JUDGMENT : MANSOOR AHMAD MIR, J. 1. Petitioner, by the medium of this writ petition has questioned the judgment and order made by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench (Circuit at Shimla) (hereinafter referred to as “the Administrative Tribunal”, for short, in O.A. No. 475/HP/2008 dated 10.8.2009, whereby the O.A. filed by the petitioner came to be dismissed, hereinafter referred to as “the impugned judgment”, for short, on the grounds taken in the writ petition. 2. A brief narration of the conspectus of facts are that the petitioner came to be appointed as TGT (Mathematics), vide appointment letter dated 5.3.2004, on probation, for a period of two years, as per the stipulations contained in the appointment order, which was extendable by another year, at the discretion of the competent authority. The petitioner, consequent upon his appointment, submitted his joining, on 2.4.2004. Thereafter the petitioner was transferred to Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalaya Kunihar, District Solan in the month of May, 2004. The competent authority, after noticing the work, conduct and performance of the petitioner, extended the period of probation upto 2.4.2007 vide order dated 24.5.2006. Thereafter, again, after noticing the work and conduct of the petitioner, the probation period of the petitioner was extended for a period of one year upto 31.3.2008, vide communication dated 28.12.2007. 3. It is worthwhile to mention here that before extension was granted to the petitioner on 24.5.2006 upto 2.4.2007, he was served with a show-cause notice dated 13.9.2004 and was asked to submit written explanation within ten days from the receipt of the notice. The petitioner had filed the reply to the said show-cause notice. After considering the reply and other attending circumstances, the services of the petitioner came to be terminated by the respondents, vide termination order dated 4.7.2008, in terms of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Services) Rules, 1965, occupying the field at the relevant point of time. 4. The petitioner questioned the said termination order by the medium of O.A before the Administrative Tribunal, as stated supra. 5. The respondents filed reply to the Original Application before the Tribunal and the petitioner also filed rejoinder to the same. After examining the pleadings of the parties, documents and the law applicable, the Administrative Tribunal dismissed the O.A. vide order dated 10.8.2009 which is subject matter of the writ petition in hand. 6. 5. The respondents filed reply to the Original Application before the Tribunal and the petitioner also filed rejoinder to the same. After examining the pleadings of the parties, documents and the law applicable, the Administrative Tribunal dismissed the O.A. vide order dated 10.8.2009 which is subject matter of the writ petition in hand. 6. Admittedly, the petitioner has not completed his first probation period of two years, in terms of the appointment order satisfactorily. It is apt to reproduce para 2 of the said appointment order herein: “2. You will be on probation for a period of two years from the date of appointment extendable by another year at the discretion of the competent authority. Failure to complete the period of probation to the satisfaction of the competent authority or found unsuitable for the post during the probation period, will render you liable to discharge from service at any time without notice and without assigning any reason thereto.” 7. The period of probation of the petitioner was extended to one year upto 2.4.2007, vide order dated 24.5.2006. It is profitable to reproduce relevant portion of the said order herein: “Consequent upon the recommendations of the Departmental Promotion Committee, the probation period of Ms. Suman Sharma, TGT (Maths), JNV Kunihar, Distt. Solan (HP) is hereby extended for one year i.e. upto 2.4.2007 as her performance has not been found satisfactory. During this period the teacher is advised to improve her work and conduct. This is also a final chance being given to her for improving her work and conduct.” 8. The said probation period was again extended vide order dated 28.12.2007, till 31.3.2008 and reasons were recorded for such extension, the relevant portion of the said order reads as under: “Consequent upon the recommendations of the Departmental Promotion Committee, the probation period of Sh. Suman Sharma, TGT (Maths), JNV Kunihar, Distt. Solan (HOP) now at JNV Sarol, Distt. Chamba (HP) is hereby extended upto 31.3.2008 as his performance has not been found satisfactory. During this period the teacher is advised to improve his work and conduct. This is also a final chance being given to him for improving his work and conduct.” 9. Suman Sharma, TGT (Maths), JNV Kunihar, Distt. Solan (HOP) now at JNV Sarol, Distt. Chamba (HP) is hereby extended upto 31.3.2008 as his performance has not been found satisfactory. During this period the teacher is advised to improve his work and conduct. This is also a final chance being given to him for improving his work and conduct.” 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that the services of the petitioner came to be terminated on 4.7.2008 and on that date, the period of probation of the petitioner was over, in view of the fact that his probation was only extended upto 31.3.2008 and he was allowed to continue after probation. It is a deemed confirmation and the services of the petitioner could not have been discharged, without full-dress regular enquiry. 10. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner appears to be attractive but is devoid of any force, for the reasons recorded hereinafter. 11. The questions to be determined in this writ petition are whether it is a case of deemed confirmation or the order of confirmation was required in writing and whether the petitioner was still on probation. 12. The petitioner has specifically averred in para 13 (l) of the petition that the 2nd order of extension of period of probation (Annexure A-3 with P2) is wrong as he continued after completion of probation period and it is deemed confirmation. It is apt to reproduce para 9 (l) of the petition herein: “9 (l) Because the petitioner was appointed vide appointment letter dated 05.03.2004, therefore, the probation period of the petitioner for the first two years ended on 04.03.2006. The probation period of the petitioner was extendable for further one year and that period also ended on 03.03.2007. The office order (Annexure A-3 with P-2) dated 28.12.2007 extending the period of the application for probation till 31.03.2008 was, therefore, unauthorized and without competence. There was no power vested with the authority to extend the probation period beyond 04.03.2007. The petitioner continued serving the respondents beyond the extendable period of probation. There was no communication with the respondents even after 31.03.2008. The communication dated 28.12.2007 has been issued after the probation period was already completed by the petitioner on 04.03.2007 after a lapse of 9 months. The