ORDER 1. The petitioner/defendant No.1 feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order passed by the trial Court under Order 39 rule 1 and 2 CPC dated 28.6.2012 which is affirmed in Misc.Civil Appeal No.20/2012 by Learned District Judge, Bhind, has filed this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. 2. Summarize and admitted facts are as under :- The suit property was originally owned by deceased Prabhudayal and upon his death devolved upon the plaintiff and the defendants. The plaintiff is one of the sons, whereas defendant No.1 ( present petitioner) is widow of another son. Other defendants are daughters of deceased Prabhudayal. All the four, i.e. plaintiff and defendants No.1, 2 and 3 are having ¼ share each in the property. The plaintiff/respondent No.1 instituted a suit before the trial Court against the defendants No.1, 2 and 3 stating that there is certain property of deceased Prabhudayal and after his death, ¼ share of the said property is devolved to each of the parties by way of succession. It is contended in this suit that without getting the partition done, defendants are trying to sell the suit property which will be detriment to the interest of plaintiff because they have a preferential right on the said property under section 22 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 ( HS Act). The suit is filed on twin grounds. Firstly, on the ground of preferential right to purchase the property flowing from section 22 of HS Act and secondly, on the ground that unpartitioned property cannot be sold. Along with the plaint, an application seeking injunction was also filed. The petitioner filed written statement and also reply to the application seeking temporary injunction. The trial Court allowed the application and granted temporary injunction by order dated 28.6.2012. Petitioner preferred an appeal under Order 43 rule 1 before the Learned District Judge. The learned District Judge dismissed this appeal by order dated 17th October, 2012. These orders dated 28.6.2012 and 17.10.2012 are called in question in the present petition. 3. Shri Vivek Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner advanced two fold submission. Firstly, it is contended that in view of judgment of this Court in (Chain Singh v. Ramchandra and others). reported in 1992 RN 277 and (Madan Singh v. Papulal) reported in 2006 RN 207, the provision of section 22 of Hindu Succession Act has no application on agricultural land. Firstly, it is contended that in view of judgment of this Court in (Chain Singh v. Ramchandra and others). reported in 1992 RN 277 and (Madan Singh v. Papulal) reported in 2006 RN 207, the provision of section 22 of Hindu Succession Act has no application on agricultural land. Secondly, it is contended that Learned District Judge has rejected the appeal on the basis of judgment of Supreme Court in the case of (Hardeo Rai v. Sakuntala Devi & others) reported in (2008)7 SCC 46 . By taking this Court on certain paragraphs of this judgment, it is contended that judgment speaks otherwise. Shri Jain submits that it is held that even a coparcenary interest can be transferred subject to the condition that the purchaser without the consent of other coparceners cannot get possession, but may sue for partition. It is further contended that for the purpose of assigning one's interest in the property, it is not necessary that partition by meets and bounds amongst the coparceners must take place. If intention is expressed to partition the coparcener property, the share of each coparcener becomes clear and ascertainable and therefore, the Court below has erred in rejecting the appeal on the basis of this judgment. 4. Per Contra, Shri K.B. Chaturvedi, learned senior counsel assisted by Shri G.P. Chaurasiya submits that the orders passed by the Court below are in accordance with law and do not require any interference by this Court. He relied on section 164 of M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 (MPLRC) to submit that personal law will prevail and HS Act is a piece of personal law. 5. I have bestowed my anxious consideration on the rival contentions and perused the record. 