JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. This regular second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge, Solan, H.P. dated 19.9.2002, passed in Civil Appeal No.15-S/13 of 2002. 2. Key facts, necessary for the adjudication of this regular second appeal are that the appellants-plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs) have instituted suit against the respondents-defendants (hereinafter referred to as the defendants), for declaration in the Court of learned Sub Judge, Ist Class, Arki, Distt. Solan, H.P. According to the plaintiffs, the suit land was “Bhentdari” in the possession of Sh. Masadi. He has three sons, namely, Sh. Dhani Ram Kanshi Ram and Jiwa Nand alias Jawala. The land was inherited by them in equal shares. Sh. Dhani Ram was the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs and Sh. Kanshi Ram was the predecessor-in-interest of proforma defendant No. 3. Sh. Jiwa Nand had died in the year 1933. Smt. Nardu was his widow. Within one year of the death of Sh. Jiwa Nand, Smt. Nardu married with Sh. Kanshi Ram in accordance with local custom prevalent in the area and became his legally wedded wife from 1934 onwards. She gave birth to proforma defendant No. 3 namely, Sh. Daulat Ram and four daughters. Kanshi Ram died in the year 1970-71. His estate was inherited by his son, daughters and Smt. Nardu. A family partition took place in between 1940 to 1945, whereby Sh Dhani Ram and Kanshi Ram both got half share each in the suit land. They came in possession of their respective 1/2 share exclusively to the exclusion and complete ouster of 1/3rd share of their third brother Sh. Jiwa Nand. Sh. Jiwa Nand died issueless. Thus, according to them, mutation No. 3 was illegal, null and void. The subsequent entries on the basis of aforesaid mutation was also wrong, illegal and bad in law. Smt. Nardu died in the year 1991. The unregistered Will was executed in favour of defendants No. 1 & 2 on 15.7.1991 by Smt. Nardu Devi. According to them, the inheritance qua 1/3rd share of Sh. Jiwa Nand which opened in the year 1933, the rights of Nardu got extinguished on her remarriage with Kanshi Ram. According to them, the widow had only limited right of maintenance. There was a complete ouster to the extent of 1/3rd share of Sh. According to them, the inheritance qua 1/3rd share of Sh. Jiwa Nand which opened in the year 1933, the rights of Nardu got extinguished on her remarriage with Kanshi Ram. According to them, the widow had only limited right of maintenance. There was a complete ouster to the extent of 1/3rd share of Sh. Jiwa Nand because the father of the plaintiffs and proforma defendant were in peaceful, continuous un-interrupted and hostile possession to the knowledge of whole world. 3. The suit was contested by defendants No. 1 & 2. According to them, Nardu being tenant had a right to acquire the suit land by operation of law. They have denied that any family partition had taken place. The plea of adverse possession was also denied. According to them, the Will was valid. There was no ouster of Smt. Nardu qua share of her husband Jiwa Nand. Defendant No. 3 also contested the suit. According to him, the revenue entries were correct and presumption of truth was attached to them. According to him, Nardu was the widow of Sh. Jiwa nand who had succeeded him before 1956. She became full owner after 1956. 4. The issues were framed by the learned Sub Judge, Ist Class, Arki. He dismissed the suit on 30.1.2002. The appellants-plaintiffs, feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 30.1.2002, filed an appeal before the learned District Judge, Solan. The learned District Judge, Solan also dismissed the same on 19.9.2002. Hence, this regular second appeal. 5. The regular second appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: “1. Whether the courts below have wrongly held Smt. Nardoo to be absolute owner of the property by misapplying the provisions of Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act? 2. Whether the findings of both the courts below are illegal, erroneous and perverse in upholding the Will alleged to have been executed by Smt. Nardoo in favour of defendants No. 1 & 2 when she had no right, title or interest of any kind in the suit land, further in the absence of proper proof of attestation and execution of the alleged Will and removal of the suspicious circumstances? 3. Whether the trial Court has wrongly applied the provisions of rule of estoppel in dismissing the suit of the plaintiff-appellants by ignoring the provisions of Evidence Act?” 6. Mr. Bhupinder Gupta, learned Sr. 3. Whether the trial Court has wrongly applied the provisions of rule of estoppel in dismissing the suit of the plaintiff-appellants by ignoring the provisions of Evidence Act?” 6. Mr. Bhupinder Gupta, learned Sr. Advocate, on the basis of the substantial questions of law framed, has vehemently argued that the findings recorded by both the Courts below have wrongly applied the provisions of Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. According to him, the Will was not proved in accordance with law. Both the courts below have not correctly appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence by ignoring the provisions of The Indian Evidence Act. He also contended that the Courts below have mis applied the provisions of Punjab Tenancy Act and H.P. Abolition of Big landed Estate and Land Reforms Act and Hindu Widow Re-marriage Act, 1856. On the other hand, Mr. K.D.Sood, learned Sr. Advocate, has supported the judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below. 7. I have heard the learned Senior Advocates for the parties and gone through the records of the case carefully. 8. Since the substantial questions of law are interconnected, these were taken up together for discussion to avoid repetition of evidence. 9. PW-1 Krishan Chand testified that the suit land was “Bhentdari” land. Masadi was his grandfather. His estate was inherited by his father Sh. Dhani Ram, Kanshi Ram and Jiwa Nand alias Jawala about 70 years back. The inheritance of land by Nardu Devi of Jiwa Nand was wrong. This land was divided between Dhani Ram and Daulat Ram about 50 years back and since then they are having 1/2 share each. Kanshi Ram died about 30 years back. The land was inherited by his son in village Chheta while in villages namely Pansoda and Thathali, he was succeeded by his daughters and wife Nardu. In the year 1979, Nardu had filed a partition case against the plaintiffs which was contested by them and the same was dismissed. The defendants were directed to go to Civil Court regarding the share of Jiwa Nand but the defendants did not file any Civil Suit. In the year 1982, the plaintiffs deposited the half compensation qua the suit land. His father had filed a civil suit No. 97/1 of 1992 in the year 1992 which was withdrawn on 26.5.1995. The defendants were directed to go to Civil Court regarding the share of Jiwa Nand but the defendants did not file any Civil Suit. In the year 1982, the plaintiffs deposited the half compensation qua the suit land. His father had filed a civil suit No. 97/1 of 1992 in the year 1992 which was withdrawn on 26.5.1995. His father died and the plaintiffs filed this suit in the year 1996. Smt. Nardu died about 10 years back. Smt. Nardu had executed Will in the year 1990 in favour of Anil Kumar and Shashi Kumar qua the share of Sh. Jiwa Nand. 10. PW-2 Nandu Ram has supported the version of PW-1. 11. PW-3 Ram Dev has testified that in the year 1991, he was the ward member of Gram Panchayat Navgaon. He was never summoned by Sh. Daulat Ram etc. to write a Will. Sh. Lal Chand was the ward member of Navgaon and Sh. Chet Ram was the ward member of Kothi and Shamkoh. Lal Chand is resident of village which is distance of 3 kms. 12. PW-4 Smt. Nirmala was the Secretary of Gram Panchayat Navgaon. She was also summoned by the plaintiffs to prove documents Ext. PW-4/A to Ext. PW-4/O. 13. DW-1 Gopal Chand Gupta, has proved Ext. DW-1/A. 15. DW-2 Sh. Khajana Ram deposed that Sh. Jiwa Nand died about 50 years back. His property was succeeded by Smt. Nardu. Kanshi Ram, Jiwa Nand and Dhani Ram were real brothers. At the time of mutation qua the inheritance of Sh. Jiwa nand, Sh. Dhani Ram was also present. Kamla was the legally wedded wife of Sh. Kanshi Ram. They remained husband and wife till the year 1962. Thereafter, divorce took place between them as per the custom and then Kamla married to another person in village Chhamla. From the year 1962 onwards, Nardu started living with Sh. Kanshi Ram as his wife. Kanshi Ram died about 30-35 years back and after his death, he was inherited by Smt. Nardu. Smt. Nardu gave birth to one Daulat Ram and three daughters. 