JUDGMENT Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. The substantial questions of law formulated on 10-12-2013 and to be answered are as under: "1. Whether the lower appellate Court was justified in reversing the finding arrived at by the trial court in granting relief which otherwise has not been prayed for in the civil suit? 2. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the suit itself in respect of the respondent/plaintiff was maintainable or not?" [For the sake of convenience, the parties will be referred in the instant judgment as were referred in the suit.] The necessary facts in nutshell required to be noticed for adjudication of the second appeal are as under: "(1.1) Plaintiff Gopichand Khemani filed a suit for declaration and injunction on 10-3-1992. In the plaint, the plaintiff sought reliefs that the action of cancellation of allotment of plot No. 74, situated at Indira Commercial Complex, Pandari Tarai, Raipur (henceforth 'the suit plot'), allotted to him by defendant Raipur Development Authority, Raipur in an auction of plots under Devendra Nagar Scheme No. 32 in 1988, be declared void and the defendant be restrained from selling the suit plot by re-auction thereof on 12-3-1992 or thereafter. It is the case of the plaintiff that in the year 1988, in a public-auction of plots held by the defendant under the aforesaid scheme, plaintiff's bid with respect to the suit plot was accepted by the defendant declaring him a successful bidder therefor. The plaintiff immediately deposited a sum of ` 8,800/- in favour of the defendant as per the terms and conditions of the public-auction (Ex. D-1). On demand made by the defendant, the plaintiff also deposited a sum of ` 26,290/-, i.e., 30% of the bid-consideration of the suit plot, in favour of the defendant. It is the further case of the plaintiff that under Clause 6 of the terms and conditions of the auction (Ex. D-1), the defendant was required to inform the plaintiff to deposit remaining 70% amount of the bid-consideration of the suit plot within 15 days from the date of acceptance of the bid of the plaintiff by the defendant. The plaintiff served a notice dated 20-10-1990 (Ex. D-1), the defendant was required to inform the plaintiff to deposit remaining 70% amount of the bid-consideration of the suit plot within 15 days from the date of acceptance of the bid of the plaintiff by the defendant. The plaintiff served a notice dated 20-10-1990 (Ex. P-1) to the defendant seeking further action in the matter, but deaf hearing was given to the said notice/ request and when re-auction of the suit plot was notified by the defendant, the instant suit was filed by the plaintiff seeking the aforesaid reliefs. (1.2) The defendant filed its written statement stating inter alia that after acceptance of the bid of the plaintiff by the defendant for the suit plot, the plaintiff deposited a sum of `7,075/- only in favour of the defendant. The defendant issued notices to the plaintiff on 5-1-1989,11-4-1989, 11-5-1989, 6-3-1990 and 12-7-1990 to deposit the balance sum of the bid-consideration, but the plaintiff failed to deposit the same leading to cancellation of the allotment of the suit plot made in favour of the plaintiff in the public-auction and forfeiture of the entire amount deposited by the plaintiff by a notice dated 12-10-1990 (Ex. D-2) issued to the plaintiff. After issuance of the notice dated 12-10-1990 (Ex. D-2), the suit plot was put to re-auction by a notification dated 12-3-1992 issued by the defendant. The defendant specifically denied that it had handed over possession of the suit plot to the plaintiff and the suit plot was in possession of the plaintiff. The defendant pleaded that the plaintiff is not entitled for a decree prayed for by him." 2. The trial Court, by judgment and decree dated 30-9-1997 in Civil Suit No. 170-A/1995, dismissed the suit holding that the cancellation of allotment of the suit plot vide the notice dated 12-10-1990 (Ex. D-2) is not illegal as the plaintiff failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the auction (Ex. D-1). 