6. The first contention of Shri Vivek Jain is based on the judgment of Chain Singh (supra). It is argued that the provision of section 22 of Hindu Succession Act has no application on agricultural land. Before dealing with this aspect, it is apt to mention that section 164 of Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code was amended w.e.f. 8.12.1961. This section before substitution by M.P. 38 of 1961 was differently worded. Unamended section 164 of MPLRC reads as under :- “164. Before dealing with this aspect, it is apt to mention that section 164 of Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code was amended w.e.f. 8.12.1961. This section before substitution by M.P. 38 of 1961 was differently worded. Unamended section 164 of MPLRC reads as under :- “164. Devolution -(1) Notwithstanding any law, custom or usage to the contrary, the interest of a Bhumiswami shall on his death devolve in accordance with the order of succession given below:- Class I- Son-predeceased son's son, son of a predeceased son's predeceased son, widow or husband as the case may be, predeceased son's widow, widow of predeceased son's predeceased son, and widow of a predeceased son's predeceased son's predeceased son.” 7. Below this provision, two explanations I & II mentioned therein were given. This was amended by inserting a new section 164 w.e.f from 8.12.1961 which reads as under :- “164. Devolution – Subject to his personal law the interest of Bhumiswami shall, on this death, pass by inheritance, survivorship or bequest, as the case may be.” 8. If unamended provision is examined in juxta position to amended section 164, it will be crystal clear that unamended provision began with a non-obstante clause. It had overriding effect on any other law, custom or usage to the contrary. In other words, unamended section 164 provided overriding effect on any other law, custom or usage. Amended provision is other way round. As per new section 164, the interest of Bhumiswami is subject to personal law. In series of judgments, this Court considered the effect of unamended section. Other provision of MPLRC were also considered by taking into account section 4 (2) of HS Act. However, it is apt to mention that section 4 (2) was omitted by Act 39 of 2005 w.e.f. 9.9.2005. The sub-section (2) before Omission was as under :- “(2) for the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed to affect the provision of any law for the time being in force providing for the prevention of fragmentation of agricultural holdings or for the fixation of ceilings or for the devolution of tenancy rights in respect of such holdings.” 9. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is based on Chain Singh and Madan Singh (supra). The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is based on Chain Singh and Madan Singh (supra). A microscopic reading of judgment of Chain Singh shows that a Single Bench of this Court has considered earlier judgments on this point. In para 15, the judgment of SA No.203/80 (G) (Gyan Singh and others v. Ghanshyam and others) [1992(2) Vidhi Bhasvar 128] was considered. Facts reproduced from this appeal shows that it was arising out of a dispute when the provisions of Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950, were applicable. This para makes it further clear that unamended sections 164 and 165 were taken into account. Similarly in para 16, judgment of SA No. 409/61 (I) (Dagdi bai v. Shyamrao and others) was considered. In para 17, reliance is placed on judgment of SA No.297/62 (I) (Jhabarsingh v. Soudansingh). 10. A careful reading of these paragraphs make it clear that MBLRT Act, 1950 and unamended section 164 of MPLRC were considered by this Court. In para 19 in Chain Singh (supra), this Court gave a finding which shows that it is based on principle laid down in aforesaid second appeals. The principles laid down in those second appeals were based on unamended section 164. Thus, entire finding of this Court in Chain Singh is based on unamended section 164. 11. Considering the aforesaid, it was held that right to alienate the land is governed by Tenancy Law and not by provisions of personal law. In the considered opinion of this Court, finding in Chain Singh is based on judgments of different second appeals which were based on unamended section 164 of MPLRC and therefore, the same are of no assistance to the petitioner in the teeth of amended provision, which became applicable w.e.f. 8.12.1961. A simple reading of amended section 164 makes it clear that the Legislature in its wisdom has decided to apply right of devolution subject to the personal law of the person concerned. 12. Interestingly, in Madan Singh (supra) this Court erroneously held that Chain Singh (supra) was decided by Division Bench, whereas it is factually incorrect, it was, in fact, decided by a Single Bench. There is no discussion in Chain Singh about applicability of amended section 164 of MPLRC. 