JUDGMENT 1. The present revision petition has been filed by the complainant to assail the judgment dated 31.3.2006 rendered by Additional Sessions Judge, Khetri, whereby respondents were acquitted of offence under Sections 148/149, 323/149, 324/149, 325/149, 326/149, 307/149 and 302/149 IPC. 2. The learned Public Prosecutor has submitted that the State has opted not to assail the judgment by filing appeal. 3. Dharm Singh (PW-12), the complainant had lodged report (Exhibit-P/37) at police station Buhana, wherein he stated that on 22.5.1997 at about 9:30 AM, he was sitting at his house along with his family members, when respondent-accused along with others and one Ishwar Singh, who was subsequently declared as proclaimed offender, trespassed into the house, armed with lathis, Sariya, Knife and Jelly. They caused injuries to Shubhram, Hanuman, Chhotu, Sunil, Dharm Singh, Rajkumar. Hukmichand also suffered injuries in the occurrence and died as a result of injuries. 4. The learned trial court held that it is not in dispute that one person Jiley Singh from the family of accused was married day before the occurrence; on the day of occurrence, he along with his wife and other relatives present at his house, along-with Band-Baja was going to pay obeisance to Devi-Devatas. When the procession reached in the front of house of accused, a fight had erupted and the complainant party received injuries. The court further held that since the procession was going to pay obeisance to devi-devatas, it consisted of newly married couple, children and women. The court further held that there were injuries on the persons on the accused and same have not been explained by the complainant party and witnesses. The court further held that since origin and genesis of the occurrence has been suppressed by the prosecution, the accused cannot be termed as aggressor. The trial court further came to the conclusion that witnesses have changed their statements. 5. The court concluded that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the accused party was not aggressor, but the complainant party having stopped the accused have attacked them. Both the complainant and accused side have suffered injuries. Thus, taking into totality of the circumstances, the court had recorded the acquittal of the accused. 6. We find no reason to interfere with the view formulated by the trial court, as it is one view which is possible on facts and circumstances of the case. 7. Both the complainant and accused side have suffered injuries. Thus, taking into totality of the circumstances, the court had recorded the acquittal of the accused. 6. We find no reason to interfere with the view formulated by the trial court, as it is one view which is possible on facts and circumstances of the case. 7. It is well settled law that High Court will not substitute its opinion with the opinion of the trial court merely because another view is possible. 8. State has decided not to file any appeal. So far as the acquittal of respondents is concerned, though, State has preferred an appeal against acquittal of one Ishwar Singh, who is not party to present revision. The said Ishwar Singh was declared proclaimed offender, was subsequently tried, in a separate trial, and acquitted later, by a separate judgment. 9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mahendra Partap Singh v. Sarju Singh and another [AIR 1968 Supreme Court 707] , relying upon D. Stephens v. Nosibolla, [ AIR 1951 SC 196 ] , has held as under:- "only two grounds are mentioned by this Court as entitling the High Court to set aside an acquittal in a revision and to order a retrial. They are that there must exist a manifest illegality in the judgment of the Court of Session ordering the acquittal or there must be a gross miscarriage of justice. In explaining these two propositions, this Court further states that the High Court is not entitled to interfere even if a wrong view of law is taken by the Court of Session or if even there is mis-appreciation of evidence. Again, in Logendranath Jha v. Polajlal Biswas, 1951 SCR 676 ( AIR 1951 SC 316 ) , this Court points out that the High Court is entitled in revision to set aside an acquittal if there is an error on a point of law or no appraisal of the evidence at all. This Court observes that it is not sufficient to say that the judgment under revision is "perverse" or "lacking in true correct perspective". It is pointed out further that by ordering a retrial, the dice is loaded against the accused, because however much the High Court may caution the Subordinate Court, it is always difficult to re-weigh the evidence ignoring the opinion of the High Court. It is pointed out further that by ordering a retrial, the dice is loaded against the accused, because however much the High Court may caution the Subordinate Court, it is always difficult to re-weigh the evidence ignoring the opinion of the High Court. Again in K.Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1963 (3) SCR 412 = ( AIR 1962 SC 1788 ) , it is pointed out that an interference in revision with an order of acquittal can only take place if there is a glaring defect of procedure such as that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the case or the Court had shut out some material evidence which was admissible or attempted to take into account evidence which was not admissible or had overlooked some evidence. Although the list given by this Court is not exhaustive of all the circumstances in which the High Court may interfere with an acquittal in revision it is obvious that the defect in the judgment under revision must be analogous to those actually indicated by this Court. As stated not one of these points which have been laid down by this Court, was covered in the present case. In fact on reading the judgment of the High Court it is apparent to us that the learned judge has re- weighed the evidence from his own point of view and reached inferences contrary to those of the Sessions judge on almost every point. This we do not conceive to be his duty in dealing in revision with an acquittal when Government has not chosen to file an appeal against it. In other words, the learned Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down by this Court and has acted in breach of them." 10. This we do not conceive to be his duty in dealing in revision with an acquittal when Government has not chosen to file an appeal against it. In other words, the learned Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down by this Court and has acted in breach of them." 10. In Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, AIR 1973 Supreme Court 2145 , the Hon'ble apex Court observed as under:- "This Court then proceeded to observe that the High Court is certainly entitled in revision to set aside the order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal, but it was emphasised that this jurisdiction should be exercised only in exceptional cases when "there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice." In face of prohibition in Section 439(4), Criminal Procedure Code., for the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, it makes all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering re-trial. No doubt, in the opinion of this Court, no criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies for attracting the High Court's power of ordering re-trial can be laid down. This Court, however, by way of illustration, indicated the following categories of cases which would justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision: (i) Where the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still acquitted the accused; (ii) Where the trial Court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce; (iii) Where the appellate Court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by the trial Court to be inadmissible; (iv) Where the material evidence has been over-looked only (either?) by the trial Court or by the appellate Court; and (v) Where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law. These categories were, however, merely illustrative and it was clarified that other cases of similar nature can also be properly held to be of exceptional nature where the High Court can justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal. In Mahendra Pratap Singh, (1968) 2 SCR 287 = ( AIR 1968 SC 707 ) (supra) the position was again reviewed and the rule laid down in the three earlier cases reaffirmed. In that case the reading of the judgment of the High Court made it plain that it had re- weighed the evidence from its own point of view and reached inferences contrary to those of the Sessions Judge on almost every point. This court pointed out that it was not the duty of the High Court to do so while dealing with an acquittal on revision, when the Government had not chosen to file an appeal against it. "In other words" said this Court, "the learned Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down by this Court and has acted in breach of them." 11. Similar view was reiterated by Hon'ble apex Court in Bansi Lal and others v. Laxman Singh, (1986) 3 SCC 44 . 12. Again, Hon'ble apex Court, in Ramu alias Ram Kumar and others v. Jagannath, 1995 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 181 , held that it is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court should not be lightly exercised particularly when it has been invoked by a private complainant. In Vimal Singh v. Khuman Singh and another, (1998) Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1574 and in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 2002 (SC) 2907 , the High Court has been reminded of its very limited jurisdiction in revision against acquittal. 13. Having examined the record, we are of the view that the finding of the trial court suffers from neither any patent illegality, nor irregularity. There being no infirmity in the appreciation of facts, while exercising our revisional jurisdiction, we are hesitant to interfere as the impugned judgment of the trial court is neither perverse, nor perfunctory. 14. Consequently, the present revision petition, being devoid of any merit, is dismissed.Revision dismissed. *******