JUDGMENT 1. - The appellants, Ram Singh and Ramesh Singh, are aggrieved by the judgment dated 1.4.2010 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track), Sawai Madhopur whereby the learned Judge has convicted both of them for offences under Section 302/149 IPC, and under Section 201 IPC. For offence under Section 302/149 IPC, the learned Judge has sentenced both of them to life imprisonment, and imposed a find of Rs. 1000/-, and directed that they shall undergo a simple imprisonment for three months in default thereof. For offence under Section 201 IPC, the learned Judge has sentenced them for two years of rigorous imprisonment, and imposed a fine of Rs. 500/-, and directed them to further undergo one month's simple imprisonment in default thereof. 2. Briefly the facts of the case are that on 5.2.2003, Hansraj (P.W.1), submitted a written report (Ex.P.1) before the Superintendent of Police, Sawai Madhopur. In the report, Hansraj (P.W.1) claimed that his brother, Jugraj, was an accused in a criminal case and was absconding ever since September, 2002. Therefore, the Superintendent of Police, Sawai Madhopur told the complainant to search for Jugraj and to produce him before the police. He, thus, started looking for his brother, but could not locate him. The Superintendent of Police again told him to further look for his brother. Therefore, he went to the Dang (Jungle) area searching for his brother. At village Dangara, P.S. Baharawanda Kalan, District Sawai Madhopur, he was told by the villagers that they had seen his brother, Jugraj, with Shree Lal, Mithalal, Ganesh, Ganesh and Ram Singh. However, they did not know where they had gone. Thereafter, the complainant went to the house of Shree Lal and inquired about his brother, Jugraj. Shree Lal admitted that about 20-25 days earlier he, along with Mithalal, Ramesh, Ganesh and Ram Singh had killed his brother with firearms in Village Dangara Ki Tan at a place called "Tipkaran Ki Khoh". Shree Lal further claimed that clothes of the deceased are lying in the Khoh and they had left the dead body in the water. They took Shree Lal with them. Thereafter at the instance of Shree Lal, they went to the place pointed out by him. They discovered the clothes worn by Jugraj at "Tipkaran Ki Khoh". Therefore, the complainant was convinced that Shree Lal and others had killed his brother. They took Shree Lal with them. Thereafter at the instance of Shree Lal, they went to the place pointed out by him. They discovered the clothes worn by Jugraj at "Tipkaran Ki Khoh". Therefore, the complainant was convinced that Shree Lal and others had killed his brother. He left Shree Lal with the villagers of his village. He further claimed that he had gone to the police after the clothes of the deceased were discovered. But the police did not register the case. Therefore, he has come to the Superintendent of Police requesting him to register a case against Shree Lal and others, to arrest them, to recover the dead body of his brother, Jugraj. 3. On the basis of this written report, a formal FIR, namely FIR No.5/03 (Ex.P.2) was registered on 5.2.2003 against Shree Lal, Mithalal, Ram Singh, Ramesh and Ganesh for offences under Sections 302 and 201 IPC at Police Station Baharawanda Kalan, and the investigation commenced. 4. Initially, on 8.11.2003, the police submitted a charge-sheet against Shree Lal and kept the investigation open against Ram Singh, Ramesh, Mithalal and Ganesh under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. During the course of trial of Shree Lal, the police submitted a supplementary chargesheet against Mithalal. The trials of Shree Lal, and Mithalal were combined; by judgment dated 30.10.2006, the Special Judge SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) and Additional Sessions Judge, Sawai Madhopur convicted both of them for offence under Section 302 IPC read with Section 149 IPC, but acquitted them for offence under Section 201 IPC. 5. Subsequently, on 5.12.2006, the police submitted a supplementary charge-sheet against Ram Singh for offences under Sections 302 and 201 IPC. Thereafter on 27.7.2007, the police submitted a supplementary charge-sheet against Ramesh Singh for offences under Sections 302 and 201 IPC. The Judicial Magistrate, Khandar committed both the trials to the Sessions Court, Sawai Madhopur, where from the cases were transferred to the Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track), Sawai Madhopur. As mentioned above, by judgment dated 1.4.2010, the learned Judge has convicted and sentenced the appellants. Hence, this appeal before this court. 6. The Judicial Magistrate, Khandar committed both the trials to the Sessions Court, Sawai Madhopur, where from the cases were transferred to the Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track), Sawai Madhopur. As mentioned above, by judgment dated 1.4.2010, the learned Judge has convicted and sentenced the appellants. Hence, this appeal before this court. 