JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—Heard Sri V.D. Ojha, learned counsel for petitioner and Sri A. Sinha, learned counsel for respondent No. 3. 2. In all these four matters, the facts and questions of law raised are similar, therefore, as agreed by learned counsels for parties, all have been heard together and are being decided by this common judgment. 3. With the consent of parties, Writ Petition No. 47051 of 2009 (hereinafter referred to as “First Petition”) is taken as leading case and for narration of facts and discussion, the pleadings from the leading case, i.e., the First Petition would be referred. 4. The First Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the orders dated 23.5.2008 and 4.7.2009 in Motor Accidents Claim Petition No. 17 of 2002, passed by District Judge/Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, Sant Ravidas Nagar (Bhadohi-Gyanpur) (hereinafter referred to as “Tribunal”). 5. One Mohammad Ikram, husband of Smt. Saima Khatoon, respondent No. 4, died in an accident on 6.2.1997 with Truck No. UMG 9040, owned by petitioner, and, driven by Sri Shiv Sagar, respondent No. 5. Smt. Saima Khatoon moved Accident Claim Petition No. 17 of 2002 before Tribunal impleading petitioner as defendant No. 1, Sri Shiv Sagar as defendant No. 2, and the Oriental Insurance Company Limited, Varanasi as defendant No. 3. The Tribunal passed an order on 25.1.2006 to proceed against defendants No. 1, 2 and 4 ex parte since none of them had responded despite service of notice. Thereafter it pronounced award dated 23.5.2008 awarding compensation of Rs. 4,17,500/- to the claimant. The compensation was payable by Insurance Company which was given liberty to recover the said amount from owner of vehicle and its driver, i.e. petitioner and respondent No. 5. Insurance Company proceeded to recover the amount from petitioner by filing an application before Tribunal, i.e., Misc. Application No. 73 of 2008 pursuant whereto recovery certificate was issued to Collector. When the said recovery proceedings were initiated, petitioner claimed to acquire knowledge of above proceedings only on 17.11.2008 and then preferred application dated 20.11.2008 under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. before Tribunal for recall of ex parte award dated 23.5.2008. This application accompanied with an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1963”) seeking condonation of delay. This application accompanied with an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1963”) seeking condonation of delay. The Delay Condonation Application has been rejected by order dated 4.7.2009 and as a consequence thereof, the application under Order 9 Rule 13 has also been rejected. Hence this writ petition. 6. Sri V.D. Ojha, learned counsel for petitioner, stated that though summons were issued by registered post, and since registered letter neither received undelivered nor acknowledgement received back, hence service was deemed sufficient by Tribunal vide order dated 30.11.2002. On 19.3.2005, application (Paper No. 26-Ka) was filed by claimant seeking amendment on which order was passed for taking steps. Steps were taken on 2.4.2005. On 9.9.2005, another order was passed for taking steps and time was granted on 29.9.2005, 5.10.2005 and 10.11.2005. The order sheet dated 3.12.2004 shows that steps were taken only in respect to defendant No. 4 and not 1 and 2. Therefore, on 25.1.2006, Tribunal erred in law by holding that service upon defendants No. 1 and 2 has already been deemed sufficient, therefore, claim petition shall proceed ex parte against them. The entire subsequent proceedings are wholly illegal. He further submitted that on 21.4.2005 case was transferred from the Court of Additional District Judge to District Judge, but no notice was issued as contemplated under Rule 89-A of the General Rules (Civil), 1957 (hereinafter referred to as “Rules, 1957”) to the defendants again, hence, also the entire proceedings are illegal. He then urged that Tribunal has rejected Delay Condonation Application only on the ground that Recall Application has been filed after six years when the Insurance Company had already paid awarded compensation to claimant and, therefore, at this stage, there is no justification to condone delay and to revive a dispute which has already been settled. This approach is unwarranted and unjust, being resulted in gross injustice to the petitioner. 7. Per contra, on behalf of Insurance Company, it is alleged that petitioner having not disputed the factum of accident and the death of claimant’s husband, therefore, it cannot be said that he had no information particularly when the Truck was seized on the spot. 8. In my view, no interference is called for in these writ petitions. The factum of death of claimant’s husband in the accident, on 6.2.1997, met with Truck No. UMG 9040, owned by petitioner, is not disputed. 8. In my view, no interference is called for in these writ petitions. The factum of death of claimant’s husband in the accident, on 6.2.1997, met with Truck No. UMG 9040, owned by petitioner, is not disputed. The Claim Petition was instituted by respondent No. 4 on 2.4.2002. It was registered in the Court of District Judge, Bhadohi on 5.4.2002 and thereafter transferred to Court of Additional District Judge, Court No. 1 for disposal. Notices were issued on 1.8.2002 to the defendants. Order sheet dated 30.11.2002 shows that defendant No. 2 refused to receive registered notice and registered summon sent to defendant No. 1 was not received back undelivered though more than a month had already passed. Trial Court, therefore, passed an order deeming service upon defendants No. 1 and 2 sufficient and fixed next date for written statement and framing of issues. The written statement of Insurance Company was filed on 20.9.2003. Thereafter an amendment application was filed whereon order was passed on 10.3.2005 to take steps which were taken on 2.4.2005. The endorsement dated 4.4.2005 on the order sheet reads as under: ^^Jheku th] iSjoh dh xbZ gSA uksfVl tkjh fd;kA^^ English Translation by the Court: “Sir, pairavi has been done. Notice issued.” 