petitioner continued serving the respondents beyond the extendable period of probation. There was no communication with the respondents even after 31.03.2008. The communication dated 28.12.2007 has been issued after the probation period was already completed by the petitioner on 04.03.2007 after a lapse of 9 months. Assuming that the probation period of the petitioner is to commence from the date of joining the service by the petitioner, then also the probation period of the petitioner (even extended period also) has come to an end on 01.04.2007. In this view of the matter the petitioner was deemed to have been confirmed with effect from 02.04.2007 and the services of the petitioner are not liable to be terminated thereafter. The probation period of the petitioner has come to an end on 02.04.2007, therefore, termination of the petitioner is invalid. It is well settled law that termination after the expiry of maximum period up to which probation could be extended is invalid, illegal and unconstitutional inasmuch as the employee is deemed to have been confirmed after the expiry of the probation period. It is brought into the kind notice of this Hon'ble Court that maximum probation period in case of the category of petitioner is two years which is further extendable for one year only. There is no power vested with the authorities in the rules to extend the probation period for another year. Therefore, after the expiry of the period of probation of the petitioner, the petitioner is deemed to have been confirmed and there is no authority vested with the respondents to keep the petitioner under probation after the expiry of the period of probation. In case the respondents have failed to pass any further order confirming the petitioner, the petitioner cannot be penalized for this. The petitioner has been deemed to have been confirmed as the petitioner has been allowed to continue in service beyond the period of probation. In this view of the matter the petitioner was confirmed employee for all intents and purposes and as such could not be terminated under the provisions of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, which are not applicable in the present case.” 13. The respondents have specifically replied the same in preliminary submissions. It is apt to reproduce preliminary submissions and relevant portion of reply on merits, as under: “1. The respondents have specifically replied the same in preliminary submissions. It is apt to reproduce preliminary submissions and relevant portion of reply on merits, as under: “1. That by way of OA No.475/HP/2008 titled Suman Sharma vs. UOI, respondent/applicant approached the ld. Tribunal below stating therein that his services cannot be terminated under rules 5 (1) of CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 because after completion of three years probation period as per terms and condition of appointment he is deemed to have been confirmed and his services cannot be terminated without following due process as per law. It is humbly submitted that applicant/respondent cannot be automatically deemed to have been confirmed unless some specific orders are passed by the competent authority for the confirmation of the employee. In catena of cases Hon'ble Apex Court as well as various High Courts have held that so long as specific order of confirmation is not passed after expiry of period of probation, a probationer shall continue and remain in service as probationer only. 2. That in the present case respondent/applicant joined services with the respondent on 2.4.2004 on probation. During his probation period he was not found to be good teacher and instead of teaching the classes assigned to him he indulged in uncalled for activities. It is humbly submitted that whenever authorities asked him to improve, he leveled/filed false allegations/complaints against the Principal of School. It is ample clear from the records available with the school authorities that number of advisory notes were issued to respondent/applicant by the School Administration advising him to improve his working. Even when his probation period was extended for another one year Memorandum were issued to him. Record available with the school authorities would go to show that during year 2006 his work was also inspected by inspecting team and one of the member of the inspecting team namely Shri P.K. Puri, Principal Jawahar Navodyalaya, Nahan adversely commented against the working of respondent/applicant. Thereafter even after his transfer to Jawahar Navodya Vidyalya, Sarol, Distt. Chamba, working of respondent/applicant did not improve and Principal of the concerned School found the work of the applicant below average. Besides this, petitioner/applicant remained on 84 days leave during probation period besides availing the summer vacation and other Gazetted Holidays. 3. That by way of O.A. filed before ld. Chamba, working of respondent/applicant did not improve and Principal of the concerned School found the work of the applicant below average. Besides this, petitioner/applicant remained on 84 days leave during probation period besides availing the summer vacation and other Gazetted Holidays. 3. That by way of O.A. filed before ld. Tribunal below, respondent/applicant alleged that he is being harassed by the respondents but not even a single instance has been quoted to substantiate his allegations which regard to harassment. To the contrary, there is ample evidence on record that school authorities have afforded him reasonable opportunities to improve his working. But instead of improving, petitioner/applicant started filing false complaints against the Principal JNV, Kunihar as well as answering respondent No.4. It is evident from the record that whenever the Principal of the concerned school tried to point out the deficiencies in the working of petitioner/applicant he has filed baseless complaints against the authorities concerned. In view of the fact that respondent/applicant was on probation and during probation he has not worked upto the satisfaction of the employer i.e.School Authorities, services of the petitioner/applicant has been rightly terminated by the respondents. Hence, the present petition deserves to be dismissed. 4. That the order passed under Rule 5 (1) of CCS (TS) Rules, 1965 is appealable and appeal can be filed to next higher authority within a period of three months. But in the present case respondent/applicant without availing the remedy of appeal approached the ld. Tribunal below by way of O.A., hence petition deserves to be dismissed. 