JUDGMENT 1. - This criminal misc. petition has been filed by the State of Rajasthan through Addl. Director General, Anti Corruption Bureau, Govt, of Rajasthan, Jaipur against the order dated 18.11.2013 passed by Special Judge-Sessions Judge, ACD Cases, Ajmer directing the petitioner to be present in person to explain why FIR had not been registered and only a preliminary enquiry was registered in private complaint No.3 of 2013 Hari Ram v. Anil Kumar Vishnol and another . The State of Rajasthan In the said criminal misc. petition prayed that this Hon'ble Court may very graciously be pleased to accept and allow this misc. petition and may be further pleased to quash and set aside the order dated 18th November, 2013 passed by the Special Judge, ACD Cases Ajmer In private complaint No. 3/2013 and may further be pleased to direct the Court of ACD Cases not to Insist on registering an FIR unless a PE is registered and the findings of the PE require the registration of FIR. 2. The facts of this case are that one Hari Ram filed a complaint against the non-petitioners Anil Kumar Vishnol and Babu Lal Vishnol before the court of Special Judge, ACD Cases, Jodhpur on May 30,2012. The said complaint was registered as Private Complaint No. 3/2013. The Special Judge directed that the complaint be sent to Additional Superintendent of Police, Nagaur under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for Investigation as per law and for submission of the findings to the court vide order dated June 27, 2012. The said complaint was received In the office of the Anti Corruption Bureau (ACB) from the Additional Superintendent of Police Nagaur. In compliance of the directions of the court, a preliminary enquiry No. 193 of 2012 was registered on October 5, 2012. The Additional Superintendent of Police, ACB, Chowkl Nagaur Investigated the matter and the report was submitted In the court of Special Judge ACD Cases Jodhpur on January 28, 2013, In the detailed report submitted on June 6, 2013 the allegations were found as baseless. On constitution of new courts, the aforesaid matter was transferred to the court of Special Judge, ACD Cases, Ajmer. The petitioner received a letter dated 18th October, 2013 from the Special Judges, ACD Cases Ajmer with regard to non- compliance of the directions of the court by the ACB Chowkl Nagaur. On constitution of new courts, the aforesaid matter was transferred to the court of Special Judge, ACD Cases, Ajmer. The petitioner received a letter dated 18th October, 2013 from the Special Judges, ACD Cases Ajmer with regard to non- compliance of the directions of the court by the ACB Chowkl Nagaur. In the said letter following five points were mentioned : 1- eqLrxhl gjhjke us vfHk;qDr vfuy dqekj fo'uksbZ ,oa ckcwyky fo'uksbZ ds fo:) Hkz"Vkpkj fuokj.k vf/kfu;e o Hkkjrh; n.M lafgrk dh /kkjkvksa ds rgr ifjokn is'k fd;k ftl ij lEcfU/kr U;k;ky;] tks/kiqj }kjk n.M izfdz;k lafgrk dh /kkjk 156 ( 3 ) ds rgr ifjokn ,0lh0ch0 ukxkSj dks Hkstk x;kA ;g izdj.k vUrfjr gksdj vc v/kksgLrk{kjdrkZ ds U;k;ky; esa vk x;k gSA bl izdj.k esa vHkh rd izFke lwpuk fjiksVZ ntZ ugha dh xbZ gS vkSj vfrfjDr iqfyl v/kh{kd ,0lh0ch0 ukxkSj ls izkFkfed tkap djus dk Li"Vhdj.k izkIr gqvk gSA 2- v/kksgLrk{kjdrkZ ds bl U;k;ky; esa eqLrxhl vkseizdk'k us vfHk;qDr vk;qokuflag pkj.k ds fo:) Hkz"Vkpkj fuokj.k vf/kfu;e o Hkkjrh; n.M lafgrk dh /kkjkvksa ds rgr ifjokn is'k fd;k] tks n.M izfdz;k lafgrk dh /kkjk 156 ( 3 ) ds rgr vuqla/kku dj rhu ekg esa fjiksVZ is'k djus ds fy, vfrfjDr iqfyl vf/k{kd ,0lh0ch0 ukxkSj dks Hkstk x;k ysfdu vkt fnukad rd izFke lwpuk fjiksVZ ntZ gks pqdh gks] ,slh lwpuk izkIr ugha gqbZ gSA 3- lEcfU/kr U;k;ky; tks/kiqj esa eqLrxhl guqeku jke us vfHk;qDrx.k Jherh gkcM+h nsoh oxSjg dqy 04 ds fo:) Hkz"Vkpkj fuokj.k vf/kfu;e o Hkkjrh; n.M lafgrk dh /kkjkvksa ds rgr ifjokn is'k fd;kA ;g izdj.k Hkh vUrfjr gksdj v/kksgLrk{kjdrkZ ds U;k;ky; dks izkIr gqvk gSA bl izdj.k esa izFke lwpuk fjiksVZ la0 170@2011 ntZ gksuk ik;k x;k gS] tks pkj vfHk;qDrx.k esa ls dsoy nks vfHk;qDrx.k ds fo:) gh ntZ dh xbZ gS vkSj urhtk vkuk vHkh ckdh gS tcfd ekeyk o"kZ 2008 dk gSaA 4- blh izdkj ,d ifjokn xqekukjke cuke ?kklhjke lEcfU/kr U;k;ky; tks/kiqj esa is'k gqvk] tgkWa ls ,0lh0ch0 ukxkSj dks n.M izfdz;k lafgrk dh /kkjk 156 ( 3 ) ds rgr Hkstk x;kA ysfdu mlesa Hkh izkFkfed tkap fd;s tkus dh fjiksVZ izkIr gqbZ gS vkSj izFke lwpuk fjiksVZ vkt fnukad rd ntZ ugha gqbZA 5- ,d vU; izdj.k tks ,0lh0ch0 pkSdh ukxkSj ls gh lEcfU/kr gS] ftldh ,Q0vkbZ0vkj uEcj 318@2011 gSA bl izdj.k esa ifjoknh Hkh vfrfjDr iqfyl v/kh{kd Hkz"Vkpkj fujks/kd C;wjks ukxkSj Jh jktsUnz dqekj eh.kk gS vkSj ,Q0vkj0 drkZ djus okyk vf/kdkjh Hkh mDr Jh jktsUnz dqekj eh.kk gh gSA 3. That in similar matter a revision petition was filed before the Hon'ble High Court at Jodhpur and the said revision petition No. 911/2012 was dismissed vide order dated 1.11.2012 and the petitioner was directed to appear before the court below at Bikaner. The petitioner appeared before the Special Judge, ACD Cases, Bikaner on November 17, 2012. The Special Judge ACD Cases was satisfied with the response and held that before registering an FIR, PE was permissible. The extract of the order dated 17.11.2012 passed by the Special Judge, ACD Cases, Bikaner reads as under: " tokc iwoZ esa is'k fd;k tk pqdk gS o lEcfU/kr vly i=kofy;ksa ftuesa fd iz'uxr bLrxklk@bLrxkls esa izkFkfed tkap ds vkns'k ih0 lqjktqn~nhu cuke LVsV vkWQ enzkl oxSjg ,0vkbZ0vkj0 1971 ( ,l0lh0 ) ist 520 ,oa vU; U;kf;d n'"VkUrksa ds vk/kkj ij MhMhih dh fjiksVZ ds mijkUr izkFkfed tkap okaNuh; gksus dh fjiksVZ ds vk/kkj ij Jh vthrflag }kjk ,QvkbZvkj ntZ djus ls iwoZ izkFkfed tkap lapkfyr djus dks mfpr ekuk x;k gS] dk Hkh voyksdu djok;k x;k o tSlk fd ekuuh; lokZsPp U;k;ky; us mij of.kZr ljktqn~nhu okys ekeys esa ,Q0vkbZ0vkj0 ntZ djus ls iwoZ izkFkfed tkap dk vuquR; fd;k gS] blfy;s esjh jk; esa ,Q0vkbZ0vkj0 ntZ djus ls iwoZ izkFkfed tkap dk tks vkns'k iz'uxr bLrxkls@bLrxklksa ds lEcU/k esa fd;k x;k gS] og vuqfpr ugha dgk tk ldrk] ysfdu izkFkfed tkap Rofjr xfr ls fuiVk;k tkuk Hkh visf{kr gS blfy, vfrfjDr ekgkfuns'kd iqfyl Hkz"Vkpkj fujks/kd C;wjks jktLFkku] t;iqj dks funsZf'kr fd;k tkrk gS fd os bLrxkls ftuesa fd izkFkfed tkap ds fy, fofHkUu ,lhch pkSdh dks Hksts x;s gSa] mUgsa izkFkfed tkap dks Rofjr xfr ls fuLrkfjr djus ds funsZ'k lEcfU/kr ,lhch pkSdh dks iznku djsa o mldh izxfr dh fLV~DV eksusVfjax djs] o izR;sd ekg dh izFke rkjh[k dks bl U;k;ky; dks Hkh izxfr ls voxr djkosa o rhu ekg esa izkFkfed tkap ds fdlh vatke ij ugha igWaqpus dh fLFkfr esa U;k;ky; dks fo'ks"k :i ls dkj.k lfgr lwfpr djsa o vuqla/kkukf/kdkjh ds fo:) leqfpr dk;Zokgh djsaA " " izFke izxfr fjiksVZ fnukad 1-12-2012 dks fHktokosaA i=koyh okLrs ns[kus izxfr fjiksVZ fnukad 5-12-2012 dks is'k gksA " 4. It is stated In the criminal misc. petition that despite all the clarification having been given, the Special Judge, ACD Cases, Ajmer directed the petitioner to remain present In person before the court on December 18, 2013. It is stated In the criminal misc. petition that despite all the clarification having been given, the Special Judge, ACD Cases, Ajmer directed the petitioner to remain present In person before the court on December 18, 2013. The order dated 18.11.2013 of the Special Judge ACD Cases Ajmer reads as under: " eqLrxhl e; vf/koDrk gkftjA U;k;ky; }kjk /kkjk 156 ( 3 ) lh vkj ihlh ds rgr Hksts x;s ifjokn esa ,Q vkbZ vkj ntZ ugha fd;s tkus ds bl izdj.k lfgr vusd izdj.k /;ku esa vkus ij egkfuns'kd , lh ch jktLFkku t;iqj dks vkt O;fDrxr :i ls gkftj gksus ds fy;s i= fy[kk x;k Fkk rkfd ;g lqfuf'pr fd;k tkos fd ,d vkbZ vkj ntZ ugha djus ds fy;s dkSu vf/kdkjh mRrjnk;h gS ysfdu os gkftj ugha vk;s vkSj Hksts x;s i= dzekad 137 fnukad 18-10-2013 dk tokc dzekad 3984] fnukad 14-11-2013 cgLrk{kfjr vfr0 egkfuns'kd iqfyl , lh ch jkt0 t;iqj dks ,Mh ,l0ih0 , lh ch pkSdh ukxkSj us is'k fd;k tks ;g crkus esa vleFkZ gS fd ,Q vkbZ vkj ntZ djus ls euk djus ds fy, dkSu vf/kdkjh mRrnk;h gSA tckc esa Hkh fdlh vf/kdkjh dk uke mRrjnk;h gksus ds :i esa vfdar ugha gSA fcuk mRrjnk;h vf/kdkjh ds uke dh tkudkjh ds voekuuk dh dk;Zokgh vxzsf"kr ugha dh tk ldrh gSA vr% tokc izLrqrdrkZ ds ekQZr ;g lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd Jheku~ egkfuns'kd iqfyl , lh ch jktLFkku t;iqj fnukd 18-12-2013 dks mifLFkr gksdj tokc is'k djsA " 5. This court earlier heard the matter on 25,2.2014 and passed the following order: ekuuh; U;k;kf/kifr Jh egs'kpUnz 'kekZ Jh vadq'k 'kekZ okLrs Jh txeksgu lDlSuk] vfrfjDr ekgkf/koDrkA Jh vuqjkx 'kekZ vfrfjDr egkf/koDrkA Jh ch0,u0 lkUnw] fo'ks"k yksd vfHk;kstdA izkFkhZ LVsV vkWaQ jktLFkku dh vksj ls ;g ;kfpdk /kkjk 482 n.M izfdz;k lafgrk ds vUrxZr izLrqr dh x;h gSA mDr izdj.k esa izkFkhZ dh vksj ls ,d izkFkZuki= vUrxZr /kkjk 482 n.M izfdz;k lafgrk izLrqr dj mlds lkFk layXu nLrkostkr ftlesa tokc o vknsf'kdk fnukad 18-12-2013 dh izfr dks izkFkZuk i= ds lkFk layXu dj mDr nLrkostkr dks fjdkMZ ij fy;s tkus dh izkFkZuk dh x;h gSA izkFkhZ dh vksj ls izLrqr mDr izkFkZuki= Lohdkj fd;k tkdj mlds lkFk layXu mDr nLrkostkr dks fjdkMZ ij fy;s tkus dk vkns'k fn;k tkrk gSA izkFkhZ dh vksj ls izLrqr bl ;kfpdk esa fof/k ls lEcfU/kr fof'k"V iz'u fufgr gS fd D;k n.M izfdz;k lafgrk dh /kkjk 156 ( 3 ) ds v/khu n.Muk;d }kjk vkns'k nsus ds mijkUr mlesa Hkz"Vkpkj fujks/kd C;wjks lh/ks gh izFke lwpuk fjiksVZ ntZ dj ysxk ;k ,slh izFke lwpuk fjiksVZ izkFkfed tkap fd;s tkus ds mijkUr ntZ dh tkosxhA