9. Thereafter on 8.4.2005, District Judge transferred Claim Petition to his own Court. On 15.4.2005, record was transmitted by Court of Additional District Judge to District Judge. In the Court of District Judge, case was registered on 21.4.2005 and proceeded thereon. The subsequent orders passed by District Judge refers to registered pairavi. There is no review or recall of order dated 30.11.2002 whereby service of Claim Petition upon defendants No. 1 and 2 was deemed sufficient. The subsequent orders cannot be read so as to have the effect of undoing order dated 30.11.2002 which has continued throughout. It is not the case of petitioner that address written on the letter was not correct and, therefore, presumption of service upon him has wrongly been drawn. This presumption has to be rebutted by petitioner by adducing adequate evidence which he has failed. In fact, even in respect to delay, he has completely failed to explain reason satisfying the Tribunal to condone delay. 10. The statutory presumption in the matter of service of notice sent by registered post is a matter, no more res-integra, having already been settled long back. In fact, even in respect to delay, he has completely failed to explain reason satisfying the Tribunal to condone delay. 10. The statutory presumption in the matter of service of notice sent by registered post is a matter, no more res-integra, having already been settled long back. Just for recapitulation, I find it appropriate to re-consider various statutory provisions and the authorities on this aspects. 11. First of all I proceed to refer Section 27 of General Clauses Act, 1897 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1897”) which reads as under: “27. Meaning of service by post.—Where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorizes or requires any document to be served by post, where the expression “serve” or either of the expressions “give” or “send” or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing pre-paying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.” 12. Another relevant provision is Section 114, Illustrations (e) and (f), Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1972”) which reads as under: “114. Court may presume existence of certain facts.—The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. Illustrations The Court may presume- ... (e) The judicial and official acts have been regularly performed; (f) That the common course of business has been followed in particular cases;” 13. The third is Indian Post Office Act, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1898”). Section 3 and 14 thereof, relevant for the purpose of present case, are reproduced as under: “3. (e) The judicial and official acts have been regularly performed; (f) That the common course of business has been followed in particular cases;” 13. The third is Indian Post Office Act, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1898”). Section 3 and 14 thereof, relevant for the purpose of present case, are reproduced as under: “3. Meanings of “in course of transmission by post” and “delivery”.—For the purposes of this Act,- (a) a postal article shall be deemed to be in course of transmission by the post from the time of its being delivered to a post office to the time of its being delivered to the addressee or of its being returned to the sender or otherwise disposed of under Chapter VII; (b) the delivery of a postal article of any description to a postman or other person authorized to receive postal articles of that description for the post shall be deemed to be a delivery to a post office; and (c) the delivery of a postal article at the house or office of the addressee, or to the addressee or his servant or agent or other person considered to be authorized to receive the article according to the usual manner of delivering postal articles to the addressee, shall be deemed to be delivery to the addressee.” “14. Post Office marks prima facie evidence of certain facts denoted.—In every proceeding for the recovery of any postage or other sum alleged to be due under this Act in respect of a postal article,- (a) the production of the postal article, having thereon the official mark of the Post Office denoting that the article has been refused, or that the addressee is dead or cannot be found, shall be prima facie evidence of the fact so denoted, and (b) the person from whom the postal article purports to have come, shall, until the contrary is proved, be deemed to be the sender thereof.” 14. Though in the three statutes referred to above, the oldest one is Act, 1872 but in fact the provisions relating to Post Office Act are older, going to 1866 when the first Post Office Act was enacted. Though in the three statutes referred to above, the oldest one is Act, 1872 but in fact the provisions relating to Post Office Act are older, going to 1866 when the first Post Office Act was enacted. In the then British Indian Territory governed by the British Government, postal services were established by appointing a Director, Post Office by the Governor General in Council in order to regulate this branch of public service and revenue, in the light of experiences gained by English postal legislation and development of Post Offices. Commenting upon the Post Office service in England, in Whitfield v. Lord Le Despencer, (1778) 2 Cowp. 754, Lord Mansfield had said: “The Post Master has no hire, enters into no contract, carries on no merchandise or commerce. But the post office is a branch of revenue, and a branch of police, created by Act of Parliament. As a branch of revenue, there are great receipts; but there is likewise a great surplus of benefit and advantage to the public, arising from the fund. As a branch of police it puts the whole correspondence of the kingdom (for the exceptions are very trifling) under Government, and entrusts the management and direction of it to the crown, and officers appointed by the crown. There is no analogy therefore between the case of the Post Master and a common carrier.” 15. Following the above decision in a recent case in Triefus & Co. Ltd. v. Post Office, (1957) 2 Q.B. 352, it was held that Post Office is a branch of revenue and Post Master General does not enter into any contract with a person who entrusted to the Post Office a postal packet for transmission overseas. 16. Presently also the Post Office service in India, with which this Court is concerned, is not in the hands of any private individual or corporate body but it is a Department of Government of India and on certain matters, it is regulated by various Statutes including the Act, 1898. 