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2014 DIGILAW 206 (CHH)

United India Insurance Company v. Prabhachand

2014-05-07

PRITINKER DIWAKER

body2014
ORDER Pritinker Diwaker, J. 1. This appeal arises out of the award dated 30.8.2010 passed by Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (for short the "Tribunal") Bastar at Jagdalpur in Claim Case No. 112/2007 awarding a compensation of Rs. 70,000/- in favour of respondents No. 4 and 5/claimants. Facts of the case in brief are that on 2.4.2007 when deceased Vednath Baghel - a young boy aged about 7 years at the relevant time was crossing the road, he was dashed by a tractor attached with trolley which resulted in his death. 2. Claim case was filed by the claimants who are parents of the deceased claiming compensation of Rs. 3,00,000/- in their favour inter alia pleading that as the accident occurred on account of rash and negligent driving by the driver of the offending vehicle which was duly insured with the insurance company/appellant herein, suitable compensation may be awarded to them. 3. Insurance company however contested the claim and denied its liability to satisfy the claim. However, by the impugned award the Tribunal has awarded a compensation of Rs. 70,000/- in favour of the claimants and it is this award which is challenged in this appeal. Cross appeal has also been filed by the claimants under Order 41 Rule 22 CPC seeking enhancement of the compensation along with an application for condonation of delay. 4. Counsel for the appellant/insurance company submits as under: "(i) That on the date of accident driver of the vehicle was not having valid and effective driving licence and therefore liability cannot be fastened on the insurance company. (ii) That the owner of the vehicle was not careful while handing over the vehicle to the driver to drive the same and further he made incorrect statement before the Tribunal that he had authorized one person to verify the authenticity of the driving licence. He submits that once it has been admitted by the owner that he made an effort to verify the licence from the RTO office then it becomes his duty to establish the fact that the driver of the offending vehicle was driving it duly possessing the valid and effective driving licence." 5. He submits that once it has been admitted by the owner that he made an effort to verify the licence from the RTO office then it becomes his duty to establish the fact that the driver of the offending vehicle was driving it duly possessing the valid and effective driving licence." 5. Replying to these arguments of the counsel for the appellant/insurance company it has been submitted by the counsel for the claimants that owner of the offending vehicle namely Prabhachand (NAW-1) has been examined before the Tribunal and has categorically stated that before employing Balchand Nayak as his driver, he had seen his licence, taken his driving test and on being satisfied with his driving he employed him. According to the counsel for the claimants, this witness has further stated that he took driving test of the driver by sitting beside him and he drove the vehicle about 30-35 kilometers and after recording his satisfaction he had employed him. He submits that even the licence of the driver was verified by this witness which shows that he had taken all precautions as required under the law before employing the driver. 6. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the documents on record. 7. The question for consideration before this Court is whether the appellant/insurance company has pleaded and proved that respondent/driver Balchand was not having valid and effective driving licence at the time of accident as the burden lies on the shoulder of the appellant/insurance company not only to plead the said fact but also to prove the same to the satisfaction of the Tribunal by adducing legally admissible evidence. 8. In the present case, the insurance company has pleaded that the driving licence of the driver was fake but at the same time respondent/owner Prabhachand (NAW-1) has entered into the witness box and clearly stated that before employing the driver namely Balchand Nayak he was put on driving test, he drove the vehicle for about 30-35 kilometers and after being fully satisfied with his driving, he employed him to drive the vehicle. He has further stated that not only he had seen the licence of the driver but also recorded his satisfaction by verifying the same. He has further stated that not only he had seen the licence of the driver but also recorded his satisfaction by verifying the same. Now the fact remains that there is no evidence led by the appellant/insurance company to the effect that the offending vehicle was driven in violation of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy. The question whether the insurance company can avoid its liability to indemnify the claimants on the ground that the offending vehicle was driven by a person not having the valid and effective driving licence came for consideration before the Apex Court in the matter of United India Insurance Company v. Lehru and others, (2003) 3 SCC 338 and thereafter in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swarn Singh and others, (2004) 3 SCC 297 and then in Pepsu Road Transport Corporation v. National Insurance Company III, (2013) ACC 871 (SC) wherein it has been held by the Apex Court that in case the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the conditions of the policy regarding use of vehicle by a duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time, insurance company would be liable to make payment of compensation. In a claim case for compensation it is certainly open to the insurer under Section 149(2)(a)(ii) to take a defence that driver of the vehicle involved in the accident was not duly licensed. Once such a defence is taken, onus is on the insurer. But even after it is proved that the licence possessed by the driver was fake one, whether there is liability on the insurer is the moot question. 