JUDGMENT U.B. Saha, J.:-- 1. This petition is filed for review of the judgment and order dated 02.04.2012 passed in WP(C) 126/2012 wherein this Court dismissed the writ petition being devoid of merit. 2. Heard Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Somik Deb, learned counsel for the petitioners as well as Ms. A.S. Lodh, learned Addl. GA for the State. 3. Brief facts needed to be discussed are as follows:-- On 14.03.2011 vide notification No. F.09(01)-REV/ACQ/XV/II Govt. of Tripura, Department of Revenue acquired land measuring 1.18 acres including the lands of the petitioners for construction of Panchayati Raj Training Institute at Mouja Ambassa in Dhalai District. On 17.03.2011 a notice was issued by the Collector, Dhalai District to the persons interested in the land concerned including the petitioners to lodge their objection in writing on or before 30 days from the date of receipt of the said notice. The petitioners on receipt of the aforesaid notice filed their written objection on 04.04.2011 before the Land Acquisition Collector wherein it was stated that there was sufficient Khas land around the petitioners’ lands which can be acquired by the government for the purpose of the aforesaid training institute. It was also stated therein that the petitioners were poor local tribal cultivators who had no other land except the lands proposed to be acquired by the government. As the Collector did not dispose of the objection of the petitioners they filed a writ petition being WP(C) 462/2011 which was disposed of by the learned single Judge of the Gauhati High Court, Agartala Bench with the following orders: “From the materials placed before this court, it appears that the respondent Collector has not yet resorted to such proceedings for disposal of the objection filed by the petitioners. The respondent No. 2 is, therefore, directed to dispose of the petitioners’ objection by a speaking order as per provisions under Section 5A(2) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The entire process shall be completed within 30 days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. The respondent authorities shall not take further step for acquisition of petitioners’ land until disposal of the objection/representation in accordance with law.” 4. The entire process shall be completed within 30 days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. The respondent authorities shall not take further step for acquisition of petitioners’ land until disposal of the objection/representation in accordance with law.” 4. As the Collector did not hear the objection of the petitioners as ordered by the learned single Judge they filed another writ petition being WP(C) 126/2012 which was dismissed by us after hearing the parties as the learned Land Acquisition Collector had examined the objection of the petitioners stating inter alia, “the contents as stated above, has been examined sympathetically as because the land is required for Govt. purpose i.e. for construction of Panchayati Raj Training Institute. No other suitable land is found nearby area. So, the prayer is not considered and hence disposed of.” Moreso, the aforesaid order dated 13.04.2011 passed by the Land Acquisition Collector as well as the letter dated 14.04.2011 issued by the said Land Acquisition Collector were placed before this Court by Ms A.S. Lodh, learned Addl. GA and on perusal of the aforesaid order and letter we had noted inter alia, “The aforesaid order dated 13.04.2011 was also communicated to the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Tripura, Revenue Department with a copy to the petitioners. The said order dated 13.04.2011 as well as the letter dated 14.11.2011 are not under challenge before this Court. Therefore, it is very difficult on the part of this Court to interfere the order as sought for. Moreover identification of land required for public purpose cannot fall in the domain of this Court. When it is demonstrated that there is no public purpose or mala fide intention, then a writ court can exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Else the purpose of enacting the law by the legislature, namely, Land Acquisition Act, 1894 would be frustrated.” 5. Being aggrieved by our aforesaid order dated 02.04.2012 the petitioners filed a Special Leave Petition being SLP(Civil) No. 3210/2013 before the Apex Court. When the aforesaid Special Leave Petition was taken up on 08.02.2013 the petitioners sought permission to withdraw the Special Leave Petition with a view to seek for review of the impugned order and as the Apex Court permitted them to withdraw the said petition with a liberty to file review application, the petitioners have filed the instant petition. 6. When the aforesaid Special Leave Petition was taken up on 08.02.2013 the petitioners sought permission to withdraw the Special Leave Petition with a view to seek for review of the impugned order and as the Apex Court permitted them to withdraw the said petition with a liberty to file review application, the petitioners have filed the instant petition. 6. Mr. Deb while urging for review of the order dated 02.04.2012 would contend that though the earlier writ petition being WP(C) 462/2011 was disposed of on 21.11.2011, this court in its order dated 02.04.2012 while referring to the order in the aforesaid writ petition mentioned the word ‘thereafter’ before the order of the LA Collector dated 13-04-2011 wherein the LA Collector referred that the petitioners were heard under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and ultimately the LA Collector while disposing of the objection of the petitioners held that as no other land is found in the nearby area for construction of Panchayati Raj Training Institute, the prayer of the petitioners is not considered which is a mistake apparent on the face of the record. He has also contended that this Court has committed error in relying on the alleged order dated 13.04.2011 passed by the Collector when the learned single Judge of the Gauhati High Court, Agartala Bench disposed of the earlier writ petition on 21.11.2011 directing the Collector to dispose of the objections of the petitioners by a speaking order under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. He finally contended that the hearing on the objections by the Collector without making any inquiry therefor, and summarily dismissing the objections, could not be a hearing within the meaning of Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Thus, the impugned order is required to be altered/amended setting aside the notification No. F.09(01)-REV/ACQ/XV/II dated 14.03.2011. 7. On the other hand, Ms Lodh submits that the petitioners by way of filing this review petition actually wanted rehearing of the writ petition being WP(C) 126/2012 and also to substitute another view over the view expressed in the impugned order. Thus, the impugned order is required to be altered/amended setting aside the notification No. F.09(01)-REV/ACQ/XV/II dated 14.03.2011. 