JUDGMENT 1. - This writ petition purporting to be both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India impugns the judgment dated 17-1-2012 passed by the Divisional Commissioner Jaipur whereby the appeal filed by the respondent-appellants (hereinafter `the respondents') under Section 90-B (7) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 (hereinafter `the 1956 Act') has been allowed and the judgment dated 12-4-2010 passed by the Authorised Officer Zone-6, Jaipur Development Authority Jaipur under Section 90-B of the 1956 Act has been set aside. 2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner as also respondents and perused the impugned order dated 17-1-2012 as also the underlying order dated 12-4-2010 passed by the authorised officer under Section 90-B of the 1956 Act. 3. Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that albeit the Divisional Commissioner as an appellate authority in respect of order under Section 90-B (5) of the 1956 Act passed by an authorised officer has the power to set aside the said order, yet such power has to be exercised according to well known principles and standards in law. As the appellate authority, the Divisional Commissioner, is under a duty to deal with the conclusions of facts arrived at by the Authorised Officer and set out reasons for holding them erroneous, perverse or otherwise vitiated in law. It has been submitted that the Divisional Commissioner has instead very cursorily by the impugned judgment dated 17-1-2012 set aside the detailed and reasonable conclusions/findings of facts by the Authorised Officer that proceeding with regard to the land in dispute under Section 90-B of the 1956 Act were validly taken with due process as statutorily prescribed. Counsel has submitted that the Authorised Officer in his order dated 12-4-2010 found that khatedari land in issue had been voluntarily surrendered by one Mohar Singh on the basis of a duly registered Power of Attorney dated 30-11-1990 executed and signed by khatedars Prahlad, Mangla, Chhotu and on behalf of minor Hari Narayan by his mother. The said power of attorney was at no point of time cancelled. Further the recorded khatedars/their legal representatives of land in issue in spite of publication of notices during proceedings under Section 90-B of the 1956 Act in various news papers did not respond or object to the statutory exercise prior to surrender of khatedari rights for non-agricultural use. The said power of attorney was at no point of time cancelled. Further the recorded khatedars/their legal representatives of land in issue in spite of publication of notices during proceedings under Section 90-B of the 1956 Act in various news papers did not respond or object to the statutory exercise prior to surrender of khatedari rights for non-agricultural use. The over all facts and evidence of the case before the Authorised Officer also established that aside of the order under Section 90-B (3) of the 1956 Act pertaining to the surrender of land by recorded khatedars or their legal representatives, the agricultural land had been unauthorisedly used for non agricultural purposes and therefore was liable to be resumed by the State Government under Section 90-B (5) of the 1956 Act divesting the recorded khatedars/legal representatives of their rights. Therein it has been submitted that in the circumstances, there was no good ground before the Divisional Commissioner to have interfered with the conclusions of the authorised officer with regard to the validity and procedural compliances in passing of the composite order under Section 90-B (3) and (5) of the 1956 Act. It has been further submitted that subsequent to recording of mutation of land in issue in the name of Jaipur Development Authority following the order dated 12-4-2010 passed by the Authorised Officer, lease deeds under Section 54-A of the Jaipur Development Authority Act, 1982 have also been issued to the allottees in possession also holding pattas issued by the Moti Bhawan Grah Nirman Sahakari Samiti (hereinafter `the Samiti') for residential use. 4. Learned counsel for respondents has however supported the impugned judgment passed by the Divisional Commissioner. It has been submitted that procedural compliance with the Section 90-B of the 1956 Act was not made. The land in issue was never surrendered by the khatedars/legal representatives of erstwhile khatedar to the JDA nor was there any proof of any probative worth available that the erstwhile khatedars had sold their khatedari land to the Samiti and put it/allowed it to be put to non-agricultural use entailing resumption of such land by the State Government. 5. Heard. Considered. 6. 5. Heard. Considered. 6. In the case of Narbada Prasad v. Chhagan Lal [ AIR 1969 SC 395 ] the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that practice of the courts uniformly is to give the greatest assurance to assessment of evidence by the court of the first instance. In challenging a judgment of the court of first instance, the burden is on the appellant and it is for him to show how the judgment impugned in appeal is erroneous. The appellant cannot ask for a mere re-assessment of evidence but has instead to discharge the burden of showing the error by the original court in assessment of evidence. In the case of Baburao Bagaji Karemore v. Govind [ AIR 1974 SC 405 ] the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that before a finding of fact by the trial court can be upset, the finding is to be established to be clearly unsound, perverse and based on grounds unsatisfactory by reasons of inconsistencies and inaccuracies. 7. In the context of aforesaid burden on appellant in displacing the judgment of the trial court (court of original jurisdiction), it is the duty of the court hearing appeal to address the conclusions of fact by the trial court, to negate such conclusions for good reasons and then came to its own findings as the final court of fact on evidence on record. The appellate court does not have power to negate and set aside conclusions finding of fact/s by the trial court without good cause, circumventing the trial court's reasoning for reaching to conclusions of facts and yet reach its own conclusions of fact as if the appellate court was the court of original jurisdiction. 8. Evaluated on the aforesaid tests, the Divisional Commissioner's judgment dated 17-1-2012 setting aside the order dated 12-4-2010 passed by the Authorised Officer under Section 90-B of the 1956 Act is wholly unsatisfactory and absolutely unsustainable. The Divisional Commissioner has not addressed the conclusions/finding of facts by the Authorised Officer, based on the evidence of surrender of land by Mohar Singh, as the registered power of attorney holder of the recorded khatedars Prahlad, Mangla, Chhotu and Hari Narayan or its conclusion that the land in issue was even otherwise liable to be resumed under Section 90-B (5) of the 1956 Act for having been put to non agricultural use without authority of law. 9. 9. Consequently, I would set aside the impugned order dated 17-1-2012 passed by the Divisional Commissioner and remand the matter to him to decide the appeal afresh with reference to the principles for the exercise of appellate power as detailed hereinabove. It is directed that appeal be now disposed of by a reasoned and speaking order within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. It is clarified by way of abundant caution that the parties shall be entitled to agitate all arguments as may be available in their respective armouries. 10. The writ petition stands accordingly allowed.Petition Allowed. *******