JUDGMENT Dev Darshan Sud, J. This appeal has been preferred by defendants 1 and 2 against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in OMP No.290 of 2011, application filed under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the CPC) calling upon the defendants to deposit mesne profit for the suit premises. The Hon’ble Single Judge holds that for the period up to the filing of the suit i.e. 27.9.2009, a sum of Rs.25,00,000/- be deposited by the defendants, and thereafter, up to September, 2012 a sum of Rs.50,00,000/- shall be deposited by the defendants which will be adjusted against the suit amount. 2. It is contended before us that the amount awarded by way of interim relief exceeds the suit amount which is Rs.43,66,000/-; defendants disputed even this amount. Before adverting to the submissions made by learned counsel appearing for the parties, we note that preliminary objection has been urged on behalf of the plaintiffs/respondents that this appeal is not maintainable the order appealed being interlocutory. It is contended by learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/respondents that the appeal is not maintainable for the reasons that the order passed is interlocutory in nature and is not a case decided within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. Learned counsel placed reliance upon the decision in M/s I.T.C. Ltd., versus M/s Bhatia Brothers and others, AIR 1979 Punjab and Haryana 191 holding: “3. It is manifest that the order under appeal is merely a stay order on terms and conditions specified therein and involves no determination of any right or liability which may ultimately affect the merits of the controversy. That being so, the matter is obviously covered by Faqir Chand’s case (AIR 1978 Punj. & Har. 269) (supra), wherein it has been categorically held that against such a stay order no letter patent appeal is competent.” (P.191) 3. Learned counsel further supports his submissions relying upon Smt. Chando Devi versus Municipal Committee, Delhi, AIR 1961 Punjab 424 holding that an order of setting aside an abatement of a suit or an appeal cannot be regarded as a decision which affects the merits of the question pending resolution between the parties by determining some right or liability and is not a judgment within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent and, therefore, appeal is not maintainable against such an order. Further reliance was also placed upon the decision in Firm Badri Dass Janakidass of Delhi versus Mathanmal and others, AIR 1922 Lahore 185. 4. Reliance was also placed by learned counsel appearing for the respondents upon the decision in Begum Aftab Zamani versus Shri Lal Chand Khanna, AIR 1969 Delhi 85 holding :- “4. Without dealing at length with some other decisions which have distinguished the Privy Council decision, we feel that we have to construe the word “judgment” in section 10 of the Act in its own context and in the back ground of its own statutory scheme and that the ratio of the Privy Council decision merely goes to suggest that the word “judgment” as used in the Letters Patent may not be restricted to the literal definition of the expression “judgment” as contained in the Civil P.C. The letters Patent, when providing for appeals from judgments, in our view, contemplate judgments which have both the effect of a decree as defined in the Code and of such order as may affect the merits of a controversy between the parties by determining some disputed right or liability. A judgment may thus be either final or preliminary or interlocutory. In order to decide whether an adjudication should be treated as a “judgment” within the meaning of clause 10 of the Letters Patent, we feel that regard should be had not to the form of the adjudication but to its effect upon the suit or the civil proceeding in which it is made. If its effect, whatever its form and whatever the nature of the proceeding in which it is made, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding, or if its effect, if not complied with, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding, the adjudication is indisputably a “judgment” within the meaning of this clause . Other decisions or determinations adjudicating upon a disputed controversy on the merits in a suit or proceeding may also appropriately fall within the contemplation of the word “judgment”. Other decisions or determinations adjudicating upon a disputed controversy on the merits in a suit or proceeding may also appropriately fall within the contemplation of the word “judgment”. It is not possible to lay down any definite rule which would meet the requirements of all cases and all that we may say is that in determining whether an order or decision constitutes a “judgment” or not, the Court has to take into consideration the nature of the order and its effect upon the suit or the civil proceeding in which it is made. Each case would thus depend on its own peculiar facts and circumstances.” (P.89) 5. We are not inclined to accept this objection as the matter had been settled by the Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji vs. Jayaben D. Kania and another, AIR 1981 SC 1786 holding: “110. In Mt. Shahzadi Begam v. Alakh Nath, AIR 1935 All 620 (2) (FB), Sulaiman, C.J. very rightly pointed out that as the Letters Patent were drafted long before even the Code of 1882 was passed, the word ‘judgment’ used in the Letters Patent cannot be relatable to or confined to the definition of ‘judgment’ as contained in the Code of Civil Procedure which came into existence long after the Letters Patent were given. In this connection, the Chief Justice observed as follows:- “It has been held in numerous cases that as the Letters Patent were drafted long before even the earlier Code of 1882 was passed, the word ‘judgment’ used therein does not mean the judgment as defined in the existing Code of Civil Procedure. At the same time the word ‘judgment’ does not include every possible order, final, preliminary or interlocutory passed by a Judge of the High Court.” 111. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the observations made by the Allahabad High Court on this aspect of the matter. 115. Thus, in other words every interlocutory order cannot be regarded as a judgment but only those orders would be judgments which decide matters of moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the parties and which work serious injustice to the party concerned. Similarly, orders passed by the trial Judge deciding question of admissibility of relevancy of a document also cannot be treated as judgments because the grievance on this score can be corrected by the appellate court in appeal against the final judgment. 