5.That the impugned order dated 10.8.2009 passed by the ld. Tribunal below in OA No.475/HP/2008 is based on correct appreciation of law and facts and same deserves to be upheld by this Hon'ble Court.” “……. ………. It is further submitted that petitioner/applicant was afforded number of opportunities by the replying respondent to improve his working but the petitioner/applicant instead of making any improvement in his work and conduct indulged in making false and frivolous complaints against the authorities. There is ample evidence on record to show that on number of accassions petitioner/applicant has remained absent from the duty without due permission from the quarter concerned. Replying respondents have already placed on record number of documents by way of filing written statement before the ld. CAT showing the misconduct of the petitioner/applicant and the same are not being reproduced for the sake of brevity. Replying respondents have already placed on record number of documents by way of filing written statement before the ld. CAT showing the misconduct of the petitioner/applicant and the same are not being reproduced for the sake of brevity. Very perusal of the documents on record would go to show that petitioner/applicant never performed his duties with sincerity, rather he took his duties very casually and failed to do justice to the number of students to whom he was supposed to teach. Replying respondent humbly submits that in case such teachers are allowed to continue to work is prestigious institutions like of Jawahar Navodya Vidyalayas, run by Ministry of HRD, Govt. of India, great injustice would be caused to the number of students studying in such schools. Hence, present petition filed by petitioner/applicant deserves to be quashed and set aside.” 14. The Administrative Tribunal has discussed in detail at pages 7 and 8 of the judgment that in terms of Rule 5, mere expiry of initial period of probation is not a deemed confirmation because express order of confirmation was to be made in view of the said rule. It is profitable to reproduce relevant paras at pages 7 and 8 of the said judgment herein: “ (viii) A direct recruit who holds a lien on a post under the Central Government or any State Government or in the NVS may, while on probation, be reverted to such post at any time on grounds of any of the circumstances specified in sub-rule (iii) above. Thus, as per Rule 5 aforesaid, a probationer can be discharged from service if his work and conduct is not found satisfactory. Even under Rule 5 of the CCS (TS) Rules, services of a templorary employee can be dispensed with by giving him one month's notice or salary in lieu thereof on account of unsatisfactory work. The applicant was on probation of two years. His probation was extended not once but twice. The probation has to be completed successfully and followed by an order in this regard. Satisfactory performance of work is another condition precedent. There cannot be automatic confirmation on expiry of prescribed period of probation as has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Shri Jai Kishan vs. Commissioner of Police & another (supra), wherein Dharm Singh's case (supra) was also considered. Satisfactory performance of work is another condition precedent. There cannot be automatic confirmation on expiry of prescribed period of probation as has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Shri Jai Kishan vs. Commissioner of Police & another (supra), wherein Dharm Singh's case (supra) was also considered. This was also the view taken by the Apex Court in Municipal Corporation, Raipur vs. Ashok Kumar Misra- AIR 1991 SC 1402 & Registrar, High Court of Gujarat and another vs. C.G. Sharma, AIR 2005 SC 344 . The following observations made by the Apex Court in the aforesaid case are relevant to be noticed here: “Exercise of the power to extend the probation is hedged with the existence of the rule in that regard followed by positive act of either confirmation of the probation or discharge from service or expiry of the period of probation. If the rules do not empower the period, or where the rules are absent about confirmation or passing of the prescribed test for confirmation or probation and inaction for a very long time may lead to an indication of the satisfactory completion of probation. However, rule 8 expressly postulates that the period of probation is subject to extension by order in writing for another period of one year. Passing the prescribed examinations and successful completion of probation and passing of an express order or confirmation are made condition precedent for conformation of probation under R.8 Mere expiry of the initial period of probation therefore does not automatically have the effect of deemed confirmation. An express order in that regard only confers status of an approved probationer. Before confirmation, the appointing authority is empowered to terminate the services of the petitioner by issuing one month's calendar notice in writing and on expiry thereof the service stands terminated without any further notice. As such the order terminating the services of a probationer was passed within three months from the date of expiry of original two years period of probation and within one year's period, the question of conducting an inquiry under the Classification, Control and Appeal (Rules) after giving an opportunity and that too for specific charges would not arise.” 15. As such the order terminating the services of a probationer was passed within three months from the date of expiry of original two years period of probation and within one year's period, the question of conducting an inquiry under the Classification, Control and Appeal (Rules) after giving an opportunity and that too for specific charges would not arise.” 15. The Administrative Tribunal has also discussed what was the reasons for granting extension of probation period to the petitioner, which has been reproduced hereinabove and also that the authorities have rightly terminated the services of the petitioner. 16. The apex Court has also dealt with this issue in various judgments and held that order of confirmation should be made in writing and after expiry of probation period, it cannot be said that it is deemed confirmation. 17. In case titled High Court of Madhya Pradeshs Thru. Registrar and others v. Satya Narayan Jhavar reported in AIR 2001 SC 3234 , it has been held as under: “35. In the case of Dayaram Dayal (supra), a two Judge Bench of this Court was considering a case covered by Rule 24 of the Rules, in which the incumbent was appointed as Civil Judge Class II in M.P. Subordinate Judicial Service on 22nd Oct. 1985 and after completing six months training, he was put on probation for two years which period was completed on 22nd May, 1988. On 2nd March, 1990, he was placed under suspension pending some charges and in the year 1991 after inquiry, punishment of stoppage of two annual increments with cumulative effect was awarded. There were certain adverse remarks in ACRs between the years 1987-88 and 1992-93. On 3rd May, 1992, the Full Court having not found him fit for confirmation, deferred the matter to give one more opportunity. In the year 1993 again, the High Court did not find him fit for confirmation as such his services were terminated by paying one month's salary in lieu of notice as required under Rule 24. When the said order was challenged in a writ application, the same was dismissed and order of dismissal was affirmed in appeal. In the year 1993 again, the High Court did not find him fit for confirmation as such his services