3. On an appeal being preferred by the plaintiff under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (henceforth 'the CPC'), the first appellate Court, by judgment and decree dated 7-5-1999 in Civil Appeal No. 9-A/1998, allowed the appeal and decreed the suit of the plaintiff. 4. D-1). 3. On an appeal being preferred by the plaintiff under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (henceforth 'the CPC'), the first appellate Court, by judgment and decree dated 7-5-1999 in Civil Appeal No. 9-A/1998, allowed the appeal and decreed the suit of the plaintiff. 4. Questioning the legal acceptability and correctness of the impugned judgment and decree, defendant Raipur Development Authority, Raipur preferred the instant appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, in which substantial questions of law have been formulated by order dated 10-12-2013 and the same have been quoted in first paragraph of this judgment. 5. Shri H.B. Agrawal, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant/defendant would submit that the first appellate Court has committed manifest error of jurisdiction in reversing the judgment and decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit. As such, no written notice was required to be given to the plaintiff for depositing the balance 70% amount of the bid-consideration. Learned Senior Advocate would further submit that the reliefs granted by the first appellate Court dehors the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff and the reliefs granted are unsustainable in law. 6. As against this, Dr. N.K. Shukla, learned Senior Advocate appearing for respondent No. 1/plaintiff would submit that the first appellate Court has rightly reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court holding that neither the notice has been given to the plaintiff to deposit the balance of bid-consideration nor the notice has been produced and proved before the trial Court in accordance with law. 7. Shri Y.C. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 would adopt the arguments advanced by Shri H.B. Agrawal, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant/defendant. 8. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties at length and have also perused the record with utmost circumspection. 9. Admittedly and undisputedly, the suit plot was auctioned in favour of the plaintiff and pursuant to which, the plaintiff deposit 30% amount of the bid-consideration after the acceptance of his bid. The terms and conditions of the auction are provided in Ex. D-1. Clauses 6 and 9 of the terms and conditions of the auction (Ex. D-1) are required to be noticed for the purpose of adjudication of this appeal. The terms and conditions of the auction are provided in Ex. D-1. Clauses 6 and 9 of the terms and conditions of the auction (Ex. D-1) are required to be noticed for the purpose of adjudication of this appeal. ^^¼6½ tc Hkwfe ds Hkw[k.M dk uhyke fd;k tk,xk rks lcls Åaph cksyh Lohd`r cksyh ds :i esa le>h tk,xhA ;fn v/;{k dh jk; esa vafre cksyh mfpr ugha gS ;k izjf{kr dher ls de ls gS rks v/;{k cksyh dks ukeatwj dj ldsxk vkSj u;s fljs ls uhyke ds fy, vkns’k ns ldsxk] tks ckn esa ?kksf”kr dh tkus okyh i’pkr~orhZ rkjh[k dks gksxkA tc v/;{k }kjk lcls Åaph cksyh Lohdkj dj yh tk,] rks cksyh yxkus okyk rRdky cksyh /ku dk 30 izfr’kr fu{ksi djsxk vkSj vU; cksyh yxkus okyksa }kjk fuf{kIr dh xbZ leLr jkf’k;ka okil dj nh tk,xhA uhyke ds ekeys esa v/;{k }kjk lcls Åaph cksyh Lohd`r dj ysus ds i’pkr~ uhykeh cksyh dk vfr’ks”k ,slh lalwpuk ls iUnzg fnu ds Hkhrj izkf/kdkjh ds dk;kZy; esa fuf{kIr dj fn;k tk,xkA bl izdkj uhyke dh xbZ Hkwfe lcls Åaph cksyh cksyus okys dks] vU; ckrksa ds lkFk izhfe;e ds ds 6-50 izfr’kr dh nj ls Hkw&HkkVd ds okf”kZd Hkqxrku dh ‘krZ ds v/khu jgrs gq, varfjr dj nh tk,xhA ¼9½ lQy dzsrk )kjk dz; djus ls badkj djus vFkok fu/kkZfjr vof/k esa okafNr jkf’k tek ugha djus ij] v/;{k mDr uhykeh fodz; dks ,d rjQk jn~n dj ldsxk ,oa dzsrk }kjk tek dh xbZ leLr jkf’k jktlkr dh tk ldsxh] vU;Fkk fu/kkZfjr vof/k ds ckn Hkqxrku fd;s tkus gsrq v/;{k egksn; dh fyf[kr Lohd`fr