JUDGMENT Per Rajiv Sharma, Judge: This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 1.9.2012 rendered by learned Sessions Judge, Solan, District Solan, in Sessions Trial No.7-S/7 of 2011, whereby the accused/appellant was acquitted for the offence punishable under Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code and convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 307 and 333 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 184 and 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act. He was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to pay a fine of Rs.30,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo further imprisonment for a period of one year under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code; to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs.20,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo further imprisonment for one year under Section 333 of the Indian Penal Code; to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for one month under Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act; and to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs.2000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for one month under Section 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act. All these sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 2. The case of the prosecution, in a nutshell, is that on 1.3.2011 PW3 Surender Mohit Sharma was going from Solan to Delhi along with his wife in a car bearing HR-64-A-5551 and when he reached near Barog Bye Pass, Tapan Motor, the accused came from behind driving a truck bearing No. HR-56-5781. He while over taking the vehicle of Surender Mohit Sharma from wrong side hit the same from behind. Surender Mohit Sharma asked the accused to compensate him for damage caused to his vehicle, but the accused refused to do so and took away the truck in question towards Dharampur. Surender Mohit Sharma reported the matter to the police and rapat in the daily diary, Ext.PW16/D was recorded by PW16 HC Praveen Kumar. Nakka was laid in front of the Police Station Dharampur by PW1 Constable Sunil Kumar, PW2 HHG Mohinder Singh and HHC Mast Ram. The accused after some time reached at the Nakka driving the truck at a high speed. Nakka was laid in front of the Police Station Dharampur by PW1 Constable Sunil Kumar, PW2 HHG Mohinder Singh and HHC Mast Ram. The accused after some time reached at the Nakka driving the truck at a high speed. The police officials gave signal to the accused to stop the truck, but the accused did not stop the truck and hit HHC Mast Ram with an intention to kill him. HHC Mast Ram fell down and thereafter, the accused took the truck towards Sanwara side. Prior to reaching Dharampur, the accused had also hit the bus being driven by PW5 Balvinder Singh. HHC Mast Ram was taken to hospital at Dharampur. He was medically examined by PW13 Dr. Parvinder Singh. According to him, the injured suffered three injuries, out of which injuries No. 1 and 2 were found dangerous to life. He issued MLC Ext. PW13/B along with opinion Ext.PW13/D. HHC Mast Ram was referred to PGI Chandigarh. He was examined by PW25 Dr. Balrajashekhar Chandra. HHC Mast Ram was found to have suffered severe head injury, which was dangerous to life. He issued case summary Ext.PW13/C along with MLC Ext.PW25/A. The truck in question was apprehended near Timber Trail Resort, Parwanoo. Thereafter, on the basis of statement of Sunil Kumar, Ext.PW1/A, under Section 154 Cr.P.C., FIR Ext.PW16/A was recorded by PW16 HC Parveen Kumar at Police Station, Dharampur. PW23 Inspector Jagdish Chand visited the spot and prepared spot map Ext.PW23/B and took photographs Ext.PW23/C-1 to Ext.PW23/C-3. Sample of blood stained soil was lifted and sealed with seal impression N and was seized vide memo Ext.PW1/C in the presence of witnesses PW1 Constable Sunil Kumar and PW4 Raghubir Singh. The seal after use was handed over to PW4 Raghubir Singh after taking specimen impression of seal vide Ext. PW4/A separately. The car of PW3 Surender Mohit Sharma was also taken to the Police Station and its photographs Ext.PW23A-1 to Ext.PW3/A-3 were taken and the paint of the car after scratching was taken into possession by the police. It was sealed in a cloth packet with seal impression ‘O’ vide memo Ext.PW1/B. The paint of the truck after scratching was put into match box, which was sealed with seal impression ‘B’ after putting in a cloth parcel and was seized vide memo Ext.PW7/A. The truck along with its documents was seized vide memo Ext. PW4/C and photographs of the truck Ext. PW4/C and photographs of the truck Ext. PW23/D-1 and Ext.PW23/D-2 were taken. The investigation was completed and the challan was put up in the court after completing all codal formalities. 3. The prosecution examined as many as twenty five witnesses to prove its case. The accused was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C.. The accused denied the case of the prosecution and pleaded innocence. He also examined one witness in his defence. 4. Learned Sessions Judge, Solan acquitted the accused under Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code and convicted and sentenced him for the offences punishable under Sections 307 and 333 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 184 and 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act vide judgment dated 1.9.2012, as stated hereinabove. Hence, the appeal. 5. Mr. Rajiv Rai, learned Advocate, has vehemently argued that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the accused. According to him, the accused had no intention to kill HHC Mast Ram. 6. Mr. Parmod Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General, has supported the impugned judgment dated 1.9.2012. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone the pleadings and record carefully. 