JUDGMENT V. Dhanapalan, J. Petitioners called in question the order passed by the 1st respondent on 18.01.2011 in Transfer Application No: 86 of 2010, wherein, the Tribunal, after extracting the operative portion of the order passed by the Bangalore Bench, disposed of the application on the following terms: “a. The impugned order dated 24.02.2004 of the 1st respondent is quashed in so far as the condition as stipulated in para iii. b. There will be a consequential direction to the respondents to consider the applicants for promotion to Gr. III Sr. Section Supervisor (TOA) on par with their juniors viz. the third respondent and they are entitled for all consequential benefits including seniority and other attendant benefits arising there-from. c. The above exercise shall be completed within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. d. There will be no order as to costs.” 2. Aggrieved by the above order, the petitioner is before this Court raising the following grounds, namely, “a. The order is illegal, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India ; b. The order passed by the Tribunal is contrary to the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Leelamma Jacob's case; c. Comparison shall not be made to para 38 transferees in reference to letter of communication No: 22-47/93-TE-II dated 24.02.2004 ; d. If Para (iii) of BSNL C.O. Letter dated 24.02.2004 is removed and a comparison is allowed to be made with Rule 38 transferees, then there can be cases of officials claiming Grade III promotion immediately after joining the Grade I and therefore, there would be instances where almost all officials would have to be promoted against the scheme of the Government. ” 3. On the above grounds, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would contend that the Tribunal, in a cryptic order, without discussing the stand of the parties on the issue raised and without analysing the factum of application of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Leelamma Jacob's case to the facts pleaded in the present case, has passed an order with total non application of mind. Learned counsel further submits that the materials facts as well as the legal position have not been looked into by the Tribunal, which simply allowed the application in the above mentioned terms. 4. Learned counsel further submits that the materials facts as well as the legal position have not been looked into by the Tribunal, which simply allowed the application in the above mentioned terms. 4. Refutting the aforesaid submission, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents would contend that the ratio laid by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision rendered in Leelamma Jacob's case – reported in 2003 (12) S.C.C. 280 is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. Learned Senior Counsel has also produced a copy of the statement showing the seniority position of all of them. According to her, the case of the respondents herein have to be considered for extention of One Time Bound Promotion Scheme (OTBP) as well as the Biennial Cadre Review (BCR) Scheme and the benefit extended by the Supreme Court in Leelamma Jacob's case has to be extended to these respondents as well. By referring to the statement produced, learned Senior counsel submits that Mr.Venkatramana, the third respondent herein, to whom the benefit has been extended is Sl.No: 162 whereas all the respondents herein are placed above him. She has further submitted that subsequently also about 10 persons, who were similarly placed as that of the respondents herein, have been considered for promotion and not these respondents. 5. We have heard the learned counsel on either side and perused the material records. 6. It is seen that the applicants before the Tribunal were originally recruited as LDCs/ Telephone Operators. Subsequently, they were promoted to higher grade viz. Upper Divisional Clerks after being selected through competitive examinations. Thereafter, they were promoted and posted as Section Supervisor Cadre on completion of 10 years of qualifying service in the cadre of UDC. The above cadre is Gr. II cadre and the next avenue for promotion is Sr. Section Supervisors (TOA) Gr.III. While the applicants were waiting for promotion as Gr. III, OTBP and BCR Schemes were introduced by the Department of Telecommunications. As per the said Scheme, the employees who have completed 26 of years of sevice are entitled to be promoted to higher grade viz. Gr. III, even though, several of them were juniors in the basic grade and who could not get higher promotion in Gr.II in the merit quota. As per the said Scheme, the employees who have completed 26 of years of sevice are entitled to be promoted to higher grade viz. Gr. III, even though, several of them were juniors in the basic grade and who could not get higher promotion in Gr.II in the merit quota. Several aggrieved persons have challenged the said scheme and a direction was issued by the Tribunal as well as the Bangalore Bench in Mrs.Leelamma Jacob's case, which was upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. As per the said orders, they are claiming benefits. 7. The claim made by the applicants before the Tribunal was based on both the schemes introduced by the Government namely (1) One Time Bound Promotion Scheme (OTBP) and (2) Biennial Cadre Review (BCR). Both these schemes were introduced by the Department of Telecom to avoid stagnation in the same post or pay scale for a long time. As per the OTBP Scheme those Group C & D employees who have completed 16 years of service will be given one upgradation and as per the BCR Scheme, second time bound promotion was decided to be given on the basis of seniority subject to selection. As per this Scheme, those employees covered by OTBP/BCR Schemes, who have completed 26 years of service will be given next upgradation. However, one Leelamma Jacob, who was promoted to the post of UDC through merit quota. On introduction of OTBP / BCR Scheme, those who have completed 16 / 26 years of service were upgraded to successive higher grades. Since Mrs.Leelamma Jacob did not complete 26 years of service, she was superceded by employees having higher number of years of service, by which, those who were juniors under her became seniors. This anomolly was challenged. On appeal, the Supreme Court, declared that Mrs. Leelamma Jacob by virtue of her regular appointment by merit quota in the higher post shall be construed to be senior and whenever a junior is promoted, she shall also be upgraded without insisting on 16 / 26 years of service in the cadre. Accordingly, she was upgraded to higher grades so also the similarly placed employees. According to the learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondents herein, the respondents are also similarly