JUDGMENT Kalimullah Khan, J. 1. This Government Appeal No. 710 of 1985 under section 378 Cr.P.C. has been filed by the State of U.P. against Reshmani S/o. Jogeshwar Prasad (suspended Pharmacist P.H.C., Dalel Nagar, Mirganj, District-Bareilly) against the impugned judgment and order of acquittal dated 1.10.1984 passed by Additional Sessions Judge (Special Judge), Bareilly in Criminal Appeal No. 215 of 1984 whereby he has set aside the conviction and sentence of accused-respondent dated 20.6.1984 passed by IInd Asstt. Sessions Judge, Bareilly in S.T. No. 294 of 1983 under sections 354 and 376 I.P.C. It appears that in Sessions Trial No. 294 of 1983 State of U.P. v. Reshmani under sections 354/376 I.P.C., P.S. Mirganj, District-Bareilly, learned IInd Asstt. Sessions Judge, Bareilly vide his judgment and order dated 20.6.1984 convicted and sentenced respondent Reshmani to undergo R.I. for one year under section 354 I.P.C. and R.I. for five years along with fine of  Rs. 200 under section 376 I.P.C. and in case of default of payment of fine he was directed to further undergo a sentence of six months. Both the sentences were to run concurrently. Against the aforesaid judgment and order of conviction dated 20.6.1984 respondent Reshmani filed Criminal Appeal No. 215 of 1984 before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. The said appeal was sent back to learned Sessions Judge, Bareilly by the Hon'ble High Court vide its order dated 17.7.1984 for disposal according to law and ultimately, it was transferred to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge (Special Judge), Bareilly who vide his impugned judgment and order dated 1.10.1984 allowed the appeal and set aside the order of conviction and sentence dated 20.6.1984 passed against the respondent by learned Trial Court. 2. Learned C.J.M. Bareilly vide his letter dated 26.4.2014 reported that accused Reshmani has retired on 30.4.2013 from P.H.C. Lambua, District-Sultanpur and he is residing at present in village Parsa Mahapatra, P.O.- Katree Bazar, Tehsil-Naugarh, District-Siddharth Nagar (U.P.). Accused Reshmani himself has filed affidavit dated 28.4.2014 before this Court showing his aforesaid present address. 3. This Government appeal has been preferred on the ground that the impugned judgment and order dated 1.10.1984 passed by Additional Sessions Judge (Special Judge), Bareilly is against the law and facts of the case. It is illegal, perverse, manifestly erroneous and resulted in miscarriage of justice. 3. This Government appeal has been preferred on the ground that the impugned judgment and order dated 1.10.1984 passed by Additional Sessions Judge (Special Judge), Bareilly is against the law and facts of the case. It is illegal, perverse, manifestly erroneous and resulted in miscarriage of justice. Learned Appellate Court has committed serious error in appreciating the evidence both in law and facts; it is based on presumptions, conjectures and surmises unwarranted by law; F.I.R. was wrongly held to be delayed; prosecutrix had no reason to falsely implicate the accused-respondent. The judgment and order of conviction recorded by learned IInd Asstt. Sessions Judge, Bareilly against respondent is based on sound reasoning but the learned Additional Sessions Judge has reversed the finding of conviction against the weight of evidence on record and acquitted accused-respondent on his own imagination, conjecture and surmises and, therefore, it is liable to be set aside. The prayer has been made to set aside the order of acquittal and maintain the conviction and sentence of the respondent recorded by learned Trial Court. 4. The prosecution case, as embedded in the F.I.R. is that victim/prosecutrix Smt. Zaibun Nisha Begam (P.W.-1) was married to Shaukat Ali in village Pipla Khera, District-Meerut. She along with her two minor children (aged about six years and four years respectively) was at her parents' house. Sharafat Ali (P.W.-2), her husband's younger brother had come to take them by train to her in-laws' house (Sasural) situated at village-Pipla Khera, P.S. Kharkhoda, District Meerut. She along with her two minor children and Sharafat Ali reached railway station Nagaria Sadaat, Mirganj, Bareilly to board the train on 9.1.1981 at about 9: 00 P.M. When the Delhi-passenger train came at the aforesaid railway station, Sharafat Ali along with two minor children boarded the train but Smt. Zaibun Nisha could not succeed in boarding the train rather in the said process she fell down on the rails and her leg was badly injured. The injured lady was sent to P.H.C. Mirganj for her medical treatment. She was provided medical aid and her wounds in leg were stitched at about 65-70 places. She was admitted in female ward of the hospital. Sharafat Ali and two minor children after breaking their journey stepped down on the next railway station and reached to the hospital where the lady was being taken care of. She was provided medical aid and her wounds in leg were stitched at about 65-70 places. She was admitted in female ward of the hospital. Sharafat Ali and two minor children after breaking their journey stepped down on the next railway station and reached to the hospital where the lady was being taken care of. In the same night at about 1: 30 A.M. accused-respondent Reshmani, the compounder of the hospital entered into the ward and asked Sharafat Ali that being male member he could not be allowed to remain in the female ward and commanded him to go out and bring candles. Consequently, he went out. The compounder Reshmani then asked the victim lady that he is to give injection at her private part. He outraged her modesty. Sometime he touched her breast and sometime tried to open her Salwar. She was having unbearable pain in her leg and was unable to move her body. The compounder (Reshmani) opened her salwar and committed rape upon her. She raised hue and cry but none came to her rescue. Sharafat Ali had, by that time, returned and knocked the door for some time and thereafter, he pushed it then the leaves of the door were opened. On seeing Sharafat Ali, the compounder jumped from over the body of victim and after scolding Sharafat Ali ran away. However, his spectacle was left on the cot as he rushed out in hurry. She narrated the entire mischief and crime committed by accused Reshmani upon her to Sharafat Ali at once and in the morning when the doctor came, the incident was reported and the spectacle of the compounder was handed over to him. Doctor assured her to take action against the compounder Reshmani but he did nothing against him rather went to District Head Quarter, Bareilly. 5. On the dictation of the lady Smt. Zaibun Nisha, a written report was scribed by one Aslam Raza Khan, her relative. Sharafat Ali handed it over to police station Mirganj, Bareilly. Doctor assured her to take action against the compounder Reshmani but he did nothing against him rather went to District Head Quarter, Bareilly. 5. On the dictation of the lady Smt. Zaibun Nisha, a written report was scribed by one Aslam Raza Khan, her relative. Sharafat Ali handed it over to police station Mirganj, Bareilly. Chek report was drawn and case was registered in the General Diary on 10.1.1981 at 12: 30 P.M. as Crime No. 2 under section 376 I.P.C. I.O. interrogated the witnesses, prepared the site plan and sent the lady to District Hospital, Bareilly for her medical examination where she was medically examined on 10.1.1981 at about 7: 30 P.M. After completing the investigation, I.O. submitted charge-sheet under section 354I.P.C. in accordance with the direction of CO. as no spermatozoa was found in the vaginal swab of the lady and no definite opinion of rape was given by the Doctor although he had collected sufficient evidence to constitute offence punishable under section 376 I.P.C. 6. Accused-respondent was charged by learned Trial Court under sections 354 and 376 I.P.C. for outraging her modesty and committing rape upon the prosecutrix. He denied the charge and claimed his trial. 