8. PW1, Constable Sunil Kumar, deposed that on 1.3.2011 he was on duty outside the Police Station, Dharampur at National Highway along with HHC Mast Ram and HHG Mahinder Singh. They were directed to stop a vehicle bearing registration No.HR-56-5781, which was coming from Solan involving in an accident. They placed barricades over National Highway on both sides of road and kept some space so as the vehicles could pass with slow speed. After about 15-20 minutes, a truck bearing registration No. HR-56-5781 came from Solan side in a rash speed. It was signalled to stop, but the driver neither stop the truck nor reduced the speed. He tried to hit him. However, the truck hit HHC Mast Ram, who fell down. The accused took the truck towards Sanwara side. HHC Mast Ram was taken to Hospital at Dharampur, from where he was further referred to PGI Chandigarh. HHC Mast Ram was unconscious. The accused hit HHC Mast Ram with an intention to kill him. His statement under Section 154 Cr.P.C, Ext. PW1/A was recorded. He signed the same. The accused took the truck towards Sanwara side. HHC Mast Ram was taken to Hospital at Dharampur, from where he was further referred to PGI Chandigarh. HHC Mast Ram was unconscious. The accused hit HHC Mast Ram with an intention to kill him. His statement under Section 154 Cr.P.C, Ext. PW1/A was recorded. He signed the same. After some time, a car bearing registration No. HR-64A-5551 came from Solan side and the driver of the car, Surinder Mohit disclosed that his car was hit by the same truck at Anji. The back side of the car was hit by the Truck. Paint of truck at the back side the car was scratched and taken into possession vide seizure memo Ext. PW1/B. In cross-examination, he deposed that distance between two barricades was around 10-15 feet to enable the vehicles to pass with slow speed. They were directed to stop the vehicles going from Solan towards Kalka. They were three in number. He had seen the truck coming from a distance of about 40 mts. He had given signal to stop the truck when it was at a distance of about 3040 mts. from the barricades, but it did not stop. He was standing at a distance of about 20 feet from barricades towards Solan by the left side of the road. He denied that HHC Mast Ram was also standing with him on the road. He volunteered that HHC Mast Ram was standing on the other side of the road next to barricades. He denied that he suddenly rushed towards middle of the road to stop the truck. He also denied that he and HHC Mast Ram were standing together having dandas in their hands. He denied that they suddenly run towards the truck. 9. PW2, Mahinder Singh deposed that he was in Home Guard No.11/3-31 Battalion, Solan. On 1.3.2011, he was deputed at Police Station Dharmapur. According to him, he along with Constable Sunil Kumar and HHC Mast Ram was deputed outside the Police Station Dharampur at National Highway to stop truck bearing registration No.HR-56-5781 coming from Solan towards Parwanoo side. Constable Sunil Kumar had given signal to the driver of the truck to stop, but even the speed was not reduced and the driver of the truck hit HHC Mast Ram. He was taken to hospital at Dharampur, from where he was referred to PGI Chandigarh. Constable Sunil Kumar had given signal to the driver of the truck to stop, but even the speed was not reduced and the driver of the truck hit HHC Mast Ram. He was taken to hospital at Dharampur, from where he was referred to PGI Chandigarh. In cross-examination, he deposed that they came on the spot at about 3-05 P.M.. The truck came at the spot after about 20 minutes. They were not having sticks when they came near barricades. He denied that Constable Sunil and HHC Mast Ram had tried to stop the truck by rushing immediately towards the truck. He denied that HHC Mast Ram after crossing front of the truck had thrown stick/danda over the wind screen of the truck. 10. PW3, Surinder Mohit Sharma, deposed that on 1.3.2011, he was going from Solan to Delhi along with his wife in car No.HR-64A-5551. When he reached Barong Bye Pass near Tapan Motor, a truck came from behind on wrong side and over took his car after hitting car from back side. The truck bearing registration No. HR-56-5781 was at high speed. He followed the truck and got it stopped at Kumarhatti. He asked the driver to compensate the damage caused to his car, but he refused to do so. The accused took the truck towards Dharampur. He reported the matter to the police. The police directed him to come to Dharampur. When he reached at Dharampur, the police told him that the truck had hit the police official. On the same day, in the evening, the truck driver was caught by the police and brought back to the police station. He identified the accused along with truck. The police collected the paint of truck over his car vide seizure memo Ext. PW1/B. In cross-examination, he denied that his car was not hit by truck No. HR-56-5781. According to him, he had asked the accused to compensate the damage caused to his vehicle. 11. PW4, Raghubir Singh deposed that on 1.3.2011 he was standing near Police Station, Dharmpur where the barricades were placed by the police over the road. A truck No.HR-56-5781 came from Shimla side at about 3.25 P.M. at a high speed. The police personnel tried to stop the truck, but it did not stop and hit the police official. The driver took the truck towards Parwanoo side. HHC Mast Ram received injuries. A truck No.HR-56-5781 came from Shimla side at about 3.25 P.M. at a high speed. The police personnel tried to stop the truck, but it did not stop and hit the police official. The driver took the truck towards Parwanoo side. HHC Mast Ram received injuries. The police lifted blood stained soil from the spot and sealed with a cloth packet with seal ‘N’ vide seizure memo Ext. PW1/C. The truck was brought in the Police Station in the evening and was taken into possession along with documents vide seizure memo Ext. PW4/C. In cross-examination, he deposed that he was running a Dhaba at Kumarhatti. He had come on that date to purchase vegetables from the shop in front of Police Station. There were about 2-3 police officials near the barricades. No police official had thrown danda towards wind screen of the truck. He had seen the truck from the distance of about 1520 feet. 12. PW5, Balvinder Singh, deposed that on 1.3.2011, he was driving bus No HC01G-8898 CTU from Shimla to Chandigarh. When he reached near Shiv Mandir, a truck No. HR-56-6781 being driven at high speed hit his bus. He tried to chase the truck, but did not succeed. 