were terminated by paying one month's salary in lieu of notice as required under Rule 24. When the said order was challenged in a writ application, the same was dismissed and order of dismissal was affirmed in appeal. Thereafter, when the matter was challenged before this Court, the appeal was allowed, judgments of the High Court were set aside and order of termination was quashed holding that the incumbent would be deemed to have been confirmed on the expiry of four years maximum period of probation prescribed under the Rules following Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of Dharam Singh (supra) where Rules did not require an incumbent to pass any test or fulfil any other condition before confirmation, as noticed by the Constitution Bench itself in that case which goes to show that if the Rules would have required a person to pass any test or fulfil any other condition before confirmation. It was not possible to draw an inference that merely because an employee was allowed to continue on the post up on completion of the maximum period of probation, he was confirmed by implication. There the Court proceeded on the facts of that case, which do not show any assessment of work and conduct of the probationer being made and he being not found fit for confirmation by the competent authority during the period of probation. In the absence of any opinion formed after considering the performance of probationer, it was presumed in that case that there being nothing adverse against the officer, there was no compelling reason not to confirm him on the post inasmuch as there was no plea on behalf of the State that his work and conduct was not satisfactory. The Rules did not require any condition of assessment of work at the end of extended period of probation or passing of departmental examination. In the said case, order of termination was issued more than two years after the expiry of maximum period of probation which was completed on 1st Oct. 1960 and the order of termination was issued in 1963 without any assessment of his performance.” 36. In the said case, order of termination was issued more than two years after the expiry of maximum period of probation which was completed on 1st Oct. 1960 and the order of termination was issued in 1963 without any assessment of his performance.” 36. In the case on hand, correctness of the interpretation given by this Court to Rule 24 of the Rules in the case of Dayaram Dayal (supra) is the bone of contention. In the aforesaid case, no doubt, this Court has held that a maximum period of probation having been provided under sub-rule (1) of Rule 24, if a probationer's service is not terminated and he is allowed to continue thereafter. It will be a case of deemed confirmation and the sheet anchor of the aforesaid conclusion is the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of Dharam Singh (supra). But, in our considered opinion in the case of Dayaram Dayal ( supra) Rule 24 of the Rules has not been interpreted in its proper perspective. A plain reading of different sub-rules of Rule 24 would indicate that every candidate appointed to the cadre will go for initial training for six months whereafter he would be appointed on probation for a period of 2 years and the said period of probation would be extended for a further period not exceeding 2 years. Thus, under sub-rule (1) of Rule 24 a maximum period of 4 years' probation has been provided. The aforesaid sub-rule also stipulates that at the end of the probation period the appointee could be confirmed subject to his fitness for confirmation and to have passed the departmental examination, as may be prescribed. In the very sub-rule, therefore, while a maximum period of probation has been indicated, yet the question of confirmation of such a probationer is dependent upon his fitness for such confirmation and his passing of the departmental examination by the higher standard, as prescribed. It necessarily stipulates that question of confirmation can be considered at the end of the period of probation, and on such consideration, if the probationer is found suitable by the Appointing Authority and he is found to have passed the prescribed departmental examination then the Appointing Authority may issue an order of confirmation. It necessarily stipulates that question of confirmation can be considered at the end of the period of probation, and on such consideration, if the probationer is found suitable by the Appointing Authority and he is found to have passed the prescribed departmental examination then the Appointing Authority may issue an order of confirmation. It is too well settled that an order of confirmation is a positive act on the part of the employer which the employer is required to pass in accordance with the Rules governing the question of confirmation subject to a finding that the probationer is in fact fit for confirmation. This being the position under sub- rule (1) of Rule 24, it is difficult for us to accept the proposition, broadly laid down in the case of Dayaram Dayal (supra) and to hold that since a maximum period of probation has been provided thereunder, at the end of that period the probationer must be held to be deemed to be confirmed on the basis of the judgment of this Court in the case of Dharam Singh (supra). 37-38….…….……….. 39. Apart from sub-rule (I) of Rule 24 of the Rules, the effect of sub-rule (3) may also be considered. Under sub-rule (3), if a probationer has been found unsuitable for the service during the period of probation or he has failed to pass the prescribed departmental examination then the Governor at any time thereafter may dispense with his service. The power for dispensing with services has been conferred upon the Governor to be exercised at any time after the period of probation if the probationer is found unsuitable or if he has failed to pass the prescribed departmental examination. If the interpretation given by this Court in the case of Dayaram Dayal (supra) to sub-rule (1) of Rule 24 is held to be correct then this power of the Governor under sub-rule (3) would become otiose inasmuch as a probationer would acquire a deemed confirmation on the expiry of the maximum period of probation provided in sub-rule (1). If the interpretation given by this Court in the case of Dayaram Dayal (supra) to sub-rule (1) of Rule 24 is held to be correct then this power of the Governor under sub-rule (3) would become otiose inasmuch as a probationer would acquire a deemed confirmation on the expiry of the maximum period of probation provided in sub-rule (1). Subrule (3) of Rule 24, therefore, is another inbuilt provision in the Rules which can be held to be a special provision to negative the inference of deemed confirmation on the expiry of the maximum period of probation indicated in sub-rule (1), as has been observed by this Court in the case of Dayaram Dayal (supra) also and which is in conformity with the decisions of this Court in the case of Shamsher Singh (supra), Sukhbans Singh (supra), G.S. Ramaswamy (supra) and AkbarAli Khan (supra). Rule 24 on a plain grammatical meaning being given to the words used therein does not provide for a deemed confirmation on expiry of the maximum period of probation, and on the other hand it contemplates a positive order of confirmation to be passed by the Appropriate Authority, if the Authority concerned is satisfied about the fitness of the probationer for confirmation, and if the probationer has passed the departmental examination, as prescribed. Mere continuance of the probationer after considering his case of confirmation during the period of probation and finding him unsuitable for confirmation by the decision of the Full Court, by no stretch of imagination can be construed to be a confirmation by implication, as was held by this Court in the case of Dharam Singh (supra) and that can never be the intention of the Rule Making Authority. If the Full Court would not have considered the suitability of the probationer for confirmation while the probation period was continuing, the matter might have stood on a different footing.” 