NAVINCHANDRA SUKHLAL KHANDOL v. STATE OF GUJARAT - THROUGH SECRETARY
2014-02-07
S.H.VORA
body2014
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT 1. By way of these petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners seek to challenge the legality and validity of the order of detention at pre-execution stage passed by the respondent No.2 under the provisions of Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 (for short, the 'PBM Act') being illegal, invalid, null and void, malafide, misuse of powers and violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 2. Brief facts leading to filing of the present petitions are as follows:- 2.1. Both the petitioners are holding retail license of Fair Price Shops and having no antecedents and running their Fair Price Shops successfully and satisfactorily. On 19.01.2013, Mamlatdar, Rapar carried out raid at the compound situated near 'Jay Chamunda' Electrician, Opp. Gokul Hotel, National Highway going to Radhanpur from Aadesara. At the time of raid, one truck bearing R.T.O. registration No.GJ-14-T-4185, was found loaded with stock of bags of wheat. Upon inquiry by the Inquiry Officer, the truck driver disclosed names of both the petitioners. In pursuance thereof, the petitioners' Fair Price Shops were checked. By showing account mistakes, false allegations were made against the petitioners that there was a shortfall of 2025 Kg. of wheat. So, considering such shortfall, licenses of the petitioners suspended for a period of 90 days with immediate effect by order dated 30.01.2013 passed by the District Supply Officer, Kutch-Bhuj. 3. It is submitted by the learned advocate for the petitioners that immediately, F.I.R. being II-C.R.No.3013 of 2013 was lodged with Bhimashar police station on 21.02.2013 for the offences punishable under Sections 3 and 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. It is submitted that on the basis of the allegations made in the F.I.R., as aforesaid, the respondent No.2 passed the order of detention under the PBM Act. According to petitioner - Mr.N.S. Khandol, the respondent No.2 has failed to consider the representation dated 25.02.2013 made by him.
It is submitted that on the basis of the allegations made in the F.I.R., as aforesaid, the respondent No.2 passed the order of detention under the PBM Act. According to petitioner - Mr.N.S. Khandol, the respondent No.2 has failed to consider the representation dated 25.02.2013 made by him. It is submitted that for the irregularities and for the same reasons on which, order of detention has been passed, the licensing authority has suspended licenses of both the petitioners by order dated 30.01.2013 for a period of 90 days with immediate effect and thus, once the licenses are suspended for a period of 90 days, there is no possibility of the petitioners continuing their business because they would not be given stock of essential articles by the authority. Therefore, the purpose and object of preventive detention is to prevent the petitioners but when the petitioners are already prevented by resorting to less drastic remedy, exercising powers of preventive detention would be illegal and without jurisdiction and it would be for a wrong purpose. 4. In support of the factual submissions, learned advocate for the petitioners has relied upon the decisions of this Court rendered in case of Deepak Bajaj V/s. State of Maharashtra reported in 2009(1) GLH 140 and in case of Ganeshbhai Gangabhai Harijan V/s. District Magistrate, Banaskantha and others reported in 1983 GLH 612 wherein, this Court has held that if the detaining authority fails to take into consideration the alternative remedies or possibilities of preventing the person from going on with objectionable activities, detention order would be bad. The learned advocate for the petitioners has relied upon the decision of this Court rendered in case of Upendrabhai Jasubhai Joshi V/s. District Magistrate, Navsari and others reported in 1999(1) GLH 145 on the point that if the detaining authority was not aware of the aspect that the suspension or cancellation of license would not be the effective remedy in preventing the alleged nefarious activities of the detenu, the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority stands vitiated. The learned advocate for the petitioners also relied upon the decision of this Court rendered in case of Sureshbhai Sankarbhai Parmar V/s. State of Gujarat and Ors.
The learned advocate for the petitioners also relied upon the decision of this Court rendered in case of Sureshbhai Sankarbhai Parmar V/s. State of Gujarat and Ors. reported in 2006(3) GLH 25 wherein, representation made to the detaining authority prior to order of detention was passed pointing out factual and legal position and guidelines and requested the authority that before the order of detention is passed, the authority may consider such representation. Lastly, the learned advocate for the petitioners submitted that in light of the above offences registered against the petitioners, the detaining authority issued order of detention against one Mr.Sureshbhai Thakkar but, pending hearing of Special Civil Application No.2922 of 2013, the detaining authority revoked the order of detention qua the said proposed detenu and, therefore, on this count, subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority stands vitiated. 5. Per contra, learned A.G.P. Ms.Trusha Mehta for the respondent – State filed affidavit-in-reply in Special Civil Application No.3224 of 2013 inter alia denying each and every allegations, averments and contentions raised in both the petitions and took the Court through the orders and files which were kept present in the Court including detention order dated 01.02.2013 passed in exercise of Section 8(1) of the PBM Act. 6. However, on going through the grounds narrated/described/recorded in the detention order produced at page 41 of Special Civil Application No.3224 of 2013, the detaining authority seems to have passed detailed order. The learned A.G.P. was unable to locket anything therein which goes to indicate that alternative possibilities were in the mind of the detaining authority before passing the impugned order. It is not necessary that where alternative remedies or possibility of preventing the present petitioners were present, no detention order could have been passed. Instead of launching a prosecution, it might become necessary in certain cases to detain the detenu and that might be an efficacious way of preventing him from indulging in such objectionable activities. In light of decision rendered in case of Ganeshbhai Gangabhai Harijan (supra), the Court is required to satisfy itself that this possibility was very much present before the detaining authority and after taking into consideration and after knowing pros and cons, the prognosis was arrived at. If this is not done, then clearly, detention order would be bad because it would be suffering from the voice of non-application of mind. 7.