13. PW6, Bimla Devi, wife of injured HHC Mast Ram, deposed that on 1.3.2011 she came to know that her husband had met with an accident, who was referred to PGI Chandigarh. She went to PGI Chandigarh and found her husband to be unconscious. During investigation, she handed over blood stained clothes of her husband to the police vide seizure memo Ext. PW6/A. 14. PW7 Constable Devinder Singh, deposed that on 1.3.2011, he along with HC Bharat Singh had gone in search of a truck, which had hit HHC Mast Ram, towards Parwanoo side in a private vehicle. The truck bearing registration No. HR-56-5781 was stopped at TTR Parwanoo. On 3.3.2011, paint of truck No. HR-56-5781 after scratching was taken into possession vide seizure memo Ext. PW7/A. 15. PW8, Roshan Lal, deposed that on 5.3.2011, his sister Bimla Devi had handed over blood stained clothes of the injured to the police, which were taken into possession vide seizure memo Ext. PW6/A. 16. PW9, Sohan Lal, deposed that on 3.3.2011, he mechanically examined the truck No. HR-56-5781 in the Police Station, Dharampur and issued report Ext. PW7/A. 15. PW8, Roshan Lal, deposed that on 5.3.2011, his sister Bimla Devi had handed over blood stained clothes of the injured to the police, which were taken into possession vide seizure memo Ext. PW6/A. 16. PW9, Sohan Lal, deposed that on 3.3.2011, he mechanically examined the truck No. HR-56-5781 in the Police Station, Dharampur and issued report Ext. PW9/A. He scratched the paint over the bumper of the truck, which was taken into possession vide seizure memo Ext. PW7/A. 17. PW10, HHC Bhupinder Singh, proved on record posting order of HHC Mast Ram at Police Station Dharampur vide Ext.PW10/A. 18. PW11, Madan Lal, owner of truck No. HR-56-5781 deposed that on 30.12.2011, he had handed over RC, route permit and agreement of the truck to the police vide seizure memo Ext. PW11/A. According to him, on 1.3.2011, the accused was driving his truck from Solan to Mubarkapur as he had brought a consignment to Solan. 19. PW12, C.L. Sharma, Assistant Chemical Examiner Chemistry Toxicology, SFSL, Junga, deposed that contents of both the parcels were analyzed chemically. Ethyl alcohol was detected in contents of parcels P1 and P2. As per his report, Ext. PW12/A, quantity of ethyl alcohol in Ext.P1 (blood) and Ext. PP2 (urine) was 59 mg% and 86.3% respectively. 20. PW13, Dr. Parvinder Singh, deposed that on 1.3.2011, he medically examined HHC Mast Ram and observed following injuries on his body:- a) An open wound above left eye brow on forehead about 6cm x 1.5 cm in size. Fresh blood was oozing. b) Two other open lacerated wounds on scalp left side on parietal area, size 6 cm x 1.5 cm, 4cm x 1.5 cm intersecting each other. Fresh blood was oozing profusely. The person was unconscious. BP 90/60 and at the time of examination, pulse was very feeble at the rate of 96 per minute. Left pupils was dilated and right was slowly reacting to light. c) Many abrasions over left knee joint. The injured was referred to PGI Chandigarh in view of his condition. He issued MLC Ext. PW13/B. Injuries No. 1 and 3 were dangerous to life as per opinion vide Ext.PW13/D. According to him, the injured was referred to PGI as there was imminent danger to his life. 21. PW14, Vijay Negi, proved on record copy of FIR No.27/2011 vide Ext. PW14/A. 22. He issued MLC Ext. PW13/B. Injuries No. 1 and 3 were dangerous to life as per opinion vide Ext.PW13/D. According to him, the injured was referred to PGI as there was imminent danger to his life. 21. PW14, Vijay Negi, proved on record copy of FIR No.27/2011 vide Ext. PW14/A. 22. PW15, HC Hari Ram, deposed that he investigated FIR No.27/11 dated 1.3.2011 under Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 187 and 177 of the Motor Vehicles Act. After investigation, he prepared the final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. and presented the same before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Solan. 23. PW16, HC Praveen Kumar, deposed that on the basis of statement Ext. PW1/A, FIR Ext. PW16/A was registered. 24. PW17, Lady Constable Sharda, deposed that she deposited the case property at SFSL on 9.3.2011. 25. PW18, SI Partap Singh proved on record appointment letter of HHC Mast Ram vide Ext.PW18/A. 26. PW19, Constable Mandeep Singh proved on record agreement Ext.PW11/A/5 in Punjabi Language and its Hindi translation vide Ext.PW11/A.-6. 27. PW20, Chander Mohan is a formal witness. 28. PW21, Dr. R.K. Sharma, deposed that on 12.8.2011, the police sought his opinion about capability of making statement by injured HHC Mast Ram vide application No.Ext. PW21/A. He observed vide Ext.PW21/B that HHC Mast Ram was in semiconscious state and was not fit for making statement. 29. PW22 Nasib Patial, Scientific Officer, SFSL, Junga, deposed that he gave his opinion vide Ext. PW22/A. 30. PW23 Inspector Jagdish Chand, deposed that on 1.3.2011, HHC Mast Ram, Constable Sunil Kumar, HHG Mahinder Singh were on Nakka duty on National Highway in front of Police Station Dharampur, as he had received an information that truck No. HR-56-5781 had fled away after accident near Tapan Motor, Barog Bye Pass, Solan. At about 3.25 P.M., HHG Mahinder Singh came to the Police Station and disclosed that truck No HR-56-5781 had hit HHC Mast Ram by breaking Nakka and fled towards Sanwara. He recorded statement of Constable Sunil Kumar under Section 154 Cr.P.C. vide Ext.PW1/A. He prepared the spot map Ext. PW23/B. He took photographs Ext. PW23/C-1 to Ext.PW23/C-3. He collected blood stained soil from the spot and sealed in a cloth packet vide memo Ext.PW1/A in the presence of witnesses. The photographs of the car and truck were also taken vide Ext. PW3/A-1 to Ext. PW3/A-3 and Ext. PW23/D-1 and Ext.PW23/D2 respectively. PW23/B. He took photographs Ext. PW23/C-1 to Ext.PW23/C-3. He collected blood stained soil from the spot and sealed in a cloth packet vide memo Ext.PW1/A in the presence of witnesses. The photographs of the car and truck were also taken vide Ext. PW3/A-1 to Ext. PW3/A-3 and Ext. PW23/D-1 and Ext.PW23/D2 respectively. He deposited the case property in Malkhana. He arrested the accused. He sought medical examination of the accused including blood and urine sample vide application Ext.PW13/E and obtained MLC Ext. PW13/F and Ext. PW13/G. In cross-examination, he deposed that when HHG Mahinder Singh informed at the Police Station about the accident, he immediately went to the spot and took the injured to the hospital. The injured was unconscious. The truck was brought to the Police Station at about 5-5.30 P.M.. 31. PW24, ASI Chole Ram, proved on record seizure memos Ext.PW1/C, Ext.PW7/A and Ext.PW6/A. 32. PW25, Dr. Balrajasekhar Chandra, Senior Resident, Department of Neuro Surgery, PGI