JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. 1. This regular second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge, Una, H.P. dated 31.01.2003, passed in Civil Appeal No. 21 of 2000. 2. Key facts, necessary for the adjudication of this regular second appeal are that the appellant-plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) has filed suit for possession through redemption of the shop consisting of two rooms situated in Una town detailed in headnote of the plaint on payment of Rs. 1500/- principle mortgage money. According to the averments made in the plaint, Wattan Singh alias Hari Kishan Singh son of Hakam Singh, the father of the plaintiff, was owner in possession of shop in dispute. The shop was situated in Kh. No. 1039/1 entered in jamabandi for the year 1976-77. Sh. Wattan Singh has mortgaged with possession the shop to respondent-defendant (hereinafter referred to as the defendant No.1) vide two registered mortgage deeds dated 27.1.1977 and 14.12.1977 for consideration of Rs. 800/- and Rs. 700/-, respectively. The mortgagor has not authorized the mortgagee to induct tenant over the disputed shop however the mortgagee has inducted respondent No. 2, namely Sh. Gian Chand as tenant vide rent note dated 7.7.1982. Sh. Wattan Singh died on 17.3.1983. The plaintiff succeeded to his estate. He requested the defendant several times to deliver the possession of the shop in dispute to him through redemption on payment of Rs. 1500/-. However, the defendant No. 1 refused to admit his claim. 3. The defendant No. 1 has admitted his claim. It was admitted that the shop in dispute was mortgaged vide two registered mortgage deeds. He rented out the shop in dispute to defendant No. 2 vide rent note dated 7.7.1982 on payment of rent of Rs. 800/- per month. Defendant No. 2 did not pay the rent of the suit premises from September, 1986. 4. The suit was contested by defendant No. 2. According to defendant No. 2, the shop in dispute was given to him in the month of July, 1982 by Sh. Wattan Singh. He had been paying rent earlier to Wattan Singh and after his death to the plaintiff. Rent upto July, 1989 has already been paid. 4. The suit was contested by defendant No. 2. According to defendant No. 2, the shop in dispute was given to him in the month of July, 1982 by Sh. Wattan Singh. He had been paying rent earlier to Wattan Singh and after his death to the plaintiff. Rent upto July, 1989 has already been paid. Due to cordial relations between the father of the plaintiff and defendant No. 2, the father of the plaintiff had not been issuing any receipt with respect to the rent, Due to this, the father of the plaintiff obtained signatures of defendant No. 2 on a document purporting to be a rent note in favour of Shanti Sarup who was his close relative by telling that it was required for avoiding some income tax problem. The alleged rent note was got executed with ulterior motive to defeat the provisions of H.P. Urban Rent Control Act. He was never inducted tenant by defendant No. 1 but he was put in possession over the shop in dispute as tenant by Wattan Singh. According to him, the mortgage deed in favour of the defendant No. 1 was collusive and nonest in the eyes of law. 4. Replication was filed by the plaintiff. The trial Court framed the issues on 5.12.1990. The learned Sub Judge, Ist Class, Una dismissed the suit on 29.12.1999. The plaintiff, feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 29.12.1999, filed an appeal before the learned District Judge, Una. The learned District Judge, Una also dismissed the same on 31.1.2003. Hence, this regular second appeal. 5. The regular second appeal was admitted on 14.8.2003 on the following substantial question of law: “1. Whether the judgment and decrees of the two Courts below are vitiated on account of misreading and misunderstanding of the pleadings, misconstruing and misapplication of correct proposition of law on the facts and in the circumstances of the case?” 6. Mr. Bhupinder Gupta, learned Sr. Advocate, on the basis of the substantial questions of law framed, has vehemently argued that both the Courts below have not correctly appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence on record. According to him, both the courts below have misapplied the provisions of Section 23 of the Indian contract Act. According to him, defendant No. 2 was totally stranger to the mortgage. According to him, both the courts below have misapplied the provisions of Section 23 of the Indian contract Act. According to him, defendant No. 2 was totally stranger to the mortgage. The rent note was executed by defendant No. 2 with defendant No. 1 on 7.7.1992 and the same was not against the public policy. He also contended that the courts below have overlooked the provisions of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act. He lastly contended that the defendant No. 2 was inducted tenant by the mortgagee and not by the mortgagor. On the other hand, Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocate, has supported the judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below. 