7. In order to prove its case, prosecution examined Smt. Zaibun Nisha (P.W.-1), Sharafat Ali (P.W.-2), S.I. Prem Pal Singh (I.O.) (P.W.-3), and the doctor Smt. Usha Jain (P.W.-4). 8. Accused-respondent was examined under section 313 Cr.P.C. who denied the prosecution case, allegation and evidence led against him and attributed his false implication on the instance of local persons who were inimical to him. 9. Accused-respondent Reshmani has examined himself as D.W. 1 and proved a copy of alleged complaint dated 27.10.1980 (Ex. Kha-1) allegedly given by doctor of hospital to C.M.O., Deputy C.M.O., S.S.P. Bareilly and S.O. Mirganj apprehending their false implication by persons of locality after hatching out a criminal conspiracy against them. He deposed that Aslam Raza Khan, the scribe of the report, is a relative of Smt. Zaibun Nisha (P.W.-1). He was against the hospital staff and at his instance, Smt. Zaibun Nisha and Sharafat Ali had falsely implicated him. 10. He deposed that Aslam Raza Khan, the scribe of the report, is a relative of Smt. Zaibun Nisha (P.W.-1). He was against the hospital staff and at his instance, Smt. Zaibun Nisha and Sharafat Ali had falsely implicated him. 10. Learned Trial Court held respondent Reshmani guilty under sections 354 and 376 I.P.C. vide judgment and order dated 20.6.1984 as stated above on following grounds i. That the rape committed upon the prosecutrix by accused-respondent was proved by her evidence supported by the evidence of Sharafat Ali and corroborated by the medical evidence; ii. That the prosecutrix (P.W.-1) had no enmity with accused-respondent to falsely implicate him in this case of rape and even the scribe of the report had no animus against accused; iii. That minor contradiction occurred in between the evidence of prosecutrix (P.W.-1) and Sharafat Ali (P.W.-2) are but natural and not fatal to the prosecution case; iv. That the identity of accused-respondent was fixed and mere was no misconception about his identity; v. That there is no inordinate delay in lodging the F.I.R. and so called delay has been fully explained on record; vi. That there was no reason to falsely implicate the accused-respondent. vii. That Ex. Kha-1 has not been legally proved and the original thereof was not got summoned and none of the doctor of P.H.C. were produced to corroborate the testimony of the accused who has examined himself as D.W. 1 to prove the alleged enmity in between the hospital staff and persons of locality. 11. The aforesaid judgment and order dated 20.6.1984 passed in Sessions Trial No. 294 of 1983 was challenged in Criminal Appeal No. 215 of 1984 (supra). 12. Learned Additional Sessions Judge (Special Judge), Bareilly vide his impugned judgment and order dated 1.10.1984 allowed the Criminal Appeal No. 215 of 1984 and set aside the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 20.6.1984 passed by learned IInd Asstt. Sessions Judge, Bareilly and recorded a finding of acquittal of accused-respondent Reshmani. 13. It is this judgment of acquittal dated 1.10.1984 which has been challenged in this Government appeal before us. 14. We have heard Sri D.I. Faridi, learned A.G.A. for the State and Sri Devendra Dhahma, learned Counsel for the respondent and perused the record. 15. Sessions Judge, Bareilly and recorded a finding of acquittal of accused-respondent Reshmani. 13. It is this judgment of acquittal dated 1.10.1984 which has been challenged in this Government appeal before us. 14. We have heard Sri D.I. Faridi, learned A.G.A. for the State and Sri Devendra Dhahma, learned Counsel for the respondent and perused the record. 15. The perusal of the impugned judgment and order dated 1.10.1984, transpires that learned Additional Sessions Judge (Special Judge), Bareilly has recorded the findings of acquittal after reversing the judgment and order of conviction and sentence on following grounds I. That there was no need to frame charge under both the sections 354 and 376 I.P.C., as the offence of 354 I.P.C. is included in the offence punishable under section 376 I.P.C.; II. That the prosecutrix (P.W.-1) and Sharafat Ali (P.W.-2) were not pre-acquainted with the accused Reshmani compounder and, therefore, they could not identify him; III. That Sharafat Ali claims to have seen accused jumping away from over P.W.-1 still he did not overpower the respondent inside the ward; IV. That the claim of prosecutrix to raise hue and cry is belied by the fact that none of the persons of the locality and in the ward in question were attracted there towards the scene of the incident; V. That the prosecutrix and Sharafat Ali did not disclose the incident even to the doctor who resides in the premises of hospital hardly at the distance of 50 steps away from the ward in question and kept mum throughout the night; VI. That the F.I.R. is delayed and there is no explanation; VII. That the scribe Aslam Raza Khan, a relative of P.W.-1, is inimical to the hospital staff; VIII. That the prosecutrix P.W.-1 did not receive any external injury as no resistance with her hand, mouth and teeth was made by her; IX. That her silence throughout the episode of catching her breast and opening the salwar followed by sexual intercourse does not rule out her consent; X. That the medical report does not support the prosecution case; XI. That the testimony of prosecutrix (P.W.-1) is not worth reliable and; XII. That there was no sufficient source of light. 16. That her silence throughout the episode of catching her breast and opening the salwar followed by sexual intercourse does not rule out her consent; X. That the medical report does not support the prosecution case; XI. That the testimony of prosecutrix (P.W.-1) is not worth reliable and; XII. That there was no sufficient source of light. 16. We are fully alive of the fact that we are dealing with an appeal against acquittal and in the absence of perversity in the said judgment and order, interference by this Court exercising its appellate jurisdiction is not warranted. It is settle proposition of law that the Appellate Court being the final Court of fact is fully competent to reappreciate, reconsider and review the evidence and take its own decision. Law does not prescribe any limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and the Appellate Court is free to arrive at its own conclusion keeping in mind that acquittal provides for presumption in favour of the accused. The presumption of innocence is available to the person and in criminal jurisprudence, every person is presumed innocent unless he is proved guilty by the competent Court. Further, there can be no quarrel to the said legal proposition that if two reasonable views are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 17. The hallmark of a judgment/order and exercise of judicial power by a judicial forum is to disclose the reasons for its decision and giving of reasons has been always insisted upon as one of the fundamentals of sound administration of justice-delivery system, to make known that there had been proper and due application of mind to the issue before the Court and also as an essential requisite of principles of natural justice. The State does not in pursuing or conducting a criminal case or an appeal espouse any right of its own but really vindicates the cause of society at large, to prevent recurrence as well as punish offences and offenders respectively, in order to preserve orderliness in society by upholding the rule of law. 18. Learned A.G.A. has submitted that High Court has full power to review at large the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. 18. Learned A.G.A. has submitted that High Court has full power to review at large the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that power, unless it be found especially stated in the Code. According to him, the evidence of prosecutrix (P.W.-1) and Sharafat Ali (P.W.-2) are wholly reliable which are supported by medical evidence and also by the deposition of Dr. Usha Jain (P.W.