17. I have referred to the above two decisions in Whitfield (supra) and Triefus & Co. Ltd. (supra) for the reason that the system of Post Office in India has been observed to be similar as it was in England and the Apex Court referring to the certain provisions of Act, 1898 said, in Union of India v. Mohd. 17. I have referred to the above two decisions in Whitfield (supra) and Triefus & Co. Ltd. (supra) for the reason that the system of Post Office in India has been observed to be similar as it was in England and the Apex Court referring to the certain provisions of Act, 1898 said, in Union of India v. Mohd. Niazim, AIR 1980 SC 431 : “These are only some of the provisions of the Act which seem to indicate that the post office is not a common carrier, it is not an agent of the sender of the postal article for reaching it to the addressee. It is really a branch of the public service providing postal services subject to the provisions of the Indian Post Office Act and the rules made thereunder. The law relating to the post office in England is not very much different from that in this country. “ 18. The aforesaid decision was rendered considering the provisions in Act, 1898 which was enacted by repealing the previous Act of 1866 so as to consolidate and amend the law relating to Post Office in India. 19. The post office in India, thus, is an institution established by a statute. “Postage” required to avail of the postal services has been defined in Section 2 (f) of Act, 1898 as “the duty chargeable for the transmission by post of postal articles”. Under Section 4 the exclusive privilege of conveying letters is reserved to the Central Government with certain exceptions which are not significant. Section 17 of the Act says that “postage stamps” shall be deemed to be issued by Government for the purpose of revenue. The provisions of the Act indicate that the post office is not a common carrier. It is not an agent of sender of the postal article for reaching it to the addressee. It is really a branch of the public service providing postal services subject to the provisions of Act, 1898 and the Rules made thereunder. It is in this context, Section 14 of Act, 1898 would also be a matter of relevance which says that the production of the postal article, having thereon the official mark of Post Office denoting that the article has been refused, or that the addressee is dead or cannot be found, shall be prima facie evidence of the fact so denoted. The Statute provides a prima facie evidence of the mark given by Postal Department on the postal article sent by post regarding its correctness, though the word “prima facie” shows that it is liable to be disproved by adducing evidence otherwise. Meaning thereby the mere denial by the party in respect to whom the endorsement has been made by postal agent otherwise, would not be sufficient unless he adduce evidence to discredit prima facie evidence in the shape of endorsement made by postal department on the article concerned. This provision read with Section 114 of Act, 1872 and Section 27 of Act, 1897 makes the situation quite clear. It appears that in various decisions, while considering the question of service of notice, most of the times, provisions of Act, 1898 and its implication have been omitted even when the service was sought to be effected by registered post. 20. Initially the issue of service of notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1882”) was considered by Privy Council in Harihar Banerji and others v. Ramshashi Roy and others, AIR 1918 PC 102. The Court said, if a letter, properly directed, containing a notice to quit, is proved to have been put into post office, it is presumed that letter reached its destination at the proper time according to the regular course of business of post office and was received by the person to whom it was addressed. The presumption would apply with still greater force to such letters which the sender has taken the precaution to register and is not rebutted but strengthened by the fact that a receipt for the letter is produced, signed on behalf of the addressee by some person other than the addressee himself. Here was a case where the service of notice was not denied by all and one of the person has admitted its service, therefore, a presumption was drawn. So the facts of this case makes it clear that the presumption was rightly drawn. 21. In Sukumar Guha v. Naresh Chandra Ghosh, AIR 1968 Cal. Here was a case where the service of notice was not denied by all and one of the person has admitted its service, therefore, a presumption was drawn. So the facts of this case makes it clear that the presumption was rightly drawn. 21. In Sukumar Guha v. Naresh Chandra Ghosh, AIR 1968 Cal. 49 , a Single Judge (Hon’ble Amresh Roj, J.) referring to Section 114, Illustration (f) of Act, 1872, Section 106 of Act, 1882 and Section 27 of Act, 1897 said that presumption under Section 27 of Act, 1897 can arise only when a notice is sent by registered post while there may arise a presumption under Section 114 of Act, 1872 when notice is sent by ordinary post or under certificate of posting. Both the presumptions are rebuttable. When the cover containing notice has been returned to the sender by postal authorities, then that fact is direct proof of the fact that the notice sent by post was not delivered to the party to whom it was addressed. Whether it was tendered and, if so, to whom tendered, remains a matter to be ascertained on evidence. If acceptable evidence is available that it was tendered to the party personally, then such facts may bring the service of notice within the second mode, namely, tendered or delivered personally to such party. If however, tender or delivery is not to the party personally but to a member of his family or a servant, then it may be effective tender or delivery only when the notice was addressed to the residence of the party. Such personal tender or vicarious tender may be effective even if it was through the agency of post office, and proof of that tender comes from testimony of any person present at the event, and not only by examining the postman. Here what I find is that when the Court talks of evidence, when we read it in the context of Section 114 of Act, 1872, a registered envelop received back from postal authority with the endorsement of postman of “refusal” will constitute a valid evidence to show that it was served upon the addressee but he refused to accept unless proved otherwise and for that purpose the examination of postman for constituting a prima facie evidence further would not be required in view of Section 14 of Act, 1898. This Section 14 of Act, 1898 has been omitted by the Court. 