7. I have heard the learned Senior Advocates for the parties and gone through the records of the case carefully. 8. There is no dispute about the execution of two mortgage deeds dated 27.1.1977 Ext. P-2 and 14.12.1977 Ext. P-3 for a sum of Rs. 800/- and Rs. 700/-, respectively. Defendant No. 1 Shamsher Singh has died and his legal heir Kaushalya Devi was ordered to be brought on record during the trial. 9. PW-1 Sadhu Singh deposed that his father was in possession of the disputed shop. He mortgaged it with possession with defendant No. 1 for a consideration of Rs. 1500/- vide two mortgage deeds dated 27.1. 1977 and 14.12.1977. His father died on 17.3.1983. He succeeded to his estate. He asked defendant No. 1 to deliver back the possession of the shop in dispute to him by way of redemption of mortgage but the defendants refused to admit his claim. Defendant No. 1 has unauthorisedly inducted defendant No. 2 as tenant over the suit premises on 7.7.1982. He admitted the close relationship with defendant No. 1. He also admitted that his father has mortgaged two shops with Tilak Raj and those shops were also in possession of tenants. 10. PW-2 Surjit Singh has proved the site plan Ext. P-1. 11. PW-3 Diwan Singh has testified that his father was a Petition Writer. He died in 1982. He produced the record of his father. 12. PW-4 Vijay Puri testified that he was acquainted with the handwriting of Ganpat Rai, Petition Writer. The mortgage deed dated 27.1.1977 was in the handwriting of Ganpat Rai. He proved the mortgage deed Ext. P-2 dated 27.1.1977 and also proved the mortgage deed Ext. 14.12.1977 as Ext. He died in 1982. He produced the record of his father. 12. PW-4 Vijay Puri testified that he was acquainted with the handwriting of Ganpat Rai, Petition Writer. The mortgage deed dated 27.1.1977 was in the handwriting of Ganpat Rai. He proved the mortgage deed Ext. P-2 dated 27.1.1977 and also proved the mortgage deed Ext. 14.12.1977 as Ext. P-3 which had also been scribed by Ganpat Rai. 13. PW-5 Som Nath deposed about the scribing of rent note Ext. P-4 vide which, defendant No. 1 inducted defendant No. 2 as a tenant over the disputed shop on payment of monthly rent of Rs. 800/-. According to him, rent note was written by him on the instructions of the parties and was read over and explained to them. The parties put their signatures on the rent note admitting its contents to be correct. The rent note was entered in his register at Sr. No. 135 dated 7.7.1982. 14. PW-6 Shamsher Singh is a witness of mortgage deed Ext. P-2. According to him, mortgage deed was scribed by Ganpat Rai, Document Writer. He read over and explained to the parties the contents of the same and parties have put their signatures over the mortgage deed. 15. PW-7 Daulat Ram, is also a witness to mortgage deed Ext. P-3 dated 14.12.1977. According to him, the mortgage deed was read over and explained to the parties and the parties have put their signatures over the mortgage deed. 16. PW-8 Kartar Singh Gill is also the attesting witness to mortgage deed Ext. P-3. According to him, the deed was scribed on the instructions of the parties. It was read over and explained to the parties and the parties have put their signatures over the mortgage deed admitting its contents to be correct. He has also proved his signatures on rent note Ext. P-4. The contents of the rent note were also read over and explained to the parties. 17. PW-9 Jagdish Ram proved the site plans Ext. P-5 and P-6. 18. PW-10 Sohan Lal has produced the summoned record. 19. PW-11 Gurbachan Singh deposed that he was working as a Stamp Vendor at Una. He had sold the stamp paper of rent deed Ext. P-4 to Gian Chand on 7.7.1982. 20. 17. PW-9 Jagdish Ram proved the site plans Ext. P-5 and P-6. 18. PW-10 Sohan Lal has produced the summoned record. 19. PW-11 Gurbachan Singh deposed that he was working as a Stamp Vendor at Una. He had sold the stamp paper of rent deed Ext. P-4 to Gian Chand on 7.7.1982. 