-4) which proves the charge under sections 354 and 376 I.P.C. against accused-respondent. The judgment and order of conviction recorded by IInd Asstt. Sessions Judge, Bareilly was fully, in accordance with the law and facts based on proper appreciation of evidence on record but the impugned judgment passed by Additional Sessions Judge (Special Judge), Bareilly is against the weight of evidence on record and is perverse which has caused miscarriage of justice. 19. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondent has submitted that although the High Court is fully competent to make a re-appreciation of evidence and to come its own conclusion yet in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the view of the Court below as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of the innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an Appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by the Lower Court. According to him, the Trial Court has not properly appreciated the evidence on record and without applying his judicial mind recorded a finding of conviction of respondent while the first Appellate Court had made better appreciation of evidence in accordance with law and rightly extended the benefit of doubt to respondent and acquitted him vide impugned judgment and order, therefore, this Court need not reverse the finding of acquittal. He invited our attention towards circumstances pointed out in the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka 2007 (54) AIC 172 (SC): 2007 (58) ACC 402 (SC), under which the finding of acquittal may be interfered with by the Appellate Court. 20. The observations made in the aforesaid case was reiterated in a recent decision in Murugesan v. State Through Inspector of Police (2012) 10 SCC 383 , wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court had the occasion to consider the broad principles of law governing the power of the High Court under section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The summary of the relevant principles of law set out in para. 21 of the judgment may be extracted hereinunder: "21.A concise statement of the law on the issue that had emerged after over half a century of evolution since Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor (1933-34) 61 IA 398 : AIR 1934 PC 227 , is to be found in para. 38 of the Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka 2007 (54) AIC 172 (SC): 2007 (58) ACC 402 (SC). The same may, therefore, be usefully noticed below: "38. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the Appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: i. An Appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. ii. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an Appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. iii. Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons'," good and sufficient grounds', "very strong circumstances', "distorted conclusions', "glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an Appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language' to emphasise the reluctance of an Appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. iv. An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. iv. An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the Trial Court. v. If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court." 21. We have re-examined the entire case because of the conflicting judgments of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court. On careful marshalling of the entire evidence and the documents on record, we arrived at the conclusion that the view taken by the Trial Court is a possible, plausible and most judicious view. The judgment of the Trial Court cannot be termed as perverse or against the weight of evidence on record. The impugned judgment and order dated 1.10.1984 delivered by the First Appellate Court cannot stand the scrutiny of the well settled legal position. 22. The date, time and place of incident is not denied by accused respondent. The fact that prosecutrix (P.W. 1) sustained injuries in her leg in the rail accident has also not been challenged. Accused respondent has not denied that during the relevant date and time, victim (P.W. 1) was hospitalized in P.H.C. Mirganj, Bareilly. He has not denied that on the date of the incident, he was pharmacist posted in the said hospital. However, he has challenged the allegation made against him by victim Smt. Zaibun Nisha that he outraged her modesty and committed rape upon her in the hospital. 23. Zaibun Nisha (P.W. 1) is the victim of the case. She has deposed that 3-½ years ago, she had come to her Maika. On the day of the incident, she along with her two minor children and Sharafat Ali (P.W.2), the brother of her husband, came to Railway Station, Nagaria Sadaat at about 9.00 p.m. in order to board Bareilly-Delhi Passenger Train to reach to her in-laws' house Pipla Khera, district Meerut. On the day of the incident, she along with her two minor children and Sharafat Ali (P.W.2), the brother of her husband, came to Railway Station, Nagaria Sadaat at about 9.00 p.m. in order to board Bareilly-Delhi Passenger Train to reach to her in-laws' house Pipla Khera, district Meerut. She could not board the train rather fell down as a result of which she met with rail accident and sustained injuries in her leg. She was hospitalized in P.H.C. Mirganj, District Bareilly, where her injuries were stitched by the doctor at 65 to 70 places. She was bedridden in the night. Sharafat Ali (P.W. 2) and her two minor children, who had already boarded the train, stepped down on the next railway station and came back to the hospital. In the ward, she was sleeping on the cot. The said ward was partitioned in two parts with a curtain. In other part, another lady patient of burn injuries was lying in an unconscious state. Besides her, the two minor children of the prosecutrix were sleeping. Sharafat Ali (P.W. 2) was also there. At about 1: 30 a.m., accused Reshmani, compounder, came in the ward and asked Sharafat Ali to go out to bring candle. He further asked him not to remain in the ward as gents were not allowed to stay inside the family ward. After sending Sharafat Ali out of the ward, Reshmani, compounder, asked the victim, Smt. Zaibun Nisha, to give injection in her vagina and started catching and pressing her breast. He put his hand inside her salwar and ultimately he opened the salwar and committed rape upon her without her consent. She was raising hue and cry throughout but none came to her rescue except Sharafat Ali, who by then had returned. Hearing the hue and cry, he knocked the door first for sometime and thereafter pushed the door, whereupon the leaves of the door were opened. He saw accused Reshmani jumping from over the body of the prosecutrix. Reshmani accused ran away from the ward after scolding Sharafat Ali. 24. The witness has been cross-examined at length but nothing material could be fetched out to render her deposition unreliable. 25. He saw accused Reshmani jumping from over the body of the prosecutrix. Reshmani accused ran away from the ward after scolding Sharafat Ali. 24. The witness has been cross-examined at length but nothing material could be fetched out to render her deposition unreliable. 25. Corroborating the evidence of Smt. Zaibun Nisha (P.W. 1), Sharafat Ali (P.W. 2) has deposed that at about 1: 30 a.m., in the night of the incident, Reshmani accused respondent asked him to go out from the wand wherein prosecutrix was admitted on the ground that he being male could not be allowed to remain there. He asked him to go to bring the candle. He went out of the ward. He could not procure the candle in the locality as the shops were closed. He returned to the ward where he found that the doors of the ward were shut. Some noise/shrieks were heard by him from inside the ward. He knocked the door and ultimately pushed it. The door was then opened. He saw accused jumping from over the body of the prosecutrix. Accused scolded Sharafat Ali and succeeded in going out of the ward. Prosecutrix narrated him the incident. 