MER, Chandigarh, deposed that on 1.3.2011, HHC Mast Ram was referred from Community Health Centre Dharampur with the history of being hit by a truck when he was on duty. He was unconscious. Bleeding from the left ear. C.T. head (7830/11) showed intra ventricular haemorrhage multiple brain contusions and perimesencephalic bleed. The injuries were dangerous to life. He issued the medico legal case summary Ext.PW25/A. 33. DW1, Pradeep, deposed that he was employed conductor with Truck No. HR-56-5781 at the relevant time. On 1.3.2011, when they were at Kumarhatti one person came in a car and stopped their truck. When he and Attar Singh alighted from the truck, person started quarrelling with Attar Singh saying that he had hit his car with truck and demanded damages. According to him, the police official who was on left side of the road at once started crossing and driver Attar Singh took the vehicle towards right side. The police official who was on right side came towards truck and threw a danda on wind screen of the truck and while throwing danda, police official got entangled with danda and fell down. According to him, while falling down, the police official struck against bumper of the truck. They were frightened and ran away from the spot in the truck. In cross-examination, he deposed that the accused was related to him. According to him, while falling down, the police official struck against bumper of the truck. They were frightened and ran away from the spot in the truck. In cross-examination, he deposed that the accused was related to him. 34 What emerges from the evidence discussed hereinabove is that on 1.3.2011, the accused while driving Truck bearing No. HR-56-5781 hit a car bearing registration No.HR-64-A-5551 from the back side, driven by PW3 Surender Mohit Sharma near Tapan Motor, Barog Bye Pass. The truck was chased by PW3 Surender Mohit Sharma and got it stopped at Kumarhatti. PW3 Surender Mohit Sharma demanded compensation from the accused. The accused refused to do so. Thereafter, he fled away from the spot towards Dharampur. PW3 Surender Mohit Sharma reported the matter to the police. The Nakka was laid by the police near Police Station Dharampur. PW1 Constable Sunil Kumar, PW2 Home Guard Mahinder Singh and HHC Mast Ram were deputed to stop the truck. They signaled the accused to stop the truck, however, he did not slow down the speed of the truck. The accused hit HHC Mast Ram. Mast Ram received serious injuries. He was taken to hospital at Dharampur, from where, he was referred to PGI Chandigarh. He was unconscious when he was taken to the hospital. 35. PW1 Sunil Kumar has given the version the manner in which HHC Mast Ram was hit by the truck driven by the accused. According to him, the accused did not reduce the speed of the truck and hit HHC Mast Ram with an intention to kill him. Thereafter, the accused fled away towards Sanwara. Statement of PW1 Sunil Kumar was recorded under Section 154 Cr.P.C. vide Ext.PW1/A. There is no variance in his oral testimony and in the statement given by him under Section 154 Cr.P.C., on the basis of which FIR was registered. PW2, Mohinder Singh, has fully corroborated the statement of PW1 Constable Sunil Kumar. He has also deposed the manner in which the accused did not stop the truck at barricades and hit HHC Mast Ram. Both of them have denied that HHC Mast Ram had thrown Danda over the wind screen of the truck. PW3 Surinder Mohit Sharma has also given the manner in which the accused hit his car near Tapan Motor, Barog Bye Pass. He asked the accused to pay compensation for the damage caused to his car. Both of them have denied that HHC Mast Ram had thrown Danda over the wind screen of the truck. PW3 Surinder Mohit Sharma has also given the manner in which the accused hit his car near Tapan Motor, Barog Bye Pass. He asked the accused to pay compensation for the damage caused to his car. However, he refused to do so. Thereafter, the accused fled towards Dharampur. He also reached the Police Station and told the manner in which the accident had caused by the accused. 36. The accused had also caused accident with bus bearing registration No. CH-01G-8898 CTU near Shiv Mandir Dharampur. Statements of PW1 Sunil Kumar, PW2 Home Guard Mohinder Singh have also been corroborated by PW4 Raghubir Singh, who was standing near Police Station Dharampur where the barricades were placed by the police. He was owner of a Dhaba. He had gone to Dharampur to purchase vegetables. The truck was apprehended at Parwanoo and brought back to Dharampur as per version of PW7 Constable Devinder Singh. The truck was also got mechanically examined from PW9 Sohan Lal, who submitted his report Ext.PW9/A. PW12, C.L. Sharma, has deposed that ethyl alcohol was detected in contents of parcels P1 and P2. As per his report, Ext. PW12/A, quantity of ethyl alcohol in Ext.P1 (blood) and Ext. PP2 (urine) was 59 mg% and 86.3% respectively. PW13, Dr. Pavinder Singh, issued MLC Ext.PW 13/B. According to him injuries No. 1 and 2 were dangerous to life. He has referred the injured to PGI Chandigarh. According to PW21 Dr. R.K. Sharma the injured was in semi conscious state and was not fit for making statement. PW22 Nasib Patial, has proved on record report Ext.PW22/A. According to him, the soil in Ext. E/1 was similar to the soil in Ext. E/2 and the paint chips in Ext. E/3 were similar to the paint chips in Ext. E/4. 37. It is clear from the statement of PW25 Bala Raja Sekhar Chandra that the injuries received by the injured were dangerous to life. He was unconscious. There was bleeding from the ear and CT head showed intra ventricular haemorrhage multiple brain contusions and perimesencephalic bleeding. The accused has produced DW1 Pradeep in his defence. According to him, he and the accused belong to same village. He was employed as conductor with the truck in question at the relevant time. He was unconscious. There was bleeding from the ear and CT head showed intra ventricular haemorrhage multiple brain contusions and perimesencephalic bleeding. The accused has produced DW1 Pradeep in his defence. According to him, he and the accused belong to same village. He was employed as conductor with the truck in question at the relevant time. However, PW11, Madan Lal, owner of truck No. HR-56-5781, has not deposed that DW1 Pradeep Kumar was employed as conductor with the truck. 