22. This Court in Wasu Ram v. R.L. Sethi, 1963 AWR 472, said: “The question whether a communication sent through the post was received by the address is one of fact, but in many cases it may be difficult and inconvenient if not impossible, to produce the postal official who delivered the letter or the money order. To obviate this difficulty the Evidence Act permits certain presumptions to be made under certain circumstances. Section 16 provides that “when there is a question whether a particular act was done, the existence of any course of business, according to which it naturally would have been done, is a relevant fact”. The illustration (a) to this section explains that in a question “whether a particular letter was despaired, the facts that it was the ordinary course of business for all letter put in a certain place to be carried to the post, and that particular letter was put in that place, are relevant”. Section 114 provides that the Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and proper business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. Illustration (e) to this section says that “the Court may presume that judicial and official acts have been regularly performed”; and Illustration (f) says that the Court may presume that “the common course of business has been followed in particular cases”. The combined effect of these two sections is to raise a presumption that a communication sent by post was received in the ordinary course by the addressee, and if it was returned to the sender with the endorsement “refused”, the postman must have tendered it but delivery could not be made because of the refusal of the addressee. These presumptions are based on human experience and common sense. Our experience tells us that millions of letters which are posted are delivered in due course to the address, though in exceptional cases letters do get lost. The onus of proof is on the person who asserts that the abnormal happened in his case and the communication sent by post did not follow its normal course to destination.” 23. Our experience tells us that millions of letters which are posted are delivered in due course to the address, though in exceptional cases letters do get lost. The onus of proof is on the person who asserts that the abnormal happened in his case and the communication sent by post did not follow its normal course to destination.” 23. It further held: “Whenever a communication is sent by post there is a presumption that it was duly delivered or tendered. If the communication is returned by the post office with the endorsement “refused” the presumption will be that it was tendered by the postal authorities in their ordinary course of business to the addressee who refused. The strength of the presumption will vary according to the fact of each case, being strong in the case of registered letters, and strongest in the case of money orders and insured articles the delivery of which cannot be made without observing certain precautions which are prescribed. Rules u/Chap. VII of the Post and Telegraph Guide provide that in case of refusal the money order shall be returned to the remitter with the endorsement “refused”. If the addressee states on oath that he never received the communication, the Court must decide after considering all the surrounding circumstances, whether he should be believed. The question is always one of fact, though I would add as a matter of plain common sense that a denial which is not only bare but bare-faced and made by a person who stood to profit by his denial and, therefore, had all the motive in the word to deny, will not ordinarily weaken the presumption.” 24. The above view was followed in Asa Ram v. Ravi Prakash, AIR 1966 All 519 and the relevant observation in para 3 thereof reads as under: “3. Mr. Sinha then argued that a presumption of refusal could arise only if the endorsement ‘refused’ was proved by evidence, and this could only be done by producing the postman who made the endorsement. I do not agree. If the landlord deposes that he sent an envelop containing the notice and that the same envelop was received by him with the endorsement ‘refused’ which was not there before and he produces the envelop with the endorsement, this is a sufficient evidence to prove the endorsement. I do not agree. If the landlord deposes that he sent an envelop containing the notice and that the same envelop was received by him with the endorsement ‘refused’ which was not there before and he produces the envelop with the endorsement, this is a sufficient evidence to prove the endorsement. In this case the respondent appeared as a witness and proved the sending and the return of the envelope. On this evidence the Court could rely on the presumption authorized under Section 114 of the Evidence Act.” 25. Thereafter, the issue came to be considered by a Full Bench in Ganga Ram v. Phulwati, AIR 1970 All 446 . One of the three questions referred for consideration before Full Bench was “whether it is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove the endorsement of refusal on the notice sent by registered post by producing the postman or other evidence in case the defendant denies service on him? Full Bench considered this question referring to provisions of all three Statutes, namely, Act, 1872; Act, 1897 and Act, 1898. Besides others, it also referred to Rule 64 (1) of Indian Post Office Rules which reads as under: “64 (1). If the sender of a registered article pays at the time of posting the article a fee of one anna in addition to the postage and registration fee, there shall be sent to him on the delivery of the article a form of acknowledgement which shall be signed by the addressee or if the addressee refuses to sign shall be accompanied by a statement to the effect that the addressee has refused to sign.” 26. Having referred to various provisions of Act, 1898 and Rules framed thereunder, the Court said that when the postmen or the clerks at the station of destination are required to do and what endorsements they are required to make, all such acts are clearly provided in the Statute. All such acts are done by them and all such endorsements are made by them in discharge of their official duties. The Court, thus, proceeded further and held that a notice sent by registered post will be entitled to draw a presumption regarding due service of that notice vide Illustration (e) and (f) of Section 114 of Act, 1872. All such acts are done by them and all such endorsements are made by them in discharge of their official duties. The Court, thus, proceeded further and held that a notice sent by registered post will be entitled to draw a presumption regarding due service of that notice vide Illustration (e) and (f) of Section 114 of Act, 1872. In this regard, the Court also referred to Section 16 of Act, 1872 and said that as a proposition, it cannot be disputed that when a letter is delivered to an accepting or receiving post office it is reasonably expected that in the normal course it would be delivered to the addressee. That is the official and the normal function of the post office. 