mi fucU/kd ( U;kf;d ) gks funsZ'k fn;k tkrk gS fd bl iz'u ds lEcU/k esa ckj ds leLr bPNqd lnL;ksa dks lqus tkus gsrq okn lwph esa uksfVl izdkf'kr djsaA izkFkhZ dh vksj ls mifLFkr Jh vadq'k 'kekZ vf/koDrk us bl U;k;ky; ds le{k ;g izdV fd;k gS fd bl ekeys esa voekuuk dh dk;Zokgh 'kq: gks pqdh gS ,oa ekeyk mPp U;k;ky; dks jsQj fd;k x;k gS] blfy, izdj.k dk fuLrkj.k 'kh?kz fd;k tkosA pwafd ;g ,d egRoiw.kZ ekeyk gS blfy, bl ;kfpdk dk fuLrkj.k iwoZ foi{kh la[;k 2] 3 o 4 dks uksfVl tkjh fd;k tkuk vko';d gSA vr% foi{kh la[;k 2] 3 o 4 dks ;kfpdk ,oa LFkxu izkFkZuki= ds uksfVl tkjh fd;s tkosaA pwafd foi{kh la[;k 3 o 4 iqfyldehZ gksdj jktdh; deZpkjh gSa] blfy;s mi fucU/kd U;kf;d dks funsZ'k fn;k tkrk gS fd muds uksfVl lEcfU/kr iqfyl Fkkus ij Hksts tkosa ,oa foi{kh la[;k 2 iqfyl Fkkuk dqpsjk ds {ks=kf/kdkj dk fuoklh gS blfy;s mlds uksfVl iqfyl Fkkuk dqpsjk ij Hksts tkosaA bu foi{khx.k ds uksfVl bl funsZ'k ds lkFk Hksts tkosa fd uksfVl fnukad 28-2-2014 ls iwoZ rkehy djkosaA bl izdj.k dks fnukad 28-2-2014 dks lwphc) fd;k tkosA " 6. Thereafter on 28.2.2014 this court passed the following order : " fnukad 28-2-2014 ekuuh; U;k;kfFkifr Jh egs'kpUnz 'kekZ Jh izrkiflag] deZpkjh dk;kZy; jktdh; vf/koDrkA jktdh; vf/koDrk ds dk;kZy; ds deZpkjh Jh izrkiflag us crk;k fd foi{khx.k ij rkehy gks pqdh gSA rkehy ds ckotwn Hkh foi{khx.k dh vksj ls vkt U;k;ky; ds le{k dksbZ mifLFkr ugha gSA bl ;kfpdk esa fof/k ls lEcfU/kr fof'k"V iz'u fufgr gS fd D;k n.M izfdz;k lafgrk dh /kkjk 156 ( 3 ) ds v/khu n.Muk;d }kjk vkns'k nsus ds mijkUr mlesa Hkz"Vkpkj fujks/kd C;wjks lh/ks gh izFke lwpuk fjiksVZ ntZ dj ysxk ;k ,slh izkFke lwpuk fjiksVZ izkFkfed tkap fd;s tkus ds mijkUr ntZ dh tkosxhA mi fucU/kd ( U;kf;d ) dks funsZ'k fn;k tkrk gS fd bl iz'u ds lEcU/k esa ckj ds leLr bPNqd lnL;ksa dks lqus tkus gsrq okn lwph esa uksfVl izdk'kr djsa rFkk fo'ks"k lans'kokgd dks Hkstdj lEcfU/kr U;k;ky; ls bl ekeys ls lEcfU/kr leLr fjdkMZ ryc fd;k tkosA bl izdj.k dks fnukad 3-3-2014 dks lwphc) fd;k tkosA " 7. The matter was heard on March 5, 2014 and following order was passed: "I have heard Mr. Anurag Sharma, Addl. Advocate General for the State of Rajasthan, Mr, B.N. Sandu, Government Advocate of the State of Rajasthan, Mr. Ankush Sharma for Mr. J.M. Saxena, AAG for the State of Rajasthan, Mr, Virendra Godara, PP and Mr. Rajendra Singh Raghav, PP on behalf of the State of Rajasthan; Mr. Tej Prakash Sharma, Special Counsel for CBI; Mr. Chain Singh Rathore, counsel for the complainant and Mr. J.K. Singhl, Sr, Counsel assisted by Mr, Amltava Jatav, Mr. Prem Kumar Sharma, Mr. C.L. Salni, Mr. Sandeep Pathak, Mr. Anil Upman, Advocates, at length, on the question o law, which has been circulated In the cause list dated 4th March, 2014. All the Advocates want further time to argue this matter and they have given their consent that this matter should be posted on 11th March, 2014. Put up this case In this Court on 11th March, 2014 at 2.00 PM. On that day, the relevant officers of Anti Corruption Department will remain present In person In the Court. Registry is directed to show the name of all the aforesaid advocates In the cause list on 11th March, 2014 and other subsequent dates, If any. Put up this case In this Court on 11th March, 2014 at 2.00 PM. On that day, the relevant officers of Anti Corruption Department will remain present In person In the Court. Registry is directed to show the name of all the aforesaid advocates In the cause list on 11th March, 2014 and other subsequent dates, If any. Deputy Registrar (Judicial) is directed to get circulated the question d law, as has been circulated In the cause list of 4th March, 2014, In the cause of list of 10th March, 2014, so that the Advocate General and other members of Bar, who are willing to address the Court, may address the Court on the aforesaid question of law." 8. Thereafter on 11.2 2014, a further application under section 482 Cr.P.C. was filed by the petitioner for taking on record the replies and subsequent order dated 18.12.2013 of the Special Judge, ACD Cases, Ajmer. 9. Thereafter on 11.2 2014, a further application under section 482 Cr.P.C. was filed by the petitioner for taking on record the replies and subsequent order dated 18.12.2013 of the Special Judge, ACD Cases, Ajmer. 9. The Special Judge, ACD Cases, Ajmer passed the following order on 18.12.2013: pqafd ekeyk izFke n'"V;k gh U;k;ky; ds vkns'k dh voKk dk o U;k;ky; flfoy voekuuk dk gSA blfy, ekuuh; jkt0 mPp U;k;ky; dks voekuuk ckcr dk;Zokgh vxzsf"kr fd;s tkus ds fy, mRrjnk;h O;fDr dk uke dh tkudkjh vko';d Fkh blfy, iqu% fnukad 18-11-2013 dks Jhekou~ egkfuns'kd iqfyl ,lhch jkt0 t;iqj dks mifLFkr gksdj tokc nsus gsrq vkns'k fn;k x;kA ftu ij vkt mifLFkr vfr0 egkfuns'kd iqfyl ,lhch Jh vthr flag us Sec. 156(3) Cr.C.P. ds rgr Hksts x;s ekeyksa esa Hkh izkjfEHkd tkap djus vkSj izkjfEHkd tkap esa ekeyk izekf.kr ugha ik;s tkus ij ntZ djus dks lgh crk;k vkSj ,slk djus ls vkns'k dh voKk ugha gksuk dFku fd;k vkSj ntZ ugha djus ds fy, mRrnk;h O;fDr dk uke iwNs tkus ij dFku fd;k fd eSaus vthr flag Lo;a us mu ekeyksa esa ntZ djus ls bUdkj fd;k tks Sec. 156(3) Cr.P.C. ds rgr izkIr gq, ysfdu izkjfEHkd tkap esa ekeys izekf.kr ugha ik;s x;sA U;k;ky; dk er gS fd izkjfEHkd tkap nks gh ifjfLFkfr esa dh tk ldrh gS %& 1- tgkWa lKs; vijk/k izdV (Disclose) ugha gks jgk gks] 2- tgkWa iqfyl ds ikl lh/ks gh fjiksVZ dh tkrh gS vkSj tks ekeys U;k;ky; ls Sec. 156(3) Cr.P.C. ds rgr Hksts gq, ugha gSA U;k;ky; ;gkWa ij ;g Hkh Li"V djuk mfpr le>rk gS fd izkjfEHkd tkap vkns'kksa dh lR;rk ij[kus ds fy, ugha dh tk ldrh lR;rk ij[kus ds fy, igys ntZ djuh gksxh vkSj ekeyk >waBk ik;k tkrk gS rks is'k dh tkosxh vkSj lR; ik;k tkrk gS rks pktZ'khV is'k dh tk;sxhA izkjfEHkd tkap mu ekeyksa esa tks fd Sec. 156(3) Cr.P.C. ds U;k;ky; }kjk ugha Hksts x;s gSa] dsoy laKs; vijk/k ds izdV (Disclose) gksus@u gksus ds lEcU/k esa dh tkrh gSA vr% Sec. 156(3) Cr.P.C. ds rgr Hksts x;s ifjokn ij ntZ ugha djuk vkSj ntZ ugha djus dh viuh ckr ij vfMx jguk Li"V :i ls U;k;ky; ds vkns'k dh voKk dh Js.kh esa vkrk gSA tks flfoy voekuuk gSA vr% U;k;ky; voekuuk vf/kfu;e 1971 dh /kkjk 12 ds rgr mDr Jh vthrflag ds fo:) ekuuh; jkt0 mPp U;k;ky; esa voekurk dk;Zokgh vxzsf"kr fd;s tkus gsrq etcwju eq>s ck/; gksuk iM+ jgk gSA i=koyh ij miyC/k i=kad 137 fnukad 18-10-13 rFkk vknsf'kdk fnukad 18-11-13 rFkk vkt dh vknsf'kdk vkSj Jh vthrflag }kjk is'k fd;k tokc ( 7 i'"B ) bl lHkh dh pkj&pkj izfr;kWa i'Fkd~ ls rS;kj dh tkosaA i=koyh okLrs vxzsf"kr fd;s tkus voekuuk ;kfpdk fnukad 22-1-2014 dks is'k gksA 10. It may also be mentioned that by further application dated 30.3.2014, the petitioner further filed an application under section 482 Cr.RC. for amendment In the relief para of prayer for quashing and setting aside of the order dated 18.12.2013 passed by Special Judge, ACD Cases, Ajmer. 11. At present, this court is hearing civil misc. appeals, admission, orders and hearing matters. Hon'ble the Chief Justice assigned this matter on 29,5.2014 to this court in view of the fact that this matter has been earlier heard by this court.Hence, I have heard the learned counsel for the parties on the point formulated by this court on 25,2.2014. 12. In the present case only arguments have been heard in respect of section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and so far as other part of the orders dated 18.11.2013 and 18.12.2013 are concerned, the same cannot be adjudicated In this criminal misc. petition as the matter is sub-judice before the Division Bench. The order dated 18,11.2013 is only related about the fact that the Police Officer was directed to remain present and the police officer who appeared before the court is not in a position to disclose the name of the person who had Initiated the Preliminary enquiry in the matter and further the order dated 18.12.2013 is about the officer who appeared before the court and stated that he has looked into the preliminary enquiry and has not found any substance In the matter and hence the FIR was not registered and on this the Special Judge fixed up the matter for forwarding the matter for contempt of court and listed the same for 22.1.2014. In this view of matter, It is not necessary for this court to give any opinion In the matter and only the point formulated above is considered. 13. At this stage, It is necessary to have a look at the order passed by this court on April 30, 2014 In Manju Surana v. Special Judge, Sessions Court (Prevention of Corruption Act) No. 1 Jaipur and others on which reliance was made by the parties. 13. At this stage, It is necessary to have a look at the order passed by this court on April 30, 2014 In Manju Surana v. Special Judge, Sessions Court (Prevention of Corruption Act) No. 1 Jaipur and others on which reliance was made by the parties. The respondents were the public servants In that case and one of the respondents was a private party and the Special Judge, Sessions Court (Prevention of Corruption Act) No. 1 Jaipur Metropolitan consigned the complaint to record In absence of prosecution sanction In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court In Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa, (2013) 10 SCC 705 and further In P. Nallammal v. State, (1999) 6 SCC 559 . It was held by this court that the consigning of case to record is an Interlocutory order and the petitioner is not entitled to file a revision petition against an Interlocutory order as section 19(3)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, states that "no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no court shall exercise the powers of revision In relation to any Interlocutory order passed In any Inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings." and the revision petition was dismissed as not maintainable against an Interlocutory order of consigning the case to record by the court below. 