38. The accused had the knowledge that if a person is hit by a speeding truck, it may cause death. The accused had not slowed down the speed of the truck, when he was stopped by the police officials near Police Station Dharampur. He hit HHC Mast Ram, who received serious injuries. He became unconscious. He was taken to Hospital at Dharampur and thereafter, to PGI Chandigarh. He had received head injury, which was dangerous to life. In view of this, the accused has rightly been convicted and sentenced under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. 39. The injured HHC Mast Ram was discharging his duties as public servant when he was hit by the truck. He received grievous injuries. Appointment letter and posting order of HHC Mast Ram at Police Station Dharampur have been duly proved on record vide Ext.PW18/A and Ext.PW10/A respectively. In view of this, the accused has rightly been convicted and sentenced under Section 333 of the Indian Penal Code for voluntarily causing grievous hurt to public servant while he was discharging his duties as public servant. The truck driven by accused was firstly involved in an accident with car, thereafter, with a bus and lastly it hit HHC Mast Ram. The accused was driving the truck at a speed and in a manner, which was dangerous to public. Thus, he has been rightly convicted and sentenced under Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act. As per report issued by PW12 C.L. Sharma, Assistant Chemical Examiner, SFSL Junga, Ext. PW12/A, on chemical analysis, ethyl alcohol was detected in the blood as well as urine samples and quantity of ethyl alcohol in the blood and urine was 59 mg% and 86.3% respectively. Thus, he has been rightly convicted and sentenced under Section 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act. There is no illegality or perversity in the well-reasoned judgment rendered by the learned Sessions Judge. 40. Thus, he has been rightly convicted and sentenced under Section 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act. There is no illegality or perversity in the well-reasoned judgment rendered by the learned Sessions Judge. 40. Accordingly, in view of the observations and analysis made hereinabove, there is no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. No costs. 13. The Court dealing with the petition for divorce on the ground of cruelty has to bear in mind that the problems before it are those of human beings and the psychological changes in a spouse's conduct have to be borne in mind before disposing of the petition for divorce. However insignificant or trifling, such conduct may cause pain in the mind of another. But before the conduct can be called cruelty, it must touch a certain pitch of severity. It is for the Court to weigh the gravity. It has to be seen whether the conduct was such that no reasonable person would tolerate it. It has to be considered whether the complainant should be called upon to endure as a part of normal human life. Every matrimonial conduct, which may cause annoyance to the other, may not amount to cruelty. Mere trivial irritations, quarrels between spouses, which happen in day-to-day married life, may also not amount to cruelty. Cruelty in matrimonial life may be of unfounded variety, which can be subtle or brutal. It may be words, gestures or by mere silence, violent or non-violent.” 33 Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vinita Saxena vs. Pankaj Pandit (2006) 3 Supreme Court Cases 778 have held that the cruelty and mental disorder are two different grounds for grant of divorce. In Section 13(1)(iii) ‘mental disorder’ as a ground of divorce is attracted only where it is of such a kind and degree that the appellant cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent. 34 Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Naveen Kohli vs. Neelu Kohli (2006) 4 Supreme Court Cases 558 have held that the cruelty is a course or conduct of one, which is adversely affecting the other. Their Lordships have held as under:- “48. The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social conditions and their culture and human values to which they attach importance. Their Lordships have held as under:- “48. The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social conditions and their culture and human values to which they attach importance. Each case has to be decided on its own merits. 64. In Durga P.Tripathy v. Arundhati Tripathy, (2005) 7 SCC 353 , this Court further observed that Marriages are made in heaven. Both parties have crossed the point of no return. A workable solution is certainly not possible. Parties cannot at this stage reconcile themselves and live together forgetting their past as a bad dream. We, therefore, have no other option except to allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court and affirming the order of the Family Court granting decree for divorce.” 35 Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sujata Uday Patil vs. Uday Madhukar Patil (2006) 13 Supreme Court Cases 272 have held that the matrimonial disputes should be decided in a pragmatic manner keeping in view the ground realities. Their Lordships have further held that the cruel treatment can be inferred from the entire course of conduct and incidents showing display of temperament, emotion and perversion by one spouse causing hurt and humiliation to the other spouse. Their Lordships have held as under:- “6. Sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred as 'the Act') lays down the grounds on which a marriage may be dissolved by a decree of divorce. This sub-section has several clauses and under clause (i-a) cruelty and under clause (i-b) desertion for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition, are grounds for granting a decree of divorce. The following observation made by this Court in Reynolds Rajamani vs. Union of India AIR 1982 SC 1261 , which is a case under Section 10 of the Divorce Act, throw considerable light on the approach which should be adopted in dealing with a provision relating to divorce: - "The history of all matrimonial legislation will show that at the outset, conservative attitude influenced the grounds on which separation or divorce could be granted. Over the decades a more liberal attitude has been adopted, fostered by a recognition of the need for individual happiness of the adult parties directly involved. Over the decades a