6. Since Shree Lal and Mithalal were aggrieved by the judgment dated 30.10.2006, passed by the Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Cases & Sessions Judge, Sawai Madhopur, they filed two different appeals, namely D.B. Criminal (Jail) Appeal No.1232/2006, Shree Lal v. State of Rajasthan , and D.B. Criminal Appeal No.222/2007, Mithalal v. State of Rajasthan , before this court. By judgment dated 10.12.2014, this court has decided both the appeals and upheld the judgment dated 30.10.2006. Although the present appeal also arises out of the same FIR, but while hearing the present appeal, this court is required to examine the evidence which was produced by the prosecution in the present trial. Therefore, this separate judgment in the present appeal. 7. Mr. D.G. Chaturvedi, the learned counsel for the appellants, has raised the following contentions before this court: firstly, the learned Judge has relied on the alleged extra-judicial confession made by Shree Lal to the complainant, Hansraj (P.W.1), in order to convict the present appellants. However, according to the learned counsel, the said extra-judicial confession cannot be used against the present appellants as they have not been tried along with Shree Lal. According to the learned counsel, reliance on the extra-judicial confession of Shree Lal, an accused not tried with the present appellants, is contrary to Section 30 of the Evidence Act. In order to buttress this contention, the learned counsel has relied on the case of State of Maharashtra v. Kamal Ahmed Mohammed Vakil Ansari & Ors. [ 2013(12) SCC 17 ] . 8. Secondly, shorne of extra-judicial confession, the prosecution does not have any legs to stand upon. For, Rameshwar (P.W.7) who has been produced as an eye-witness of the alleged murder, is an unreliable witness. For, Rameshwar (P.W.7) claims that he had seen the incident from a height of 3000 ft. Moreover, he claims that he had met Jugraj at Malarana Station about 10-12 years prior to the date of incident. In his examination-in-chief, he claims that he had seen Ram Singh and Shree Lal at the scene of the crime. For, Rameshwar (P.W.7) claims that he had seen the incident from a height of 3000 ft. Moreover, he claims that he had met Jugraj at Malarana Station about 10-12 years prior to the date of incident. In his examination-in-chief, he claims that he had seen Ram Singh and Shree Lal at the scene of the crime. The others, he did not recognize. However, in his cross-examination he claims that Ram Singh was not at the scene of the crime; he has wrongly mentioned Ram Singh's name in the examination-in-chief. Thus, according to the sole eye-witness, Ram Singh's presence at the scene of the crime is highly doubtful. Moreover, according to him, he did not know Ramesh Singh. But despite the fact that Ramesh Singh is a total stranger to him, no test identification parade was ever held by the police. Therefore, identity of Ramesh Singh continues to be a mystery. 9. Thirdly, the remaining circumstances, such as recovery of parts of body of Jugraj, recovery of his clothes, recovery of other articles from the scene of the crime do not unerringly point to the guilt of the appellants. For, these recoveries were not made at the instance of the appellants. 10. Fourthly, although the prosecution claims that Ramesh, along with Shree Lal and Mithalal had fired at Jugraj, but according to Dr. R.S. Gupta (P.W.10), Dr. Anwar (P.W.11), the parts of the body sent for postmortem did not bear any firearm injury. 11. Fifthly, no gun was ever recovered from Ramesh. Thus, there is no evidence connecting Ramesh Singh to the alleged offence. Hence, the learned Judge has committed a grave illegality and injustice in convicting the accused-appellants. 12. On the other hand, Mr. N.S. Dhakar, the learned Public Prosecutor, has pleaded as under: firstly, the extra-judicial confession made by Shree Lal can be used against the present appellants as they were all accused in the same FIR. According to him, it is immaterial if the accused were tried together or not. 13. Secondly, in the extra-judicial confession, Shree Lal had clearly admitted that Ramesh along with Mithya and he had shot Jugraj and subsequently, Ram Singh, Ganesh and these three persons including Shree Lal, had dismembered his body and thrown the body into water. According to him, it is immaterial if the accused were tried together or not. 13. Secondly, in the extra-judicial confession, Shree Lal had clearly admitted that Ramesh along with Mithya and he had shot Jugraj and subsequently, Ram Singh, Ganesh and these three persons including Shree Lal, had dismembered his body and thrown the body into water. Since it was a unlawful assembly and Ram Singh's presence was revealed by Shree Lal, therefore, the learned Judge was justified in convicting both the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC. 14. Thirdly, Rameshwar (P.W.7) has supported the case of the prosecution. 