9. In the present case the owner of the vehicle while employing the driver had checked the factum of driver having valid licence, thereafter he recorded his satisfaction himself as to the competence of the driver for driving the same in an effective manner and after being satisfied in that regard it can be said that the owner had taken reasonable care in employing a person who is qualified and competent to drive the vehicle. It is a settled legal position that the owner cannot be expected to go beyond that to the extent of verifying the genuineness of the driving licence with the licensing authority before hiring the services of the driver. It is a settled legal position that the owner cannot be expected to go beyond that to the extent of verifying the genuineness of the driving licence with the licensing authority before hiring the services of the driver. From the evidence of the owner it can be safely held that he took reasonable care and due precaution before hiring the services of driver and thus he cannot be said to be at fault. Applying the well settled principles of law, this Court is of the view that insurance company has failed to prove willful breach of conditions by the owner. It has also failed to prove that the owner was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the conditions of the policy regarding use of vehicle by a duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive the vehicle at the relevant time. Thus the finding of the Tribunal fastening liability on the insurance company to make payment of compensation cannot be said to be at fault. Appeal preferred by the insurance company thus fails and is hereby dismissed. 10. As regards cross appeal preferred by the claimant, though the same is time barred, it is accompanied by an application for condonation of delay duly supported by the affidavit of respondent No. 4/claimant. In the application for condonation of delay it has been stated that respondent No. 4/claimant is a rustic villager, he was not having the proper knowledge of the case and the provisions of law and therefore the delay in filing the application may be condoned. 11. Considering the larger interest of justice in particular the background of the claimants and the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal, this Court deems it proper to condone the delay in filing to be cross appeal. Application for condonation is thus allowed and the delay is condoned. 12. Cross appeal filed under Order 41 Rule 22 CPC is heard on merits. 13. Counsel for the claimants submits that even if the notional income of the deceased is taken into consideration, it comes to Rs. 36,000/- per annum and taking the same into consideration and applying proper multiplier the compensation may be awarded to the claimants. 14. 12. Cross appeal filed under Order 41 Rule 22 CPC is heard on merits. 13. Counsel for the claimants submits that even if the notional income of the deceased is taken into consideration, it comes to Rs. 36,000/- per annum and taking the same into consideration and applying proper multiplier the compensation may be awarded to the claimants. 14. Counsel for the respondent/insurance company however supports the impugned award and submits that looking to the age of the deceased i.e. 7 years, compensation awarded by the Tribunal is just and proper. 15. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the documents on record. 16. Before dealing with the factual aspects of the case in hand this Court deems it proper to take note of a recent judicial pronouncement made by the Apex Court in the case of Kishan Gopal and another v. Lala and others, (2014) 1 SCC 244 where the age of the deceased at the time of death was 10 years. Relevant portion thereof reads as under: "34. Since we have set aside the findings and reasons recorded by both the Tribunal and the High Court on the contentious Issue 1 and 2 by recording our reasons in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment and we have answered the point in favour of the appellants and also examined the claim of the appellants to award just and reasonable compensation in favour of the appellants as they have lost their affectionate 10 year old son. For this purpose, it would be necessary for us to refer to the Second Schedule under Section 163-A of the MV Act, at Clause 6 which refers to notional income for compensation to those persons who had no income prior to the accident. 