26. Both the aforesaid witnesses have deposed that in the morning when doctor came in the ward, the prosecutrix made complaint to him and handed over the spectacles of accused, which he had left on her cot while running away after the arrival of Sharafat Ali. The doctor promised to take action against the compounder accused but did nothing rather went to Bareilly. Several persons including Aslam Raza Khan, a relative of the prosecutrix, had also reached the hospital in the morning. She dictated the report to Aslam Raza Khan, who scribed the same and having read over the report to her, she affixed her thumb impression on written report (Ex. Ka-1). Sharafat Ali went to the police station Mirganj and lodged the report. 27. Sharafat Ali (P.W. 2) has been cross-examined in detail but nothing material could be elicited from him to disbelieve his testimony. The testimony of both these witnesses corroborated to each other without any material discrepancy. After lodging the report, the prosecutrix was subjected to medical examination to ascertain the allegation of rape. Dr. Smt. Usha Jain (P.W. 4) medically examined her and prepared the medical examination report. The testimony of both these witnesses corroborated to each other without any material discrepancy. After lodging the report, the prosecutrix was subjected to medical examination to ascertain the allegation of rape. Dr. Smt. Usha Jain (P.W. 4) medically examined her and prepared the medical examination report. She opined that no definite opinion about rape can be given as she is used to sexual intercourse. She has proved her medical examination report as Ex. Ka-7. The supplementary report has been proved by her as Ext. Ka-8. 28. Sri Prem Pal Singh (P.W. 3) is the Investigating Officer. He completed the investigation and submitted charge-sheet under section 354 IPC on the direction of CO. concerned although he had collected evidence constituting an offence punishable under section 376 IPC as well. 29. In his examination recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C., accused respondent Reshmani attributed his false implication in this case on account of enmity with persons of the locality. He appeared in the witness-box and examined himself as D.W. 1, as stated above. After perusal of the evidence on record, learned Trial Court held accused respondent guilty under sections 354 and 376 IPC 30. The perusal of the record shows that the allegation of rape is fully proved by the evidence of prosecutrix (P.W. 1) supported by the evidence of Sharafat Ali and corroborated by medical evidence. Undisputedly, prosecutrix was a married lady, having two issues. Dr. Smt. Usha Jain had deposed that she found her uterus at its normal size and shape wherein she noticed some pinkish (gulabi) discharge. The vaginal swabs were taken but on its examination, no living or dead sperm were found and the doctor has opined that no definite opinion of rape can be given. Learned Trial Court has rightly observed that for constituting the offence under section 376 IPC it is not necessary that accused should be discharged in the vagina. Mere penetration is sufficient. The incident took place at about 1: 30 a.m. on 10.1.1981 and she was subjected to medical examination at 7.30 p.m. i.e. after about 18 hours. No cross-examination has been made on the point as to whether accused discharged in the vagina or not. Mere penetration is sufficient. The incident took place at about 1: 30 a.m. on 10.1.1981 and she was subjected to medical examination at 7.30 p.m. i.e. after about 18 hours. No cross-examination has been made on the point as to whether accused discharged in the vagina or not. Learned Trial Court has rightly observed that to prove the charge under section 376 IPC prosecution was required to establish that male organ of the accused was inserted in the female organ of the victim and the victim had deposed that accused committed rape upon her. If any further detail was required by the defence, it could have fetched it out during her cross examination but no effort appears to have been made by the defence. Doctor (P.W. 4) had deposed in cross-examination that discharge is not essential in the case of rape. Prosecutrix (P.W. 1) is the married lady. She has no enmity with the accused compounder. She was badly injured in the incident. She was under medical care and treatment in P.H.C. Mirganj. The doctor and compounder had provided medical aid to her. Her injuries were so serious that it was stitched at 65 to 70 places in her leg. She was lying on the bed almost inert (shaktiviheen). She could not move herself due to the acute pain. Under such a circumstance, there was no reason for her to falsely implicate the accused respondent. The defence that persons of locality were against the doctors and the staff and at the instance of Aslam Raza Khan, prosecutrix falsely implicated him does not bear any substance. He as D.W. 1, has proved a copy of the complaint allegedly sent by doctor of the hospital to C.M.O., Dy. C.M.O. S.S.P. and Officer Incharge, police station Mirganj apprehending their false implication in criminal cases at the instance of the persons of the locality but neither he got summoned the original of the said complaint nor examined the doctor, who is said to have sent the aforesaid so called complaint. Moreover, Aslam Raza was not the person who had earlier lodged any report or made any complaint against the doctor or its staff. The aforesaid complaint (Ext. Kha-1) was not sent by accused respondent Reshmani. Prsecutrix does not have any relation with either of the person against whom the doctor of the hospital has earlier sent some alleged complaint. 31. Moreover, Aslam Raza was not the person who had earlier lodged any report or made any complaint against the doctor or its staff. The aforesaid complaint (Ext. Kha-1) was not sent by accused respondent Reshmani. Prsecutrix does not have any relation with either of the person against whom the doctor of the hospital has earlier sent some alleged complaint. 31. Learned Trial Court has rightly observed that a lady in Indian society cannot falsely implicate anyone in any such heinous offence of rape which attaches a moral, physical and mental stigma on her and also her family members' future life. 32. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohan Anna Chavan v. State of Maharashtra 2008 (68) AIC 194 (SC) : 2008 (62) ACC 729 (SC), held as under: "The physical scar may heal up, but the mental scar will always remain. When a woman is ravished, what is inflicted is not merely physical injury but the deep sense of some deathless shame. By the very nature of the offence it is an obnoxious act of the highest order" 33. In the case of Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat 1983 (20) ACC 29 (SC), Hon'ble Supreme Court held that "................it is now time to tackle the pivotal issue as regards the need for insisting on corroboration to the testimony of the prosecutrix in sex-offences. This Court, in Rameshwar v. The State of Rajasthan 1952 AIR SC 54 , has declared that corroboration is not the sine quanon for a conviction in a rape case. The utterance of the Court in Rameshwar may be replayed, across the time-gap of three decades which have whistled past, in the inimitable voice of Vivian Bose, J. who spoke for the Court--. The rule, which according to the cases has hardened into one of law, is not that corroboration is essential before there can be a conviction but that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where the circumstances make it safe to dispense with it, must be present to the mind of the Judge....... The only rule of law is that this rule of prudence must be present to the mind of the Judge or the jury as the case may be and be understood and appreciated by him or them. The only rule of law is that this rule of prudence must be present to the mind of the Judge or the jury as the case may be and be understood and appreciated by him or them. There is no rule of practice that there must, in every case, be corroboration before a conviction can be allowed to stand." 