14. Before proceeding further It is necessary to have a look at Section 156 Cr.P.C. and same reads as Under: 156. Police officers power to Investigate cognizable case. - (1) Any officer In charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, Investigate any cognizable case which a Court having Jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to Inquire Into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. (2) No proceeding of a police officer In any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to Investigate. (3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as above mentioned. 15. It is also necessary to have a look at Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, which relates to procedure and powers of Special Judge, same reads as under: 5. (3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as above mentioned. 15. It is also necessary to have a look at Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, which relates to procedure and powers of Special Judge, same reads as under: 5. Procedure and powers of Special Judge.-(1) A Special Judge may take cognizance of offences without the accused being committed to him for trial and, in trying the accused persons, shall follow the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), for the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates. (2) A Special Judge may, with a view to obtaining the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or Indirectly concerned In, or privy to, an offence, tender a pardon to such person on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, In the commission thereof and any pardon so tendered shall, for the purposes of sub-sections (1) to (5) of Section 308 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), be deemed to have been tendered under Section 307 of that Code. (3) Save as provided In sub-section (1) of sub-section (2), the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), shall, so far as they are not Inconsistent with this Act, apply to the proceedings before a Special Judge; and for the purposes of the said provisions, the court of the Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Court of Session and the person conducting a prosecution before a Special Judge shall be deemed to be a public prosecutor. (4) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained In sub-section (3), the provisions of Sections 328 and 475 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), shall, so far as may be, apply to the proceedings before a Special Judge and for the purposes of the said provisions, a Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Magistrate. (5) A Special Judge may pass upon any person convicted by him any sentence authorised by law for the punishment of the offence of which such person is convicted. (5) A Special Judge may pass upon any person convicted by him any sentence authorised by law for the punishment of the offence of which such person is convicted. (6) A Special Judge, while trying an offence punishable under this Act, shall exercise all the powers and functions exercisable by a District Judge under the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944 (Ordinance 38 of 1944). 16. It is necessary to have a look at the various judgments of the Apex Court which are necessary for deciding the point framed by this court and the cases which have been relied by the learned counsel for the parties during the course of arguments. 17. It is necessary to have a look at the case reported in (2013) 10 SCC 705 reference of which has been made in the order dated 18.12.2013 of the order of the Special Judge ACD Cases Ajmer. In Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa, (2013) 10 SCC 705 , the Leave was granted by the Apex Court. The Apex court In this case concerned with the question whether the special Judge/Magistrate is justified in referring a private complaint made under Section 200 Cr.P.C. for Investigation by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta, in exercise of powers conferred under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. without the production of a valid sanction order under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The appellants filed a private complaint under Section 200 Cr.RC. before the Additional City Civil and Special Judge for Prevention of Corruption on 9.10.2012. The complaint of the appellants was that the first respondent with mala fide Intention passed an order dated 30.6.2012 In connivance with other officers and restored valuable land in favour of a private person. On a complaint being raised, the first respondent In that case vide order dated 6.10.2012 recalled the earlier order alleging that the offence which led to issuance of the order dated 30.6.2012 constituted Ingredients contained under Sections 406 , 409, 420, 426, 463, 465, 468, 471, 474 read with Section 120-B IPC and Section 149 IPC and Sections 8, 13(1)(c), 13(1)(d), 13(1)(e), 13(2) read with Section 12 of he Prevention of Corruption Act. In these circumstances a private complaint was preferred under Section 200 Cr.P.C. On receipt of the complaint, the Special Judge passed order on 20.10.2012 which reads as follows : On going through the complaint, documents and hearing the complainant, I am of the sincere view that the matter requires to be referred for Investigation by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore Urban, under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C, Accordingly, I answer Point 1 in the affirmative. Point 2: In view of my findings on Point 1 and for the foregoing ,o reasons, I proceed to pass the following: ORDER The complaint is referred to Deputy Superintendent of Police - 3 Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore Urban, under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for investigation and to report." Aggrieved by the said order, the first respondent in that case approached the High Court of Karnataka by filing Writ Petitions Nos. 13779-80 of 2013. In the writ petition It was contended before the High Court that since the petitioner is a public servant, a complaint brought against him without being accompanied by a valid sanction order could not have been entertainer by the Special Court on the allegations of offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act. It was submitted that even though the power : order Investigation under Section 156(3) can be exercised by a Magistrate o the Special Judge at pre-cognizance stage, yet, the Governmental sanction cannot be dispensed with. It was also contended that the requirement of sanction is the prerequisite even to present a private complaint in respect oil public servant concerning the alleged offence said to have been committed in discharge of his public duty. The High Court, after hearing the parties, took the view that the Special Judge could not have taken notice of the private complaint unless the same was accompanied by a sanction order, irrespective so of whether the court was acting at a pre-cognizance stage or the post-cognizance stage, if the complaint pertains to a public servant who is alleged to have committed offences In discharge of his official duties. The High Court, In that case quashed the order passed by the Special Judge, as well as the complaint filed against the petitioner. Aggrieved by the same, the complainants filed appeal before the Apex Court.The Apex Court after considering the arguments of both the parties, rejected the appeal. The High Court, In that case quashed the order passed by the Special Judge, as well as the complaint filed against the petitioner. Aggrieved by the same, the complainants filed appeal before the Apex Court.The Apex Court after considering the arguments of both the parties, rejected the appeal. The Apex Court held that a Special Judge is deemed to be a Magistrate under Section 5(4) of the PC Act and, therefore, clothed with all the Magisterial powers provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure. When a private complaint is filed before the Magistrate, he has two options; He may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 Cr.P.C. or proceed further in enquiry or trial. A Magistrate, who is otherwise competent to take cognizance, without taking cognizance under Section 190, may direct an investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The Magistrate, who is empowered under Section 190 to take cognizance, alone has the power to refer a private complaint for police investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. 