16. DW-3 Dhani Ram testified that he remained Pradhan of Gram Panchayat from 1956. Jiwa Nand was known to him. He died 50 years back. Jiwa Nand was succeeded by Smt. Nardu. He was present at the time of attestation of mutation qua inheritance of Jiwa Nand in favour of Nardu. 16. DW-3 Dhani Ram testified that he remained Pradhan of Gram Panchayat from 1956. Jiwa Nand was known to him. He died 50 years back. Jiwa Nand was succeeded by Smt. Nardu. He was present at the time of attestation of mutation qua inheritance of Jiwa Nand in favour of Nardu. The wife of Kanshi Ram was Smt. Kamla. She remained with him till the year 1962. Thereafter, divorce took place between them as per custom. Kanshi Ram died 20-25 years back. 17. DW-4 Sant Ram has supported the version of DW-3. 18. DW-5 Jagar Nath and DW-6 Chet Ram were the marginal witnesses of Will Ext. DW-5/A. According to them, the Will was executed at the instance of Smt. Nardu who was in a sound disposing mind and had put the thumb impression on the Will. They have also identified their signatures on the Will. 19. According to “Missel Haquiyat” Ext. P-8, at the time of consolidation, the suit land was in possession of Smt. Maltu widow of Sh. Masadi. Dhani Ram, Kanshi Ram and Nardu were in possession of equal shares as “bhentdaran”. According to “shajra nasab” Ext. PW-1/P, Sh. Masadi was having three sons, namely, Dhani Ram, Kanshi Ram and Jiwa Nand. The land of Jiwa Nand was inherited by his widow Nardu. Document Ext. P-5 is the mutation No. 3 of 1990. Jiwa Nand had died issueless. The land has been shown as “bhentdaran”. 20. Now, as far as the alleged marriage of Nardu with Kanshi Ram is concerned, the plaintiffs have produced PW-2 Nandu Ram as witness. According to him, Kanshi Ram, Hiru and Nambardar and some other persons were present at the time of marriage. He himself was not present at the time of marriage. No other person has been produced to prove the marriage. This witness belongs to some other village i.e. Rundal. He has visited the village after 15-20 years after the death of Nardu. He was not aware what happened in these years. He has admitted that Nardu had legally married with Jiwa Nand. PW-1 Krishan Chand has no personal knowledge about the marriage since his date of birth is 24.9.1967. They have not produced any documentary evidence to prove the marriage of Nardu with Kanshi Ram prior to coming into force of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. He has admitted that Nardu had legally married with Jiwa Nand. PW-1 Krishan Chand has no personal knowledge about the marriage since his date of birth is 24.9.1967. They have not produced any documentary evidence to prove the marriage of Nardu with Kanshi Ram prior to coming into force of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. According to the witnesses produced by the defendant, the marriage between Nardu and Kanshi Ram had taken place after the divorce between Kanshi Ram and Kamla. In the present case the general law of succession would apply. Smt.Nardu has succeeded her husband in the year 1933. There was no provision in Punjab Tenancy Act, 1877 to deal with succession to the tenancy rights of tenants. 21. Now, as far as the plea of partition is concerned, the same has not been proved by the plaintiffs. PW-2 Nandu Ram had no personal knowledge about the partition. Rather, in his cross-examination, he admitted that the land was being cultivated in the same manner as it was during the life time of Jiwa Nand. In case there had been any private partition, the same would have been recorded in the revenue record. 22. As far as the plea of adverse possession is concerned, the same has to be pleaded and proved. The plaintiffs have not proved the ingredients of adverse possession. 23. In the case of Kanuri Sri Sankara Rao vrs. Kanuri Rajyalakshamma, reported in AIR 1961 Andhra Pradesh 241, the learned Single Judge has held that under the terms of sub Sections (2) and (3) of Section 3, the interest of the husband devolves upon the widow immediately on the date of his death. It has been held as follows : “6. The question for consideration is whether, on a true construction of Section 3, Sub-sections (2) and (3) of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, the widow acquires no rights as on the actual date of death of Venkatasiva Rao viz. 7-6-1956. Subsection (2) of Section 3 is quite clear that when a Hindu governed by Mitakshara school of Hindu Law dies having at the time of his death an interest in a Hindu joint family property, his widow shall have in the property the same interest as he himself had. 7-6-1956. Subsection (2) of Section 3 is quite clear that when a Hindu governed by Mitakshara school of Hindu Law dies having at the time of his death an interest in a Hindu joint family property, his widow shall have in the property the same interest as he himself had. Sub-section (3) provides that in respect of the interest which devolves on her under Sub-section (2) she shall have the limited interest known as the Hindu Women's estate and it further enacts that she shall have the same right of claiming partition as a male owner. It does not expressly or impliedly enact that the Hindu governed by the Mithakshara school of Hindu Law is deemed to live till his widow claims a right of partition. It is significant to note that under the terms of Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 3, the interest of the husband devolves upon the widow immediately on the date of his death. No legal fiction is imported in the section and the legislature does not provide that the husband is deemed to live till she claims partition or files a suit for working out her rights.” 24. In the case of Eramma vrs. Veerupana and others, reported in AIR 1966 SC 1879 , their lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have held Section 14 (1) of the Act contemplates that a Hindu female, who in the absence of this provision, would have been limited owner of the property, will now become full owner of the same by virtue of this section. The object of the section is to extinguish the estate called “limited estate” or “widow’s estate” in Hindu Law and to make a Hindu woman, who under the old law would have been only a limited owner, a full owner of the property will all powers of disposition and to make the estate heritable by her own heirs and not revertible to the heirs of the last male holder. Their lordships have held as under : “7. It is true that the appellant was in possession of Eran Gowda's properties but that fact alone is not sufficient to attract the operation of S. 14. The property possessed by a female Hindu, as contemplated in the section is clearly property to which she has acquired some kind of title whether before or after the commencement of the Act. It is true that the appellant was in possession of Eran Gowda's properties but that fact alone is not sufficient to attract the operation of S. 14. The property possessed by a female Hindu, as contemplated in the section is clearly property to which she has acquired some kind of title whether before or after the commencement of the Act. IT may be noticed that the Explanation to S. 14 (1) sets out the various modes of acquisition of the property by a female Hindu and indicates that the section applies only to property to which the female Hindu has acquired some kind of title, however restricted the nature of her interest may be. The words "as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner as given in the last portion of sub-section (1) of S. 14 clearly suggest that the legislature