15. Lastly, other circumstances read along with the extra-judicial confession clearly point to the guilt of the accused-appellants. Hence, the learned Public Prosecutor has supported the impugned judgment. 16. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. 17. The issue before this court is whether an extra-judicial confession made by a co-accused, who was not tried with the appellants, can be used against the present appellants or not? This issue is no longer res integra after pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kamal Ahmed Mohammed Vakil Ansari (supra). In the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- 17.5. 'There is, therefore, a common thread in the scheme of admissibility of admissions/confessions under the Evidence Act, namely, that the admission/confession is admissible only as against the person who had made such admission/confession. Naturally, it would be inappropriate to implicate a person on the basis of a statement made by another. Therefore, the next logical conclusion, that the person who has made the admission/confession (or at whose behest, or on whose behalf it is made), should be a party to the proceeding because that is the only way a confession can be used against him. Reference can be made to some provisions of the Evidence Act which fully support the above conclusions. Section 24 of the Evidence Act leads to such a conclusion. Under Section 24, a confession made "by an accused person"?, is rendered irrelevant "against the accused person"?, in the circumstances referred to above. Likewise, Section 25 of the Evidence Act contemplates, that a confession made to a police officer cannot be proved "as against a person accused of any offence"?. Under Section 24, a confession made "by an accused person"?, is rendered irrelevant "against the accused person"?, in the circumstances referred to above. Likewise, Section 25 of the Evidence Act contemplates, that a confession made to a police officer cannot be proved "as against a person accused of any offence"?. Leading to the inference, that a confession is permissible/admissible only as against the person who has made it, unless the same is rendered inadmissible under some express provision. Under Section 26 of the Evidence Act, a confession made by a person while in custody of the police, cannot "be proved as against such person"? (unless it falls within the exception contemplated by the said Section itself). 17.7 The scheme of the provisions pertaining to admissions/confessions depicts a one way traffic. Such statements are admissible only as against the author thereof. 19. The issue in hand can also be examined from another perspective, though on the same reasoning. Ordinarily, as already noticed herein above, a confessional statement is admissible only as against an accused who has made it. There is only one exception to the aforesaid rule, wherein it is permissible to use a confessional statement, even against person(s) other than the one who had made it. The aforesaid exception has been provided for in Section 30 of the Evidence Act, which is being extracted hereunder:- "30. Consideration of proved confession affecting person making it and others jointly under trial for same offence. When more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the Court may take into consideration such confession as against such other person as well as against the person who makes such confession. Illustrations (a) A and B are jointly tried for the murder of C. It is proved that A said - "B and I murdered C". The Court may consider the effect of this confession as against B. (b) A is on his trial for the murder of C. There is evidence to show that C was murdered by A and B, and that B said, "A and I murdered C". The Court may consider the effect of this confession as against B. (b) A is on his trial for the murder of C. There is evidence to show that C was murdered by A and B, and that B said, "A and I murdered C". This statement may not be taken into consideration by the Court against A, as B is not being jointly tried." As is evident from a perusal of Section 30 extracted above, a confessional statement can be used even against a co-accused. For such admissibility it is imperative, that the person making the confession besides implicating himself, also implicates others who are being jointly tried with him. In that situation alone, such a confessional statement is relevant even against the others implicated. 20. ........ Illustration (b) leaves no room for any doubt, that unless the person who has made a confessional statement is an accused in a case, the confessional statement made by him is not relevant. 