Judgment G. Chockalingam, J. The petitioner/father of the detenue has filed this petition seeking for a direction to the respondents to produce his daughter, namely, Subbulakshmi, aged about 17 years before this Court and set her at liberty. 2. Heard Mr. A. Mohan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Mr. M. Maharaja, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the first respondent and Mr. S. Saravanakumar, learned counsel appearing for respondents 2 and 4. Though notice was served on respondents 3 and 5 and their names are also printed in the cause list, none appeared for them and 6th respondent is not a necessary party in this case. 3. This Court, by an order dated 16.06.2014, has passed the following order:- "6. We have enquired the detenue Subbulakshmi, who has stated that her date of birth is 02.06.1996, completed 18 years' of age and studied upto +2. She has admitted her marriage with the second respondent Loganathan on 03.06.2014 after attaining majority, besides informing that the second respondent has studied upto 10th standard and he is a Diploma Holder doing A/C mechanic job. She has very firmly and consistently pleaded before this Court that she may be allowed to go with the second respondent. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the date of birth of detenue is 16.05.1997 and not 02.06.1996 as per the Certificate of Births issued by the Department of Registration on 12.06.2014, whereas the stand of detenue is that her date of birth is only 02.06.1996 as entered in the Transfer Certificate duly signed by her and her mother." 4. After passing the above order, the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the date of birth of the detenue mentioned in the S.S.L.C. certificate is incorrect and the date mentioned in the Birth Certificate alone is correct. He has also filed typed set of papers, which contains the Xerox copy of Birth Certificate issued by the District Registrar of Chidambaram and the Xerox copy of AADHAR CARD issued by the Government of India. Further, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that since the detenue is a minor, she may be allowed to go with her father / petitioner herein. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner has produced the following decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court:- [i] (2008) 13 SCC 133 [Babloo Pasi Vs. Further, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that since the detenue is a minor, she may be allowed to go with her father / petitioner herein. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner has produced the following decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court:- [i] (2008) 13 SCC 133 [Babloo Pasi Vs. State of Jharkhand & another] [ii] (2009) 4 SCC 18 [Arjun Singh Vs. State of H.P.] [iii] (2010) 3 SCC 757 [ Jabar Singh Vs. Dinesh & another] 5. The relevant portions of the decision reported in (2008) 13 SCC page 133 [Babloo Pasi Vs. State of Jharkhand & another], arequoted hereunder:- "15. The question for consideration is that when the statutory provisions mandate and principles of natural justice demand a pre-decisional hearing, whether or not the High Court was justified in not granting an opportunity of hearing to the appellant complainant? In our opinion, having regard to the nature of controversy before the High Court and the scheme of the relevant statutory provisions whereunder the High Court was exercising its jurisdiction, the “fairness in action” did demand that the complainant was given an opportunity of hearing in the revision petition preferred by the accused. Moreover, he was impleaded as a party-respondent and was obviously prejudiced by the order passed by the High Court when the accused was declared to be a juvenile. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the High Court was clearly in error in reversing the order passed by the Board without giving an opportunity of hearing to the appellant. Accordingly, we uphold the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the order of the High Court deserves to be set aside on this short question alone. 16. ...... 17. ...... 18. ...... 19. At this juncture, it is relevant to note that in exercise of power conferred by Section 68 of the Act, the State Government of Jharkhand has framed the Jharkhand Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2003. Rule 22 thereof lays down the procedure to be followed by a Board in holding enquiries and the determination of age. Sub-rule (5) of the said Rule which is material for the present case reads thus: “22. Procedure to be followed by a Board in holding inquiries and the determination of age.— (1)-(4) ........ Rule 22 thereof lays down the procedure to be followed by a Board in holding enquiries and the determination of age. Sub-rule (5) of the said Rule which is material for the present case reads thus: “22. Procedure to be followed by a Board in holding inquiries and the determination of age.— (1)-(4) ........ (5) In every case concerning a juvenile or a child, the Board shall either obtain— (i) a birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority; or (ii) a date of birth certificate from the school first attended; or (iii) matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and (iv) in the absence of (i) to (iii) above, the medical opinion by a duly constituted Medical Board, subject to a margin of one year, in deserving cases for the reasons to be recorded by such Medical Board (regarding his age and, when passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available or the medical opinion, as the case may be record a finding in respect of his age).” 