more liberal attitude has been adopted, fostered by a recognition of the need for individual happiness of the adult parties directly involved. But although the grounds for divorce have been liberalized, they nevertheless continue to form an exception to the general principles favouring the continuation of the marital tie. In our opinion, when a legislative provision specifies the grounds on which divorce may be granted they constitute the only conditions on which the Court has jurisdiction to grant divorce. If grounds need to be added to those already specifically set forth in the legislation, that is the business of the Legislature and not of the Courts. It is another matter that in construing the language in which the grounds are incorporated the courts should give a liberal construction to it. Indeed we think that the courts must give the fullest amplitude of meaning to such a provision. But, it must be meaning which the language of the section is capable of holding." Therefore, a liberal approach has to be adopted in dealing with various clauses of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act and full meaning should be given to the words used by the legislature. 7. The word "cruelty" and the kind or degree of "cruelty" necessary which may amount to a matrimonial offence has not been defined in the Act. What is cruel treatment is to a large extent a question of fact or a mixed question of law and fact and no dogmatic answer can be given to the variety of problems that arise before the court in these kind of cases. The law has no standard by which to measure the nature and degree of cruel treatment that may satisfy the test. It may consist of a display of temperament, emotion or pervasion whereby one gives vent to his or her feelings, without intending to injure the other. It need not consist of direct action against the other but may be misconduct indirectly affecting the other spouse even though it is not aimed at that spouse. It is necessary to weigh all the incidents and quarrels between the parties keeping in view the impact of the personality and conduct of one spouse upon the mind of the other. It need not consist of direct action against the other but may be misconduct indirectly affecting the other spouse even though it is not aimed at that spouse. It is necessary to weigh all the incidents and quarrels between the parties keeping in view the impact of the personality and conduct of one spouse upon the mind of the other. Cruelty may be inferred from the facts and matrimonial relations of the parties and interaction in their daily life disclosed by the evidence and inference on the said point can only be drawn after all the facts have been taken into consideration. Where there is proof of a deliberate course of conduct on the part of one, intended to hurt and humiliate the other spouse, and such a conduct is persisted, cruelty can easily be inferred. Neither actual nor presumed intention to hurt the other spouse is a necessary element in cruelty. 11. In the case in hand it is an established fact that the respondent has married again and has a child from the second wife. In such circumstances even if the decree for divorce granted by the learned District Judge which has been affirmed by the High Court is set aside, as prayed by the appellant herein, no useful purpose would be served. The appellant cannot possibly live with the husband in such a scenario nor it will be conducive to the upbringing of her son Charul @ Chaitanya. The learned District Judge has mentioned in the judgment that he made serious efforts for reconciliation and talked to the parties in arriving at an amicable solution but the respondent was reluctant to take back the appellant on account of strained relationship and at the same time the appellant, who refused to give divorce to the respondent, was not firm as to whether their union would bring about happy reunion. He has further mentioned that he suggested to the parties to take some unanimous decision keeping in mind the future of their son Charul @ Chaitanya but they failed to come to any such decision. He has further mentioned that he suggested to the parties to take some unanimous decision keeping in mind the future of their son Charul @ Chaitanya but they failed to come to any such decision. The case was adjourned several times in this Court also to enable the parties to arrive at a settlement but it did not bring about any fruitful result.” 36 Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 Supreme Court Cases 511 have held that there cannot be any comprehensive definition of “mental cruelty” within which all kinds of cases of mental cruelty can be covered. The prudent and appropriate way to adjudicate the case would be to evaluate it on its peculiar facts and circumstances while taking the various factors mentioned herein into consideration. Their Lordships have further held that there can never be any straitjacket formula or fixed parameters for determining mental cruelty in matrimonial matters. Their Lordships have held as under:- “100. Apart from this, the concept of mental cruelty cannot remain static; it is bound to change with the passage of time, impact of modern culture through print and electronic media and value system etc. etc. What may be mental cruelty now may not remain a mental cruelty after a passage of time or vice versa. There can never be any strait-jacket formula or fixed parameters for determining mental cruelty in matrimonial matters. The prudent and appropriate way to adjudicate the case would be to evaluate it on its peculiar facts and circumstances while taking aforementioned factors in consideration. 