18. Thus, neither Section 30 of the Evidence Act, nor the forceful pronouncement of the Apex Court permits this court to consider the extra-judicial confession made by Shree Lal against the present appellants. For, Shree Lal has not been tried along with the present appellants. Hence, the learned Judge has erred in relying upon the extra-judicial confession of Shree Lal in order to convict the present appellants. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned Public Prosecutor that the said extra-judicial confession can be read against the present appellants is unacceptable. 19. Rameshwar (P.W.7) has been produced as a sole eye-witness of the alleged murder of Jugraj. In order to base the conviction on the testimony of the sole eye-witness, the witness has to be of sterling worth whose testimony is above board, and without any reproach. Relying on the case of Inder Singh [ (2002) 9 SCC 537 ] , in the case of Ramnaresh & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh [ (2012) 4 SCC 257 ] , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has opined that "the testimony of a sole witness must be confidence-inspiring and beyond suspicion, thus, leaving no doubt in the mind of the court". 20. Rameshwar (P.W.7) in his examination-in-chief claims that "the incident occurred two to three years ago during the winter days. He was walking from Village Nage to his village, Bajoli. At Tipkaran Ki Khoh he heard gunshots. 20. Rameshwar (P.W.7) in his examination-in-chief claims that "the incident occurred two to three years ago during the winter days. He was walking from Village Nage to his village, Bajoli. At Tipkaran Ki Khoh he heard gunshots. He hid himself and looked around. He saw Ram Singh and Shree Lal. The others he did not recognize. How many people were there, he cannot say. He also recognised Mithya. These persons killed Jugraj. Since he was frightened, he had left the place. When Hansraj, from Village Dangayacha, came he told him about the incident". 21. But in his cross-examination, he admits that "Hansraj had come to his village three years ago". He further claimed that "he had met Hansraj's brother, Jugraj, 10-12 years ago at the Malarana Station. At that time, Jugraj had asked him where he is from? He told him that he is from village Bajoli. After that encounter, he never met Jugraj". According to him, "Tipkaran Ki Khoh is about three kilometers from his village. Tipkaran Ki Khoh is at the height of 3000 ft". He claimed that "he had seen the incident from a height of 3000 ft". According to him, "at that time, there was light falling at the Khoh. However, he could not remember whether it was day time, or night time, or what was the timing when he saw the incident". He further claimed that "he did not see as to who killed Jugraj. He did not know that Jugraj was with a gang of dacoits. He did not know that Jugraj was a companion of Ram Singh". He denied the fact that "Ramswaroop, the dacoit, had come to his house". He also denied that "the police had ever raided his house". He further claimed that "he saw Jugraj lying on the ground. He is not sure whether Jugraj was alive, or dead at that time". He claimed that "he knew Ram Singh for the last 8-10 years". According to him, "at the place where Jugraj was lying on the ground, Ram Singh was not there". He further claimed that "he had wrongly mentioned Ram Singh's name in his examination-in-chief". He further claimed that "he did not know that water in Tipkaran Ki Khoh drips from above". He further claimed that "he did not know whether any mendicant lived in Tipkaran". He further claimed that "he did not inform anyone about the dead body". He further claimed that "he had wrongly mentioned Ram Singh's name in his examination-in-chief". He further claimed that "he did not know that water in Tipkaran Ki Khoh drips from above". He further claimed that "he did not know whether any mendicant lived in Tipkaran". He further claimed that "he did not inform anyone about the dead body". He denied the fact that "he had not seen any incident and that he has come to depose falsely". 22. Rameshwar (P.W.7) claims to have not seen Jugraj for the last 10-12 years. The witness would not even be in a position to identify Jugraj whom he had met about 10-12 years earlier and that, too, by chance. He claims to have seen the incident from a height of 3000 ft. Thus, it would be quite impossible for someone to identify the person from such a great height and to see the actual commission of the crime. Furthermore, initially the witness claimed that Ram Singh was present. But subsequently, in his cross-examination, he denies this fact. Moreover, he claims that he saw the dead body of Jugraj lying on the ground, yet he is not sure whether Jugraj was dead or alive. He clearly admits that except for Shree Lal, Ram Singh and Mithya, he did not recognise anyone else. About the involvement of Ramesh Singh, the sole eye-witness is absolutely silent. Since the story narrated by him sounds highly improbable, since the witness changed his stand, therefore, Rameshwar (P.W.7) is not a reliable witness. The conviction cannot be sustained on the testimony of untrustworthy sole witness. 