34. It was further held in the aforesaid case law. ".....................without the fear of making too wide a statements or of overstating the case, it can be said that rarely will a girl or a woman in India make false allegations of sexual assault on account of any such factor as has been just enlisted. The statement is generally true in the context of the urban as also rural Society. It is also by and large true in the context of the sophisticated, not so sophisticated, and unsophisticated society. Only very rarely can one conceivably come across an exception or two and that too possibly from amongst the urban elites. Because: (1) A girl or a woman in the tradition bound non-permissive Society of India would be extremely reluctant even to admit that any incident which is likely to reflect on her chastity had ever occurred. (2) She would be conscious of the danger of being ostracised by the Society or being looked down by the Society including by her own family members, relatives, friends and neighbours. (3) She would have to brave the whole world. (4) She would face the risk of losing the love and respect of her own husband and near relatives, and of her matrimonial home and happiness being shattered. (5) If she is unmarried, she would apprehend that it would be difficult to secure an alliance with a suitable match from a respectable or an acceptable family. (6) It would almost inevitably and almost invariably result in mental torture and suffering to herself. (7) The fear of being taunted by others will always haunt her. (8) She would feel extremely embarrassed in relating the incident to others being over powered by a feeling of shame on account of the upbringing in a tradition bound society where by and large sex is taboo. (9) The natural inclination would be to avoid giving publicity to the incident lest the family name and family honour is brought into controversy. (9) The natural inclination would be to avoid giving publicity to the incident lest the family name and family honour is brought into controversy. (10) The parents of an unmarried girl as also the husband and members of the husband's family of a married woman would also more often than not, want to avoid publicity on account of the fear of social stigma on the family name and family honour. (11) The fear of the victim herself being considered to be promiscuous or in some way responsible for the incident regardless of her innocence. (12) The reluctance to face interrogation by the investigating agency, to face the Court, to face the cross-examination by Counsel for the culprit, and the risk of being disbelieved, acts as a deterrent. In view of these factors the victims and their relatives are not too keen to bring the culprit to books. And when in the face of these factors the crime is brought to light there is a built-in assurance that the charge is genuine rather than fabricated. On principle the evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands on par with evidence of an injured witness. Just as a witness who has sustained an injury (which is not shown or believed to be self inflicted) is the best witness in the sense that he is least likely to exculpate the real offender, the evidence of a victim of a sex-offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. And while corroboration in the form of eye-witness account of an independent witness may often be forthcoming in physical assault cases, such evidence cannot be expected in sex offences, having regard to the very nature of the offence. It would therefore be adding insult to injury to insist on corroboration drawing inspiration from the rules devised by the Courts in the Western World. Obseisance to which has perhaps become a habit presumably on account of the colonial hangover. It would therefore be adding insult to injury to insist on corroboration drawing inspiration from the rules devised by the Courts in the Western World. Obseisance to which has perhaps become a habit presumably on account of the colonial hangover. We are therefore of the opinion that if the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity, and the probabilities-factors does not render it unworthy of credence, as a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from the medical evidence, where, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence can be expected to be forth coming, subject to the following qualification: Corroboration may be insisted upon when a woman having attained majority is found in a compromising position and there is a likelihood of her having levelled such an accusation on account of the instinct of self-preservation. Or when the 'probabilities-factor' is found to be out of tune". 35. Prosecutrix has deposed that when she was first attended by the doctor and this accused compounder in the hospital for medical treatment of her injured leg, the doctor was calling the accused with the name of Reshmani and at that time, there was an electric light when her own wounds were being stitched in varandah, and therefore, she knew the name of the accused and identified him fully with his name and face. At the time of incident of rape and soon before it, there was no electric supply but there was a little candle light in her ward which was about to extinguish and on the pretext to bring candle, this accused deliberately and maliciously with a criminal intent ousted Sharafat Ali from the ward in the odd hours of the dark night and soon after his departure, he said to give injection in her vagina and started outraging her modesty and committed rape upon her amidst her possible resistance. Absence of injury at her person likely to have been caused during the incident of rape as argued by learned Counsel for the respondent does not tantamount to her consent She has clearly and categorically stated that she raised alarm, made hue and cry but none turned up for her rescue except Sharafat Ali. Absence of injury at her person likely to have been caused during the incident of rape as argued by learned Counsel for the respondent does not tantamount to her consent She has clearly and categorically stated that she raised alarm, made hue and cry but none turned up for her rescue except Sharafat Ali. Be it known that in the ward there were two sleeping minor children, aged about six years and four years apart from an unconscious lady, a burn victim. It has come in the evidence that the place where the hospital was situated was not surrounded by thickly populated houses. In the ward none could be available for her rescue. Sharafat Ali had returned by that time and when he opened the door, noticing the noise inside, before he could understand the matter, accused compounder fled away after scolding him. The finding of the Lower Appellate Court that since Sharafat Ali failed to apprehend accused respondent inside the ward, his presence is doubtful appears to be an outcome of non-application of mind of an ordinary prudent man and lack of normal human approach in the facts and circumstances of the case. 36. Similarly, the finding of the lower Appellate Court that non-resistance of the prosecutrix during the whole incident by hand, mouth or by teeth does not rule out the possibility of her being consenting is against the weight of evidence on record and, therefore, it is perverse. Both the aforesaid witnesses of fact have deposed that prosecutrix was raising hue and cry throughout. The evidence of prosecutrix shows that she made best possible resistance during the incident which she could as a badly injured lady. 37. In order to prove that there was consent on the part of the prosecutrix it must be established that she freely submitted herself while in free and unconstrained