7. On the other hand, Ms Lodh submits that the petitioners by way of filing this review petition actually wanted rehearing of the writ petition being WP(C) 126/2012 and also to substitute another view over the view expressed in the impugned order. She has also taken us to paragraph 2.3 of the instant petition wherein it is stated that “the Collector failed to give the Petitioners an opportunity of hearing, and disposed of their objections, contrary to the provisions of Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 though the petitioners were heard by the Collector as would be evident from the order dated 13.04.2011 passed by the LA Collector which was also taken into consideration by this Court while passing the impugned order dated 02.04.2012”. 8. We have considered the submission of the learned counsel for the parties. There is no doubt that the order dated 13.04.2011 was not passed by the LA Collector in compliance with the order of the learned single Judge dated 21.11.2011 but fact remains that the said order was received by the petitioners and they had not challenged the said order dated 13.04.2011 as well as the letter dated 14.11.2011 of the LA Collector before this Court at the time of hearing of the second writ petition being WP(C) 126/2012. In the said order, we had mentioned ‘thereafter on 13.04.2011 the petitioners were heard under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894’ though the word ‘thereafter’ was not necessary and ought not to have been there. Inadvertently, in the order dated 02.04.2012 the word “thereafter” is mentioned which is nothing but a minor mistake of inconsequential import and such a mistake cannot be a ground for review. However, the word “thereafter” as mentioned in the earlier order is to be treated as deleted. Except the aforesaid word ‘thereafter’ there is no other error apparent on the face of the record for which the said order is required to be reviewed. 9. However, the word “thereafter” as mentioned in the earlier order is to be treated as deleted. Except the aforesaid word ‘thereafter’ there is no other error apparent on the face of the record for which the said order is required to be reviewed. 9. The Apex Court in Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati & Ors., AIR 2013 SC 3301 has discussed the scope of review which is as under:-- “(8) This Court has repeatedly held in various judgments that the jurisdiction and scope of review is not that of an appeal and it can be entertained only if there is an error apparent on the face of the record. A mere repetition through different counsel, of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered grounds or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient. This Court, in Sow Chandra Kante & Anr. v. Sheikh Habib (1975) 1 SCC 674 : ( AIR 1975 SC 1500 ) held as under: “1. Mr. Daphtary, learned counsel for the petitioners, has argued at length all the points which were urged at the earlier stage when we refused special leave thus making out that a review proceeding virtually amounts to a rehearing. May be, we were not right in refusing special leave in the first round; but, once an order has been passed by this Court, a review thereof must be subject to the rules of the game and cannot be lightly entertained. A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. A mere repetition, through different counsel, of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient. The very strict need for compliance with these factors is the rationale behind the insistence of counsel’s certificate which should not be a routine affair or a habitual step. It is neither fairness to the Court which decided nor awareness of the precious public time lost what with a huge backlog of dockets waiting in the queue for disposal, for counsel to issue easy certificates for entertainment of review and fight over again the same battle which has been fought and lost. It is neither fairness to the Court which decided nor awareness of the precious public time lost what with a huge backlog of dockets waiting in the queue for disposal, for counsel to issue easy certificates for entertainment of review and fight over again the same battle which has been fought and lost. The Bench and the Bar, we are sure, are jointly concerned in the conservation of judicial time for maximum use. We regret to say that this case is typical of the unfortunate but frequent phenomenon of repeat performance with the review label as passport. Nothing which we did not hear then has been heard now, except a couple of rulings on points earlier put forward. May be, as counsel now urges and then pressed, our order refusing special leave was capable of a different course. The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality. ................................ (15) Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1 of CPC. In review jurisdiction, mere disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the ground for invoking the same. As long as the point is already dealt with and answered, the parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that an alternative view is possible under the review jurisdiction.” 10. We have to reiterate that our order dated 02.04.2012 was based on the submission of Ms Lodh, learned Addl. GA and also on the facts that the petitioners though received the order dated 13.04.2011, which was passed after hearing the petitioners, did not challenge the same in the said writ petition. It is also to be mentioned that when learned single Judge passed the order dated 21.11.2011 disposing the earlier writ petition, the petitioners did not place either the order dated 13.04.2011 or the letter dated 14.11.2011 of the LA Collector. In fact, by this review petition, the petitioners have prayed for rehearing of the writ petition for setting aside the notification dated 14.03.2011 issued by the Govt. of Tripura, Department of Revenue which was negated by us in the order sought to be reviewed. 11. In fact, by this review petition, the petitioners have prayed for rehearing of the writ petition for setting aside the notification dated 14.03.2011 issued by the Govt. of Tripura, Department of Revenue which was negated by us in the order sought to be reviewed. 11. It is settled by this time that a review is not maintainable relating to an order/judgment wherein the relief sought for has already been negated, in the name of clarification, modification and/or alteration of the said order. In the instant case, the petitioners in the name of review actually prayed for rehearing of the earlier writ petition which is also not permissible. 12. In the result, the instant review petition is dismissed being devoid of merit. No costs. Petition dismissed.