If this is not done, then clearly, detention order would be bad because it would be suffering from the voice of non-application of mind. 7. Not only that, the detaining authority did not indicate in the grounds of detention that suspension of license could be no effective remedy and the preventive detention was the only effective remedy and the order of detention would suffer from the voice of non-application of mind. Secondly, on this ground also, the order of detention has to be set aside as the present case is squarely covered by the decision rendered in case of Upendrabhai Jasubhai Joshi (supra). 8. Admittedly, the detaining authority failed to consider the representation dated 25.02.2013 made by the petitioner of Special Civil Application No.3224 of 2013 to the competent authority. It is true that the petitioners have no right to make representation before the detention order is passed. But, once such representation is made to the authority and invited the attention to the grounds that in the facts and circumstances, the authority may not pass any detention order, then, it is obligatory on the part of the competent authority to place such representation before the detaining authority. It seems that such representation has not been placed before the detaining authority and, therefore, also, the order of detention cannot be sustained in light of decision of this Court rendered in case of Sureshbhai Sankarbhai Parmar (supra). 9. The order of detention is passed on the basis of what has come to be known as the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority such subjective satisfaction has to be arrived at on two points. Firstly, on the veracity of facts imputed to the person to be detained and secondly, on the prognostication of the detaining authority that the person concerned is likely to indulge again in the same kind of notorious activities. Whereas, normal laws are primarily concerned with the act of commission of the offence, the detention laws are concerned with character of the person who has committed or is likely to commit an offence. The detaining authority has, therefore, to be satisfied that the person sought to be detained is of such a type that he will continue to violate the laws of the land if he is not preventively detained.
The detaining authority has, therefore, to be satisfied that the person sought to be detained is of such a type that he will continue to violate the laws of the land if he is not preventively detained. So, the commission of infraction of law, not done in an organized or systematic manner, may not be sufficient for the detaining authority to justifiably come to the conclusion that there is no alternate but to preventively detain the petitioners. 10. No doubt, neither the possibility of launching of a criminal proceedings nor pendency of any criminal proceedings is an absolute bar to an order of preventive detention. But, failure of the detaining authority to consider the possibility of either launching or pendency of criminal proceedings may, in the circumstances of a case, lead to the conclusions that the detaining authority has not applied its mind to the vital question whether it was necessary to make an order of preventive detention. Since there is an allegation that the order of detention is issued in a mechanical manner without keeping in mind whether it was necessary to make such an order when an ordinary criminal proceedings could well serve the purpose. The detaining authority must satisfy the court that the question too was borne in mind before the order of detention was made. In the case on hand, the detaining authority failed to satisfy the court that the detaining authority so bore the question in mind and, therefore, the court is justified in drawing the inference that there was non application of mind by detaining authority to the vital question whether it was necessary to preventively detain the detenue. It is also fruitful to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Rekha V/s. State of Tamil Nadu through Secretary to Government and another reported in (2011)5 SCC 244 wherein, it is observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court that if a person is liable to be tried, or is actually being tried for a criminal offence but the ordinary criminal law will not be able to deal with the situation, then and only then, preventive detention be taken recourse to. 11.
11. Lastly, it requires to be noted that the detaining authority in para 11 of the detention order, recorded that the petitioners have indulged themselves in large-scale black marketing of essential commodities and, therefore, if they are not prevented, they would continue to indulge in such activities and, therefore, the petitioners are required to be preventively detained. Unfortunately, nowhere, the detaining authority considered as to how the petitioners would indulge in such black marketing activity after suspension of their licenses and thus, this possibility was not considered by the detaining authority. The grounds of detention have been read before me by the learned A.G.P. and after going through the same, I could not find any mention in the same from which, any inference can be drawn that the detaining authority was aware of the situation that in the facts and circumstances of the case, suspension of licenses would not be effective remedy in preventing the alleged activities of the petitioners. Lastly, it is required to be noted that neither affidavit-in-reply nor detention order of petitioner of Special Civil Application No.8439 of 2013 placed on record but, it is stated at the bar that identical detention order is passed against the petitioner of the said petition. Therefore, fate of Special Civil Application No.8439 of 2013 would be the same as that of Special Civil Application No.3224 of 2013. 12. For the foregoing discussion, the present petitions are required to be accepted and accordingly, both the petitions are allowed. Detention orders dated 01.02.2013 passed by the District Magistrate, Kutch-Bhuj against both the petitioners are hereby quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute accordingly.