20. PW-12 R.S.Chauhan, has brought the summoned record and proved the mortgage deed dated 19.2.1976 executed by Jagat Ram in favour of Swaran Singh as Ext. PW-12/A and attached site plan Ext. PW-12/B. 21. DW-1 Kaushalya Devi testified that the front portion of the shop in dispute was mortgaged with her husband for Rs. 800/- and the rear portion was mortgaged with her husband for Rs. 700/-. Earlier her husband had given in dispute on rent to Darshan Singh and later on it was given to defendant No. 2 on payment of monthly rent of Rs. 800/-. According to her, defendant No. 2 was not paying the rent of the shop in dispute for the last about 8 years and her husband had filed a suit for recovery of rent. According to her, plaintiff had mortaged his one shop with her for Rs. 2000/- and she had given that shop on rent to some cloth merchant. 22. DW-2 Bal Krishan has brought the record from M.C. Una to prove the certified copy of the assessment order for the year 1984-85 as Ext. DW-1/A and also proved Ext. DW-1/B. 23. DW-3 Kishan Singh deposed that he had taken on rent one shop from Wattan Singh on payment of monthly rent of Rs. 600/- He stated that he had left that Dhabba in July, 1982 and thereafter Wattan Singh had let out the shop to Gian chand on payment of rent of Rs. 800/-. 24. DW-4 Chaman Lal stated that he had taken one shop on rent from plaintiff Sadhu Singh on payment of monthly rent of Rs. 250/- and he had left that shop after about two months. He stated that Sadhu Singh had prepared some papers of mortgage in respect of that shop. 25. DW-5 Manjit singh stated that he was tenant under the plaintiff Sadhu Singh. He was paying rent to him @ 900/- per month. The shop was in his possession as tenant, has been shown to have been mortgaged with one Nirmal Singh. 26. He stated that Sadhu Singh had prepared some papers of mortgage in respect of that shop. 25. DW-5 Manjit singh stated that he was tenant under the plaintiff Sadhu Singh. He was paying rent to him @ 900/- per month. The shop was in his possession as tenant, has been shown to have been mortgaged with one Nirmal Singh. 26. DW-6 Mohinder Pal stated that the plaintiff Sadhu Singh had mortgaged some land to him for Rs. 1000/-. But, he was paying rent of that land to him @ Rs. 300/- per month. 27. DW-8 Sohan Lal has brought the summoned record and proved the certified copy of mortgage deeds as Ext. DW-8/A to DW-8/R. 28. DW-9 R.S.Chauhan, has proved certified copy of sale deed dated 31.5.1996 as DW-9/A. 29. DW-11 Rup Lal brought the GPF record of the plaintiff as DW-11/A. 30. DW-12 Rakesh Kumar proved the copy of inquiry report Ext. DW-12/A. He proved the copy of orders Ext. DW-12/B to DW-12/E. 31. Defendant No. 2 has appeared as DW-13. According to him, he had taken shop in dispute on rent from Wattan Singh in Feburary, 1982 on payment of rent of Rs. 800/- per month. He paid rent to Wattan Singh and plaintiff Sadhu Singh upto 1989. They did not give any receipt to him. According to him, the plaintiff has fictitiously shown his all shops to have been mortgaged. He has never paid any rent to defendant No. 1 nor he was inducted as tenant over the shop in dispute by defendant No. 1. The contents of rent note were never read over and explained to him. There was no entry of mortgage of the shop in dispute in Municipal record. He has proved Ext. D-1 & D-2, Missal Haquiat of the property of the plaintiff for the year 1997-98. 32. What emerges from the facts enumerated hereinabove is that Wattan Singh, father of the plaintiff has mortgaged shops to defendant No. 1. Defendant No. 1 has inducted defendant No. 2 as tenant on 7.7.1982 vide rent note Ext. P-4. The mortgage deeds are dated 27.1.1977 and 14.12.1977. the mortgage amount was Rs. 800/- and Rs. 700/-, respectively. Sh. Wattan Singh has died on 17.3.1983. his estate was succeeded by the plaintiff. PW-4 Vijay Puri has identified the handwriting of Ganpat Rai Petition Writer. He has proved the mortgage deed Ext. P-4. The mortgage deeds are dated 27.1.1977 and 14.12.1977. the mortgage amount was Rs. 800/- and Rs. 700/-, respectively. Sh. Wattan Singh has died on 17.3.1983. his estate was succeeded by the plaintiff. PW-4 Vijay Puri has identified the handwriting of Ganpat Rai Petition Writer. He has proved the mortgage deed Ext. P-2 dated 27.1.1977 and also proved the mortgage deed Ext. 14.12.1977 as Ext. P-3. These were scribed by Ganpat Rai. PW-5 Som Nath has deposed that rent note Ext. P-4 was scribed, vide which, defendant No. 1 inducted defendant No. 2 as a tenant over the disputed shop on payment of monthly rent of Rs. 800/-. According to him, rent note was scribed on the instructions of the parties and was read over and explained to them. The parties put their signatures on the rent note admitting its contents to be correct. The rent note was entered in his register at Sr. No. 135 dated 7.7.1982. PW-6 Shamsher Singh is a witness of mortgage deed Ext. P-2. According to him, mortgage deed was scribed by Ganpat Rai, Document Writer. He read over and explained to the parties the contents of the