vko’;d gksxh rFkk ,slh n’kk esa lQy dszrk }kjk 18 izfr’kr dh nj ls nkafMd C;kt Hkh ns; gksxkA** 10. From a careful and close perusal of Clause 6, it would appear that a successful bidder was required to deposit 30% amount of the bid-consideration then and there after acceptance of his bid by the defendant and the remaining 70% amount of the bid-consideration was required to be deposited by the bidder after acceptance of the bid by the defendant within 15 days from the date of communication. It is the specific case of the defendant that it issued notices to the plaintiff on 5-1-1989, 11-4-1989, 11-5-1989, 6-3-1990 and 12-7-1990 to deposit the balance 70% amount of the bid-consideration and when the plaintiff failed to deposit the same, order dated 12-10-1990 (Ex. It is the specific case of the defendant that it issued notices to the plaintiff on 5-1-1989, 11-4-1989, 11-5-1989, 6-3-1990 and 12-7-1990 to deposit the balance 70% amount of the bid-consideration and when the plaintiff failed to deposit the same, order dated 12-10-1990 (Ex. D-2) came to be passed cancelling the allotment of the suit plot made in favour of the plaintiff and forfeiting the entire amount deposited by the plaintiff. In order to prove the aforesaid stand, the defendant filed only two documents, namely, (i) Ex. D-1, which is the terms and conditions of the public-auction and (ii) Ex. D-2, which is a copy of the order communicating the cancellation of allotment of the suit plot and forfeiting the amount deposited. Thus, there is no document placed on record by the defendant to prove the fact of service of notices dated 5-1-1989, 11-4-1989, 11-5-1989, 6-3-1990 and 12-7-1990 issued to deposit the balance 70% amount of the bid-consideration as pleaded in the written statement. 11. Coming to the oral evidence adduced by the defendant, I find that the defendant's witness Madan Chandrakar (DW-1) did not utter any word in his evidence that any such notice was ever served upon the plaintiff to make 70% deposit as provided in Clause 6 of the terms and conditions of the auction (Ex. D-1). Thus, there is no oral as well as documentary evidence on record to hold that any such notice/intimation was communicated to the plaintiff after acceptance of the bid in favour of the plaintiff by the defendant. 13. Clause 9 of the terms and conditions of the auction (Ex. D-1) could have been invoked only when Clause 6 of the terms and conditions of the auction was not complied with by the plaintiff by depositing 70% amount of the bid-consideration. As it has already been held in foregoing paragraphs that the defendant has failed to communicate the acceptance of bid of the plaintiff by it as nothing has been brought on record except self-serving pleading in the written statement by the defendant, therefore, it is also held that the defendant has failed to prove that Clause 6 of the terms and conditions of the auction was complied with by it by communicating the plaintiff to deposit the balance 70% amount of the bid-consideration. The finding recorded by the first appellate Court in this regard holding that the defendant has failed to produce and prove the service of notice for complying Clause 6 of the terms and conditions of the auction is strictly in accordance with law and based on record and, therefore, I do not find any infirmity in the said finding and the same is hereby affirmed. 13. Coming to the first substantial question of law, Shri H.B. Agrawal, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant/defendant would submit that the relief which has not been prayed for by the plaintiff has been granted by the first appellate Court. The plaintiff in his plaint has claimed the following reliefs: ^^15- vr% ekuuh; U;k;ky; ls fuEu lgk;rk dh izkFkZuk djrk gS%& ¼v½ ;g fd izfroknh )kjk nsosUnz uxj ;kstuk ds varxZr bafnjk O;olkf;d ifjrd iaMjh esa uhyke )kjk dz; dh xbZ Hkw[k.M dz- 74 dks iqu% fnukad 12-3-1992 ;k mlds ckn vU; fdlh frfFk dks uhyke dj fodz; fd;s tkus ls izfrcaf/kr fd;k tk;sA ¼c½ ;g fd izfroknh )kjk oknh ds )kjk dz; fd;k x;k oknxzLr Hkw[k.M dz- 74 dk vkcaVu fujLr