intended that the limited ownership of the Hindu female should be changed into full ownership. In other words, S. 14 (1) of the Act contemplates that a Hindu female, who, in the absence of this provision, would have been limited owner of the property will now become full owner of the same by virtue of this section. The object of the section is to extinguish the estate called 'limited estate' or 'widow's estate' in Hindu law and to make a Hindu woman, who under the old law would have been only a limited owner a full owner of the property with all powers of disposition and to make the estate heritable by her own heirs and not revertible to the heirs of the last male holder. The Explanation to sub-section (1) of S. 14 defines the word 'property' as including "both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise ... ". Sub-section (2) of S. 14 also refers to acquisition of property. IT is true that the Explanation has not given any exhaustive connotation of the word 'property' but the word 'acquired' used in the Explanation and also in sub-s. (2) of S. 14 clearly indicates that the object of the section is to make a Hindu female a full owner of the property which she has already acquired or which she acquires after the enforcement of the Act. IT does not in any way confer a title on the female Hindu where she did not in fact possess any vestige of title. IT follows, therefore, that the section cannot be interpreted so as to validate the illegal possession of a female Hindu and it does not confer any title on a mere trespasser. In other words the provisions of S. 14 (1) of the Act cannot be attracted in the case of Hindu female who is in possession of the property of the last male holder on the date of the commencement of the Act when she is only a trespasser without any right to property.” 25. In the case of Punithavalli Ammal vrs. Minor Ramalingam and another, reported in AIR 1970 SC 1730 , their lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have held that the rights conferred on a Hindu female under s. 14 (1) of the Act are not restricted of limited by any rule of Hindu law. The section plainly says that the property possessed by a Hindu female on the date the Act came into force whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act shall be held by her as full owner thereof. The provision makes a clear departure from the Hindu law texts or rules. Their lordships have held as under: “6. The explanation to the section is not necessary for our present purpose. It was conceded at the bar that Sellathachi was in possession of the property in dispute on the date the Act came into force. By virtue of the aforesaid provision, she became the 'full owner of the property on that date From a plain reading of s. 14 (1), it is clear that the estate taken by a Hindu female under that provision is an absolute one and is not defeasible under any circumstance. The ambit of that estate cannot be cut by any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law. The presumption of continuity of law is only a rule of interpretation. That presumption is inoperative if the language of the - concerned statutory provision is plain and unambiguous. The fiction mentioned earlier is abrogated to the extent it conflicts with the rights conferred on a Hindu female under s. 14 (1) of the Act. In Sukhram and anr. v. Gauri Shankar and anr. That presumption is inoperative if the language of the - concerned statutory provision is plain and unambiguous. The fiction mentioned earlier is abrogated to the extent it conflicts with the rights conferred on a Hindu female under s. 14 (1) of the Act. In Sukhram and anr. v. Gauri Shankar and anr. (1) this Court held that though a male member of a Hindu family governed by the Benaras School of Hindu law is subject to restrictions qua alienation of his interest in the joint family property but a widow acquiring an interest in that property by virtue of Hindu Succession Act is not subject to any such restrictions. This Court held in S. S. Munna Lal v. S. S. Rajkumar and ors. (2) that by virtue of s. 4 of the Act the legislature abrogated the rules of Hindu law on all matters in respect of which there is an express provision in the Act. In our opinion the rights conferred on a Hindu female under s. 14 (1) of the Act are not restricted or limited by any rule of Hindu law. The section plainly says that the property possessed by a Hindu female on the date the Act came into force whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act shall be held by her as full owner thereof. That provision makes a clear departure from the Hindu law texts or rules. Those texts or rules cannot be used for circumventing the plain intendment of the provision. 7. In our judgment the learned judges of the Madras High Court were not right in limiting the scope of s. 14: (1) by taking the aid of the fiction mentioned earlier. That in our opinion is wholly impermissible. On the point - under consideration the decision of the Bombay High Court in Yamunabai and anr. v. Ram Maharaj Shreedhar Maharaj and anr. ( AIR 1960 Bom 463 ) lays down the law correctly.” 26. In the case of Jagdish Mahton vrs. Mohammad Elahi and ors., reported in AIR 1973 Patna 170, the Division Bench has held that there is nothing in Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act that once a widow succeeds to the property of her husband and acquires absolute right over the same, she would be divested of that absolute right on her re-marriage. Mohammad Elahi and ors., reported in AIR 1973 Patna 170, the Division Bench has held that there is nothing in Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act that once a widow succeeds to the property of her husband and acquires absolute right over the same, she would be divested of that absolute right on her re-marriage. Their lordships have further held that the full ownership conferred on a Hindu widow under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act cannot be divested by her subsequent re-marriage. If Section 2 of the Hindu Widows' Re-marriage Act was to apply to cases where a Hindu widow has got an absolute interest in her deceased husband's property, that will be inconsistent with the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act and, therefore, invalid to the extent of inconsistency by virtue of the provisions of Section 4 (l) (b) of the Hindu Succession Act. Their lordships have held as under: “8. The main point for consideration in this case is whether by reason of the provision of Section 2 of the Hindu Widows' Re-marriage Act, a widow, who has acquired absolute interest in the property of her deceased husband by operation of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act would be divested of that interest by subsequent re-marriage. Section 2 of the Hindu Widows' Re-marriage Act, 1856 has the effect of divesting the estate inherited by a widow from her deceased husband as a result of her remarriage. By her second marriage the widow forfeits the interest taken by her in her husband's estate and it passed to the next heirs of her husband as if she was dead. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, lays down "Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner." The only condition which has to be fulfilled for the acquisition of the absolute right of the widow over the property of her husband is that she must be in possession over the said property at the time of the death of her husband. Section 4 (1) (b) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 lays down: "Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act--any other law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to apply to Hindus in so far as it is inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act". It appears that the Hindu Succession Act has brought about radical changes in the law of succession and that this Act will supersede all rules of succession contained in any previous enactment or elsewhere which are inconsistent with any provision contained in the Hindu Succession Act. The Hindu Widows' Re-marriage Act which provides that a widow on re-marriage would be divested of her interest in her husband's property was a previous enactment regulating succession to the property and it was clearly the law on the subject immediately before the Hindu Succession Act came into force. The effect of passing of the Hindu Succession Act is that all other laws in force prior to the passing of the Hindu Succession Act shall cease to apply to the Hindus so far as they are inconsistent with any provision of the Hindu Succession Act. 13. Even if it be accepted for the sake of argument as found out by the courts below that Most Jogni remarried Budhari Koeri, this remarriage must have taken place after the death of Ram Sahay Mahto because there is no case of any of the parties that Most. Jogni remarried Budhan Koeri during the lifetime of Ram Sahay Mahto. In this circumstance, the condition for the application of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, namely, that Most. Jogni was in possession over the property of her husband Ram Sahay Mahto at the time of his death, has been fulfilled in this case and, as such, she acquired 'absolute right over the property of her husband. There is nothing in Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act that once a widow succeeds to the property of her husband and acquires absolute right over the same, she would be divested of that absolute right on her re-marriage. This view of mine finds corroboration in the decision in the case of Chinnappavu Naidu v. Meenakshi Ammal, AIR 1971 Mad 453 . This view of mine finds corroboration in the decision in the case of Chinnappavu Naidu v. Meenakshi Ammal, AIR 1971 Mad 453 . There is also nothing in Section 24 of the Hindu Succession Act which is contrary to Section 14 of the same Act which confers absolute right to a widow on her husband's property, if she was possessed of the same at the time of his death. The disqualification of a widow to inherit as envisaged in Section 24 of the Hindu Succession Act does not apply where a widow remarries after the succession had opened. In the instant case, the succession opened immediately on the death of Ram Sahay Mahto and so his widow Most. Jogni acquired absolute interest over the property of her husband. She could not be divested of this interest by her subsequent remarriage. Section 2 of the Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act will have no application in the instant case by reason of the application of Section 4 (1) (b) of the Hindu Succession Act because the law embodied in Section 2 of the Hindu Widows' Re-marriage Act about the forfeiture of the right of the widow to hold the property of her previous husband on her subsequent remarriage is inconsistent with the provisions of law contained in Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act conferring absolute right on a widow in respect of the property over which she is in possession at the time of the death of her husband. The full ownership conferred on a Hindu widow under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act cannot be divested by her subsequent re-marriage. Although not exactly on the same point but the principle of law enunciated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Punithavalli Ammal v. Minor Ramalingam, AIR 1970 SC 1730 may also be usefully applied to the instant case. It was held in the aforesaid case that the estate taken by a Hindu widow under Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act is an absolute one and not defeasible by the subsequent adoption made by her to her deceased husband after the Act has come into force. 16. It was held in the aforesaid case that the estate taken by a Hindu widow under Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act is an absolute one and not defeasible by the subsequent adoption made by her to her deceased husband after the Act has come into force. 16. I am in entire agreement with my learned Brother Mukharji, J. that Section 2 of the Hindu Widows' Re-marriage Act is inconsistent with Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, and, therefore, in cases, where a Hindu widow gets absolute right by inrcritanee in her husband's property, she cannot be divested of that right by virtue of Section 2 of the Hindu Widows' Re-marriage Act. In my opinion, Section 2 aforesaid merely divests a Hindu widow on re-marriage of limited interest held by her. It has been expressly so stated with regard to her husband's property coming to her by virtue of any Will or testamentary disposition. If the interest conferred upon her in her husband's property by virtue of will or testamentary disposition is not limited but absolute, the section has got no application. It appears that the section has also got no application where she gets her deceased husband's property by virtue of a non-testamentary disposition. Rights and interest acquired by her in her husband's property by inheritance, to her husband or to his lineal successors were limited interest before the passing of the Hindu Succession Act. Rights and interest acquired by her in her deceased husband's property by way of maintenance except by a grant conferring upon her absolute right were also a limited interest. In view of the fact that the section was not made applicable to her deceased husband's property coming through non-testamentary disposition, it is doubtful whether the properly given to her by way of maintenance by a grant conferring absolute right on her could be divested on her remarriage. For the purpose of decision of the appeal, that point need not be examined in any further detail and, be that as it may, ordinarily Section 2 of the Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act was not intended to apply to cases where a widow acquired an absolute interest in her deceased husband's property. 17. After the passing of the Hindu Succession Act, by virtue of Section 14 of that Act, a widow gets an absolute interest in her deceased husband's property possessed by her. 17. After the passing of the Hindu Succession Act, by virtue of Section 14 of that Act, a widow gets an absolute interest in her deceased husband's property possessed by her. If Section 2 of the Hindu Widows' Re-marriage Act was to apply to cases where a Hindu widow has got an absolute interest in her deceased husband's property, that will be inconsistent with the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act and, therefore, invalid to the extent of inconsistency by virtue of the provisions of Section 4 (l) (b) of the Hindu Succession Act. Learned Counsel for the appellant placed reliance on Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, according to which, in absence of the heirs expressly mentioned in Clause (a) of Sub-section (11. the property inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother was on her dying intestate to devolve on the heirs of her father while the property inherited by a female Hindu from her husband was to devolve upon the heirs of the husband. According to him, this showed that the intention of the makers of the Hindu Succession Act was that the property in the hands of a Hindu female should not go out of the hands of the branch to which it originally belonged. Section 15 applies only to cases where a female Hindu dies intestate. It implicdly shows that she has been given full power in respect of the property possessed by her, be that of her father or mother or of her husband, to give it to any one she likes by a testamentary or non-testamentary disposition. It cannot, therefore, be said that the framers of the Hindu Succession Act intended to divest a Hindu female of absolute right acquired by her in case of re-marriage or any other contingency. Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act imposes some restriction on the power of a Hindu widow in respect of dwelling houses. Section 24 debars the widow of a pre-deceased son, widow of a pre-deceased son of a pre-deceased son or the widow of a brother from succession to the property of a Hindu dying intestate as such widow, If on the date the succession opens, she has re-married. Section 24 debars the widow of a pre-deceased son, widow of a pre-deceased son of a pre-deceased son or the widow of a brother from succession to the property of a Hindu dying intestate as such widow, If on the date the succession opens, she has re-married. Had the framers of the Act intended to divest a Hindu widow of the property inherited by her and possessed by her on ground of re-marriage, they would have made specific provisions for that in the Act itself. Sections 25 and 26 of the said Act also make provisions which are applicable to both males and females debarring them from succession or inheritance in certain cases and, thereafter, comes Section 28 which says that no person shall be disqualified from succeeding to any property on the ground of any disease, defect or deformity or save as provided in the Act on any other ground whatsoever. In my opinion, therefore, it is manifest from the provisions of the Act that the framers thereof never intended to divest a Hindu Widow of her interest in her deceased husband's property on the ground of remarriage and Section 2 of the Hindu Widows" Re-marriage Act is inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. This view is directly supported by a Bench decision of the Madras High Court in ATR 1971 Mad 433 and impliedly supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1970 SC 1730 wherein it has been held that the estate taken by a Hindu widow under Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act is not defeasible by the subsequent adoption made by her to her deceased husband. My learned Brother Mukherji, J., has already referred to these two decisions and T need not refer to them in any further detail.” 27. In the case of Vaddeboyina Tulasamma and ors. Vrs. Vaddeboyina Sesha Reddi (dead) by LRs., reported in AIR 1977 SC 1844, their lordships have held that subsection (1) of section 14 is large in its amplitude and covers every kind of acquisition of property by a female Hindu including acquisition in lieu of maintenance and where such property was possessed by her at the date of commencement of the Act or was 'subsequently acquired and possessed, she would become the full owner of the property. Their lordships have held as under: “3. Their lordships have held as under: “3. Since the determination of the question in the appeal turns on the true interpretation to be placed on sub-section (2) read in the context of subsection (1) of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, it would be convenient at this stage to set out both the sub-sections of that section which read as follows: "14 (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation.---In this sub-section, "property" includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or device, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner what- ever, and also any such property held by her as stridharas immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shah apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property." Prior to the enactment of section 14, the Hindu law, as it was then in operation, restricted the nature of the interest of a Hindu female in property acquired by her and even as regards the nature of this restricted interest, there was great diversity of doctrine on the subject. The Legislature, by enacting sub-section (1) of section 14, intended, as pointed by this Court in S.S. Munna Lal v. S.S. Raikumar (1) "to convert the interest which a Hindu female has in property, however, restricted the nature of that interest under the Sastric Hindu law may be, into absolute estate". This Court pointed out that the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is a codifying enactment and has made far-reaching changes in the structure of the Hindu law of inheritance, and succession. This Court pointed out that the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is a codifying enactment and has made far-reaching changes in the structure of the Hindu law of inheritance, and succession. The Act confers upon Hindu females full rights of inheritance and sweeps away the traditional limitations on her powers of disposition which were regarded under the Hindu law as inherent in her estate". Sub-section (1) of section 14, is wide in its scope and ambit and uses language of great amplitude. It says that any property possessed by a female Hindu,. whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. The words "any property" are, even without any amplification, large enough to cover any and every kind of property, but in order to expand the reach and ambit of the section and make it all-comprehensive, the Legislature has enacted an explanation which says that property would include "both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or device, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement" of the Act. Whatever be the kind of property, movable or immovable, and whichever be the mode of acquisition, it would be covered by subsection (1) of section 14, the object of the Legislature being to wipe out the disabilities from which a Hindu female suffered in regard to ownership of property under the old Sastric law, to abridge the stringent provisions against proprietary rights which were often regarded as evidence of her perpetual tutelege and to recongnize her status as an independent and absolute owner of property. This Court has also in a series of decisions given a most expansive interpretation to the language of sub-section (1) of section 14 with a view to advancing the social purpose of the legislation and as part of that process, construed the words 'possessed of' also in a broad sense and in their widest connotation. This Court has also in a series of decisions given a most expansive interpretation to the language of sub-section (1) of section 14 with a view to advancing the social purpose of the legislation and as part of that process, construed the words 'possessed of' also in a broad sense and in their widest connotation. It was pointed out by this Court in Gummalepura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Veeravva (1) that the words 'possessed of mean "the state of owning or having in one's hand or power". It need not be actual or physical possession or personal occupation of the property by the Hindu female, but may be possession in law. It may be actual or constructive or in any form recognized by law. Elaborating the concept, this Court pointed out in Mangal Singh v. Rattno (2) that the section covers all cases of property owned by a female Hindu al- though she may not be in actual, physical or constructive possession of the property, provided of course, that she has not parted with her rights and is capable of obtaining possession of the property. It will, therefore, be seen that sub-section (1) of section 14 is large in its amplitude and covers every kind of acquisition of property by a female Hindu including acquisition in lieu of maintenance and where such property was possessed by her at the date of commencement of the Act or was 'subsequently acquired and possessed, she would become the full owner of the property. 