer satisfies the authority under the Act that the discharge voucher was obtained by fraud, misrepresentation under influence or the like, coercive bargaining compelled by circumstances, the authority before whom the complaint is made would be justified in granting appropriate relief. However, where such discharge voucher is proved to have been obtained under any of the suspicious circumstances noted hereinabove, the tribunal or the Commission would be justified in granting the appropriate relief under the circumstances of each case. The mere execution of the discharge voucher and acceptance of the insurance claim would not estop the insured from making further claim from the insurer but only under the circumstances as noticed earlier. The Consumer Disputes Redressal Forums and Commissions constituted under the Act shall also have the power to fasten liability against the insurance companies notwithstanding the issuance of the discharge voucher. Such a claim cannot be termed to be fastening the liability against the insurance companies over and above the liabilities payable under the contract of insurance envisaged in the policy of insurance. The claim preferred regarding the deficiency of service shall be deemed to be based upon the insurance policy, being covered by the provisions of Section 14 of the Act.” 17. Their Lordships of the Hon?ble Supreme Court in National Insurance Company Limited vs. Sehtia Shoes, (2008) 5 SCC 400 have held that filing of claim after settlement is not barred when the amount is received as final settlement of claim, but it has to be proved that agreement to accept a particular amount was on account of coercion. Their Lordships have held as under: “8. Filing of a complaint is, therefore, not barred; but it has to be proved that agreement to accept a particular amount was on account of coercion. Their Lordships have held as under: “8. Filing of a complaint is, therefore, not barred; but it has to be proved that agreement to accept a particular amount was on account of coercion. In the instant case, this relevant factor has not been considered specifically by the District Forum, State Commission and the National Commission. Though plea of coercion was taken by claimant-respondent, same was refuted by the appellant. There is no dispute that the discharge voucher had been signed by the respondent. There has to be an adjudication as to whether the discharge voucher was signed voluntarily or under coercion. We remit the matter to the District Forum for fresh consideration. It would do well to dispose of the matter as early as practicable, preferably by the end of September, 2008.” 18. In the instant case, as we have already discussed, the appellants have failed to prove that the receipt was obtained from them under the circumstances, which could be termed as undue influence, fraud or misrepresentation. 19. Their Lordships of the Hon?ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others vs. Hari Singh, 2010 (10) Scale 205 have held that when the parties by a supplementary agreement obtained a full and final discharge after paying the entire amount, which was due and payable to the contractor, thereafter the contractor would not be justified in invoking arbitration because there was no arbitral dispute for reference to the arbitration. Their Lordships have held as under: “14. In this case the court relied on earlier judgments of this court and reiterated the legal position which has been crystallized by a series of judgments where both the parties to a contract confirmed in writing that the contract has been fully and finally discharged by the parties and there was no outstanding claim or dispute and thereafter the matter could not have been referred to the arbitration. 15. In a celebrated book, Russell on Arbitration, 19th Edn., p.396, it is stated that "an accord and satisfaction may be pleaded in an action on award and will constitute a good defence". 16. 15. In a celebrated book, Russell on Arbitration, 19th Edn., p.396, it is stated that "an accord and satisfaction may be pleaded in an action on award and will constitute a good defence". 16. In our considered view, on the basis of the above settled legal position that when the parties by a supplementary agreement obtained a full and final discharge after paying the entire amount, which was due and payable to the contractor, thereafter the contractor would not be justified in invoking arbitration because there was no arbitral dispute for reference to the arbitration.” 20. Learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court in M/s Vaish Brothers and Co. vs. Union of India and another, AIR 1999 Delhi 105 has held that when the dispute is settled finally, arbitration clause cannot be invoked in respect of such dispute, even though other disputes subsist. Their Lordships have held as under: “2. Ms. Jyoti Singh learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent arguing on the first point contended that the contractor having signed the final bill and having received payment in full satisfaction of its claim could not later on raise a dispute. She has placed reliance upon the judgments reported as Nathani Steels Limited Vs. Associated Constructions, 1995 Supp (3) SCC 324, M/s P.K.Ramaiah & Co. Vs. Chairman & Managing Director, National Thermal Power Corporation, 1994 (1) SCALE 1 , State of Maharashtra Vs. Navbharat and State of Maharashtra Vs.Nav Bharat Builders, 1994 Supp (3) 83 in support of her contention that once there was a full and final settlement in respect of any particular dispute or difference in relation to a matter covered under the arbitration clause in the contract and that dispute or difference is finally settled by and between the parties, such a dispute or difference does not remain to be dispute and the arbitration clause could not be invoked even though for certain other matters the contract may be in subsistence. Once the parties had arrived at a settlement in respect of any dispute or difference arising under a contract and that dispute or difference is amicably settled by way of a final settlement for and between the parties, unless that settlement was set aside in proper proceedings it could not lie in the mouth of one of the parties to the settlement to spurn it on the ground that it was a mistake and to proceed to invoke the arbitration clause. If this was permitted the sanctity of the contract, the settlement also being a contract, would be wholly lost and it would be open to one party to take the benefit under the settlement and then question the same on the ground of mistake without having the settlement set aside.” 21. Mr. K.D. Sood, learned Senior Advocate has placed strong reliance on National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. M/s Boghara Polyfab Pvt. Limited, AIR 2009 SC 170 . In this case, the discharge voucher was handed over to respondent on 21.3.2006. It was signed and delivered to the appellant immediately thereafter acknowledging that a sum of Rs. 2,33,94,964/- has been received from the insurer in full and final settlement and that in consideration of such payment, the respondent absolved the appellant from all liabilities, present and future, arising directly or indirectly, out of loss or damage under the policy. Admittedly, on the date when such discharge voucher was signed and given by the respondent, the payment of Rs. 2,33,94,964/- had been made. It was made after receiving the voucher. 22. In the case in hand, the amount has been specifically mentioned in receipts Ex.PW-4/C and Ex.PW-4/D. Thus, the judgment (supra) relied upon by Mr. K.D. Sood is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 23. Accordingly, in view of analysis and discussion made hereinabove, there is no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of. No costs.