18. In The Commissioner of Police, Hubli and another v. R.S. More reported in AIR 2003 SC 983 , the apex Court in para 8 held as under:- “8. In our view, the case at hand falls under category 3. As noticed sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 requires that a probationer shall not be considered to have satisfactorily completed the probation unless a specific order to that effect is passed. In our view, the case at hand falls under category 3. As noticed sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 requires that a probationer shall not be considered to have satisfactorily completed the probation unless a specific order to that effect is passed. No specific order having been passed by any authority, certifying the satisfactorily completion of probation period of the respondent, has been brought to our notice. Mr. Hegde, learned counsel, submitted that no order as contemplated under sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 has been passed by the competent authority. Admittedly, the order discharging the respondent, in exercise of powers under Rule 6, has been passed after the extended period of probation was over. In our view, however, that itself would not entitle the respondent to have claimed deemed confirmation in absence of the specific order to that effect. In service jurisprudence confirmation of service on a particular post is preceded by satisfactory performance of the incumbent unless service rules otherwise prescribe. In the instant case, sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of the Rules provides that unless there is a specific order that the probationer has satisfactorily completed the period of probation, he shall not be entitled to be deemed to have satisfactorily completed the probation by reason of his being continued in service beyond the extended period of probation. The High Court has failed to consider this important aspect of the matter, resulting in miscarriage of justice. In our view, the High Court fell into error resulting in miscarriage of justice.” 19. The apex Court in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan vs. Arunkumar Madhavrao Sinddhaye and another reported in (2007) 1 SCC 283 , in paras 11 and 17 held as under: “11. The question which arises for consideration is, whether the order of termination of services of the respondent had been passed by way of punishment or it had been passed in accordance with the conditions mentioned in the appointment order by which the respondent had been appointed on a temporary post of Physical Education Teacher. If it is found that the termination of services was by way of punishment, another question may arise whether a formal departmental enquiry was held prior to the passing of termination order and whether the respondent was given adequate opportunity to defend himself in the said enquiry. It will be seen that the complaint made by Capt. If it is found that the termination of services was by way of punishment, another question may arise whether a formal departmental enquiry was held prior to the passing of termination order and whether the respondent was given adequate opportunity to defend himself in the said enquiry. It will be seen that the complaint made by Capt. B.K. Balasubramanyam about forcing his son Master V.K. Srinivasalu to do six rounds (4 Kms.) around the school when he was having chest pain and was unwell and further forcing him to do PT and other exercises in spite of advice of the doctor and also giving him beating was forwarded by the Principal to the Regional Office of Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan, Bombay. The Assistant Commissioner of the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan asked the Principal to submit a report along with original statements of the students, who had been subjected to beating by the respondent. The Principal was not an eye witness to the incident relating to Master V.K. Srinivasalu and also of the corporal punishment which was awarded by the respondent to the other students. Therefore, in order to ascertain the complete facts it was necessary to make enquiry from the students concerned. If in the course of this enquiry the respondent was allowed to participate and some queries were made from the students, it would not mean that the enquiry so conducted assumed the shape of a formal departmental enquiry. No articles of charges were served upon the respondent nor were the students asked to depose on oath. The High Court has misread the evidence on record in observing that articles of charges were served upon the respondent. The limited purpose of the enquiry was to ascertain the relevant facts so that a correct report could be sent to the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan. The enquiry held can under no circumstances be held to be a formal departmental enquiry where the non-observance of the prescribed rules of procedure or a violation of principle of natural justice could have the result of vitiating the whole enquiry. There cannot be even a slightest doubt that the Assistant Commissioner, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan, Bombay Region, terminated the services of the respondent in accordance with the terms and conditions mentioned in his appointment order which expressly conferred power upon the appointing authority to terminate the respondent's services by one month's notice without assigning any reasons. There cannot be even a slightest doubt that the Assistant Commissioner, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan, Bombay Region, terminated the services of the respondent in accordance with the terms and conditions mentioned in his appointment order which expressly conferred power upon the appointing authority to terminate the respondent's services by one month's notice without assigning any reasons. The services of the respondent were, therefore, not terminated by way of punishment. 12-16…..………..…. 