same and parties have put their signatures over the mortgage deed. PW-7 Daulat Ram, is also a witness to mortgage deed Ext. P-3 dated 14.12.1977. According to him, the mortgage deed was read over and explained to the parties and the parties have put their signatures over the mortgage deed. PW-8 Kartar Singh Gill is also the attesting witness to mortgage deed Ext. P-3. According to him, the deed was scribed on the instructions of the parties. It was read over and explained to the parties and the parties have put their signatures over the mortgage deed admitting its contents to be correct. He has also proved his signatures on rent note Ext. P-4. The contents of the rent note were also read over and explained to the parties. 33. DW-1 Kaushalya Devi has also admitted that the shops were mortgaged with her husband for a sum of Rs. 800/- and Rs. 700/-, respectively. The plaintiff has duly proved the execution of mortgage deeds dated 27.1.1977 and 14.12.1977, vide Ext. P2 and P-3. The rent note has been proved by PW-5 Som Nath and PW-8 Kartar Singh Gill. 33. DW-1 Kaushalya Devi has also admitted that the shops were mortgaged with her husband for a sum of Rs. 800/- and Rs. 700/-, respectively. The plaintiff has duly proved the execution of mortgage deeds dated 27.1.1977 and 14.12.1977, vide Ext. P2 and P-3. The rent note has been proved by PW-5 Som Nath and PW-8 Kartar Singh Gill. According to PW-5 Som Nath and PW-8 Kartar Singh Gill, the contents were read over and explained to the parties and thereafter the parties have put their signatures over the same. The plea raised by defendant No. 2 that he was made to sign the rent note dated 7.7.1982 to defeat the provisions of H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, cannot be believed. Defendant No. 2 has been inducted as tenant by defendant No. 1 and not by father of the plaintiff. The Courts below have come to the wrong conclusion that the rent note was collusive and sham transaction. The shops have been mortgaged by Wattan Singh in favour of defendant no. 1. The tenancy created by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2 would come to an end after the redemption of the mortgage. Infact, the shop has been mortgaged by the plaintiff?s father with possession with Shanti Sarup. The learned Courts below have given undue importance to Exbts. DW-8/A to DW-8/R, whereby the plaintiff?s father has mortgaged the property and the mortgagees have further inducted the tenants. There is no bar under the law that the mortgagor cannot mortgage the property with his relatives. Merely that the property has been mortgaged would not defeat the provisions of H.P. Urban Rent Control Act. The findings given by both the courts below that mortgage deeds Ext. P-2 and P-3 were fictitious transactions are liable to be set aside. The Courts below have also come to the wrong conclusion that the mortgage deeds Ext. P=2 and P-3 were in breach of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. The Courts below have also given undue importance to the fact that the shops in question were mortgaged for a sum of Rs. 1500/- and the rent was Rs. 800/-. 34. Their lordships of the Hon?ble Supreme Court in the case of The All India Film Corporation Ltd., and others, vrs. The Courts below have also given undue importance to the fact that the shops in question were mortgaged for a sum of Rs. 1500/- and the rent was Rs. 800/-. 34. Their lordships of the Hon?ble Supreme Court in the case of The All India Film Corporation Ltd., and others, vrs. Sri Raja Gyan Nath and others, reported in 1969 (3) SCC 79 , have held that the termination of mortgagee interest terminated the relationship of landlord and tenant and it could not, in the circumstances, be said to run with the land. Their lordships have further held that there being no landlord and no tenant, the provisions of the Rent Restriction Act could not apply any further. It has been held as follows: “11. The respondents attempted to argue that the Rent Restriction Act defines landlord and tenant with reference to the payment of rent. A landlord means a person entitled to receive rent and a tenant means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable. These definitions apply if the tenancy, either real or statutory, could be said to survive after the termination of the mortgage. The scheme of s. 10 of the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1951 is that in the case of a mortgagor or a mortgagee, (a) the Competent Officer may pay to the Custodian or the claimant the amount payable under the mortgage debt and redeem the property, or (b) the Competent Officer may sell the mortgaged property for satisfaction of the mortgage debt and distribute the