35. The relevant portion of Clause 6 states as under: "6. Notional income for compensation to those who had no income prior to accident- (a) Non-earning persons - Rs. 15,000 p.a." The aforesaid clause of the Second Schedule to section 163-A of the MV Act is considered by this Court in Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar while examining the tortuous liability of the tort-feasor has examined the criteria for awarding compensation for death of children in accidents between the age group of 10-15 years and held in the above case that the compensation shall be awarded taking the contribution of the children to the family at Rs. 12,000 p.a. and multiplier 11 has been applied taking the age of the father and then under the conventional heads the compensation of Rs. 25,000 was awarded. Thus a total sum of Rs. 1,57,000 was awarded in that case. 36. After noting the submission made on behalf of Tisco in Lata Wadhwa case that the compensation determined for the children of all age groups could be double as in its view the determination made was grossly inadequate and the observation was further made that loss of children is ir-recoupable and no amount of money could compensate the parents. Having regard to the environment from which the children referred to in that case were brought up, their parents being reasonably well-placed officials of Tisco, it was directed that the compensation amount for the children between the age group of 5 to 10 years should be three times. In other words, it should be Rs. 1.5 lakhs to which under the conventional heads a sum of Rs. 50,000 should be added and thus total amount in each case would be Rs. 2 lakhs. 37. Further, in Lata Wadhwa case it was observed that insofar as the children of age group between 10 to 15 years are concerned, they are all students of Class VI to Class X and are children of employees of Tisco and one of the children was employed in the Company in the said case having regard to the fact the contribution of the deceased child was taken Rs. 12,000 p.a. appears to be on the lower side and held that the contribution of such children should be Rs. 24,000 p.a. 38. In our considered view, the aforesaid legal principle laid down in Lata Wadhwa case with all fours is applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case in hand having regard to the fact that the deceased was 10 years old, who was assisting the appellants in their agricultural occupation which is an undisputed fact. We have also considered the fact that the rupee value has come down drastically from the year 1994, when the notional income of the non-earning member prior to the date of accident was fixed at Rs. 15,000. Further, the deceased boy, had he been alive would have certainly contributed substantially to the family of the appellants by working hard. 39. We have also considered the fact that the rupee value has come down drastically from the year 1994, when the notional income of the non-earning member prior to the date of accident was fixed at Rs. 15,000. Further, the deceased boy, had he been alive would have certainly contributed substantially to the family of the appellants by working hard. 39. In view of the aforesaid reasons, it would be just and reasonable for us to take his notional income at Rs. 30,000 and further taking the young age of the parents, namely, the mother who was about 36 years old, at the time of accident, by applying the legal principles laid down in Sarla Verma v. DTC, the multiplier of 15 can be applied to the multiplicand. Thus, 30,000 x 15 = 4,50,000 and 50,000 under conventional heads towards loss of love and affection, funeral expenses, last rites as held in Kerala SRTC v. Susamma Thomas, which is referred to in Lata Wadhwa case and the said amount under the conventional heads is awarded even in relation to the death of children between 10 to 15 years old. In this case also we award Rs. 50,000 under conventional heads. In our view, for the aforesaid reasons the said amount would be fair, just and reasonable compensation to be awarded in favour of the appellants." 17. It is not in dispute that at the time of death the deceased was aged about 7 years and he was a school going boy. Considering the background of the deceased, his annual income is assessed at Rs. 36,000/- as per the notional income prevailing at the relevant time and after deducting 50% towards his personal and living expenses, there is no doubt that he would have contributed at least Rs. 18,000 per annum to the claimants who happen to be his parents and looking to his age at the relevant time i.e. 07 years, multiplier of 15 has to be applied and on this being done the compensation awardable to the claimants comes to Rs. 2,70,000/- and it is awarded accordingly. 18. Compensation awarded by the Tribunal under the conventional heads appears to be just and proper and calls for no interference by this Court. After deducting the amount of Rs. 70,000/- awarded by the Tribunal, the enhanced sum comes to Rs. 2,70,000/- and it is awarded accordingly. 18. Compensation awarded by the Tribunal under the conventional heads appears to be just and proper and calls for no interference by this Court. After deducting the amount of Rs. 70,000/- awarded by the Tribunal, the enhanced sum comes to Rs. 2,00,000/- which would carry the interest of 6% per annum from the date of application. Thus in view of the aforesaid factual and legal position the cross appeal filed by the claimants is allowed in part and the award impugned is modified to the extent indicated as above.