23. As far as accused-appellant, Ramesh Singh, is concerned, Rameshwar (P.W.7) clearly stated that he does not know him, and does not recognise him. However, despite this fact, the police never conducted a test identification parade. Rameshwar (P.W.7) did not identify Ramesh Singh even in the court. Thus, identity of Ramesh is unknown. 24. Furthermore other witnesses, such as Hansraj (P.W.1), Anwar (P.W.12), Radheyshyam (P.W.13), Ram Sahai (P.W.14) and Braj Mohan (P.W.15) clearly admit in their testimony that when Shree Lal did mention Ram Singh's and Ramesh Singh's names in his extra-judicial confession, he did not mention either their parentage, or about their village. Thus, even these witnesses are unable to identify Ram Singh, or Ramesh Singh in the court. 25. Thus, even these witnesses are unable to identify Ram Singh, or Ramesh Singh in the court. 25. Further, although the prosecution claims that Ramesh had shot Jugraj, no firearm has been recovered from Ramesh. Hence, there is no evidence, whatsoever, to connect Ramesh Singh to the alleged incident. Therefore, the learned Public Prosecutor is unjustified in claiming that Rameshwar (P.W.7) strengthen the case of the prosecution. 26. Of course, the prosecution has also relied upon the recovery of towel, the recovery of a socks belonging to Jugraj, the recovery of broken chain of a wrist watch, the recovery of head and arms of Jugraj from a gunny bag along with his clothes in order to make out a case against the appellants. Since these objects were not recovered at the instance of either of the appellants, such recoveries do not connect the appellants to the alleged crime. Therefore, even the circumstances of the alleged recoveries do not tilt the needle of suspicion towards the appellants. 27. A bare perusal of the evidence produced by the prosecution clearly reveals that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the present appellants beyond a reasonable doubt. In fact, the court is left groping in the dark about the culpability of these two appellants. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that suspicion howsoever strong cannot take place of proof. The Court convicting accused has to ensure that the distance between "may be" and "must be" is covered by clear, cogent and unimpeachable evidence. The criminal court is supposed to legally convict, and not morally convict a person [Ref. Surjit Biswas v. State of Assam, 2013 Cr.L.J. 3140 (Supreme Court)] . 28. In the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra [ (1984) 4 SCC 116 ] , the Apex Court had opined that "though the case superficially viewed bears an ugly look so as to prima facie shock the conscience of any court yet suspicion, however great it may be, cannot take the place of legal proof. A moral conviction however strong or genuine cannot amount to a legal conviction supportable in law". Similarly in the case of Mousam Singha Roy v. State of West Bengal [ (2003) 12 SCC 377 ] , the Apex Court has observed as under:- 27. A moral conviction however strong or genuine cannot amount to a legal conviction supportable in law". Similarly in the case of Mousam Singha Roy v. State of West Bengal [ (2003) 12 SCC 377 ] , the Apex Court has observed as under:- 27. Before we conclude, we must place on record the fact that we are not unaware of the degree of agony and frustration that may be caused to the society in general and the families of the victims in particular, by the fact that a heinous crime like this goes unpunished, but then the law does not permit the courts to punish the accused on the basis of moral conviction or on suspicion alone. The burden of proof in a criminal trial never shifts, and it is always the burden of the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of acceptable evidence. 29. Therefore, this appeal succeeds. The appellants, Ram Singh and Ramesh Singh, are given benefit of doubt and are acquitted for offences under Sections 302/149, and Section 201 IPC. They shall be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case. 30. Keeping, however, in view the provisions of Section 437-A Cr.P.C, the appellants, namely Ram Singh and Ramesh Singh, are directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 20,000/- each and a surety bond in the like amount each, before the trial court. The bonds so furnished shall be effective for a period of six months. The bonds shall contain an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the judgment or on grant of leave, the appellants, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon'ble Apex Court.Appeal Allowed. *******