sale proceeds thereof, or (c) the Competent Officer may partition the property between the mortgagor and the mortgagee proportionate to their shares, or (d) adopt a combination of any of these measures. It is obvious that method Co) was followed. The property was sold and the mortgage was satisfied. This led to the extinction of the mortgagees' interest and the purchaser acquired full title to the property. The termination of the mortgagee interest terminated the relationship of landlord and tenant and it could not, in the circumstances, be said to run with the land. There being no landlord and no tenant, the provisions of the Rent Restriction Act could not apply any further. The termination of the mortgagee interest terminated the relationship of landlord and tenant and it could not, in the circumstances, be said to run with the land. There being no landlord and no tenant, the provisions of the Rent Restriction Act could not apply any further. Nor could it be said that when the mortgagor cancelled the rent note and authorised the mortgagee to find any other tenant, the intention was to allow expressly a tenancy beyond the term of the mortgage. In this view of the matter the decision of the High Court and the court below cannot be said to be erroneous.” 35. Their lordships of the Hon?ble Supreme Court in the case of M/S Sachalmal Parasram vrs. Mst. Ratanbai and others, reported in AIR 1972 SC 637 , have held that tenancy created by mortgagee in possession does not survive the termination of the mortgagee?s interest. The termination of the mortgagee?s interest terminates the relationship of landlord and tenant. There being no landlord and tenant, the tenant cannot claim the protection of Rent Control Legislation (in this case M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961). It has been held as under: “[4] The points raised by Mr. Naunit Lal are concluded by the decision of this Court in All India Film Corporation Ltd. v. Raja Gyannath, 1969-3 SCC 79 = 1970-2 SCR 581 = (AIR 1969 NSC 185) which decision was unfortunately not brought to our notice during the course of the hearing. In this case the facts were similar. A mortgagee in possession had let out the premises, which was a cinema house, and the lessee had further sublet the same, to sub-lessees. On redemption the purchaser of the interest of the mortgagor filed a suit for possession of the property from the head lessee and the sub-lessees. The sub-lessees claimed the benefit of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (3 of 1949). In this High Court three points were raised. One of the points urged was whether the defendants were protected by the East Punjab Urban Restriction Act. This Court first considered the question; Did the tenancy create by the mortgagee in possession survive the termination of the mortgagee interest so as to be binding on the purchaser? In this High Court three points were raised. One of the points urged was whether the defendants were protected by the East Punjab Urban Restriction Act. This Court first considered the question; Did the tenancy create by the mortgagee in possession survive the termination of the mortgagee interest so as to be binding on the purchaser? This Court concluded : "The relationship of Iessor and Lessee cannot subsist beyond the mortgagee's interest unless the relationship is agreed to by the mortgagor or a fresh relationship is recreated. This the mortgagor or the person succeeding to the mortgagor's interest may elect to do. But if he does not, the lessee cannot claim any rights beyond the term of his original lessor's interest. There propositions are well-understood and find support are well-understood and find support in two rulings of this Court in Mahabir Gope v. Harbans Narain Singh, 1952 SCR 775 = ( AIR 1952 SC 205 ) and Asaram v. Mst. Ram Kali, 1958 986 = ( AIR 1958 SC 183 )." [7] This Court then examined the question whether the tenants could take advantage of the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. The Court answered the question in the following words: "The respondents attempted to argue that the Rent Restriction Act defines landlord and tenant with reference to the payment of rent. A landlord means a person entitled to receive rent and a tenant means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable. These definitions apply if the tenancy, either real or statutory, could be said to survive after the termination of the mortgage..... The termination of the mortgagee interest terminated the relationship of landlord and tenant and it could not, in the circumstances, be said to run with the land. There being no landlord and no tenant, the provisions of the Rent Restriction Act would not apply any further." 