position of her physical and mental power to act in a manner she wanted. Consent is an act of reason accompanied by deliberation, a mere act of helpless resignation in the face of inevitable compulsion, non-resistance of and passive giving in cannot be deemed to be "consent". Consent means active 'will' in the mind of a person to permit the doing of the act of and knowledge of what is to be done, or of the nature of the act that is being done is essential to a consent to an act. Consent means active 'will' in the mind of a person to permit the doing of the act of and knowledge of what is to be done, or of the nature of the act that is being done is essential to a consent to an act. Consent supposes a physical power to act, a moral power of acting and a serious and determined and free use of these powers. Every consent to act involves submission, but it by no means follows that a mere submission involves consent. As the nature of consent that absolves the accused from the guilt mere is a difference between consent and submission. Every consent involves a submission but the converse does not follow and a mere act of submission does not involve consent consent of the woman in order to relieve an act, of a criminal character, like rape, must be an act of reason, accompanied with deliberation, after the mind has weighed as in a balance, the good and evil on each side, with the existing capacity and power to withdraw the assent according to one's will or pleasure. A woman is said to consent, only when, she freely agrees to submit herself. Consent implies the exercise of a free and untrammelled right to forbid or withhold what is being consented to. A mere act of helpless resignation in the fact of inevitable compulsion, quiescence, non-resistance, or passive giving in, when volitional faculty is either clouded by fear or vitiated by duress, cannot be deemed to be "consent" as understood in law. Consent on the part of a woman, as a defence to an allegation of rape, requires voluntary participation, not only after the exercise of intelligence, based on the knowledge, of the significance and moral quality of the act, but after having freely exercised a choice between resistance and assent. Submission of her body under the influence of fear or terror is no consent. The words "will" and "consent" have well known meaning. They indicate a voluntary and conscious acceptance of what is proposed to be done by another and concurred. There is subtle difference between willingness and submission. There is a thin marginal line which divides the two. 38. Consent supposes three things--a physical power, a mental power and a free and serious use of them. They indicate a voluntary and conscious acceptance of what is proposed to be done by another and concurred. There is subtle difference between willingness and submission. There is a thin marginal line which divides the two. 38. Consent supposes three things--a physical power, a mental power and a free and serious use of them. Hence, it is that if consent be obtained by intimidation, force, mediated imposition, circumvention, surprise or undue influence it is to be treated as a delusion, and not as a deliberate and free act of the mind. 39. Here in the case in hand the victim is a rustic villager having badly injured leg stitched at 65-70 places just before the incident of this rape. She was lying on the bed and no one was mere to hear her shrieks although she raised alarm. She was under the medical treatment of hospital staff including the accused respondent, therefore, she was under undue influence of the accused who was in a position to dominate her will by practicing deception. It is to be treated as to a delusion and not as a deliberate and free act of the mind if she could not use violent physical force, due to her physical and mental incapacity, sufficient to offensive and effective resistance against the act of accused respondent especially when she was caught unaware and shocked. However, there is sufficient evidence on record that she resisted and raised hue and cry of a patient 40. The crux of the offence under section 376 I.P.C. is rape and it postulates a sexual intercourse. The word "intercourse" means sexual connection. It may be defined as mutual frequent action by members of independent organization. By a metaphor the word "intercourse" like the word "commerce" is applied to the relation of sexes. In intercourse there is temporary visitation of one organization by a member of the other organization for certain clearly defined and limited objects. The primary object of the visiting organization is to obtain euphoria by means of a detent of the nerves consequent on the sexual crisis. There is no intercourse unless the visiting member is enveloped at least partially by the visited organization, for intercourse connotes reciprocity. The primary object of the visiting organization is to obtain euphoria by means of a detent of the nerves consequent on the sexual crisis. There is no intercourse unless the visiting member is enveloped at least partially by the visited organization, for intercourse connotes reciprocity. In intercourse between thighs the visiting male organ is enveloped at least partially by the organism visited, the thighs; the thighs are kept together and tight as held in State of Kerala v. Kundumkara Govindam 1969 Cr.L.J. 818. 41. In the Concise Oxford Dictionary the word 'penetrate' means 'find access into or through, pass through'. 42. In view of the explanation to section 375 mere penetration by penis in vagina is an offence of rape. In a rape case while there must be penetration is the technical sense, slightest penetration is sufficient for conviction. The only thing is to ascertain is whether the private parts of the accused did enter into the person of the woman. It is not necessary to enter into any nice discussion as to how far it entered. 43. It may be recalled that in view of section 114A of the Evidence Act inserted by Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1983 if the rape victim says in her evidence that she did not consent to sexual intercourse, the onus to prove consent lies on the accused. 44. We are impressed that in the same set of circumstances, the reaction of different individuals may be different. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rafiq v. State of U.P. 1980 Cr.L.J. 1344, made the following observations in para. 5 which reads as under "Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of a prosecutrix is not a matter of law, but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. Indeed, from place to place, from age to age, from varying life-styles and behavioural complexes, inferences from a given set of facts, oral and circumstantial, may have to be drawn not with dead uniformity but realistic lest rigidity in the shape of rule of law in this area be introduced through a new type of precedential tyranny. The same observation holds good regarding the presence or absence of injuries on the person of the aggressor or the aggressed." 45. In para. The same observation holds good regarding the presence or absence of injuries on the person of the aggressor or the aggressed." 45. In para. 7 of this judgment Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under "Hardly a sensitized judge who sees the conspectus of circumstances in its totality and rejects the testimony of a rape victim unless there are very strong circumstances militating against its veracity. None we see in his case, and confirmation of the conviction by the Courts below must, therefore, be a matter of course. Judicial response to human rights cannot be blunted by legal bigotry." 