101. No uniform standard can ever be laid down for guidance, yet we deem it appropriate to enumerate some instances of human behaviour which may be relevant in dealing with the cases of 'mental cruelty'. The instances indicated in the succeeding paragraphs are only illustrative and not exhaustive. (i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as would not make possible for the parties to live with each other could come within the broad parameters of mental cruelty. (ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire matrimonial life of the parties, it becomes abundantly clear that situation is such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with other party. (ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire matrimonial life of the parties, it becomes abundantly clear that situation is such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with other party. (iii) Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount to cruelty, frequent rudeness of language, petulance of manner, indifference and neglect may reach such a degree that it makes the married life for the other spouse absolutely intolerable. (iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of other for a long time may lead to mental cruelty. (v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render miserable life of the spouse. (vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of one spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse. The treatment complained of and the resultant danger or apprehension must be very grave, substantial and weighty. (vii) Sustained reprehensible conduct, studied neglect, indifference or total departure from the normal standard of conjugal kindness causing injury to mental health or deriving sadistic pleasure can also amount to mental cruelty. (viii) The conduct must be much more than jealousy, selfishness, possessiveness, which causes unhappiness and dissatisfaction and emotional upset may not be a ground for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. (ix) Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the married life which happens in day to day life would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. (x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a few isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to cruelty. The ill-conduct must be persistent for a fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds it extremely difficult to live with the other party any longer, may amount to mental cruelty. (xi) If a husband submits himself for an operation of sterilization without medical reasons and without the consent or knowledge of his wife and similarly if the wife undergoes vasectomy or abortion without medical reason or without the consent or knowledge of her husband, such an act of the spouse may lead to mental cruelty. (xi) If a husband submits himself for an operation of sterilization without medical reasons and without the consent or knowledge of his wife and similarly if the wife undergoes vasectomy or abortion without medical reason or without the consent or knowledge of her husband, such an act of the spouse may lead to mental cruelty. (xii) Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse for considerable period without there being any physical incapacity or valid reason may amount to mental cruelty. (xiii) Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after marriage not to have child from the marriage may amount to cruelty. (xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases, does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. In such like situations, it may lead to mental cruelty. 102. When we take into consideration aforementioned factors along with an important circumstance that the parties are admittedly living separately for more than sixteen and half years (since 27.8.1990) the irresistible conclusion would be that matrimonial bond has been ruptured beyond repair because of the mental cruelty caused by the respondent. 37 Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manisha Tyagi vs. Deepak Kumar (2010) 4 Supreme Court Cases 339 have held that to constitute ‘cruelty’ it is enough that conduct of one of parties is so abnormal and below accepted norm that other spouse could not reasonably be expected to put with it. Their Lordships have held as under:- “26. At this stage we may notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Naveen Kohli vs. Neelu Kohli (2006) 4 SCC 558 . In this case the Court examined the development and evolution of the concept of mental cruelty in matrimonial causes. In paragraph 35 it is observed as follows: "35. The petition for divorce was filed primarily on the ground of cruelty. It may be pertinent to note that, prior to 1976 amendment in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 cruelly was not a ground for claiming divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act. It was only a ground for claiming judicial separation under Section 10 of the Act. The petition for divorce was filed primarily on the ground of cruelty. It may be pertinent to note that, prior to 1976 amendment in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 cruelly was not a ground for claiming divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act. It was only a ground for claiming judicial separation under Section 10 of the Act. By the 1976 amendment, cruelty was made a ground for divorce and the words which have been omitted from Section 10 are "as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it will be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the other party". Therefore, it is not necessary for a party claiming divorce to prove that the cruel treatment is of such a nature as to cause an apprehension-reasonable apprehension - that it will be harmful or injurious for him or her to live with the other party." 27. The classic example of the definition of cruelty in the pre-1976 era is given in the well known decision of this Court in the case of N.G. Dastane vs. S. Dastane (1975) 2 SCC 326 , wherein it is observed as follows: "The enquiry has to be whether the conduct charged as cruelty is of such a character as to cause in the mind of the petitioner as reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious for him to live with the respondent". This is no longer the required standard. Now it would be sufficient to show that the conduct of one of the spouses is so abnormal and below the accepted norm that the other spouse could not reasonably be expected to put up with it. The conduct is no longer required to be so atrociously abominable which would cause a reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to continue the cohabitation with the other spouse. Therefore to establish cruelty it is not necessary that physical violence should be used. However continued ill-treatment cessation of marital intercourse, studied neglect, indifference of one spouse to the other may lead to an inference of cruelty. However in this case even with aforesaid standard both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court had accepted that the conduct of the wife did not amount to cruelty of such a nature to enable the husband to obtain a decree of divorce.” 