18. It may further be mentioned that the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court on November 12, 2013 in Lalita Kumari v. Govt, of UP. & Ors. ( AIR 2014 SC 187 ) before passing the order dated 18.12.2013 .The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Lalita Kumar (supra) framed the following issue which requires consideration in the above matter: "Whether a police officer is bound to register a First Information Report (FIR upon receiving any information relating to commission of cognizable offence under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (in short the Code) or the police officer has the power to conduct a "preliminary inquiry" in order to test the veracity of such information before registering the same?" The Apex Court in Lalita Kumaris case (supra), held as under after considering the Apex Court rulings and the facts and circumstances of the case: "111) In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold: (i) Registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation. (ii) If the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not. (ii) If the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not. (iii) If the inquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered. In cases where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint, a copy of the entry of such closure must be supplied to the first informant forthwith and not later than one week. It must disclose reasons in brief for closing the complaint and not proceeding further. (iv) The police officer cannot avoid his duty of registering offence if cognizable offence is disclosed. Action must be taken against erring officers who do not register the FIR if information received by him discloses a cognizable offence. (v) The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the information received but only to ascertain whether the information reveals any cognizable offence. (vi) As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The category of cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under: (a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes (b) Commercial Offences (c) Medical negligence cases (d) Corruption cases (e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over 3 months delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay. The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant preliminary inquiry. (vii) While ensuring and protecting the rights of the accused and the complainant, a preliminary inquiry should be made time bound and in any case it should not exceed 7 days. The fact of such delay and the causes of it must be reflected in the General Diary entry, (viii) Since the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary is the record of all information received in a police station, we direct that all information relating to cognizable offences, whether resulting in registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be mandatorily and meticulously reflected in the said Diary and the decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry must also be reflected, as mentioned above. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Lalita Kumaris case (supra) considered section 154 Cr.RC. and section 44 of the Police Act, 1861. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Lalita Kumaris case (supra) considered section 154 Cr.RC. and section 44 of the Police Act, 1861. The Apex Court held that what is to be recorded in general diary as per Police Act is Only gist of information received and not whole information received and it cannot therefore be said that information received is final to be recorded in general diary and thereafter on preliminary inquiry it will be registered as FIR. It is further held that the Code is enacted under Entry 2 of concurrent list while the Police Act is enacted under Entry 2 of State list as such in case of inconsistency with regard to the fact as to whether the FIR is to be registered in the FIR book or in the General Diary, the provisions of section 154 of the code will prevail and the provisions of section 44 of the Police Act, 1861 shall be void to the extent of the repugnance. 19. The Apex Court considered the case of Tapan Kumar Singh ( AIR 2003 SC 4140 ) in Lalita Kumaris case. In Tapan Kumars case it was held as under: "20. It is well settled that a first information report is not an encyclopaedia, which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. An informant may lodge a report about the commission of an offence though he may not know the name of the victim or his assailant. He may not even know how the occurrence took place. A first informant need not necessarily be an eyewitness so as to be able to disclose in great detail all aspects of the offence 1 committed. What is of significance is that the information given must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and the information so lodged must provide a basis for the police officer to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence. At this stage it is ' enough if the police officer on the basis of the information given suspects the commission of a cognizable offence, and not that he must be convinced or satisfied that a cognizable offence has been committed. If he has reasons to suspect, on the basis of information received, that a cognizable offence may have been committed, he is bound to record the information and conduct an investigation. If he has reasons to suspect, on the basis of information received, that a cognizable offence may have been committed, he is bound to record the information and conduct an investigation. At this stage it is also not necessary for him to satisfy himself about the truthfulness of the information. It is only after a complete investigation that he may be able to report on the truthfulness or otherwise of the information. Similarly, even if the 1 information does not furnish all the details he must find out those details in the course of investigation and collect all the necessary evidence. The information given disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence only sets in motion the investigative machinery, with a view to collect all necessary evidence, and thereafter to take s action in accordance with law. The true test is whether the Information furnished provides a reason to suspect the commission of an offence, which the police officer concerned is empowered under Section 156 of the Code to investigate. If it does, he has no option but to record the information and 2 proceed to investigate the case either himself or depute any other competent officer to conduct the investigation. The question as to whether the report is true, whether it discloses full details regarding the manner of occurrence, whether the accused is named, and whether there is sufficient evidence to 5 support the allegations are all matters which are alien to the consideration of the question whether the report discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. Even if the information does not give full details regarding these matters, the investigating officer is not absolved of his duty to investigate 2 the case and discover the true facts, if he can." 20. In Madhu Bala v. Suresh Kumar, (1997) 8 SCC 476 , the Apex Court granted special leave. The facts of the case are that on 18.2.1988, the appellant Madhu Bala filed a complaint against the three respondents, who were her husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law respectively, before the ' Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kurukshetra alleging commission of offences under Sections 498-A and 406 of the Indian Penal Code by them. On that complaint the learned Magistrate passed an order under Section 156(3) of the Code of Crimjnal Procedure directing the police to register a case and investigate into the same. On that complaint the learned Magistrate passed an order under Section 156(3) of the Code of Crimjnal Procedure directing the police to register a case and investigate into the same. Pursuant to the said direction Thaneswar Police Station registered a case being FIR No. 61 of 1988 and on completion of investigation submitted charge-sheet (police report) against the three respondents under Section 498-A and 406 IPC. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the said charge-sheet and thereafter framed charge against the three respondents under Section 406 IPC only as, according to the learned Magistrate, the offence under Section 498-A IPC was allegedly committed In the district of Karnal. Against the framing of the charge the respondents moved the Sessions Judge In revision, but without success. Thereafter on 29.1.1994 the appellant filed another complaint against the respondents under Section 498-A IPC before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karnal and on this complaint the learned Magistrate passed a similar order under Section 156(3) of the Code for registration of a case and investigation. In compliance with the order, FIR No. 111 of 1994 was registered by the Karnal Police Station and on completion of Investigation charge-sheet was submitted against the three respondents under Section 498-A IPC. On that charge-sheet the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the above offence and later on framed charge against them in accordance with Section 240 of the Code. While the .above two cases were being tried, the respondents filed petitions under Section 182 of the Code before the Punjab and Haryana High Court for quashing of their proceedings on the ground that the orders passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrates of Kurukshetra and Karnal directing registration of cases in purported exercise of their power under Section 156(3) of the Code were patently wrong and consequently all actions taken pursuant thereto were illegal. The contention so raised found favour with the High Court, and by the impugned judgment it quashed the orders of the Chief Judicial Magistrates of Kurukshetra and Karnal dated 18.2.1988 and 29.1.1994 respectively, pursuant to which cases were registered by the police on the complaints of the appellant, and the entire proceedings of the two cases arising therefrom. According to the High Court, under Section 156(3) of the Code a Magistrate can only direct investigation by the police but he has no power to direct "registration of a case". According to the High Court, under Section 156(3) of the Code a Magistrate can only direct investigation by the police but he has no power to direct "registration of a case". In drawing the above conclusion, it relied upon the judgments of the Apex Court in Gopal Das Sindhi v. State of Assam AIR 1961 SC 986 and Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh (1977) 4 SCC 459 ) and some judgments of the Punjab and Haryana High Court which, according to it, followed the above two decisions of the Apex Court. The Apex Court in Madhu Bala Case held as under : 5. In our considered view, the impugned judgment is wholly unsustainable as it has not only failed to consider the basic provisions of the Code but also failed to notice that the judgments in Gopal Das and Tula Ram have no relevance whatsoever to the interpretation or purport of Section 156(3) of the Code. The earlier judgments of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which have been followed in the instant case also suffer from the above two infirmities. 6. Coming first to the relevant provisions of the Code, Section 2 (d) defines "complaint" to mean any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under the Code, that some person, whether known or unknown has committed an offence, but does not include a police report. Under Section 2(c) "cognizable offence" means a case in which a police officer may in accordance with the First Schedule (of the Code) or under any other law for the time being in force, arrest without a warrant. Under Section 2(r) "police report" means a report forwarded by a police officer to a Magistrate under sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Code. Chapter XII of the Code comprising Section 154 to 176 relates to Information to the police and their powers to Investigate. Section 154 provides, Inter alia, that the officer in charge of a police station shall reduce Into writing every Information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence given to him orally and every such Information If given in writing shall be signed by the person giving It and the substance thereof shall be entered In a book to be kept by such officer In such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf. Section 156 of the Code with which we are primarily concerned in these appeals reads as under: '(1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. (2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. (3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as above mentioned.. 7. On completion of Investigation undertaken under Section 156(1) the officer in charge of the police station is required under Section 173(2) to forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, a report In the form prescribed by the State Government containing all the particulars mentioned therein. Chapter XIV of the Code lays down the conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate. Under sub-section (1) of Section 190 appearing in that Chapter any Magistrate of the First Class and any Magistrate of the Second Class specially empowered may take cognizance of any offence (a) upon receiving a "complaint" of facts which constitutes such offence; (b) upon a "police report" of such facts; or (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge that such offence has been committed. Chapter XV prescribes the procedure the Magistrate has to initially follow if he takes cognizance of an offence on a complaint under Section 190(1) (a). 8. From a combined reading of the above provisions it is abundantly clear that when a written complaint disclosing a cognizable offence is made before a Magistrate, he may take cognizance upon the same under Section 190(1)(a) of the Code and proceed with the same in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XV. The other option available to the Magistrate in such a case is to send the complaint to the appropriate police station under Section 156(3) for investigation. The other option available to the Magistrate in such a case is to send the complaint to the appropriate police station under Section 156(3) for investigation. Once such a direction is given under sub-section (3) of Section 156 the police is required to investigate into that complaint under sub-section (1) thereof and on completion of investigation to submit a "police report" in accordance with Section 173(2) on which a Magistrate may take cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) - but not under I90(1)(a), Since a complaint filed before a Magistrate cannot be a "police report" in view of the definition of "complaint" referred to earlier and since the investigation of a "cognizable case" by the police under Section 156(1) has to culminate in a "police report" the "complaint" - as soon as an order under Section 156(3) is passed thereon - transforms itself to a report given in writing within the meaning of Section 154 of the Code, which is known as the first information report (FIR). As under Section 156(1), the police can only investigate a cognizable "case", it has to formally register a case on that report. 9. The mode and manner of registration of such cases are laid down in the Rules framed by the different State Governments under the Indian Police Act, 1861. As in the instant case we are concerned with Punjab Police Rules, 1934 (which are applicable to Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Delhi) framed under the said Act we may now refer to the relevant provisions of those Rules. Chapter XXIV of the said Rules lays down the procedure an officer in charge of a police station has to follow on receipt of information of commission of crime. Under Rule 24.1 appearing in the Chapter every information covered by Section 154 of the Code must be entered in the First Information Report Register and the substance thereof in the daily diary. Rule 24.5 says that the First Information Report Register shall be a printed book in Form 24.5 (1) consisting of 200 pages and shall be completely filled before a new one is commenced. It further requires that the cases shall bear an annual serial number in each police station for each calendar year. The other requirements of the said Rules need not be detailed as they have no relevance to the point at issue. 10. It further requires that the cases shall bear an annual serial number in each police station for each calendar year. The other requirements of the said Rules need not be detailed as they have no relevance to the point at issue. 10. From the foregoing discussion it is evident that whenever a Magistrate directs an investigation on a "complaint" the police has to register a cognizable case on that complaint treating' the same as the FIR and comply with the requirements of the above Rules. It, therefore, passes our comprehension as to how the direction of a Magistrate asking the police to "register a case" makes an order of investigation under Section 156(3) legally unsustainable. Indeed, even if a Magistrate does not pass a direction to register a case, still in view of the provisions of Section 156(1) of the Code which empowers the police to investigate into a cognizable "case" and the Rules framed under the Indian Police Act, 1861 it (the police) is duty-bound to formally register a case and then investigate into the same. The provisions of the Code, therefore, do not in any way stand in the way of a Magistrate to direct the police to register a case at the police station and then investigate into the same. In our opinion when an order for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code is to be made the proper direction to the police would be "to register a case at the police station treating the complaint as the first information report and investigate into the same." 11. Adverting now to the two cases of this Court on which reliance has been placed by the High Court we find that in the case of Gopal Das ( AIR 1961 SC 986 ) the facts were that on receipt of a complaint of commission of offences under Sections 147, 323, 342 and 448 of the Indian Penal Code, the Additional District Magistrate made the following endorsement: "To Shri C. Thomas, Magistrate 1st Class, for disposal". On receiving the complaint Mr. Thomas directed to the officer Incharge of the Gauhati Police Station to register a case, investigate and If warranted submit a charge-sheet. After investigation police submitted a charge-sheet under Section 448 of the Indian Penal Code and on receipt thereof the Additional District Magistrate forwarded it to Shri R. Goswami, Magistrate for