20. Thus, as per Rule 22, in the absence of birth or matriculation certificates, in order to record a finding in respect of age of a person, the Board is required to obtain the opinion of a duly constituted Medical Board. it is clear from a bare reading of the Rule that although the Board is bound to obtain the opinion of the Medical Board but the opinion per se is not a conclusive proof of age of the person concerned. It is no more than an opinion. More so, when even the Medico-Legal opinion is that owing to the variation in climatic, dietic, hereditary and other factors, affecting the people of different States in the country, it would be imprudent to formulate a uniform standard for the determination of the age. True, that a Medical Board's opinion based on the radiological examination is a useful guiding factor for determining the age of a person but is not incontrovertible. 21. ........ 22. ........ 23. ........ 24. ........ 25. ........ 26. ........ 27. ........ 28. ........ True, that a Medical Board's opinion based on the radiological examination is a useful guiding factor for determining the age of a person but is not incontrovertible. 21. ........ 22. ........ 23. ........ 24. ........ 25. ........ 26. ........ 27. ........ 28. ........ 29.Therefore, on facts at hand, in the absence of evidence to show on what material the entry in the voters’ list in the name of the accused was made, a mere production of a copy of the voters’ list, though a public document, in terms of Section 35, was not sufficient to prove the age of the accused. Similarly, though a reference to the report of the Medical Board, showing the age of the accused as 17-18 years, has been made but there is no indication in the order whether the Board had summoned any of the members of the Medical Board and recorded their statement. It also appears that the physical appearance of the accused, has weighed with the Board in coming to the aforenoted conclusion, which again may not be a decisive factor to determine the age of a delinquent." 6. The relevant portion of the decision reported in (2009) 4 SCC page 18 [Arjun Singh Vs. State of H.P.] is quoted hereunder:- "10. In State of Chhattisgarh v. Lekhram [2006(5)SCC 736] it was held that the register maintained in a school is admissible evidence to prove the date of birth of the person concerned in terms of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short 'Evidence Act'). It may be true that in the entry of the school register is not conclusive but is has evidentiary value." 7. The relevant portion of the decision reported in (2010) 3 SCC 757 [Jabar Singh Vs. It may be true that in the entry of the school register is not conclusive but is has evidentiary value." 7. The relevant portion of the decision reported in (2010) 3 SCC 757 [Jabar Singh Vs. Dinesh & another] is quoted hereunder:- "Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Section 35 - Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, (56 of 2000), Section 7 A - Juvenile - Age determination - School Record - The entry of date of birth in the admission form, the school records and transfer certificates did not satisfy the conditions laid down in Section 35 of the Evidence Act inasmuch as the entry was not in any public or official register and was not made either by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty or by any person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country and, therefore, the entry was not relevant under Section 35 of the Evidence Act for the purpose of determining the age of Respondent No.1 at the time of commission of the alleged offence. No raising of such plea during investigation -Finding by trial court on considering evidence produced by accused and also seeing his physical appearance, that accused was not less than 18 at time of commission of alleged offence is finding of fact. Such determination on a question of fact made by the trial court on the basis of the evidence or material before it and other relevant factors could not be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of its revisional powers." 8. Learned counsel for the second respondent has produced the detenue before this Court along with the second respondent and submitted that the date of birth mentioned in the S.S.L.C. certificate alone is correct. He has further contended that in the Birth Certificate, the name of the child is not mentioned. Further, in the AADHAR CARD, the date of birth is not mentioned and only the year of birth alone is mentioned. Hence, no credential value can be attached to both the above documents relied on by the petitioner. The learned counsel for the second respondent further contended that since the detenue is a major, she may be set at liberty to act according to her wish. Hence, no credential value can be attached to both the above documents relied on by the petitioner. The learned counsel for the second respondent further contended that since the detenue is a major, she may be set at liberty to act according to her wish. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the respondents 2 and 4 has produced the following decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court:- [i] AIR 2013 Supreme Court 553 [Ashwani Kumar Saxena Vs. State of M.P.] [ii] 2013 (5) Supreme 39 [Jarnail Singh Vs. State of Haryana] [iii] (2014) 1 Supreme Court Cases 588 [Ranjeet Goswami Vs. State of Jharkhand and another]. 9. The relevant portions of the decision reported in AIR 2013 Supreme Court 553 [Ashwani Kumar Saxena Vs. State of M.P.] are quoted hereunder:- "34. Age determination inquiry' contemplated under Section 7A of the Act r/w. Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules enables the court to seek evidence and in that process, the Court can obtain the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available. Only in the absence of any matriculation or equivalent certificates, the Court need obtain the date of birth certificate from the school first attended other than a play school. Only in the absence of matriculation or equivalent certificate or the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, the Court need obtain the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat (not an affidavit but certificates or documents). The question of obtaining medical opinion from a duly constituted Medical Board arises only if the above mentioned documents are unavailable. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, then the court, for reasons to be recorded, may, if considered necessary, give the benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his or her age on lower side within the margin of one year." 10. The relevant portions of the decision reported in 2013 (5) Supreme page 39 [Jarnail Singh Vs. State of Haryana] are quoted hereunder:- "20. On the issue of determination of age of a minor, one only needs to make a reference to Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as “the 2007 Rules”). The aforestated 2007 Rules have been framed under Section 68(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. On the issue of determination of age of a minor, one only needs to make a reference to Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as “the 2007 Rules”). The aforestated 2007 Rules have been framed under Section 68(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Rule 12 referred to hereinabove reads as under: “12. Procedure to be followed in determination of age.—(1) In every case concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict with law, the court or the Board or as the case may be, the Committee referred to in Rule 19 of these Rules shall determine the age of such juvenile or child or a juvenile in conflict with law within a period of thirty days from the date of making of the application for that purpose. (2) The court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the case may be the juvenile in conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of physical appearance or documents, if available, and send him to the observation home or in jail. (3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining— (a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year, and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law. (4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile in conflict with law is found to be below 18 years on the date of offence, on the basis of any of the conclusive proof specified in sub-rule (3), the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall in writing pass an order stating the age and declaring the status of juvenility or otherwise, for the purpose of the Act and these Rules and a copy of the order shall be given to such juvenile or the person concerned. (5) Save and except where, further inquiry or otherwise is required, inter alia, in terms of Section 7-A, Section 64 of the Act and these Rules, no further inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board after examining and obtaining the certificate or any other documentary proof referred to in sub-rule (3) of this Rule. (6) The provisions contained in this Rule shall also apply to those disposed of cases, where the status of juvenility has not been determined in accordance with the provisions contained in sub-rule (3) and the Act, requiring dispensation of the sentence under the Act for passing appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile in conflict with law.” Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining age, even of a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is hardly any difference insofar as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the prosecutrix VW, PW 6. The manner of determining age conclusively has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained by adopting the first available basis out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option available would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the child concerned is the highest rated option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, Rule 12(3) envisages consideration of the date of birth entered in the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration for determining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the child concerned, on the basis of medical opinion. 21. Following the scheme of Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, it is apparent that the age of the prosecutrix VW, PW 6 could not be determined on the basis of the matriculation (or equivalent) certificate as she had herself deposed, that she had studied up to Class 3 only, and thereafter, had left her school and had started to do household work. The prosecution in the facts and circumstances of this case, had endeavoured to establish the age of the prosecutrix VW, PW 6 on the next available basis in the sequence of options expressed in Rule 12(3) of the 2007 Rules. The prosecution produced Satpal (PW 4) to prove the age of the prosecutrix VW, PW 6. Satpal (PW 4) was the Head Master of Government High School, Jathlana, where the prosecutrix VW, PW 6 had studied up to Class 3. Satpal (PW 4) had proved the certificate Ext. PG, as having been made on the basis of the school records indicating that the prosecutrix VW, PW 6 was born on 15-5-1977. In the scheme contemplated under Rule 12(3) of the 2007 Rules, it is not permissible to determine age in any other manner, and certainly not on the basis of an option mentioned in a subsequent clause. We are therefore of the view that the