46. In William's Case (1850) 4 COX 220, it was held that if a girl does not resist intercourse in consequence of misapprehension this does not amount to a consent on her part where a medical man, to whom a girl of 14 years of age was sent for professional advice, had criminal connection with her, she making no resistance from a bona fide belief that he was treating her medically, it was held that he was guilty of rape. Likewise, in William's (1923) 1 KB 340, it was held that accused who was engaged to give lesson in singing and voice production to a girl of 16 years of age, had sexual intercourse with her under the pretext that her breathing was not quite right and that he had to perform an operation to enable her to produce her voice properly is guilty of rape. 47. Versions of married ladies who are victims of rape are normally accepted since they would not tell a lie at their own costs and they would give out a fact for punishment of real culprit. Taking circumstance of rape into consideration at times uncorroborated testimony of a victim of rape is expected to convict the accused. 48. In a case of rape on a married woman injury on the private part is not likely. 49. Unless there are compelling reasons which necessitates corroboration of her statement, the Court should find no difficulty in acting on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused when her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, amounts to adding insult to injury. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, amounts to adding insult to injury. Here in the case in hand the evidence of Sharafat Ali, P.W. 2 and the medical evidence fully corroborates the testimony of the prosecutrix P.W. 1. There is he reason to disbelieve her evidence. Learned Trial Court has rightly believed her evidence and based the findings of conviction of accused on her evidence supported by other evidence on record but learned First Appellate Court appears to have thrown away her deposition like anything without any justified ground. Her evidence is cogent, clinching and fully reliable. The judgment of the learned First Appellate Court is perverse and against the weight of evidence on record which has caused miscarriage of justice. Learned First Appellate Court appears to have swayed away by his own imagination, conjecture and surmises basing it on minor discrepancies which are but natural to occur. The minor discrepancies pointed out by him do not go to the roots of the prosecution case. 50. Learned First Appellate Court has pointed out that P.W. 2 has deposed that when he left the ward on the command of the accused, doctor and compounder accused both were there in the ward with the victim while prosecutrix P.W. 1 says that at that time only compounder accused was there and doctor was not there. Likewise, he has pointed out that P.W. 2 has stated that when he left the ward and also when he returned to the ward there was darkness in the ward while P.W. 1 has deposed that a small candle was taking its last breath when he left the ward on the command of compounder. Be it known that P.W. 2 on being questioned on the issue of presence of doctor in the ward he has deposed that when he left the ward doctor had also came out from the ward. He had clarified his evidence as stated above and, therefore, there was no contradiction on this issue in between the evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2. He had clarified his evidence as stated above and, therefore, there was no contradiction on this issue in between the evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2. It is clear from the evidence on record that there was no electric supply at all at the relevant time of incident, therefore, entire hospital and the locality was under darkness and if a small candle was lighting in the ward and taking its last breath as it was to extinguish very soon at any moment and on its pretext the compounder accused asked him to go out and bring the candle from market, it does not mean that he was telling a lie on this point. Had there being sufficient light of candle in the ward, probably he could not have gone to bring the candle from outside in the odd hours of the dark night but the presence of meager light in the ward at the time of his leaving the ward was sufficient for P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 to fully identify the real culprit, accused respondent Reshmani. The aforesaid contradictions are not sufficient to set aside the finding of conviction of accused respondent recorded by learned Trial Court. 51. There is no substance in the contention of learned Counsel for the respondent that there is inordinate delay in lodging the F.I.R. of this case. The finding of learned First Appellate Court recorded in the impugned judgment and order that the delay in lodging the F.I.R. of this case was not explained is baseless. The aforesaid finding is arbitrary and against the weight of evidence on record. The helpless injured lady lying on the bed has been raped in this case in the mid of night by the compounder of the hospital by playing trick and deception on the pretext that he was to give injection in the vagina of the lady and ousted the only male member Sharafat Ali from the ward. Soon after the incident of rape she narrated the incident to her Devar, P.W. 2. Soon after the incident of rape she narrated the incident to her Devar, P.W. 2. It has come in her evidence that doctor had heard the murmuring on the issue and came in her ward early in the morning and she immediately complained to him of the incident of rape and handed over the spectacle of the compounder accused as evidence of incident who assured her to take action against the accused, compounder but he did nothing rather went to Head Quarter, Bareilly. It is only when her relation came she could dictate the F.I.R. which was handed over to Sharafat Ali who lodged it to the police station and then the investigation proceeded. There is no delay at all and whatever delay is pointed out by the learned First Appellate Court that has been fully explained as stated above. It is matter of common experience that when a sex offence is involved, delay stands generally explained because in Indian society it brings a scandal to the family of the prosecutrix and time is unnecessarily wasted to decide if the scandal should be made public. Here in this rape case victim was badly injured and was hospitalized. Her husband was also not there. Two minor children below 6 years were there. She was to be provided medical care. After the occurrence of the incident she was in a shock but still narrated the incident to her Devar soon after the incident in the night itself and dictated the report immediately on the next day to the scribe naming accused respondent as culprit and then the F.I.R. could be lodged with the police through Sharafat Ali. The delay occurred in the case could not be fatal because her relative might have consulted the elders and her husband and that will naturally result in some delay. Especially, in case like rape or outraging modesty of a woman the aggrieved or injured person or her relations will naturally think twice before giving a complaint to the police. This will be much more so in villages because it involves the prestige and reputation of the family of the victim. The delay will be fatal in cases of murder and such sort of cases, but it will not be so in case of this nature. 52. This will be much more so in villages because it involves the prestige and reputation of the family of the victim. The delay will be fatal in cases of murder and such sort of cases, but it will not be so in case of this nature. 52. Learned Trial Court has rightly observed with sound reasons that there is no delay in lodging the F.I.R. in this case under the facts and circumstances. 53. The finding recorded by learned Additional Sessions Judge (Special Judge), Bareilly in the impugned judgment dated 1.10.1984 to the effect that once there was charge under section 376 I.P.C. proved against accused, he was not to be convicted under section 354 I.P.C. which offence in itself included under section 376 I.P.C. and there was no need to frame charge under section 354 I.P.C. because the use of criminal force was in itself in a process of the offence of section 376 I.P.C. is not legally correct. 