disposal. On receiving the complaint Mr. Thomas directed to the officer Incharge of the Gauhati Police Station to register a case, investigate and If warranted submit a charge-sheet. After investigation police submitted a charge-sheet under Section 448 of the Indian Penal Code and on receipt thereof the Additional District Magistrate forwarded it to Shri R. Goswami, Magistrate for disposal. Shri Goswami framed a charge under Section 448 of the Indian Penal Code against the accused therein and aggrieved thereby the accused first approached the revisional court and, having failed there, the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Since the petition before the High Court was also dismissed they moved this Court. The contention that was raised before this Court was that Mr. Thomas acted without jurisdiction in directing the police to register a case to investigate it and thereafter to submit a charge-sheet, if warranted. The steps of reasoning for the above contention were that since the Additional District Magistrate had transferred the case to Mr. Thomas for disposal under Section 192 of the Code it must be said that the former had already taken cognizance thereupon under Section 190(1)(a) of the Code. Therefore, he (Mr. Thomas) could not pass any order under Section 156(3) of the Code as it related to a pre-cognizance stage; and he could deal with the same only in accordance with Chapter XVI. In negativing this contention this Court held that the order of the Additional District Magistrate transferring the case to Mr. Thomas on the face of it did not show that the former had taken cognizance of any offence in the complaint. According to this Court the order was by way of an administrative action, presumably because Mr. Thomas was the Magistrate before whom ordinarily complaints were to be filed. The case of Gopal Das ( AIR 1961 SC 986 ) has, therefore, no manner of application in the facts of the instant case. It is interesting to note that the order that was passed under Section 156(3) therein also contained a direction to the police to register a case. 12. The case of Gopal Das ( AIR 1961 SC 986 ) has, therefore, no manner of application in the facts of the instant case. It is interesting to note that the order that was passed under Section 156(3) therein also contained a direction to the police to register a case. 12. In Tula Ram case ( (1977) 4 SCC 459 ) the only question that was raised before this Court was whether or not a Magistrate after receiving a complaint and after directing investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code and on receipt of the "police report" from the police can issue notice to the complainant, record his statement and the statements of other witnesses and then issue process under Section 204 of the Code. From the question itself it is apparent that the said case related to a stage after the police report under Section 173(2) of the Code was submitted pursuant to an order under Section 156(3) of the Code and not to the nature of the order that can be passed thereunder [Section 156(3)]. The cases of the Punjab and Haryana High Court referred to by the learned Judge In the impugned judgment need not be discussed in detail for they only lay down the proposition that under Section 156(3) a Magistrate can only direct Investigation but cannot direct registration of a case for no such power is given to him under that section. We repeat and reiterate that such a power Inheres in Section 156(3), for Investigation directed thereunder can only be In the complaint filed before the Magistrate on which a case has to be formally registered In the police station treating the same as the FIR, If the reasoning of the Punjab and Haryana High Court is taken to Its logical conclusion it would mean that if a Magistrate issues a direction to submit a report under Section 173 (2) of the Code after completion of investigation while passing an order under Section 156(3) it would be equally bad for the said section only "directs investigation" and nothing more. Needless to say, such a conclusion would be fallacious, for while with the registration of a case by the police on the complaint, the investigation directed under Section 156(3) commences, with the submission of the "police report" under Section 173(2) it culminates. 13. Needless to say, such a conclusion would be fallacious, for while with the registration of a case by the police on the complaint, the investigation directed under Section 156(3) commences, with the submission of the "police report" under Section 173(2) it culminates. 13. On the conclusions as above we set aside the impugned judgment and orders of the High Court and direct the Magistrates concerned to proceed with the cases in accordance with law. The appeals are accordingly allowed." The Apex Court quashed and set aside the judgment of the High Court and directed the Magistrates concerned to proceed with the cases In accordance with law." 21. In Lokesh Kumar Jain v. State of Rajasthan, (2013) 11 SCC 130 , the Apex Court held as under: 27. During the investigation in spite of several requests made by the investigating agency (police), the records in respect of the allegation were not produced. No evidence came against the appellant Lokesh Kumar Jain, from the file of the Education Department. As the case was pending since long and there was no possibility of availability of record in the near future, FR No. 67 of 2000 against the appellant was filed before the DJM, Dausa. The CJM, Dausa by his order dated 18.11.2000 on perusal of the final report, in exercise of the power conferred under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. directed the SHO, Dausa to re-investigate the case with the assistance of the complainant and to procure the original records. In spite of the order dated 18.11.2000, for nine years, records were not made available, as is apparent from the inquiry report dated 15.12.2008. 28. There is nothing on the record, even by way of counter-affidavit filed before this Court to show that record has now been traced to make it available to the investigating agency. There is no probability of finding out original documents or evidence mentioned in the counter-affidavit. Though, delay has been alleged on the part of the appellant, there is nothing on the record to suggest that the appellant caused delay in the matter of investigation. On the other hand, the silence on the part of the respondent regarding availability of the original record or other evidence before the investigating agency shows that the delay ws caused due to the inaction on the part of the respondent. On the other hand, the silence on the part of the respondent regarding availability of the original record or other evidence before the investigating agency shows that the delay ws caused due to the inaction on the part of the respondent. Therefore, In our view, keeping Investigation pending for further period will be futile as the respondent Including the Directorate for the State Literacy Programme is not sure whether the original records can be procured for Investigation and to bring home the charges. Considering the fact that delay In the present case is caused by the respondent, the constitutional guarantee or a speedy investigation and trial under Article 21 of the Constitution is thereby violated and as the appellant has already been exonerated In the departmental proceedings for identical charges, keeping the case pending against the appellant for Investigation, is unwarranted, the FIR deserves to be quashed, 29. In the result, the appeal is allowed and FIR No. 10 of 2000 lodged in Police Station Dausa as against the appellant is hereby quashed." 22. In Madhao v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 615 , the Apex Court held as under: 13. The only point for consideration in all these appeals is whether the learned Magistrate is justified in directing the police to investigate and submit a detailed report within one month under Section 156(3) of the Code. 14. The order of the learned Magistrate shows that before passing the direction for investigation under Section 156(3), he heard the counsel for the complainant, perused the allegations made against the accused In the complaint and the documents annexed therewith. It also shows that taking note of the fact that some of the accused are public officers and after observing that it needs proper investigation prior to the Issue of process against the accused under Section 156(3) of the Code, the learned Magistrate directed the PSO, Ghatanji to Investigate the matter and submit a detailed report within one month. 15. Chapter XIV of the Code speaks about conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings. Section 190 deals with cognizance of offences by Magistrates. 15. Chapter XIV of the Code speaks about conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings. Section 190 deals with cognizance of offences by Magistrates. In terms of sub-section (1) subject to the provisions of the said Chapter, any Magistrate of the First Class, and any Magistrate of the Second Class specially empowered In this behalf under sub-section (2), may take cognizance of any offence: (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence: (b) upon a police report of such facts; (c) upon Information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed. 16. Sub-section of Section 156 of the Code enables any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 to order such an Investigation In terms of sub-section (1) of that section. 