38. However in this case even with aforesaid standard both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court had accepted that the conduct of the wife did not amount to cruelty of such a nature to enable the husband to obtain a decree of divorce.” 38. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Neelam Kumar vs. Dayarani (2010) 13 Supreme Court Cases 298 have held that no decree of divorce can be granted unless person seeking divorce proves cruelty on the basis of pleadings and evidence. Respondent not producing any evidence in support of his/her case to the contrary is of no consequence. Their Lordships have further held that one single instance in isolation is not sufficient for dissolution of marriage on ground of cruelty. Their Lordships have held as under:- “7. Against the judgment and decree passed by the trial court, the respondent filed an appeal in the High Court under section 28 of the Act. Before the High Court, the appellant strongly defended the judgment of the trial court and pointed out that the respondent had not even led any evidence in support of her case. The High Court, however, took the view, and we think quite rightly, that even though the respondent did not produce any evidence, no decree of divorce could be granted unless the appellant was able to prove on the basis of the pleadings and the evidences produced by him that his case was covered by section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act. On a consideration of the materials on record, the High Court found and held that no case of cruelty could be made out against the respondent and hence, the appellant was not entitled to the decree of dissolution of marriage on that ground. 9. The High Court then took up the other allegation that the respondent did not come to attend and take care of the appellant when he was undergoing medical treatment in a hospital for the injuries caused in an accident. The High Court found that this allegation was not part of the appellant's pleadings and the matter was introduced in course of evidence. The court observed that not being stated in the pleadings, the allegation could not be taken into consideration. Even otherwise, apart from the oral statement made before the trial court, there was no material to support the allegation. The court observed that not being stated in the pleadings, the allegation could not be taken into consideration. Even otherwise, apart from the oral statement made before the trial court, there was no material to support the allegation. The appellant did not examine any doctor or produce the medical records in connection with his treatment. In any event, one single instance, in isolation, was hardly sufficient for the dissolution of marriage on the ground that the respondent treated the appellant with cruelty.” 39. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gurbus Singh vs. Harminder Kaur (2010) 14 Supreme Court Cases 301 have held that onus to prove that particular conduct or behaviour resulted in cruelty is on the person who claims relief. Their Lordships have held as under:- “14. Cruelty has not been defined under the Act. It is quite possible that a particular conduct may amount to cruelty in one case but the same conduct necessarily may not amount to cruelty due to change of various factors, in different set of circumstances. Therefore, it is essential for the appellant, who claims relief, to prove that a particular/part of conduct or behaviour resulted in cruelty to him. No prior assumptions can be made in such matters. Meaning thereby that it cannot be assumed that a particular conduct will, under all circumstances, amount to cruelty, vis-à-vis the other party. The aggrieved party has to make a specific case that the conduct of which exception is taken amounts to cruelty. 15. It is true that even a single act of violence which is of grievous and inexcusable nature satisfied the test of cruelty. Persistence in inordinate sexual demands or malpractices by either spouse can be cruelty if it injures the other spouse. There is no such complaint by the appellant. In the case on hand, as stated earlier, the appellant has projected few instances in which, according to him, the respondent abused his parents. We have verified all the averments in the petitions, reply statement, written submissions as well as the evidence of both parties. We are satisfied that on the basis of such instances, marriage cannot be dissolved. 16. The married life should be assessed as a whole and a few isolated instances over certain period will not amount to cruelty. We have verified all the averments in the petitions, reply statement, written submissions as well as the evidence of both parties. We are satisfied that on the basis of such instances, marriage cannot be dissolved. 16. The married life should be assessed as a whole and a few isolated instances over certain period will not amount to cruelty. The ill conduct must be precedent for a fairly lengthy period where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and behaviour of a spouse, one party finds it extremely difficult to live with the other party no longer may amount to mental cruelty. Making certain statements on the spur of the moment and expressing certain displeasure about the behaviour of elders may not be characterized as cruelty. Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of married life which happens in day to day life in all families would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of cruelty. Sustained unjustifiable and reprehensible conduct affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse may lead to mental cruelty. Both the appellant and the respondent being highly qualified persons, the appellant being Principal in ITI College, the respondent working as a Librarian in a government institute, an isolated friction on some occasion like festival of lohri even in the presence of others cannot be a valid ground for dissolving the marriage.” 40. In view of observations and discussion made hereinabove, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment dated 16.4.2013 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Una, District Una, H.P. in H.M.A. Petition No.21/2010 is set aside. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.