4. Now, sub-section (2) of section 14 provides that nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property. This provision is more in the nature of a proviso or exception to sub-section (1) and it was regarded as such by this Court in Badri Pershad v. Smt. Kanso Devi (1). This provision is more in the nature of a proviso or exception to sub-section (1) and it was regarded as such by this Court in Badri Pershad v. Smt. Kanso Devi (1). It excepts certain kinds of acquisition of property by a Hindu female from the operation of sub-section (1) and being in the nature of an exception to a provision which is calculated to achieve a social purpose by bringing about change in the social and economic position of women in Hindu society, it must be construed strictly so as to impinge as little as possible on the broad sweep of the ameliorative provision contained in sub-section (1). It cannot be interpreted in a manner which would rob sub-section (1 ) of its efficacy and deprive a Hindu female of the protection sought to be given to her by sub-section (1 ). The language of sub-section (2) is apparently wide to include acquisition of property by a Hindu female under an instrument or a decree or order or award where the instrument, decree, order or award prescribes a restricted estate for her in the property and this would apparently cover a case where property is given to a Hindu female at a partition or m lieu of maintenance and the instrument, decree, order or award giving such property prescribes limited interest for her in the property. But that would virtually emasculate sub-section (1), for in that event, a large number of cases where property is given to a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of maintenance under an instrument, order or award would be excluded from the operation of the beneficent provision enacted in sub-section (1 ), since in most of such cases, where property is allotted to the Hindu female prior to the enactment of the Act, there would be a provision, in consonance with the old Sastric law then prevailing, prescribing limit- ed interest in the property and where property is given to the Hindu female subsequent to the enactment of the Act, it would be the easiest thing for the dominant male to provide that the Hindu female shall have only a restricted interest in the property and thus make a mockery of sub-section (1). The Explanation to sub-section (1) which includes within the scope of that sub-section property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition or in lieu of maintenance would also be rendered meaningless, because there would hardly be a few cases where the instrument, decree, order or award giving property to a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of maintenance would not contain a provision prescribing restricted estate in the property. The social purpose of the law would be frustrated and the reformist zeal underlying the statutory provision would be chilled. That surely could never have been the intention of the Legislature in enacting sub-section (2). It is an elementary rule of construction that no provision of a statute should be construed in isolation but it should be construed with reference to the con- text and in the light of other provisions of the statute so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. Sub-section (2) must, therefore, be read in the context of sub-section (1) so as to leave as large a scope for operation as possible to sub-section (1) and so read, it must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing right, under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property. This constructional approach finds support in the decision in Badri Prasad's case (supra) where this Court observed that sub-section (2) "can come into operation only if acquisition in any of the methods enacted therein is made for the first time without there being any pre-existing right in the female Hindu who is in possession of the property". It' may also be noted that when the Hindu Succession Bill 1954, which ultimately culminated into the Act, was referred to a Joint Committee of the Rajya Sabha, clause 15 (2) of the Draft Bill, corresponding to the present sub- section (2) of section 14, referred only to acquisition of property by a Hindu female under gift or will and it was subsequently that the other modes of acquisition were added so as to include acquisition of property under an instrument, decree, order or award. This circumstance would also seem to indicate that the legislative intendment was that sub-section (2) should be applicable only to cases where acquisition of property is made by a Hindu female for the first time without any pre-existing right-a kind of acquisition akin to one under gift or will. Where, however, property is acquired by a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of right of maintenance, it is in virtue of a pre-existing right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of sub-section (2), even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property prescribes a restricted estate in the property. 8. In the circumstances, we reach the conclusion that since in the present case the properties in question were acquired by the appellant under the compromise in lieu or satisfaction of her right of maintenance, it is sub-section (1) and not sub-section (2) of section 14 which would be applicable and hence the appellant must be deemed to have become full owner of the properties notwithstanding that the compromise prescribed a limited interest for her in his properties. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and restore that of the District Judge, Nellore. The result is that the suit will stand dismissed but with no order as to costs.” 28. In the case of Sulochana Dei vrs. Khali Dei and ors., reported in AIR 1987 Orissa 11, the Division Bench has held that when the death of the husband took place in 1954 and the property had devolved upon the wife and wife remarriages in 1958, the wife would be exclusive owner of property devolved on her. It has been held as under: “10. We find that the trial Court has correctly concluded that the respondent 1 had acquired exclusive title over the 'A' schedule properties on the coming into force of the Act, had remarried the respondent 1 (a) in May, 1958 and had, for legal necessity and consideration, sold schedule 'A' properties in favour of the respondent 2 for Rs. 2,000/-. In an affirming judgment, we do not feel ourselves called upon to re-state and reiterate the reasons given by the Trial Court in support of these conclusions as it was not necessary to do so. (See AIR 1967 SC 1124 Girijanandini Devi v. Bijendra Narayan Choudhury).” 29. 2,000/-. In an affirming judgment, we do not feel ourselves called upon to re-state and reiterate the reasons given by the Trial Court in support of these conclusions as it was not necessary to do so. (See AIR 1967 SC 1124 Girijanandini Devi v. Bijendra Narayan Choudhury).” 29. In the case of Velamuri Venkata Sivaprasad vrs. Kothuri Venkateshwarlu, reported in AIR 2000 SC 434 , their lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have held that The Hindu Widow’s Re-marriage Act of 1856 has its full play on the date of re-marriage itself, as such Succession Act could not confer the widow who has already re-married, any right in terms of S. 14 (1) of the Act of 1956. Their lordships have held as under: “16. The Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court unfortunately has not been able to appreciate the admitted re-marriage of Lakshmamma in the year 1953. Re-marriage is a fact which ought to be taken note of in the matter under consideration and it is this change of status, by reason of remarriage, falls for determination in the present appeal. While there is no amount of doubt that by reason of the well settled law as laid down by this Court, to the effect that a limited right of maintenance permeated into an absolute right under Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act but would the effect be the same, in the event of there being a re-marriage of the widow prior to 1956? The Act of 1956, incidentally is prospective in its operation and no element of retrospectivity can be attributed therein. The effect of remarriage is available in the Act of 1856. Section 2 thereof reads as below: "2. All rights and interests which any widow may have in her deceased husband's property by way of maintenance or by inheritance to her husband or to his lineal successors, or by virtue of any will or testamentary disposition conferring upon her, without express permission to re-marry, only a limited interest in such property, with no power of alienating the same, shall upon her re-marriage cease and determine as if she had then died; and the next heirs of her deceased husband, or other persons entitled to the property on her death, shall thereupon succeed to the same." 48. Be that as it may the law as declared by Privy Council has been consistently followed that subsequent unchastity will not make a widow forfeit the property which she has succeeded to her husband on his death neither we express any contra view in regard thereto. In the contextual facts of the matter under consideration however, and since the factual situation of re-marriage