placed like Mrs.Leelamma Jacob, as in their case also Mr. Accordingly, she was upgraded to higher grades so also the similarly placed employees. According to the learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondents herein, the respondents are also similarly placed like Mrs.Leelamma Jacob, as in their case also Mr. Venkatramana, the third respondent herein, who is junior to all of them had been given promotion, without considering their case. 8. Be that as it may. In our view, these are all matters which should be decided after taking into consideration various facts pleaded and after perusing the materials placed before the Tribunal. In considering these aspects, the various rules framed and schemes introduced from time to time also has to be taken into account. Not only that, the Tribunal has to analyse the facts of the case on hand with that of the case in which a ratio was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and then arrive at the conclusion that the facts are similar and therefore, the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court shall apply. In the case on hand, instead of doing this exercise, the Tribunal has just chosen to extract the order passed by the Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal, and then passed a cryptic order. In our thoughtful consideration, the Tribunal has not applied its mind to the facts of the case on hand as to the cliam made by the applicants before it by taking into account, the number of years of service put in by the applicants, thier juniors being promoted, the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in similar matter, etc. Therefore, in our opinion, the matter requires re-consideration, in detail, by the Tribunal. 9. At this juncture, it would be worthwhile to look into the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Gram Panchayat Village cum Kalan -vs- State of Punjab and others reported in 2008 (4) S.C.C. 253 , wherein it has been held that, "11. In the impugned judgment, (sic the High Court) after merely recording the fact that Amendment Act 8 of 1995 was brought in the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 and concluding that the basis of the order cancelling the allotment of Savitri Devi no longer subsists, dismissed the writ petition filed by the Gram Panchayat. In the impugned judgment, (sic the High Court) after merely recording the fact that Amendment Act 8 of 1995 was brought in the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 and concluding that the basis of the order cancelling the allotment of Savitri Devi no longer subsists, dismissed the writ petition filed by the Gram Panchayat. As rightly pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Gram Panchayat, the High Court has not considered the relief/challenge made in the writ petition. In other words, in the judgment, the High Court has not dealt with the point in issue, namely, whether the amendment dated 8-5-1995 (Amendment Act 8 of 1995) made by the State of Punjab has been validly made or not. 12. The abovementioned order of the High Court goes to show that practically no reason was indicated with reference to the challenge to the Amendment Act. The dismissal of the writ petition in such summary manner without adverting to the relief prayed for and without indicating any reason is clearly indefensible. This Court in a series of decisions held that reasons introduce clarity in an order and failure to consider the relief/challenge in the writ petition and the absence of reasons render the High Court judgment unsustainable. In view of the fact that the High Court has not considered the challenge as to the validity or otherwise of the Amendment Act and the notification thereon, we have no other option except to set aside the impugned order and remit the same to the High Court for fresh disposal." While dealing with the necessity to pass speaking order, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in the decision reported in 1990 (4) SCC 594 – S.N. Mukherjee vs. Union of India, held that, "34. The decisions of this Court referred to above indicate that with regard to the requirement to record reasons the approach of this Court is more in line with that of the American Courts. The decisions of this Court referred to above indicate that with regard to the requirement to record reasons the approach of this Court is more in line with that of the American Courts. An important consideration which has weighed with the Court for holding that an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions must record the reasons for its decision, is that such a decision is subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution as well as the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution and that the reasons, if recorded, would enable this Court or the High Courts to effectively exercise the appellate or supervisory power. But this is not the sole consideration. The other considerations which have also weighed with the Court in taking this view are that the requirement of recording reasons would (i) guarantee consideration by the authority; (ii) introduce clarity in the decisions; and (iii) minimise chances of arbitrariness in decision-making. In this regard a distinction has been drawn between ordinary Courts of law and tribunals and authorities exercising judicial functions on the ground that a Judge is trained to look at things objectively uninfluenced by considerations of policy or expediency whereas an executive officer generally looks at things from the stand point of policy and expediency. 35. Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory. authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision are of no less significance. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decisions-making. 'The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasijudicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasijudicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a Court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such art order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge." 10. For all the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order cannot be allowed to stand and is accordingly, set aside. The matter is remitted back to the Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras Bench, for re-consideration, where all the parties are at liberty to contest all the points urged by them before us in this writ petition. Needless to state that the Tribunal shall consider all the points urged before it and then dispose of the matter in accordance with law. Since the matter is pending from the year 2005, the Tribunal is directed to dispose of the application within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Registry shall send the records forthwith to the Tribunal.