17. In CREF Finance Ltd. v. Shree Shanthi Homes (P) Ltd. ( (2005) 7 SCC 467 ) while considering the power of a Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence, this Court held: (SCC p. 471, para 10) 1 "10. Cognizance is taken at the initial stage when the Magistrate peruses the complaint with a view to ascertain whether the commission of any offence is disclosed. The Issuance of process is at a later stage when after considering the material placed before It, the court decides to proceed against the offenders against whom a prima facie case is made out. It is possible that a complaint may be filed against several persons, but the Magistrate may choose to Issue process only against some of the accused. It may also be that after taking cognizance and examining the complainant on oath, the court may come to the conclusion that no case is made out for Issuance of process and it may reject the complaint. It may also be that having considered the complaint, the court may consider It appropriate to send the complaint to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure." It is clear that any Judicial Magistrate before taking cognizance of the offence can order Investigation under Section 166(3) of the Code. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. 18. When a Magistrate receives a complaint he is not bound to take cognizance If the facts alleged In the complaint disclose the commission of an offence. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. 18. When a Magistrate receives a complaint he is not bound to take cognizance If the facts alleged In the complaint disclose the commission of an offence. The Magistrate has discretion In the matter. If on a reading of the complaint, he finds that the allegations therein disclose a cognizable offence and the forwarding of the complaint to the police for Investigation under Section 156(3) will be conducive to Justice and save the valuable time of the Magistrate from being wasted In enquiring Into a matter which was primarily the duty of the police to Investigate, he will be justified In adopting that course as an alternative to taking cognizance of the offence Itself. As said earlier, In the case of a complaint regarding the commission of cognizable offence, the power under Section 166(3) can be Invoked by the Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence under Section 160(1) (a). However, If he once takes such cognizance and embarks upon the procedure embodied in Chapter XV, he is not competent to revert back to the pre-cognizance stage and avail of Section 166(3). 19. Where a Magistrate choose to take cognizance he can adopt any of the following alternatives: (a) He can peruse the complaint and If satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding he can straightway Issue process to the accused but before he does so he must comply with the requirements of Section 200 and record the evidence of the complainant or his witnesses. (b) The Magistrate can postpone the Issue of process and direct an enquiry by himself. (c) The Magistrate can postpone the Issue of process and direct an enquiry by any other person or an investigation by the police. 20. In case the Magistrate after considering the statement of the complainant and the witnesses or as a result of the Investigation and the enquiry ordered is not satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding he can dismiss the complaint. 21. 20. In case the Magistrate after considering the statement of the complainant and the witnesses or as a result of the Investigation and the enquiry ordered is not satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding he can dismiss the complaint. 21. Where a Magistrate orders Investigation by the police before taking cognizance under Section 156(3) of the Code and receives the report thereupon he can act on the report and discharge the accused or straightway Issue process against the accused or apply his mind to the complaint filed before him and take action under Section 190 of the Code. 22. The above principles have been reiterated In Devarapaili Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy (1976) 3 SCC 252 ) and Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh (1977) 4 SCC 459 ) . 23. Keeping In view the above principles, If we test the same with the direction Issued by the Magistrate for Investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code and the facts of these cases, we are satisfied that the Magistrate has not exceeded his power nor violated any of the provisions contained in the Code. As observed earlier, the Magistrate need not order any Investigation If he presupposes (sic.) to take cognizance of the offence and once he takes cognizance of the offence, he has to follow the procedure provided In Chapter XV of the Code. It is also settled position that any Judicial Magistrate before taking cognizance of the offence can order Investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. 24. As rightly observed by the High Court, the Magistrate before taking cognizance of the offence can order Investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code, we are of the view that the procedure adopted and the power exercised by the Magistrate In this case is acceptable and In accordance with the scheme of the Code. We are also satisfied that the High Court rightly refused to exercise Its power under Section 482 of the Code. 25. In the light of the above discussion and conclusion, we find no merit In all these appeals, consequently, the same are dismissed." 23. In Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad All, (2013) 5 SCC 762 , the Apex Court held under: 20. Having noticed the provisions and relevant part of the scheme of the Code, now we must examine the powers of the court to direct Investigation. In Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad All, (2013) 5 SCC 762 , the Apex Court held under: 20. Having noticed the provisions and relevant part of the scheme of the Code, now we must examine the powers of the court to direct Investigation. Investigation can be ordered In varied forms and at different stages. Right at the Initial stage of receiving the FIR or a complaint, the court can direct Investigation In accordance with the provisions of Section 156(1) In exercise of Its powers under Section 156(3) of the Code. Investigation can be of the following kinds: (I) Initial Investigation, (II) Further Investigation, (III) Fresh or de novo or reinvestigation. 21. The "Initial Investigation" is the one which the empowered police officer shall conduct In furtherance of registration of an FIR. Such Investigation Itself can lead to filing of a final report under Section 173 (2) of the Code and shall take within Its ambit the Investigation which the empowered officer shall conduct In furtherance of an order for Investigation passed by the court of competent jurisdiction In terms of Section 156(3) of the Code. 22. "Further Investigation" is where the Investigating officer obtains further oral or documentary evidence after the final report has been filed before the court In terms of Section 173(8). This power is vested with the executive. It is the continuation of previous Investigation and, therefore, is understood and described as "further Investigation", The scope of such Investigation is restricted to the discovery of further oral and documentary evidence. Its purpose is to bring the true facts before the court even if they are discovered at a subsequent stage to the primary Investigation. It is commonly described as "supplementary report". Supplementary report" would be the correct expression as the subsequent Investigation is meant and Intended to supplement the primary Investigation conducted by the empowered police officer. Another significant feature of further investigation is that It does not have the effect of wiping out directly or Impliedly the initial investigation conducted by the Investigating agency. This is a kind of continuation of the previous Investigation. The basis is discovery of fresh evidence and In continuation of the same offence and chain of events relating to the same occurrence incidental thereto. In other words, It has to be understood In complete contradistinction to a "reinvestigation", "fresh" or "de novo" investigation. 23. This is a kind of continuation of the previous Investigation. The basis is discovery of fresh evidence and In continuation of the same offence and chain of events relating to the same occurrence incidental thereto. In other words, It has to be understood In complete contradistinction to a "reinvestigation", "fresh" or "de novo" investigation. 