djus dh dk;Zokgh voS/k ?kksf”kr fd;k tk;sA ¼l½ okn O;; o vU; lgk;rk tks ekuuh; U;k;ky; mfpr le>s fnykbZ tkosA** 14. The first appellate Court has granted the following reliefs: ^^27- ifj.kker% vihykFkhZ )kjk izzLrqr vihy Lohdkj dh tkrh gS ,oa lIre O;-U;k- oxZ&2] jk;iqj )kjk O;- okn dz- 170,@95 ¼xksihpan cuke jk;iqj fodkl izkf/kdj.k½ esa ikfjr fu.kZ; ,oa t;i= fnukad 30-9-1997 fujLr fd;k tkrk gS ,oa vihykFkhZ ds i{k esa rFkk mrjoknh ds fo:} fuEu vk’k; dh lgk;rk iznku dh tkrh gS %& ¼1½ izfroknh@mrjoknh )kjk nsosUnz uxj ;kstuk dz- 32 ds varxZr bafnjk O;kolkf;d ifjlj iaMjh rjkbZ jk;iqj esa vihykFkhZ )kjk uhykeh esa dz; fd;s x;s Hkw[k.M dz- 74 ds laca/k esa mrjoknh )kjk ikfjr vkns’k fnukad 12-10-1990 tks fd vkoaVu fujLr fd;s tkus ,oa tek jkf’k jktlkr fd;s tkus gsrq gS] dks fof/k ,oa rF;ksa ds foijhr gksus ls voS/k ?kksf”kr dj] fujLr fd;k tkrk gSA ¼2½ vihykFkhZ )kjk foofnr Hkw[ka.M dz- 74 dh uhykeh dh cdk;k jkf’k ,oa ‘krZ dz- 6 ds vuqlkj Hkw&HkkVd Hkqxrku fd;s tkus ij mrjoknh lQy dzsrk ds :i esa vihykFkhZ ds i{k esa iV~Vs dk fu”iknu ‘krZ dz- 11 ds vuqlkj djsA ¼3½ mrjoknh Lo;a dk rFkk vihykFkhZ dk bl vihy dk O;; ogu djsA vf/koDrk ‘kqYd izekf.kr gksus ij lwph vuqlkj O;; esa tksM+k tkosA** 15. A conjoint reading of the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiff and the reliefs granted by the first appellate Court would reveal that the plaintiff has clearly claimed the relief that the cancellation of allotment of the suit plot be declared void, which the first appellate Court, while granting the reliefs, held that the cancellation of allotment on 12-10-1990 (Ex. D-2) is illegal. Though the execution of a Patta (lease-deed) for the suit plot has not been claimed specifically yet the grant of relief of execution of lease-deed by the first appellate Court in favour of the plaintiff is a consequential relief in the interest of justice, which is in accordance with law and cannot be faulted with as once the cancellation of allotment is set aside by the competent Court, it is also the obligation of the defendant to execute the lease-deed in favour of the plaintiff. So, the first substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 16. Coming to the second substantial question of law, 1 find that a bare perusal of the written statement would reveal that no such plea that the suit was not maintainable has been taken in the written statement. So, the first substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 16. Coming to the second substantial question of law, 1 find that a bare perusal of the written statement would reveal that no such plea that the suit was not maintainable has been taken in the written statement. Even before the two Courts below, no such plea was taken by the defendant that the suit was not maintainable on any count. 17. Now, at this stage, Shri H.B. Agrawal, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant/defendant would submit that since the suit plot has been re-auctioned in favour of respondent No. 2 Anil Kumar Agrawal on 12-3-1992, therefore, in absence of challenge to re-auction and that respondent No. 2 - the transferee pendente lite was not impleaded as a party - defendant to the suit, the suit is not maintainable. It is apparent that the present suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction was filed on 10-3-1992 challenging the cancellation of allotment and also challenging the re-auction dated 12-3-1992 and by order dated 11-3-1992 the application for temporary injunction was rejected by the trial Court and re-auction of the suit plot was held on 12-3-1992 and a lease-deed was executed in favour of respondent No. 2 on 24-10-1996 and the trial Court has also framed and decided an issue as to whether the re-auction was invalid. 