High Court was fully justified in relying on the aforesaid basis for establishing the age of the prosecutrix VW, PW 6. It would also be relevant to mention that under the scheme of Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, it would have been improper for the High Court to rely on any other material including the ossification test, for determining the age of the prosecutrix VW, PW 6. The deposition of Satpal, PW 4 has not been contested. Therefore, the date of birth of the prosecutrix VW, PW 6 (indicated in Ext. PG as 15-7-1977) assumes finality. Accordingly it is clear that the prosecutrix VW, PW 6, was less than 15 years old on the date of occurrence i.e. on 25-3-1993. In the said view of the matter, there is no room for any doubt that the prosecutrix VW, PW 6 was a minor on the date of occurrence. Accordingly, we hereby endorse the conclusions recorded by the High Court, that even if the prosecutrix VW, PW 6 had accompanied the appellant-accused Jarnail Singh of her own free will, and had had consensual sex with him, the same would have been clearly inconsequential, as she was a minor." 11. The relevant portions of the decision reported in (2014) 1 Supreme Court Cases page 588 [Ranjeet Goswami Vs. State of Jharkhand and another] are quoted hereunder:- "8. The relevant portions of the decision reported in (2014) 1 Supreme Court Cases page 588 [Ranjeet Goswami Vs. State of Jharkhand and another] are quoted hereunder:- "8. We are of the view that no cogent reasons have been stated by the High Court to discard the school leaving certificate which was issued on 10-4-2004 by the then Principal of the school. The certificate reveals the date of birth of the accused as 10-5-1991. The school leaving certificate was proved by examining the Headmistress of the school. She has recognised the signatures of the Principal who issued the school leaving certificate. The evidence adduced by the Headmistress was not challenged. Consequently, there is no reason to discard that document. Further, we notice that there was some confusion as to whether the appellant, whose name is Ranjeet Goswami is the same person as Rajiv Ranjan Goswami. The investigating officer’s report indicates that they are different persons. Consequently we have to take it that the school leaving certificate produced was in respect of the appellant which has been proved. 9. We, therefore, find no reason to reject the school leaving certificate. If that be so, as per the ratio laid down in Ashwani Kumar Saxena there is no question of subjecting the accused to a medical examination by a Medical Board. Going by the school leaving certificate since the appellant was a juvenile on the date of occurrence, he can be tried only by the JJ Board. Consequently, the order passed by the High Court is set aside and that of the Sessions Judge, Dumka is restored. The appeal is allowed, as stated above." 12. In this case, the petitioner has produced two documents viz., [i] Xerox copy of Birth Certificate issued by the District Registrar of Chidambaram and [ii] Xerox copy of AADHAR CARD issued by the Government of India. In the Birth Certificate, names of the father/mother alone are mentioned as Panneerselvam/Sumathi, but the name of the child is not mentioned. Since there is no mention about the name of the child, there is no material to connect the above Birth Certificate to the detenue and there are no materials to show that how it is not connected with other younger sister, if any. Since there is no mention about the name of the child, there is no material to connect the above Birth Certificate to the detenue and there are no materials to show that how it is not connected with other younger sister, if any. In the absence of any material produced by the petitioner to show that the unnamed birth certificate pertains only to the detenue, we cannot accept that document as proof to show the age of the detenue. Further, in the AADHAR card, the name of the detenue is mentioned as Subalakshmi Panneerselvam and the year of Birth is mentioned as 1997, but, no date of birth is given. Therefore, the second document viz., AADHAR card also cannot be taken as a document to prove the date of birth of the detenue. Hence, both the documents produced by the petitioner cannot be relied on to prove the age of the detenue. But, on the contrary, the petitioner himself, at the time of filing the above H.C.P., has filed the Xerox copy of Transfer Certificate of his daughter signed by her mother. In the Transfer Certificate, the date of birth of the detenue is mentioned as 02.06.1996. Hence, it can be safely concluded that the detenue has attained majority on 02.06.2014. 13. In the last hearing, the detenue was enquired by this Court and the detenue herself had admitted that her marriage was conducted with the second respondent viz., Loganathan on 03.06.2014, after attaining majority. 14. The principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decisions reported in AIR 2013 Supreme Court page 553 and (2014) 1 Supreme Court Cases page 588 [cited supra] aresquarely applicable to the facts of the present case. At the time of filing the above H.C.P., the petitioner himself had filed the Xerox copy of Transfer Certificate of his daughter, the detenue, and as per the said Transfer Certificate, the detenue has attained majority on 02.06.2014. 15. In view of the above categorical findings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we are of the considered view that since the detenue is a major, she must be allowed to act according to her wish. Accordingly, recording the submission of the detenue that she would like to go along with her husband, the second respondent, this Habeas Corpus Petition is disposed of.