36. In the case of Om Prakash Garg vrs. Ganga Sahai and ors. reported in AIR 1988 SC 108 , their lordships of the Supreme Court have held that after the redemption of mortgage, tenant is not entitled to protection of Rent Act. It has been held as under: “[1] After hearing learned counsel for the appellant, we are satisfied that the order passed by the High Court does not call for any interference. It has been held as under: “[1] After hearing learned counsel for the appellant, we are satisfied that the order passed by the High Court does not call for any interference. The appellant who claims to be a tenant of the mortgagee Narain Prasad resisted the application made by the respondent-decree-holder Ganga Sahai under Order XXI, R. 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 pleading inter alia that being a tenant of the mortgagee he was entitled to the protection of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. That objection of his was not sustained by the Executing Court and it accordingly issued a warrant of possession in favour of the decree-holder. The appellant went up in appeal against the order of the executing Court. The Additional District Judge differed from the executing Court and held that the appellant being a tenant inducted into possession by the mortgagee was entitled to the protection of the Act and therefore could not be evicted in execution of the final decree for redemption, and further held that the respondent was only entitled to symbolical possession. Aggrieved, the respondent preferred an appeal to the High Court. By the order under appeal, a learned single Judge following the decision of this Court in M/s. Sachalmal Parasram v. Mst. Ratanbai, AIR 1972 SC 637 held that the lease was not an act of prudent management on the part of the mortgagee Narain Prasad within the meaning of S. 76 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and therefore the alleged lease could not subsist after the extinction of the mortgage by the passing of the final decree for redemption and thus the appellant could not take advantage of the Act as there was no subsisting lease in his favour. After hearing the learned counsel, we are not persuaded to take a different view than the one reached by the High Court.” 37. Their lordships in the case of Ishwar Dass Jain vrs. Sohan Lal, reported in AIR 2000 SC 426 , have dealt with in detail Section 34, 65 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. It has been held as follows: “……………The facts of the case of Ishwar Dass Jain were that the plaintiff had mortgaged the entire shop and his 5/6th share therein and gave possession of the whole shop to the defendant for Rs. 1,000/ -. It has been held as follows: “……………The facts of the case of Ishwar Dass Jain were that the plaintiff had mortgaged the entire shop and his 5/6th share therein and gave possession of the whole shop to the defendant for Rs. 1,000/ -. He filed a suit for redemption and recovery of possession from the defendant. The mortgage deed stated that on redemption possession had to be delivered back to the mortgagor. On 1.2.1981 the plaintiff demanded production of the deed and possession on redemption. The defendant did not comply. The defence put up by the defendant was that there was no relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee between the parties, but that the relationship was as landlord and tenant. It was also alleged by the defendant that plaintiff was a man of substance and very rich and there was indeed no occasion to mortgage the same for a petty sum. Their Lordships have framed the following points for consideration: (1) Whether the High Court can interfere under Section 100, CPC (as mentioned in 1976) with the findings of fact arrived at by the lower appellate Court if vital evidence which could have led to a different conclusion was omitted or if inadmissible evidence was relied upon which if omitted, could have led to a different conclusion? (2) Whether on the facts of the case, the mortgage was proved by the plaintiff by production of a certified copy of the deed? (3) Whether Section 92 (1) of the Evidence Act could be a bar for proving a document to be a sham document? (4) Whether the Exs. D2 to D5 were only extracts from account books and could not be treated as account books for purposes of Section 34 of the Evidence Act and were not admissible? (5) Whether the lower Courts had omitted vital evidence from consideration? (6) Whether the mortgagee who got possession of the entire property under the deed of mortgage could be permitted to deny the title of the mortgagor either wholly or partly? (7) What relief? [12] Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held