120. Similarly, orders passed by the trial Judge deciding question of admissibility of relevancy of a document also cannot be treated as judgments because the grievance on this score can be corrected by the appellate court in appeal against the final judgment. 120. Thus, these are some of the principles which might guide a Division Bench in deciding whether an order passed by the trial Judge amounts to a judgment within the meaning of the letters Patent. We might, however, at the risk of repetition give illustrations of interlocutory orders which may be treated as judgments:- (1) An order granting leave to amend the plain by introducing a new cause of action which completely alters the nature of the suit and takes away a vested right of limitation or any other valuable right accrued to the defendant. (2) An order rejecting the plaint. (3) An order refusing leave to defend the suit in an action under Order 37, Code of Civil Procedure. (4) An order rescinding leave of the trial Judge granted by him under Cl.12 of the Letters Patent. (5). An order deciding a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the suit on the ground of limitation, absence of notice under Section 80, bar against competency of the suit against the defendant even though the suit is kept alive. (6) An order rejecting an application for a judgment on admission under O.12, Rule 6. (7) An order refusing to add necessary parties in a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (8) An order varying or amending a decree. (9) an order refusing leave to sue in forma pauperis. (10) An order granting review. (11) An order allowing withdrawal of the suit with liberty to file a fresh one. (12) An order holding that the defendants are not agriculturists within the meaning of the special law. (13) An order staying or refusing to stay a suit under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (14) An order granting or refusing to stay execution of the decree. (15) An order deciding payment of court-fees against the plaintiff.” (Pp.1814-1817) 6. In J.S. Tins Fabricators and others versus U.Co. Bank, AIR 1994 HP 33 a learned Division Bench of this Court reiterated these very principles. 7. In Vijay Devi versus Navendra Singh Katoch and others, 2009(2) Shim.LC 316 this Court holds: “16. (15) An order deciding payment of court-fees against the plaintiff.” (Pp.1814-1817) 6. In J.S. Tins Fabricators and others versus U.Co. Bank, AIR 1994 HP 33 a learned Division Bench of this Court reiterated these very principles. 7. In Vijay Devi versus Navendra Singh Katoch and others, 2009(2) Shim.LC 316 this Court holds: “16. What is the import of the word ‘judgment’ has been the subject matter of a large number of decisions. A Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Begum Aftab Zamani vs. Lal Chand Khanna, AIR 1969 Delhi 85 , while dealing with the scope of the word ‘judgment’ occurring in Clause 10 of the Letters Patent and Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, held as follows:- “4. xxxx…..xxx…. In order to decide whether an adjudication should be treated as a “Judgment” within the meaning of clause 10 of the Letters Patent, we feel that regard should be had not to the form of the adjudication but to its effect upon the suit or the civil proceeding in which it is made. If its effect, whatever its form and whatever the nature of the proceeding in which it is made, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding, or if its effect, if not complied with, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding, the adjudication is indisputably a “Judgment” within the meaning of this clause. Other decisions or determinations adjudicating upon a disputed controversy on the merits in a suit or proceeding may also appropriately fall within the contemplation of the word “Judgment”. It is not possible to lay down any definite rule which would meet the requirements of all cases and all that we may say is that in determining whether an order or decision constitutes a “Judgment” or not, the Court has to take into consideration the nature of the order and its effect upon the suit or the civil proceeding in which it is made. Each case would thus depend on its own peculiar facts and circumstances. 5. We have arrived at this conclusion on the plain reading of Section 10 of the Act in the background of the statutory scheme. Each case would thus depend on its own peculiar facts and circumstances. 5. We have arrived at this conclusion on the plain reading of Section 10 of the Act in the background of the statutory scheme. In our view, the draftsman could neither have intended to restrict the right of appeal only to final Judgments disposing of the entire suit, nor could he have intended it to extend to all orders made during the course of trial, however ministerial or procedural in their nature or ineffectual on the rights of the parties. 6. xxx. Xxx… xxx…. 7. In the present case, the Judgment has indisputably disposed of the suit finally, with the result that nothing more remains to be done in the trial of the suit. Whether a decree is also to be framed in agreement with the Judgment under the Civil P.C. is, in our opinion, immaterial because the Act does not take notice of decrees and in terms it provides for appeals only from Judgments. The Judgment under appeal, however, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to the matters in controversy in the suit and it embodies in itself the formal expression of the adjudication. Merely because as a result of the adjudication, it purports also to grant a decree, would not deprive the Judgment of the characteristics of a decree for the purposes of Court Fees Act. This Judgment must, therefore, be held to amount to a decree and, therefore, excluded from the operation of Article 11, Schedule II. The Act, it may be remembered, does not define either “Judgment” or “decree”. It merely makes the Judgment appealable under Section 10. To be appealable, as hereinbefore discussed, the Judgment, broadly stated, must be more than a mere statement given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order; in other words, it must contain or embody a decision on a dispute affecting the merits as well. In the case before us, the Judgment also contains all the criteria of a decree and this indeed is not contested. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that this case quite clearly falls within the purview of Article 1, Schedule I and is subject to payment of ad valorem court-fee.” 17. In the case before us, the Judgment also contains all the criteria of a decree and this indeed is not contested. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that this case quite clearly falls within the purview of Article 1, Schedule I and is subject to payment of ad valorem court-fee.” 17. The Apex Court also considered the scope of the word Judgment in a detailed Judgment in Shah Babulal Khimji vs. Jayaben D. Kania and another, AIR 1981 SC 1786 . After considering the entire law on the subject held as follows:- “113. Thus, under the Code of Civil Procedure, a Judgment consists of the reasons and grounds for a decree passed by a court. As a Judgment constitutes the reasons for the decree it follows as a matter of course that the Judgment must be a formal adjudication which conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy. The concept of a Judgment as defined by the Code of Civil Procedure seems to be rather narrow and the limitations engrafted by sub-section (2) of Section 2 cannot be physically imported into the definition of the word ‘Judgment’ as used in Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent because the Letters Patent has advisedly not used the term ‘order’ or ‘decree’ anywhere. The intention, therefore, of the givers of the Letters Patent was that the word ‘Judgment’ should receive a much wider and more liberal interpretation than the word ‘Judgment’ used in the Code of Civil Procedure. At the same time, it cannot be said that any order passed by a trial Judge would amount to a Judgment; otherwise there will be no end to the number of orders which would be appealable under the Letters Patent. It seems to us that the word ‘Judgment’ has undoubtedly a concept of finality in a broader and not a narrower sense. In other words, a Judgment can be of three kinds:- (1) A final Judgment - A Judgment which decides all the questions or issues in controversy so far as the trial Judge is concerned and leaves nothing else to be decided. This would mean that by virtue of the Judgment, the suit or action brought by the plaintiff is dismissed or decreed in part or in full. This would mean that by virtue of the Judgment, the suit or action brought by the plaintiff is dismissed or decreed in part or in full. Such an order passed by the trial Judge indisputably and unquestionably is a Judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent and even amounts to a decree so that an appeal would lie from such a Judgment to a Division Bench.” 18. It is clear that the Apex Court drew a distinction between the definition of decree and Judgment as occurring in Code of Civil Procedure and the term Judgment as used in the Letters Patents. In respect of a final Judgment the Apex Court clearly held that a Judgment which decides all the questions or issues so far as the trial Judge is concerned and leaves nothing else to be decided is a final Judgment. A ‘Judgment’ has been described as constituting the reasons for the decree that follows. Reasons are part of the Judgment while the decree is the operative part of the order. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the law cited by the respondent which relates only to Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to the present appeal which has been filed under Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act. This provision allows a party to challenge a Judgment. The findings given by the learned trial Judge holding the Will set up by the defendant No.1 to be invalid as well as the findings recorded by him that the orders of the Revenue Officials allowing mutation of the property in favour of the defendant No.1 are null and void, definitely amount to a Judgment against the appellant and therefore, we are of the view that the appellant is entitled to challenge the same by means of the present appeal.” (Pp. 321-324) 8. We, therefore, hold that the appeal is maintainable since the decision itself touches the merits of the case. It is not a decision which is interlocutory per se. More so, because of the fact that the plaintiffs prays for decree of Rs.43,66,000/- along with interest 18% per annum. If the order is allowed to stand, it grants much beyond what has been claimed in the suit. It is not a decision which is interlocutory per se. More so, because of the fact that the plaintiffs prays for decree of Rs.43,66,000/- along with interest 18% per annum. If the order is allowed to stand, it grants much beyond what has been claimed in the suit. In all fairness we advert to the pleadings in OMP No.290 of 2011, it is pleaded that the plaintiffs/respondents have instituted the suit for possession of the land and building, subject matter of the suit and prayer is that directions be issued to the non-applicants/defendants to clear the rental in terms of the lease deed binding between the parties and after termination of the tenancy to pay use and occupation charges at the market rate as pleaded in the replication. In order to substantiate there pleadings, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/applicants/respondents pointed out that the evidence recorded on behalf of the plaintiffs is un-rebutted and establishes the claim of the plaintiffs. We are unable to accept the submission for the reasons that till the entire evidence in the suit is recorded, the figures as submitted by the plaintiffs/applicants cannot be accepted. No award can be made in interlocutory proceedings, which is beyond the main relief claimed as a decree in the suit and for this reason we would find that the judgment of the Hon’ble Single Judge does not consider this aspect of the case. A number of submissions have been made by learned counsel appearing for the parties in support of their contentions. We do not adjudicate on them lest it prejudices the case of the parties. Suffice to say, at this stage for the purpose of consideration of the application, it should have been granted in accordance with law after due determination with the established principles. 9. In these circumstances, this appeal is allowed and the order of the Hon’ble Single Judge is modified to the extent that direction for deposit will not be beyond that which is claimed in the suit. No order as to the costs. 10. All pending miscellaneous applications also stand disposed of.