54. Section 218 of the Cr.P.C. reads as under: (1) For every distinct offence of which any person is accused there shall be a separate charge, and every such charge shall be tried separately. Provided that where the accused person, by an application in writing, so desires and the Magistrate is of opinion that such person is not likely to be prejudiced thereby, the Magistrate may try together all or any number of the charges framed against such person. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall affect the operation of the provision of sections 219, 220, 221 and 223. 55. The provision contained under section 218 Cr.P.C. clarifies that every distinct offence of which any person is accused there shall be a separate charge and every such charge shall be tried separately. The offence punishable under section 354 IPC is a quite different offence from the offence punishable under section 376 IPC, therefore, the law requires that if the allegations against the accused discloses an offence punishable under section354 IPC followed by an offence punishable under section 376 IPC, he must be charged for both the offences and if the charges so framed are proved by reliable and admissible evidence on record, he must be convicted and sentenced as well. This section is mandatory, and for every distinct offence, there should be a separate charge. 56. This section is mandatory, and for every distinct offence, there should be a separate charge. 56. The object of this section is to see that the accused is not bewildered in his defence by having to meet several charges in no way connected with one another. 57. There does not appear any fault factual or legal in the judgment of the Trial Court who had found accused respondent guilty under section 354 IPC as well as under section 376 IPC. In the case in hand, the sentences awarded under both the counts have been directed to run concurrently. No prejudice whatsoever appears to have occurred to accused respondent in any way. 58. The impugned judgment and order of acquittal dated 1.10.1984 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge does not hold good and the view taken by him in the wake of evidence on record is 'not a possible view' rattier the view of conviction taken by the learned Trial Court is 'only possible view' in the facts and circumstances of this case. 59. Learned Counsel for the accused respondent has submitted that more than 34 years have elapsed since the date of the incident of this rape case. Accused-respondent is now above 61 years of age. He has retired from his service from the post of Chief Pharmacist in the year 2013. During the pendency of the investigation, he was placed under suspension in this case. Although he was convicted by learned Trial Court but was acquitted by learned Additional Sessions Judge on 1.10.1984. According to him, these are the circumstances, in the light of which, a lenient view in the matter of awarding sentence is called for, in case Government appeal is allowed. He has relied on Hon'ble Supreme Court decision in the case of Gopal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand 2013 (81) ACC 289, wherein sentence of imprisonment for three years under section 324 IPC against accused appellant Gopal Singh awarded by learned Trial Court was reduced to one year, in the facts and circumstances of that case. 60. He has relied on Hon'ble Supreme Court decision in the case of Gopal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand 2013 (81) ACC 289, wherein sentence of imprisonment for three years under section 324 IPC against accused appellant Gopal Singh awarded by learned Trial Court was reduced to one year, in the facts and circumstances of that case. 60. In the aforesaid case, Hon'ble Supreme Court has referred the pronouncement made in Santa Singh v. State of Punjab 1976 (13) ACC 344 (SC), wherein Bhagwati, J. (as his Lordship then was), speaking for the Court, while interpreting the words used in section 235(2)of the Code of Criminal Procedure, adverted to the concept of proper sentence and opined thus: "...... a proper sentence is the amalgam of many factors such as the nature of the offence, the circumstances extenuating or aggravating of the offence, the prior criminal record, if any, of the offender, the age of the offender, the record of the offender as to employment, the background of the offender with reference to education, home, life sobriety and social adjustment, the emotional and mental condition of the offender, the prospects for the rehabilitation of the offender to a normal life in the community, the possibility of treatment or training of the offender, the possibility that the sentence may serve as a deterrent to crime by the offender or by others and the current community need, if any, for such a deterrent in respect to the particular type of offence. These are factors which have to be taken into account by the Court in deciding upon the appropriate sentence, and, therefore, the Legislature felt that, for this purpose, a separate stage should be provided after conviction when the Court can hear the accused in regard to these factors bearing on sentence and then pass proper sentence on the accused." 61. Recently, Hon'ble Supreme Court in Guru Basavaraj v. State of Karnataka 2012 (118) AIC 71 (SC) : 2012 (79) ACC 314 (SC), while discussing the concept of appropriate sentence has expressed that; "It is the duty of the Court to see that appropriate sentence is imposed regard being had to the commission of the crime and its impact on the social order. The cry of the collective for justice which includes adequate punishment cannot be lightly ignored." 62. The cry of the collective for justice which includes adequate punishment cannot be lightly ignored." 62. In Dhananjai Chatterjee @ Dhana v. State of West Bengal 1995 (Suppl.) ACC 598 (SC) : JT 1994 (1) SC 33, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "The imposition of appropriate punishment is the manner in which the Courts respond to the society's cry for justice against the criminal. Justice demands that Courts should impose punishment befitting the crime so that the Courts reflect public abhorrence of the crime. The Court must not only keep in view the rights of the criminal but also the rights of the victim of the crime and the society at large while considering the imposition of appropriate punishment." 63. Considering the aforesaid guidelines of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on sentencing of accused, we are of the view that learned Trial Court has already taken a lenient view on the matter of sentencing accused respondent Reshmani. Considering his conduct, who absconded soon after the incident from the hospital, character, nature of the crime committed on an injured, helpless, unfortunate, poor married lady under his medical supervision in the rural hospital was ravished by him by playing deception upon her who was caught unaware and was shocked, no leniency is called for to reduce the sentence awarded to him by learned Trial Court. 64. In the result the Government Appeal is allowed and the judgment and order impugned dated 1.10.1984 acquitting accused respondent Reshmani is hereby set aside and the judgment and order dated 20.6.1984 passed by the learned Trial Court (Second Assistant Sessions Judge, Bareilly) convicting and sentencing the accused respondent Reshmani is hereby upheld, restored and affirmed. 65. Accused respondent Reshmani is directed to surrender before the Court of C.J.M., Bareilly within a period of two months to serve out the sentence awarded to him by learned Trial Court. Let copy of this judgment be sent to learned C.J.M., Bareilly to ensure the compliance. In case accused respondent does not surrender within the stipulated period, learned C.J.M., Bareilly shall commit him to custody and send him to jail by following the procedure established by law under the intimation to the Registry of this Court Within a reasonable time.