as under: The point here is whether oral evidence is admissible under Section 92 (1) of the Evidence Act to prove that a document though executed was a sham document and whether that would amount to varying or contradicting the terms of the document. (7) What relief? [12] Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held as under: The point here is whether oral evidence is admissible under Section 92 (1) of the Evidence Act to prove that a document though executed was a sham document and whether that would amount to varying or contradicting the terms of the document. The plea of the defendant in the written statement was that mortgage deed though true was a sham document not intended to be acted upon and that it was executed only as a collateral security. It was pleaded that the plaintiff demanded that a mortgage deed be executed by defendant as "collateral security in order to guarantee that the shop will be vacated by the defendant whenever demanded by the plaintiff" and that this was done to circumvent the rent control law. It was said that the alleged transaction of mortgage was a sham transaction, executed only with aforesaid object. The consideration of Rs. 1,000/- "was only in the nature of a collateral security or 'pagri'." The plaintiff was and is a rich man and there was no occasion for him to mortgage his property. It was further pleaded: The plaintiff thus demanded Rs. 1,000/- from the defendant by way of security and asked the defendant to thumbmark some writing to arm the plaintiff with a right to get the shop vacated according to his sweet will. The defendant who was in dire necessity of the shop, had to agree on the said condition put forward by the plaintiff." But the question is whether on the facts of this case, the reason given by the defendant in his evidence for treating the mortgage as a sham document, can be accepted. The reason given by the defendant appears to us rather curious. One can understand a debtor incurring a debt and executing a deed as collateral security. There is no such situation here. Further, if it is a deed of collateral security by defendant, then the defendant would have had to execute a deed in favour of the plaintiff and not vice-versa. Here the plaintiff-owner has mortgaged his shop to the defendant, as security. The plea and evidence of collateral security offered by the defendant appears to us not to fit into a situation where the plaintiff has executed the mortgage. Here the plaintiff-owner has mortgaged his shop to the defendant, as security. The plea and evidence of collateral security offered by the defendant appears to us not to fit into a situation where the plaintiff has executed the mortgage. Obviously, if the plaintiff wanted to secure something by way of an additional security from the defendant, the normal course would have been to ask the defendant to give such a security and to for the plaintiff to execute a mortgage. Thus the reason mentioned and evidence given by the defendant as to why a sham document was executed falls to the ground. Now under Section 34 of the Evidence Act, entries in "account books" regularly kept in the course of business are admissible though they by themselves cannot create any liability. Section 34 reads as follows: Section 34. Entries in books of account when relevant.-Entries in books of account, regularly kept in the course of business, are relevant whenever they refer to a matter into which the Court has to inquire, but such statements shall not alone be sufficient evidence to charge any person with liability. It will be noticed that sanctity is attached in the law of evidence to books of account if the books are indeed "account books i.e. in original and if they show, on their face, that they are kept in the "regular course of business". Such sanctity, in our opinion, cannot attach to private extracts of alleged account books where the original accounts are not filed into Court. This is because, from the extracts, it cannot be discovered whether accounts are kept in the regular course of business or if there are any interpolations or whether the interpolations are in a different ink or whether the accounts are in the form of a book with continuous page numbering. Hence, if the original books have not been produced, it is not possible to know whether the entries relating to payment of rent are entries made in the regular course of business. The judgments of all the three Courts therefore are set aside. The suit is decreed for redemption as follows. The appellants are entitled to redeem the usufructary mortgage and get possession of the suit shop from the defendant, if the appellants deposit in the trial Court, within three months from today, the