27. Having said so, the Court further proceeded to hold that taking into consideration the manner in which the post office deals with registered letters, the endorsement on the notice “Refused” strengthens the presumption that an attempt was made to deliver the notice to the addressee. The Court in para 22 of the judgment clearly said: “... with the endorsement “Refused” the presumption of service could be raised under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, and it would be a presumption of law, and not of fact.” 28. It also held that a presumption of law is rebuttable unless it is made unrebuttable by some provision of law. The Full Bench disagreed with the view taken by the Bombay High Court in Vaman Vithal v. Khanderao Ram Rao, AIR 1935 Bom 247; Nagpur High Court in Jankiram Narhari v. Damodhar Ramchandra, AIR 1956 Nag 266 and the Madhya Bharat High Court in Tekchand Devidas v. Gulab Chand Chandan Mal, AIR 1957 Madh B. 151, where the said three Courts have taken a view that there can be no presumption that the endorsement of refusal was made by the postman unless the postman is examined and such endorsement was inadmissible in evidence. The Full Bench thus answered the question accordingly holding that postman is not necessarily to be examined by plaintiff. 29. The above Full Bench judgment in Ganga Ram (supra) has been referred to and approved by Apex Court recently in Samittri Devi and another v. Sampuran Singh and another, (2011) 3 SCC 556 (para 26). 30. The Full Bench thus answered the question accordingly holding that postman is not necessarily to be examined by plaintiff. 29. The above Full Bench judgment in Ganga Ram (supra) has been referred to and approved by Apex Court recently in Samittri Devi and another v. Sampuran Singh and another, (2011) 3 SCC 556 (para 26). 30. This issue also came up before Apex Court in Puwada Venkateswara Rao v. Chidamana Venkata Ramana, AIR 1976 SC 869 and in para 10 of the judgment, it held: “It is not always necessary, in such cases, to produce the postman who tried to effect service. The denial of service by a party may be found to be incorrect from its own admissions or conduct.” 31. In Har Charan Singh v. Shiv Rani, AIR 1981 SC 1284 , a three-Judge Bench (by majority held) with respect to notice when registered letter is returned with endorsement of “refusal”, said: “Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 deals with the topic ‘Meaning of service by post’ and says that where any Central Act or Regulation authorities or requires any document to be served by post, then unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting it by registered post, a letter containing the document, and unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. The section thus raises a presumption of due service or proper service if the document sought to be served is sent by properly addressing, prepaying and posting by registered post to the addressee and such presumption is raised irrespective of whether any acknowledgement due is received from the addressee or not. It is obvious that when the section raises the presumption that the service shall be deemed to have been effected it means the addressee to whom the communication is sent must be taken to have known the contents of the document sought to be served upon him without anything more. It is obvious that when the section raises the presumption that the service shall be deemed to have been effected it means the addressee to whom the communication is sent must be taken to have known the contents of the document sought to be served upon him without anything more. Similar presumption is raised under Illustration (f) to s. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act whereunder it is stated that the Court may presume that the common course of business has been followed in a particular case, that is to say, when a letter is sent by post by pre-paying and properly addressing it the same has been received by the addressee. Undoubtedly, the presumptions both under s. 27 of the General Clauses Act as well as under s. 114 of the Evidence Act are rebuttable but in the absence of proof to the contrary the presumption of proper service or effective service on the addressee would arise.” 32. Again this issue came to be considered by a two-Judge, Bench of Apex Court in Anil Kumar v. Nanak Chandra Verma, AIR 1990 SC 1215 and while overruling this Court’s decision in Shiv Dutt Singh v. Ram Das, AIR 1980 All 280 , it was held in para 2 as under: “2. The question considered in both the decisions was to the statement on oath by the, tenant denying the tender and refusal to accept delivery. It was held that the bare statement of the tenant was sufficient to rebut the presumption of service. In our opinion there could be no hard and fast rule on that aspect. Unchallenged testimony of a tenant in certain cases may be sufficient to rebut the presumption but if the testimony of the tenant itself is inherently unreliable, the position may be different. It is always a question of fact in each case whether there was sufficient evidence from the tenant to discharge the initial burden.” 33. In Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh, AIR 1992 SC 1604 , the Court confirmed a decision of this Court in respect to presumption about service of notice received with the endorsement of “refusal” and held that presumption contemplated by Section 27 of Act, 1897 must be drawn to deem service upon the addressee. In para 8 of the judgement, the Court said: “In our opinion, the High Court was right in its view. In para 8 of the judgement, the Court said: “In our opinion, the High Court was right in its view. The notices must be presumed to have been served as contemplated by Section 27 of the General Clauses Act.” 34. I find a straight answer as to who should disprove the factum of offer of registered letter when returned by postal authority with the endorsement of “refusal” in the Apex Court decision in Gujarat Electricity Board v. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani, AIR 1989 SC 1433 , where it has been observed: “There is presumption of service of a letter sent under registered cover, if the same is returned back with a postal endorsement that the addressee refused to accept the same. No doubt the presumption is rebuttable and it is open to the party concerned to place evidence before the Court to rebut the presumption by showing that the address mentioned on the cover was incorrect or that the postal authorities never tendered the registered letter to him or that there was no occasion for him to refuse the same. The burden to rebut the presumption lies on the party, challenging the factum of service. In the instant case, the respondent failed to discharge this burden as he failed to place material before the Court to show that the endorsement made by the postal authorities was wrong and incorrect. Mere denial made by the respondent in the circumstances of the case was not sufficient to rebut the presumption relating to service of the registered cover.” (emphasis added) 35. Following the Apex Court decision in Gujarat Electricity Board (supra) this Court in Jhabul Ram v. District Judge, Ballia, 1994 (23) ALR 464, has also said in para 9 as under: “9. Bald denial of the petitioner could not absolve him from the burden of rebutting the presumption of service of notice arising from the endorsement by the postal authorities on the registered cover containing the notice. The Court below did not commit any error, muchless an error apparent on the face of record, in holding that the notice in question was duly served on the petitioner.” 36. I find another Apex Court’s decision straight on this issue i.e. Basant Singh v. Roman Catholic Mission, 2003 (1) AIC 1 (SC). In para 8 and 10 of the judgment, the Court observed: “The presumptions are rebuttable. I find another Apex Court’s decision straight on this issue i.e. Basant Singh v. Roman Catholic Mission, 2003 (1) AIC 1 (SC). In para 8 and 10 of the judgment, the Court observed: “The presumptions are rebuttable. It is always open to the defendants to rebut the presumption by leading convincing and cogent evidence.” “As already noticed, Hari Singh appeared and save and except the bald statement that registered letter was not tendered to him, no evidence whatsoever was led to rebut the presumption. He could have examined the postman, who would have been the material witness and whose evidence would have bearing for proper adjudication. He has failed to discharge the onus cast upon him by the Statute.” 37. This Court has followed the above decision in Noor Mohammad and another v. XIV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kanpur Nagar, 2006 (63) ALR 244. Therein the Revisional Court reversed the Trial Court’s order on the ground that the tenant has tendered rent to landlord through money order which was received with the endorsement “refusal” by the postman but when landlord denied the tender of money order, tenant did not examine the postman and hence failed to discharge burden lying upon him. In other words, the Revisional Court said that it is the sender who should examine the postman and not the sendee/addressee for whom the postal authorities have endorsed that it has refused to accept the article. This view of the Revisional Court was reversed by this Court by observing: “In respect of endorsement of refusal by the postman, there is no necessity to examine the postman to prove that. If there is any such duty then it is for the person denying tender by the postman.” 38. This Court also in Brij Nandan Gupta v. III Additional District Judge, Rampur and another (Writ-A No. 24853 of 1989) decided on 30.7.2012 in para 21 of judgment said: “Similarly, if a notice has been sent by landlord by registered post and it is received back with an endorsement made by an official of Post Office namely Postman that it was refused by the addresee, presumption of service upon addressee shall be drawn unless the tenant prove that the letter was never offered to him by the Postman and endorsement made thereon is not correct. The tenant’s bare denial would not be sufficient in such a case and he will have to prove his case by adducing relevant evidence. Such denial can be by making statement on oath and in such case onus would shift on the landlord to prove that refusal was by the tenant which he can show by summoning the postman and adducing his oral evidence. However, this is one aspect of the matter. Sometimes from the conduct of tenant or other circumstances, his denial even if on oath, can justifiably be disproved by the Court without having Postman examined.” 39. Considering the aforesaid authorities, this Court also in Smt. Santosh Kumari v. 4th Additional District Judge, Bareilly and others (Writ-A No. 36759 of 1996), in paras 42 and 43 of the judgment, has said as under: “42. In the present case, the Revisional Court has taken a different view so as to reverse the finding of the Trial Court in respect to service of notice only on the ground that plaintiff-landlord ought to have examined postman and unless he is so examined, his endorsement of “refusal” cannot be treated to be an evidence to draw a presumption in favour of service upon the tenant when tenant simply deny service upon him. He has found that the address given on the registered letter was correct, yet only on the ground that postman having not been examined by the landlord, the Revisional Court, in holding that endorsement of “refusal” cannot be treated to be an evidence to draw presumption of service, has acted wholly illegally and the aforesaid view taken by Revisional Court, in view of exposition of law discussed hereinabove, cannot sustain. 43. When the endorsement made by a Postman by virtue of Section 14 of Act, 1898 is to be treated as prima facie evidence of correctness of endorsement, this is a statutory presumption of evidence and can be rebutted by the addressee by adducing adequate evidence failing which it is the addressee who will fail and not the sender. It is thus for the addressee to examine the postman to demonstrate that the endorsement made by him (postman) is not correct and mere fact that sender could not identify the Postman would make no different since it is wholly irrelevant.” 40. It is thus for the addressee to examine the postman to demonstrate that the endorsement made by him (postman) is not correct and mere fact that sender could not identify the Postman would make no different since it is wholly irrelevant.” 