12. Interestingly, in Madan Singh (supra) this Court erroneously held that Chain Singh (supra) was decided by Division Bench, whereas it is factually incorrect, it was, in fact, decided by a Single Bench. There is no discussion in Chain Singh about applicability of amended section 164 of MPLRC. Since whole judgment is passed by placing reliance on Chain Singh (surpa), the judgment which was based on unamended section 164 of MPLRC, it is of no help to the petitioner. Thus, these judgments are clearly distinguishable and are of no assistance to the petitioner. Admittedly in the present case amended section 164 will be applicable. section 164, in no uncertain terms provides that interest of Bhumiswami shall be subject to his personal law. 13. Section 22 of HS Act, 1956 has been enacted to keep out stranger coming into heirs of Class-I Schedule after coming into force of said Act. A conjoint reading of section 164 of MPLRC and section 22 of HS Act makes it clear that section 22 needs to be given preference. The effect of amended section 164 was taken into consideration by this Court in 1998 RN 53 (Chaitram and others v. Mrs. Itwarin). It was opined that if Phulabai died after this amendment, succession to her interest will be governed by the Hindu Succession Act, but if she died before 8.12.1961, her interest would devolve in accordance with the scheme under unamended section 164 of the Code. Thus, the judgment of Chaitram makes the said distinction very clear. 14. In (Anant Kibe and others v. Purushottam Rao and others) reported in 1985 RN 107 = 1985 JLJ 105 (SC) = [1984 (Supp) SCC 175] the apex Court considered the impact of amended section 164 of MPLRC and opined as under :- “Section 164 provides that subject to his personal law, the interest of a bhumiswami shall, on his death, pass by inheritance, survivorship or bequest, as the case maybe. On a combined reading of sections 158 (1) (b) and 164, the legal consequence of succession by the rule of primogeniture which were terms of the grant of inam lands under the Jagir Manual of the Holkar State, stood extinguished.” The apex Court has drawn the curtains on the issue by holding that as per section 164, interest of Bhumiswami shall be subject to his personal law. 15. 15. In 1987 JLJ 284 (Dalchand v Kamlabai & others) this Court opined that it is now well settled that the devolution on the competency or incompetency to dispose of property in any particular mode is governed by the law applicable on the date of devolution or the date of disposition of property. 16. On the basis of aforesaid analysis, it is clear that amended section 164 will be applicable in the present case. Thus, I am unable to agree with the first contention of Shri Jain. The applicability and definitions of MPLRC makes it clear that it is applicable on agricultural land. Apart from this, the judgments of Chain Singh and Madan Singh (supra) are of no assistance to the petitioner in view of new section 164 for the proposition that section 22 of H.S. Act is not applicable on agricultural land. 17. The second submission of Shri Jain is based on finding of learned District Judge, which is based on judgment of Supreme Court in Hardeo Rai (surpa). It is canvassed by Shri Jain that as per this judgment, the petitioner became owner of her share and she was free to alienate the property of her share. A microscopic reading of paras 21 to 25 shows that contention is not absolutely correct. In para 21, the apex Court referred about the statement of a witness who admitted that appellants therein had been in separate possession. On the basis of this factual foundation, the apex Court opined in paras 22 to 25. It is mentioned that when share of each of the coparcener is clear and ascertainable and share aforesaid is determined, it ceases to be a coparcenary property . In the present case, that stage has not come. Admittedly, the share of petitioner is not ascertainable and identifiable. Thus, said judgment cannot be read in the manner suggested by Shri Jain. 18. For the aforesaid reasons, in my opinion, the Courts below have not committed any error of law in passing the order dated 28.6.2012 and affirming it in Misc. appeal. The scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited. If order is shown to be passed by a Court having no jurisdiction, it suffers from manifest procedural impropriety or perversity, interference can be made. Interference is made to ensure that Courts below act within the bounds of their authority. appeal. The scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited. If order is shown to be passed by a Court having no jurisdiction, it suffers from manifest procedural impropriety or perversity, interference can be made. Interference is made to ensure that Courts below act within the bounds of their authority. Another view is possible, is not a ground for interference. Interference can be made sparingly for the said purpose and not for correcting error of facts and law in a routine manner. This view is taken in (Shalini Shyam Shetty and another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil), reported in [ (2010) 8 SCC 329 ]. None of these ingredients are available here. 19. Resultantly, I find no reason to interfere. Petition sans substance and is hereby dismissed. No costs.