sum of Rs. 1,000/-. The judgments of all the three Courts therefore are set aside. The suit is decreed for redemption as follows. The appellants are entitled to redeem the usufructary mortgage and get possession of the suit shop from the defendant, if the appellants deposit in the trial Court, within three months from today, the sum of Rs. 1,000/-. There is no need to deposit any interest inasmuch as according to the deed, the defendant was to be in possession and interest was to be set-off against the occupation of the shop. We direct that on such deposit of Rs. 1,000/-, the defendant will produce the mortgage deed into Court for cancellation. In case he does not produce the deed, within the said period, it will be deemed that the mortgage is cancelled. On such deposit of Rs. 1,000/- as aforesaid, the defendant shall restore possession to the appellants. On such restoration of possession, defendant shall be entitled to withdraw the sum of Rs. 1,000/-. In case the defendant does not surrender possession as aforesaid, it will be open to the appellants to seek possession by way of execution.” 38. The ratio of Ishwar Dass Jain?s case (supra) was relied upon by this Court in 2008 (2) Shim. LC 388, titled as Shri Shiv Charan Verma vrs. Shri Shiv Parshad. 39. In the case of Joginder Singh and another vrs. Smt. Jogindero and ors., reported in AIR 1996 SC 1654 , their lordships of the Hon?ble Supreme Court have held that tenant cannot deny the title of land lord. It has been held as follows: “6. Late Surain Singh and Respondent Bur Singh did not seriously dispute that they were not tenants under Smt. Soman in respect of the land in dispute and adduced no evidence in that behalf. On the contrary Khasra Girdawari Ext.P.6 clearly indicated that the deceased Surain Singh (who is represented by his legal representatives in this appeal) and Bur Singh were tenants under Smt. Soman with regard to the land in suit. This being the position the tenants could not be permitted to deny or dispute the title of the owner. On the contrary Khasra Girdawari Ext.P.6 clearly indicated that the deceased Surain Singh (who is represented by his legal representatives in this appeal) and Bur Singh were tenants under Smt. Soman with regard to the land in suit. This being the position the tenants could not be permitted to deny or dispute the title of the owner. This is a settled view that having regard to the provisions of Section 116 of the Evidence Act no tenant of immovable property or person claiming through such tenant shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny the title of the owner of such property. In this connection it would be relevant to make a reference to the decision of this Court in Veerraju Vs. Venkanna [ 1966 (1) SCR 831 (839) = AIR 1966 SC 629 ] wherein this Court, with reference to the decision of Privy Council took the view as under:- "A tenant who has been let into possession cannot deny his landlord's title, however defective it may be, so long as he has not openly restored possession by surrender to his landlord". 40. In the case of Janta Travels Pvt. Ltd. Vrs. Raj Kumar Seth, reported in AIR 1997 Rajasthan 1, the learned Single Judge has held that it is not open to the tenant to dispute the title of the landlord in a case where a lease deed is duly executed and proved on the record. It would not be open to the tenant to advance pleas contrary to the spirit of the agreement. 41. In the case of Thakar Singh vrs. Sh. Mula Singh, reported in 2014 (2) RCT (Rent) 371, their lordships of the Hon?ble Supreme Court have held that after redemption tenants of mortgagee do not become tenants of mortgagor even though mortgagor received rent from the tenants. 42. The substantial question of law is answered accordingly. The Regular Second Appeal is allowed. The judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below are set aside. The suit is decreed for redemption. The plaintiff is held entitled to redeem the mortgage and get possession of the suit shop from defendant No. 2 if the plaintiff deposits a sum of Rs. 1500/-, in the trial Court, within three months from today. Thereafter on such deposit of Rs. 1500/-, the defendant No. 1 will produce the mortgage deed before the Court for cancellation. The plaintiff is held entitled to redeem the mortgage and get possession of the suit shop from defendant No. 2 if the plaintiff deposits a sum of Rs. 1500/-, in the trial Court, within three months from today. Thereafter on such deposit of Rs. 1500/-, the defendant No. 1 will produce the mortgage deed before the Court for cancellation. Immediately on deposit, as stated hereinabove, the defendant No. 2 shall hand over the vacant possession to the plaintiff.