of Lakshmamma in the year 1953, stands proved, it has to be held that Section 2 of the Hindu Widow's Re-marriage Act, 1956 gets attracted. As a result thereof, Defendant No.1's right to get maintenance from their deceased husband's property came to an end on civil death qua her ex-husband's estate latest by 1953. Hence there was no subsisting legal right of maintenance available to Defendant No.1 qua her deceased husband's estate in any of his properties nor was there a subsisting limited interest of hers in any of those properties which get matured into full ownership under Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act when it came into force. As such the legal situation is different in the present case and the law as laid down and as noticed above does not render any assistance to the Respondent herein. Similar is the situation in regard to another decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Chinnappavu Naidu v. Meenakshi Ammal and another, AIR (1971) Mad.453. The decision last noted dealt with the effect of Section 2 of the Hindu Widows Re-marriage Act, 1856 and the Division Bench of the Madras High Court came to a conclusion that by reason of Section 4 (1) (b) of the latter Act, of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Section 14 prevails over Section 2 of the 1856 Act and as such re-marriage will not create any divestation. The re- marriage spoken of in the Madras High Court decision however, did take place after introduction of the Succession Act of 1956, as such this decision also does not lend any assistance to the respondent by reason of the factual differentiation in the matter presently before us.” 30. In the case of Cherotte Sugathan vrs. The re- marriage spoken of in the Madras High Court decision however, did take place after introduction of the Succession Act of 1956, as such this decision also does not lend any assistance to the respondent by reason of the factual differentiation in the matter presently before us.” 30. In the case of Cherotte Sugathan vrs. Cherotte Bharathi & ors., reported in BI AIR 2008 SC 1467 , their lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have held that widow inheriting property of her husband on his death becomes its absolute owner and subsequent remarriage does not divest her of property in view of Sections 24 and 14. Their lordships have held as under: “13. Succession had not opened in this case when the 1956 Act came into force. Section 2 of the 1856 Act speaks about a limited right but when succession opened on 2.8.1976, first respondent became an absolute owner of the property by reason of inheritance from her husband in terms of subsection (1) of Section 14 of the 1956 Act. Section 4 of the 1956 Act has an overriding effect. The provisions of 1956 Act, thus, shall prevail over the text of any Hindu Law or the provisions of 1856 Act. Section 2 of the 1856 Act would not prevail over the provisions of the 1956 Act having regard to Section 4 and 24 thereof.” 31. In the case of Jayaram Govind Bhalerao vrs. Jaywant Balkrishna Deshmukh & ors., reported in AIR 2008 Bombay 151, the learned Single Judge has held that in view of the provisions of Section 3 (2) of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, the widow was entitled to get same interest in joint family as was her husband had at the time of his death. The learned Single Judge has further held that since the Hindu widow in question got interest of her husband in coparcenary property 1942 as a limited estate but she became full owner of that interest in 1956 and by virtue of Section 30, she could bequeath her share or interest by executing a Will. It has been held as follows: “6. From the facts noted above, it is clear that the husband and brother-in-law of Sitabai were members of the Joint Hindu Family along with their father. Sitabai was married in 1938 and her husband had died in 1942 during the lifetime of his father. It has been held as follows: “6. From the facts noted above, it is clear that the husband and brother-in-law of Sitabai were members of the Joint Hindu Family along with their father. Sitabai was married in 1938 and her husband had died in 1942 during the lifetime of his father. In 1945, his father also died and thus the Joint Family property of the coparcener was in the hands of Balkrishna. There is no dispute that the coparcenery had joint family property shown in Schedules "A", "B" and "C" in the plaint. Admittedly, under the old Mitakshara Hindu Law, on death of the father and brother, when there was no other male member in the family except Balkrishna, he alone would get whole of the property by survivorship and the female members would be entitled only to maintenance from that property. However, a drastic change was brought in the law by Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Act"). Under Section 3 (2) of the said Act, when a Hindu governed by any school of Hindu Law other than the Dayabhaga school or by customary law dies having at the time of his death an interest in a Hindu Joint Family property, his widow shall, subject to the provisions of Sub-section (3) have in the property same interest as he himself had. Sub-section (3) only declares that the Hindu widow would get only a limited interest known as a Hindu woman's estate, provided however that she shall have the right of claiming partition as a male owner. It means she could claim partition, get possession and enjoy the property, but she could not dispose of the property except in special circumstances. In 1942, when Narayan, husband of Sitabai died, he had an interest in the Joint Hindu Family property and admittedly the properties were governed by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law as applicable in Maharashtra. In view of the provisions of Sub-section 3 (2) of the said Act, Sitabai would get the same interest in the Joint Hindu Family property as her husband had at the time of her death, but that interest was a limited interest. As the partition did not take place, after death of her husband or after the death of father-in-law, the joint family and the joint family property continued till Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was enacted. 7. As the partition did not take place, after death of her husband or after the death of father-in-law, the joint family and the joint family property continued till Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was enacted. 7. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 reads as under: 14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property - (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation - In this sub-section, 'property' includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) Nothing contained in Sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property. From this it is clear that any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner and not as a limited owner. The preamble of this Act clearly shows that the Hindu Succession Act was enacted to amend and codify the law relating to inteste. Thus, Section 14 amended the Hindu Law in relation to the intestate succession in respect of female Hindus. Thus, what Sitabai had received as the limited estate on death of her husband in 1942 by virtue of Section 3 (2) of the said Act, she became full owner of the same by virtue of Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Admittedly, in view of this legal provision, her suit for partition and separate possession was decreed in respect of the property shown in Schedules "B" and "C". Admittedly, in view of this legal provision, her suit for partition and separate possession was decreed in respect of the property shown in Schedules "B" and "C". She was required to prefer an appeal only in respect of the properties mentioned in Schedule "A" about which the suit was dismissed on the ground that the property was not possessed by the family and it was already acquired by the Government. It is not necessary to enter into the merits of that appeal. Possibly, she would get share in the compensation received from the Government in the same ratio in which she had share in the joint family property. 