23. However, in the case of a "fresh Investigation", "reinvestigation" or "de novo Investigation" there has to be a definite order of the court, The order .of the court unambiguously should state as to whether the previous Investigation, for reasons to be recorded, is Incapable of being acted upon. Neither the Investigating agency nor the Magistrate has any power to order or conduct "fresh investigation". This is primarily for the reason that It would be opposed to the scheme of the Code. It is essential that even an order of "fresh"/"de novo" Investigation passed by the higher judiciary should always be coupled with a specific direction as to the fate of the Investigation already conducted. The cases where such direction can be issued are few and far between. This is based upon a fundamental principle of our criminal jurisprudence which is that it is the right of a suspect or an accused to have a just and fair Investigation and trial. This principle flows from the constitutional mandate contained In Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. Where the Investigation ex facie is unfair, tainted, mala fide and smacks of foul play, the courts would set aside such an Investigation and direct fresh or de novo Investigation and, If necessary, even by another Independent Investigating agency. As already noticed, this is a power of wide plenitude and, therefore, has to be exercised sparingly. The principle of the rarest of rare cases would squarely apply to such cases. Unless the unfairness of the Investigation is such that It pricks the Judicial conscience of the court, the court should be reluctant to Interfere In such matters to the extent of quashing an Investigation and directing a "fresh investigation". 24. The principle of the rarest of rare cases would squarely apply to such cases. Unless the unfairness of the Investigation is such that It pricks the Judicial conscience of the court, the court should be reluctant to Interfere In such matters to the extent of quashing an Investigation and directing a "fresh investigation". 24. In Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2010) 6 SCC 21 SCC p 80 para 199), the Court stated that it is not only the responsibility of the Investigating agency, but also that of the courts to ensure that investigation is fair and does not In any way hamper the freedom of an individual except In accordance with law. An equally enforceable canon of the criminal law is that high responsibility lies upon the Investigating agency not to conduct an 1 Investigation In a tainted or unfair manner. The Investigation should not prima facie be Indicative of a biased mind and every effort should be made to bring the guilty to law as nobody stands above law dehors his position and Influence In the society. The maxim contra Veritatem lex nunquam a liquid permit it applies to exercise of powers by the courts while granting approval or declining to accept the report. 25. In Gudalure M.J. Cherian v. Union of India ((1992') 1 SCO 397) , this Court stated the principle that In cases where charge-sheets have been filed after completion of Investigation and request is made belatedly to reopen the Investigation, such Investigation being entrusted to a specialised agency would normally be declined by the court of competent jurisdiction but nevertheless In a given situation to do justice between the parties and to instil confidence In public mind, It may become necessary to pass such orders. 26. Further, In R.S. Sodhi v. State of U.P. (1994 Supp (1) SCC 142) , where allegations were made against a police officer, the Court ordered the Investigation to be transferred to CBI with an intent to maintain credibility of investigation, public confidence and In the Interest of justice. Ordinarily, the courts would not exercise such jurisdiction but the expression "ordinarily" means normally and it is used where there can be an exception. It means In the large majority of cases but not Invariably. "Ordinarily" excludes extraordinary or special circumstances. Ordinarily, the courts would not exercise such jurisdiction but the expression "ordinarily" means normally and it is used where there can be an exception. It means In the large majority of cases but not Invariably. "Ordinarily" excludes extraordinary or special circumstances. In other words, If special circumstances exist, the court may exercise Its jurisdiction to direct "fresh Investigation" and even transfer cases to the courts of higher jurisdiction which may pass such directions. 27. Here, we will also have to examine the kind of reports that can be filed by an investigating agency under the scheme of the Code. 27.1. Firstly the FIR which the Investigating agency is required to file before the Magistrate right at the threshold and within the time specified. 27.2. Secondly, It may file a report In furtherance of a direction Issued under Section 156(3) of the Code. 27.3. Thirdly, It can also file a "further report", as contemplated under Section 173(8). 27.4. Finally, the Investigating agency is required to file a "final report" on the basis of which the court shall proceed further to frame the charge and put the accused to trial or discharge him as envisaged by Section 227 of the Code. 28. The next question that comes up for consideration of this Court is whether the empowered Magistrate has the jurisdiction to direct "further Investigation" or fresh Investigation". As far as the latter is concerned, the law declared by this Court consistently is that the learned Magistrate has no jurisdiction to direct "fresh" or "de novo" investigation. However, once the report is filed, the Magistrate has jurisdiction to accept the report or reject the same right at the threshold. Even after accepting the report, it has the jurisdiction to discharge the accused or frame the charge and put him to trial. However, once the report is filed, the Magistrate has jurisdiction to accept the report or reject the same right at the threshold. Even after accepting the report, it has the jurisdiction to discharge the accused or frame the charge and put him to trial. But there are no provisions In the Code which empower the Magistrate to disturb the status of an accused pending Investigation or when report is filed to wipe out the report and Its effects In law, Reference In this regard can be made to K. Chandrasekhar v. State of Kerala (1994 Supp (1) SCC 142) , Ramchandran v. R. Udhayakumar ( (2008) 5 SCC 413 ) , Nirmal Singh Kahion v. State of Punjab ( (2009) 1 SCC 441 ) , Mithabhai Pashabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat ( (2009) 6 SCC 332 ) and Babubhai v. State of Gujarat ( (2010) 12 SCC 254 ). " 25. In Lalita Kumari's case the Apex Court mainly considered the question of preliminary enquiry In para 110, the same reads as under: "110) Therefore, In view of various counter claims regarding registration or non-registration, what is necessary is only that the Information given to the police must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In such a situation, registration of an FIR is mandatory. However, If no cognizable offence is made out In the Information given, then the FIR need not be registered Immediately and perhaps the police can conduct a sort of preliminary verification or Inquiry for the limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether a cognizable offence has been committed. But, If the Information given clearly mentions the commission of a cognizable offence, there is no other option but to register an FIR forthwith. Other considerations are not relevant at the stage of registration of FIR, such as, whether the Information is falsely given, whether the Information is genuine, whether the Information is credible etc. These are the issues that have to be verified during the Investigation of the FIR. At the stage of registration of FIR, what is to be seen is merely whether the Information given ex facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. If, after Investigation, the Information given is found to be false, there is always an option to prosecute the complainant for filing a false FIR." 26. At the stage of registration of FIR, what is to be seen is merely whether the Information given ex facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. If, after Investigation, the Information given is found to be false, there is always an option to prosecute the complainant for filing a false FIR." 26. From the above verdict of the Apex Court In Lalita Kumari's case supra), It is very clear that "If no cognizable offence is made out In the Information given, then the FIR need not be registered Immediately and perhaps the police can conduct a sort of preliminary verification or Inquiry for the limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether a cognizable offence has been committed. The counsel for the parties submitted that on a review petition filed In that case, the Apex Court Increased the period from seven days to six weeks for preliminary enquiry vide order dated 5.3.2014. 27. As per the principles laid down In the judgments quoted above, the Special Judge ACD Cases Ajmer being a Magistrate In view of section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, quoted above can direct the police to Investigate the matter under section 156 (3) Cr.RC. and after receiving such directions, the police will conduct the preliminary enquiry, In such circumstances, the police may register the FIR If cognizable offence is made out and If such cognizable offence is not made out In the preliminary enquiry which is conducted by the police, then the police will submit the report before the concerned Magistrate. 28. The criminal misc. petition as also the stay application, both stand disposed of accordingly.Petition disposed of. *******