40. In the present case, petitioner has not disputed that defendant No. 2 was his Driver and he filed Recall Application seeking plea that the Driver possess a valid driving licence, therefore, no recovery by Insurance Company was permissible from defendant No. 1, i.e., petitioner. The registered notice sent to defendant No. 1 had not delivered back un-served and from defendant No. 2 it was received back with endorsement of Postman as “refusal”. Defendant No. 2, admittedly was/is Driver of petitioner employed throughout. Petitioner has nowhere said that defendant No. 2 did not inform him about the proceedings of Claim Petition though he tried to take advantage of driving licence possessed by defendant No. 2 for the purpose of denying recovery of compensation awarded to the claimant by Insurance Company. It is also not in dispute that there is nothing wrong so far as the award of compensation by Tribunal to the claimant is concerned. The real dispute, which is being raised by petitioner is vis-a-vis Insurance Company, so as to deny the recovery of awarded compensation from him. It appears that petitioner did not respond initially under the impression that vehicle being ensured, he has not to worry at all since the responsibility of payment would be of Insurance Company, but after the award, when he found that Insurance Company under law can recover the awarded compensation from him, since a legal lacuna has survived enabling Insurance Company to recover the amount from petitioner, only then the application in question has been filed. With regard to registered summon sent to petitioner, it is not his case that there was any mistake in the address. In the entirety of the facts and circumstances, it thus cannot be said that presumption drawn by Tribunal was not justified and that petitioner rebutted the same by adducing any evidence, whatsoever, that he had no notice of the matter, whatsoever. In the entirety of the facts and circumstances, it thus cannot be said that presumption drawn by Tribunal was not justified and that petitioner rebutted the same by adducing any evidence, whatsoever, that he had no notice of the matter, whatsoever. Having said so, application having been filed after very long time since when Tribunal proceeded ex parte, the Tribunal has rightly held that delay was not condonable since it was not explained satisfactorily and I even otherwise do not find any error apparent on the face of record. 41. The scope of judicial review, even otherwise, in such matter, under Article 226/227 is very limited and narrow inasmuch it is not the mere illegality in the order or error apparent on the face thereof which may justify interference but petitioner has further to show an irreparable injury caused to him and not otherwise. 42. In supervisory jurisdiction of this Court over subordinate Courts, the scope of judicial review is very limited and narrow. It is not to correct the errors in the orders of the Court below but to remove manifest and patent errors of law and jurisdiction without acting as an appellate authority. 43. This power involves a duty on the High Court to keep the inferior Courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. But this power does not vest the High Court with any unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Court or Tribunal. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principle of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes. 44. In D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee, AIR 1953 SC 58 , the Court said: “Unless there was any grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law calling for intervention, it is not for the High Court under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to interfere.” 45. 44. In D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee, AIR 1953 SC 58 , the Court said: “Unless there was any grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law calling for intervention, it is not for the High Court under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to interfere.” 45. A Constitution Bench of Apex Court examined the scope of Article 227 of the Constitution in Waryam Singh and another v. Amarnath and another, AIR 1954 SC 215 and made following observations at p. 571 : “This power of superintendence conferred by article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J. in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee, AIR 1951 Cal 193 , to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors”. 46. In Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim and others, AIR 1984 SC 38 , the Court held that this Court has very limited scope under Article 227 of the Constitution and even the errors of law cannot be corrected in exercise of power of judicial review under Article 227 of the Constitution. The power can be used sparingly when it comes to the conclusion that the Authority/Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or proceeded under erroneous presumption of jurisdiction. The High Court cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decision. For interference, there must be a case of flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or where order of the Tribunal, etc. has resulted in grave injustice. 47. For interference under Article 227, the finding of facts recorded by the Authority should be found to be perverse or patently erroneous and de hors the factual and legal position on record. (See: Nibaran Chandra Bag v. Mahendra Nath Ghughu, AIR 1963 SC 1895 ; Rukmanand Bairoliya v. The State of Bihar and others, AIR 1971 SC 746 ; Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha and others, AIR 1980 SC 1896 ; Laxmikant R. Bhojwani v. Pratapsing Mohansingh Singh Pardeshi, (1995) 6 SCC 576 ; Reliance Industries Ltd. v. Pravinbhai Jasbhai Patel and others, (1997) 7 SCC 300 ; M/s. Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Sub-Judicial Magistrate and others, (1998) 5 SCC 749 ; and Virendra Kashinath Ravat and others v. Vinayak N. Joshi and others, (1999) 1 SCC 47 ). 48. It is well-settled that power under Article 227 is of the judicial superintendence which cannot be used to up-set conclusions of facts, howsoever erroneous those may be, unless such conclusions are so perverse or so unreasonable that no Court could ever have reached them. (See: Rena Drego v. Lalchand Soni and others, (1998) 3 SCC 341 ; Chandra Bhushan v. Beni Prasad and others, (1999) 1 SCC 70 ; Savitrabai Bhausaheb Kevate and others v. Raichand Dhanraj Lunja, (1999) 2 SCC 171 ; and Savita Chemical (P) Ltd. v. Dyes & Chemical Workers’ Union and another, (1999) 2 SCC 143 ). 