8. According to the appellant, Sitabai had executed a Will bequeathing her property to him. After her death, on the basis of that Will, the appellant had made an application before the appellate Court to implead him or to bring him on record as legal heir of the appellant -Sitabai. That appeal came to be rejected by the learned appellate Court relying on M.N. Aryamurthi (supra) and Addagada Raghavamma and other (supra) in which it was held that a Hindu cannot bequeath his share or interest in the joint family property by executing a Will. Mr. Walawalkar, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant pointed out that if these two judgments are carefully read, it would become clear that in both these matters, interest in the Joint Hindu Family property was sought to be bequeathed by executing a Will prior to the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. He rightly pointed out that Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act has made important departure from the legal position as it prevailed prior to the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Section 30 of the said Act reads as follows: 30. Testamentary succession - Any Hindu may dispose of by will or other testamentary disposition any property, which is capable of being so disposed of by him, in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Succession Act 1925 (39 of 1925), or any other law for the time being in force and applicable to Hindus. Testamentary succession - Any Hindu may dispose of by will or other testamentary disposition any property, which is capable of being so disposed of by him, in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Succession Act 1925 (39 of 1925), or any other law for the time being in force and applicable to Hindus. Explanation - The interest of a male Hindu in a Mitakshara coparcenary property or the interest of a member of a tarwad, tavazhi, illom, kutumba or kavaru in the property of the tarwad, tavazhiillom, kutumba or kavaru shall notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to be property capable of being disposed of by him or by her within the meaning of this section. It will be useful to quote following observations from Mulla on Hindu Law 17th Edition, Vol. II page 374, in respect of the effect of Section 30: According to Mitakshara law, no coparcener, not even a father, can dispose of by will his undivided coparcenary interest even if the other coparceners consent to the disposition, the reason being that at the moment of the death the right of survivorship (of the other coparceners) is in conflict with the right by device. Then the title by survivorship, being the prior title, take precedence to the exclusion of that by device. That rule of Mitakshara law is now abrogated by the Explanation which lays down in explicit terms that such interest is to be deemed to be property capable of being disposed of by will notwithstanding anything contained in any provision of the Act or any other law for the time being in force.... Prior to the coming into force of this Act neither under Mitakshara nor under Dayabhaga law could a widow or other limited female heir in any case dispose of by will any property inherited by her or any portion thereof, whether the property was movable or immovable. The effect of Section 14 of this act inter alia is to abrogate that traditional limitation. She is now full owner of all property howsoever acquired and held by her and can dispose of it by will.... The effect of Section 14 of this act inter alia is to abrogate that traditional limitation. She is now full owner of all property howsoever acquired and held by her and can dispose of it by will.... From this, it is clear that inspite of the restrictions on the disposition of undivided coparcenary interest by coparcener or by a widow by will under the Mitakshra School of law, in view of the drastic change brought in by Section 30 and particularly Explanation to Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, the interest of a male Hindu in a Mitakshara coparcenary property shall be deemed to be property capable of being disposed of by a male or female within the meaning of this Section. 9. As pointed out earlier, Sitabai got interest of her husband in the coparcenary property in 1942 as a limited estate but she became full owner of that interest in 1956 and by virtue of Section 30, she could bequeath her share or interest by executing a will. It appears that this legal position was not brought to the notice of the learned appellate Court and the learned appellate Court rejected the application of the applicant holding that Sitabai could not bequeath her interest in the joint family property by a will in view of the above referred two authorities. As Their Lordships were concerned with the disposition of property by a Will executed prior to the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 those authorities could not have been made applicable to the facts of the present case. I find support to this view from Gopal Singh and Anr. v. Dile Ram (Dead by Lrs. and Ors. wherein the Supreme Court held that the effect of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was that a female can transfer her property by will and since that case was subsequent to 1956, she had absolute estate and full capacity to make the Will. This legal position was also followed in several authorities by the Supreme Court, including Pavitri Devi v. Darbari Singh.” 32. In the instant case, Smt. Nardu executed Will in favour of defendants No. 1 & 2. The Will has been duly proved by defendants by producing marginal witnesses. This legal position was also followed in several authorities by the Supreme Court, including Pavitri Devi v. Darbari Singh.” 32. In the instant case, Smt. Nardu executed Will in favour of defendants No. 1 & 2. The Will has been duly proved by defendants by producing marginal witnesses. The marginal witnesses have deposed that they have signed the Will as marginal witnesses on the Will and Smt. Nardu had also put her thumb impression on the same. 33. The learned Single Judge in the case of Baliram Atmaram Dhake vrs. Rahubai alias Saraswatibai, reported in AIR 2009 Bombay 57, have held that the widow inherits the property of her husband becomes absolute owner and her remarriage would not divest her of the property. It has been held as follows: “10. The fact that in the year 1962 the plaintiff/respondent remarried would not divest her of her rights vested in her by virtue of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. In support of this proposition the learned advocate for the respondent Shri Sangeet, advocate relied upon the case of Cherotte Sugathan (D) by L.Rs. and others vs Cherotte Bharathi and others [2008 AIR SCW 1525]. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court clearly laid down that widow inheriting property of her husband on his death would become absolute owner and subsequent remarriage would not divest her of property in view of Sections 24 and 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It is also observed that Hindu Succession Act, 1956 overrides provisions of Hindu Widow's Remarriage Act, 1856.” 34. DW-5 Jagar Nath and DW-6 Chet Ram were the marginal witnesses of Will Ext. DW-5/A. According to them, the Will was executed at the instance of Smt. Nardu who was in a sound disposing mind and had put the thumb impression on the Will. They have also identified their signatures on the Will. The plaintiffs have failed to prove that Nardu Devi has re-married Kanshi Ram prior to coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The Courts below have correctly applied Section 14 (1) of the Act to come to the conclusion that the widow Nardu Devi has acquired full right in the property after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 35. The Courts below have correctly applied Section 14 (1) of the Act to come to the conclusion that the widow Nardu Devi has acquired full right in the property after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 35. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed, so also the pending application (s), if any.