17. As shown above, the nature of enquiry conducted against the respondent was merely a preliminary or fact finding enquiry and no formal full scale departmental enquiry had been conducted against the respondent. In fact, the enquiry officer had himself recommended that disciplinary action be taken against the respondent. However, the authorities chose not to hold a disciplinary enquiry against the respondent and did not serve him with any article of charges or take any further steps in that regard. Instead they chose to exercise power under the terms and conditions of the appointment order. The termination order is wholly innocuous and does not cast any stigma upon the respondent nor it visits him with any evil consequences. The High Court seems to have proceeded on a wholly wrong basis and has treated the enquiry which was only a preliminary or fact finding enquiry into a regular disciplinary enquiry, which was not the case here. In these circumstances the judgment of the High Court is wholly erroneous in law and has to be set aside.” 20. Same principles of law have been laid down by the apex Court in Kazia Mohammed Muzzammil vs. State of Karnataka and another reported in (2010) 8 SCC 155 . It is apt to reproduce paras 19,20,33 and 35 of the said judgment herein: “19. Having discussed in some elaboration the conduct of the appellant as well as his antecedents, now we proceed to examine the merits of the legal controversy raised in the present case on behalf of the appellant in relation to `deemed confirmation'. The `deemed confirmation' is an aspect which is known to the service jurisprudence now for a considerable time. Both the views have been taken by the Court. Firstly, there can be `deemed confirmation' after an employee has completed the maximum probation period provided under the Rules where after, his entitlement and conditions of service are placed at parity with the confirmed employee. Both the views have been taken by the Court. Firstly, there can be `deemed confirmation' after an employee has completed the maximum probation period provided under the Rules where after, his entitlement and conditions of service are placed at parity with the confirmed employee. Secondly, that there would be no `deemed confirmation' and at best after completion of maximum probation period provided under the Rules governing the employee, the employee becomes eligible for being confirmed in his post. His period of probation remains in force till written document of successful completion of probation is issued by the Competent Authority. 20. Having examined the various judgments cited at the bar, including that of all larger Benches, it is not possible for this Bench to state which of the view is the correct enunciation of law or otherwise. We are of the considered opinion, as to what view has to be taken, would depend upon the facts of a given case and the relevant Rules in force. It will be cumulative effect of these two basics that would determine the application of the principle of law to the facts of that case. Thus, it will be necessary for us to refer to this legal contention in some elucidation. 21-32….…..….. 33. We have already noticed that two views are prevalent. Primarily, the Court has taken the diametrical opposite view. One which accepts the application of the deemed confirmation after the expiry of the prescribed period of probation, while the other taking the view that it will not be appropriate to apply the concept of deemed confirmation to the officers on probation as that is not the intent of law. In our opinion, the rules and regulations governing a particular service are bound to have greater impact on determining such question and that is the precise reason that we have discussed Rules 3 to 6 of the 1977 Rules in the earlier part of the judgment of this Court in Dharam Singh (AIR01213, Paras 8-9). 34.….……… 35. We may refer to the following paragraphs of the judgment of this Court: "8. The initial period of probation of the respondents ended on October 1, 1958. By allowing the respondents to continue in their posts thereafter without any express order of confirmation, the competent authority must be taken to have extended the period of probation up to October 1, 1960 by implication. The initial period of probation of the respondents ended on October 1, 1958. By allowing the respondents to continue in their posts thereafter without any express order of confirmation, the competent authority must be taken to have extended the period of probation up to October 1, 1960 by implication. But under the proviso to Rule 6 (3), the probationary period could not extend beyond October 1, 1960. In view of the proviso to Rule 6 (3), it is not possible to presume that the competent authority extended the probationary period after October 1, 1960, or that thereafter the respondents continued to hold their posts as probationers. 9. Immediately upon completion of the extended period of probation on October 1, 1960, the appointing authority could dispense with the services of the respondents if their work or conduct during the period of probation was in the opinion of the authority unsatisfactory. Instead of dispensing with their services on completion of the extended period of probation, the authority continued them in their posts until sometime in 1963, and allowed them to draw annual increments of salary including the increment which fell due on October 1, 1962. The rules did not require them to pass any test or to fulfil any other condition before confirmation. There was no compelling reason for dispensing with their services and re-employing them as temporary employees on October 1, 1960, and the High Court rightly refused to draw the inference that they were so discharged from services and re-employed. In these circumstances, the High Court rightly held that the respondents must be deemed to have been confirmed in their posts. Though the appointing authority did not pass formal orders of confirmation in writing, it should be presumed to have passed orders of confirmation by so allowing them to continue in their posts after October 1, 1960. After such confirmation, the authority had no power to dispense with their services under Rule 6 (3) on the ground that their work or conduct during the period of probation was unsatisfactory. It follows that on the dates of the impugned orders, the respondents had the right to hold their posts. The impugned orders deprived them of this right and amounted to removal from service by way of punishment. It follows that on the dates of the impugned orders, the respondents had the right to hold their posts. The impugned orders deprived them of this right and amounted to removal from service by way of punishment. The removal from service could not be made without following the procedure laid down in the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952 and without conforming to the constitutional requirements of Article 311 of the Constitution. As the procedure laid down in the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952 was not followed and as the constitutional protection of Article 311 was violated, the impugned orders were rightly set aside by the High Court." 