49. Power under Article 227 of the Constitution is not in the nature of power of appellate authority enabling re-appreciation of evidence. It should not alter the conclusion reached by the Competent Statutory Authority merely on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. (See: Union of India and others v. Himmat Singh Chahar, (1999) 4 SCC 521 ). 50. In Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-opeative Marketing cum Processing Service Society Ltd., (1999) 6 SCC 82 , the Court has held that there is no justification for the High Court to substitute its view for the opinion of the Authorities/Courts below as the same is not permissible in proceedings under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. 51. In Mohan Amba Prasad Agnihotri v. Bhaskar Balwant Aheer, AIR 2000 SC 931 , the Court said that jurisdiction of High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is not appealable but supervisory. Therefore, it cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by Courts below unless there is no evidence to support findings or the findings are totally perverse. 52. In Indian Overseas Bank v. Indian Overseas Bank Staff Canteen Workers’ Union, (2000) 4 SCC 245 , the Court observed that it is impermissible for the Writ Court to reappreciate evidence liberally and drawing conclusions on its own on pure questions of fact for the reason that it is not exercising appellate jurisdiction over the awards passed by Tribunal. The findings of fact recorded by the fact finding authority duly constituted for the purpose ordinarily should be considered to have become final. The same cannot be disturbed for the mere reason of having based on materials or evidence not sufficient or credible in the opinion of Writ Court to warrant those findings. The findings of fact recorded by the fact finding authority duly constituted for the purpose ordinarily should be considered to have become final. The same cannot be disturbed for the mere reason of having based on materials or evidence not sufficient or credible in the opinion of Writ Court to warrant those findings. At any rate, as long as they are based upon some material which are relevant for the purpose no interference is called for. Even on the ground that there is yet another view which can reasonably and possibly be taken the High Court can not interfere. 53. In Union of India v. Rajendra Prabhu, (2001) 4 SCC 472 , the Court observed that the High Court, in exercise of its extraordinary powers under Article 227 of the Constitution, cannot re-appreciate the evidence nor it can substitute its subjective opinion in place of the findings of Authorities below. 54. Similar view has been reiterated in State of Maharashtra v. Milind and others, (2001) 1 SCC 4 ; Extrella Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97 ; and Omeph Mathai and others v. M. Abdul Khader, (2002) 1 SCC 319 . 55. In Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others, (2003) 6 SCC 675 , it was held that in exercise of supervisory power under Article 227, High Court can correct errors of jurisdiction committed by subordinate Courts. It also held that when subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned, the Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. However, it also said that be it a writ of certiorari or exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or law unless error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law; or, a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. 56. 56. In Jasbir Singh v. State of Punjab, (2006) 8 SCC 294 , the Court said: “...while invoking the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution, it is provided that the High Court would exercise such powers most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority. The power of superintendence exercised over the subordinate Courts and tribunals does not imply that the High Court can intervene in the judicial functions of the lower judiciary. The independence of the subordinate Courts in the discharge of their judicial functions is of paramount importance, just as the independence of the superior Courts in the discharge of their judicial functions.” 57. In Shalini Shyam Shetty and another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329 , the Court said that power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. The above authority has been cited and followed in Kokkanda B. Poondacha and others v. K.D. Ganapathi and another, AIR 2011 SC 1353 and Bandaru Satyanarayana v. Imandi Anasuya, (2011) 12 SCC 650. 58. In Abdul Razak (D) through Lrs. and others v. Mangesh Rajaram Wagle and others, (2010) 2 SCC 432 , Court reminded that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227, High Courts should not act as if they are exercising an appellate jurisdiction. 59. In T.G.N. Kumar v. State of Kerala and others, (2011) 2 SCC 772 , the Court said that power of superintendence conferred on the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is both administrative and judicial, but such power is to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority. 60. In Commandant, 22nd Battalion, CRPF and others v. Surinder Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC 244 , Apex Court referring to its earlier decision in Union of India v. R.K. Sharma, (2001) 9 SCC 592 , observed that only in an extreme case, where on the face of it there is perversity or irrationality, there can be judicial review under Articles 226 or 227. 61. 61. In the present case, the accident has taken place with vehicle owned by petitioner and claimant’s husband has died. The owner and the Driver chosen not to contest the claim petitioner for the reasons best known to them and in these facts and circumstances, I do not find it a fit case warranting interference. 62. Learned counsel for petitioner also placed reliance on two judgments of this Court in Ashtosh Shrotriya v. Rais Uddin, 1994 (Suppl.) RD 73 and Santosh Kumar Navman and others v. Raja Amar Pratap Singh, 2011 All CJ 2260, but both these decisions are not applicable to the facts of the present case and, therefore, do not help the petitioner in any manner. 63. I may also add here that the remedy was available to petitioner by filing an appeal in which he could have adduced evidence with the leave of Court and, thereafter could have contested the matter, but he has chosen not to do so and therefore also I do not find that here is case where this Court would be justified to interfere under Article 226/227. 64. In the result, all the writ petitions, being devoid of merits, are hereby dismissed. —————