18. At this stage, it would be profitable to take notice of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (henceforth 'the Act of 1882'). Section 52 of the Act of 1882 prohibits alienation or any transaction in respect of any immovable property for being subject-matter of the suit or proceeding. In order to bring into operation the rule of lis pendens, the following requirements must be fulfilled: "1. There should be a suit or proceeding pending between the parties; 2. The suit or proceeding should be bona fide and not collusive; 3. It must relate to any right to immovable property; 4. The involvement of any right to immovable property is not enough, but that right should be directly and specifically in question; 5. The other party, that is to say, the party other than the one making the transfer during the pendency of the suit, must have some right under the decree in the suit; and 6. The involvement of any right to immovable property is not enough, but that right should be directly and specifically in question; 5. The other party, that is to say, the party other than the one making the transfer during the pendency of the suit, must have some right under the decree in the suit; and 6. The alienation or transaction is calculated to prejudice the right of that party under any decree or order which may be made in the suit." 19. In Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy and others : AIR 2007 SC 1332 , the Supreme Court has clearly held that a transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree just as much as he was a party to the suit. The ratio of law reads thus: "12. The principles specified in Section 52 of the T.P. Act are in accordance with equity, good conscience or justice because they rest upon an equitable and just foundation that it will be impossible to bring an action or suit to a successful termination if alienations are permitted to prevail. A transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree just as much as he was a party to the suit. The principle of lis pendens embodied in Section 52 of the T.P. Act being a principle of public policy, no question of good faith or bona fide arises. The principle underlying Section 52 is that a litigating party is exempted from taking notice of a title acquired during the pendency of the litigation. The mere pendency of a suit does not prevent one of the parties from dealing with the property constituting the subject-matter of the suit. The Section only postulates a condition that the alienation will in no manner affect the rights of the other party under any decree which may be passed in the suit unless the property was alienated with the permission of the Court." 20. Admittedly, in the light of Section 52 of the Act of 1882 and the foregoing principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Sanjay Verma case : AIR 2007 SC 1332 (supra), on turning back to the facts of the instant case, it would appear that the allotment made in favour of the plaintiff was cancelled on 12-10-1990 (Ex. Admittedly, in the light of Section 52 of the Act of 1882 and the foregoing principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Sanjay Verma case : AIR 2007 SC 1332 (supra), on turning back to the facts of the instant case, it would appear that the allotment made in favour of the plaintiff was cancelled on 12-10-1990 (Ex. D-2), the suit came to be filed on 10-3-1992, the application for temporary injunction was rejected by the trial Court on 11-3-1992, re-auction of the suit plot in favour of respondent No. 2 was made on 12-3-1992, a lease-deed for the suit plot was also executed in favour of respondent No. 2 on 24-10-1996, the trial Court dismissed the suit on 30-9-1997, but, ultimately, the first appellate Court decreed the suit on 7-5-1999. Thus, the rule of lis pendens is squarely attracted to the facts of the instant case and respondent No. 2 is bound by the decree so passed by the first appellate Court and it cannot be held that the suit is not maintainable for want of challenge to the re-auction made and thereafter to the lease-deed executed in favour of respondent No. 2. The second substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 21. In the result, the appeal deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. The judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court is affirmed. There shall be no order as to costs. A decree be drawn-up accordingly.