21. The apex Court in Rajesh Kohli v. High Court of J & K & Anr., reported in 2010 AIR SCW 6877 held as under: “23. In the present case, the order of termination is a fall out of his unsatisfactory service adjudged on the basis of his overall performance and the manner in which he conducted himself. Such satisfaction even if recorded that his service is unsatisfactory would not make the order stigmatic or punitive as sought to be submitted by the petitioner. On the basis of the aforesaid resolution, the matter was referred to the State Government for issuing necessary orders. 24.…………. 25. The aforesaid submission of the petitioner is devoid of any merit in view of the fact that since the petitioner was continuing in service, therefore, the case for granting increment was required to be considered which was so granted. The mere granting of yearly increments would not in any manner indicate that after completion of the probation period the full court of the High Court was not competent to scrutinize his records and on the basis thereof take a decision as to whether or not his service should be confirmed or dispensed with or whether his probation period should be extended. The High Court has solemn duty to consider and appreciate the service of a judicial officer before confirming him in service. The district judiciary is the bedrock of our judicial system and is positioned at the primary level of entry to the doors of justice. The High Court has solemn duty to consider and appreciate the service of a judicial officer before confirming him in service. The district judiciary is the bedrock of our judicial system and is positioned at the primary level of entry to the doors of justice. In providing the opportunity of access to justice to the people of the country, the Judicial Officers who are entrusted with the task of adjudication must officiate in a manner that is becoming of their position and responsibility towards society.” 22. In Mohd. Salman v. Committee of Management & Ors., reported in 2012 AIR SCW 2527, the apex Court held as under: “16. In the case of Kedar Nath Bahl Vs. The State of Punjab and Others reported in 1974 (3) SCC 21 , this Court clearly laid down the proposition of law that where a person is appointed as a probationer in any post and a period of probation is specified, it does not follow that at the end of the said specified period of probation he obtains confirmation automatically even if no order is passed on that behalf. It was also held in that decision that unless the terms of appointment clearly indicate that confirmation would automatically follow at the end of the specified period or that there is a specific service rule to that effect, the expiration of the probationary period does not necessarily lead to confirmation. This Court went on to hold that at the end of the period of probation an order confirming the officer is required to be passed and if no such order is passed and if he is not reverted to his substantive post, the result merely is that he continues in his post as a probationer. 17. In our considered opinion, the ratio of the aforesaid decision is also clearly applicable to the facts of the present case. In the present case, in the appointment letter issued to the appellant, it was specifically mentioned that his service would be regularised only when his performance during the probation period is found to be good/satisfactory. 18. In view of the aforesaid stipulation, so long an order is not passed holding that the service of the appellant is good and satisfactory, it could not have been held that his service could be regularised automatically by a deeming provision.” 23. 18. In view of the aforesaid stipulation, so long an order is not passed holding that the service of the appellant is good and satisfactory, it could not have been held that his service could be regularised automatically by a deeming provision.” 23. In case titled Head Master, Lawrence School Lovedale vs. Jayanthi Raghu and another reported in (2012) 4 SCC 793 , the apex Court in paras 31 and 37 held as under: “31. Having so observed, we are only required to analyse what the words "if confirmed" in their contextual use would convey. The Division Bench of the High Court has associated the said words with the entitlement of the age of superannuation. In our considered opinion, the interpretation placed by the High Court is unacceptable. The words have to be understood in the context they are used. Rule 4.9 has to be read as a whole to understand the purport and what the Rule conveys and means. 32. In Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and others, [ (1987) 1 SCC 424 ], it has been held as follows:- "33. Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, - context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. The interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place." 33. Keeping the said principle in view, we are required to appreciate what precisely the words "if confirmed" contextually convey. Regard being had to the tenor of the Rules, the words "if confirmed", read in proper context, confer a status on the appointee which consequently entitles him to continue on the post till the age of 55 years, unless he is otherwise removed from service as per the Rules. 34. It is worth noting that the use of the word "if" has its own significance. In this regard, we may usefully refer to the decision in S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari and others, [ (1970) 1 SCC 653 ]. In the said case, a three-Judge Bench was interpreting the words "if he thinks fit" as provided under Section 159 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. It related to the exercise of power by the Magistrate. 35. In that context, the Bench observed thus:- "5. ……..The use of this expression makes it clear that Section 159 is primarily meant to give to the Magistrate the power of directing an investigation in cases where the police decide not to investigate the case under the proviso to Section 157 (1), and it is in those cases that, if he thinks fit, he can choose the second alternative. If the expression "if he thinks fit" had not been used, it might have been argued that this section was intended to give in wide terms the power to the Magistrate to adopt any of the two courses of either directing an investigation, or of proceeding himself or deputing any Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed to hold a preliminary enquiry as the circumstances of the case may require. 6. 6. Without the use of the expression "if he thinks fit", the second alternative could have been held to be independent of the first; but the use of this expression, in our opinion, makes it plain that the power conferred by the second clause of this section is only an alternative to the power given by the first clause and can, therefore, be exercised only in those cases in which the first clause is applicable." 36. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Kodaikanal Motor Union (P) Ltd., [ (1986) 3 SCC 91 ], the Court, while interpreting the words "if the offence had not been committed" as used in Section 10-A (1) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, expressed the view as follows:- "19. …….In our opinion the use of the expression `if' simpliciter, was meant to indicate a condition, the condition being that at the time of assessing the penalty, that situation should be visualised wherein there was no scope of committing any offence. Such a situation could arise only if the tax liability fell under sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act." 37. Bearing in mind the aforesaid conceptual meaning, when the language employed under Rule 4.9 is scrutinised, it can safely be concluded that the entitlement to continue till the age of superannuation, i.e., 55 years, is not absolute. The power and right to remove is not obliterated. The status of confirmation has to be earned and conferred.” 24. In a recent judgment titled State Bank of India and Ors v. Palak Modi and Anr., reported in 2013 AIR SCW 76, the apex Court in paras 20 and 27 held as under: “20. The ratio of the above noted judgments is that a probationer has no right to hold the post and his service can be terminated at any time during or at the end of the period of probation on account of general suitability for the post held by him. If the competent authority holds an inquiry for judging the suitability of the probationer or for his further continuance in service or for confirmation and such inquiry is the basis for taking decision to terminate his service, then the action of the competent authority cannot be castigated as punitive. If the competent authority holds an inquiry for judging the suitability of the probationer or for his further continuance in service or for confirmation and such inquiry is the basis for taking decision to terminate his service, then the action of the competent authority cannot be castigated as punitive. However, if the allegation of misconduct constitutes the foundation of the action taken, the ultimate decision taken by the competent authority can be nullified on the ground of violation of the rules of natural justice. 21-26…………….……………………………….. 27. The use of unfair means in the evaluation test/confirmation test held by the Bank certainly constitutes a misconduct. The Bank itself had treated such an act to be a misconduct (paragraph 10 of advertisement dated 1.7.2008). It is not in dispute that the services of the private respondents were not terminated on the ground that there was any deficiency or shortcoming in their work or performance during probation or that they had failed to satisfactorily complete the training or had failed to secure the qualifying marks in the test held on 27.2.2011. As a matter of fact, the note prepared by the Deputy General Manager, which was approved by the General Manager makes it crystal clear that the decision to dispense with the services of the private respondents was taken solely on the ground that they were guilty of using unfair means in the test held on 27.2.2011. To put it differently, the foundation of the action taken by the General Manager was the accusation that while appearing in the objective test, the private respondents had resorted to copying. IBPS had relied upon the analysis made by the computer and sent report to the Bank that 18 candidates were suspected to have used unfair means. The concerned authority then sent for the chart of seating arrangement and treated the same as a piece of evidence for coming to the conclusion that the private respondents had indeed used unfair means in the examination. This exercise was not preceded by an inquiry involving the private respondents and no opportunity was given to them to defend themselves against the charge of use of unfair means. In other words, they were condemned unheard which, in our considered view, was legally impermissible.” 25. This exercise was not preceded by an inquiry involving the private respondents and no opportunity was given to them to defend themselves against the charge of use of unfair means. In other words, they were condemned unheard which, in our considered view, was legally impermissible.” 25. The same principles of law have been laid down by the apex Court in University of Rajasthan and another vs. Prem Lata Agarwal alongwith connected matters reported in (2013) 3 SCC 705 . It is apt to reproduce para 43 of the said judgment herein: “43. The High Court, as has been stated earlier, has pressed into service Regulation 23 and relying on the same, it has held that the services of the respondents shall be deemed to have been confirmed as in the instant cases the University has never opined that their services were not satisfactory. The language of Regulation 23 is couched in a different manner. It fundamentally deals with the computation of the period of service of an employee. That apart, Regulation 23 (b) uses the words “if he is confirmed”. It is a conditional one and it relates to officiating services. Both the concepts have their own significance in service jurisprudence. The respondents were not in the officiating service and by no stretch of imagination, could they have been treated to be confirmed because the words “if he is confirmed” required an affirmative act to be done by the University. The High Court, as we find, has applied the doctrine of deemed confirmation to the case at hand which is impermissible. In this context, we may, with profit, refer to the decision in Head Master, Lawrence School, Lovedale v. Jayanthi Raghu and another[ (2012) 4 SCC 793 ] wherein it has been ruled thus:- “A confirmation, as is demonstrable from the language employed in the Rule, does not occur with efflux of time. As it is hedged by a condition, an affirmative or positive act is the requisite by the employer. In our considered opinion, an order of confirmation is required to be passed.” Thus analyzed, the conclusion of the High Court which also rests on the interpretation of the regulations does not commend acceptation.” 26. As it is hedged by a condition, an affirmative or positive act is the requisite by the employer. In our considered opinion, an order of confirmation is required to be passed.” Thus analyzed, the conclusion of the High Court which also rests on the interpretation of the regulations does not commend acceptation.” 26. Applying the ratio and keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case on hand, read with the discussion made by the Administrative Tribunal, we are of the considered view that the confirmation order in writing was must and mere continuance, after expiry of probation period, cannot be said to be deemed confirmation. 27. The petitioner has not made out a case for interference by this Court, not to speak of issuance of a writ of certiorari. 28. Having said so, we find that the order of termination is legal one, needs no interference. The impugned judgment is well reasoned, speaking and legal one, is upheld. Consequently, the writ petition merits dismissal and is accordingly, dismissed. 29. With the aforesaid observations, the writ petition is disposed of along with pending applications, if any.