JUDGMENT Hon’ble Anil Kumar Sharma, J.—We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and learned AGA for respondents No. 1 to 3 and perused the petition and its enclosures. 2. The petitioner has invoked the extra ordinary jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of Indian Constitution to seek the following reliefs: (i) A writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents 2 and 3 to recover the respondent No. 8 from the custody of the respondents 4 and 7 forthwith and to take suitable action in accordance with law; (ii) A writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondent 2 and 3 to take action in accordance with law in pursuant to the FIR dated 17.5.2014 registered as Case Crime No. 395 of 2014 under Sections 363, 366 IPC P. S. Tajganj District-Agra and to ensure fair and proper investigation. (iii) Any other writ, order or direction which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper under the facts and circumstances of the case.” 3. Learned AGA has raised question about the maintainability of the petition. 4. It has been stated by the petitioner that respondent No. 4 and 5 residing in Agra belong to his village and he was having family relations with them. On 24.4.2014, the minor daughter of the petitioner (respondent No. 8) visited the house of respondent No. 4 and 5 and since she has not returned back. The petitioner filed an application in this regard with the police, pursuant to which on 15.5.2014 respondent No. 5 was arrested and he admitted to have kept the respondent No. 8 with him for 15 days and thereafter he handed her to Anil Sharma, who too had admitted to have kept respondent No. 8 with him for 3-days. He was arrested by the police on 16.5.14 Thereafter, the petitioner filed FIR against respondents No. 4 to 7 on 17.5.2014, but the police has not taken any action and recovered the minor respondent No. 8. It has been further stated that the petitioner filed representation with respondent No. 2, where he stated that the police had arrested respondent No. 4 who admitted to have kept respondent No. 8 for 15-days. It has been further stated that the petitioner filed representation with respondent No. 2, where he stated that the police had arrested respondent No. 4 who admitted to have kept respondent No. 8 for 15-days. Thus, the contention of the petitioner with regard to captivity of respondent No. 8 for 15-days is self contradictory because at one place in the petition he has stated that the police had arrested respondent No. 4, while in the application to respondent No. 2 he has mentioned that respondent No. 5 was apprehended by the police and he made the aforesaid admission regarding respondent No. 8. The petitioner has not alleged the date of birth of his daughter. He has simply stated that she is aged about 16 years and had visited respondent No. 4 and 5 voluntarily on 24.4.2014. It is not the case of the petitioner that the victim (respondent No. 8) was enticed away by any of the respondents No. 4 to 7 from her house. The petitioner has not mentioned the name of any witness who had seen his minor daughter in the company of any of respondent No. 4 to 7. He has not mentioned the factum of alleged arrest of respondent No. 4 or 5 or Anil in the FIR which was registered by the police on 17.5.2014. Even the name of Anil Sharma aforesaid does not find place in the list of accused nor he had been arrayed as a respondent in the instant petition. It is not res integra that this Court has the power to issue a writ of mandamus restraining the police officer if it is convinced that the power of investigation has been exercised by the investigating agency in a malafide manner. Thus, on merits the case set up by the petitioner falls short of any interference by this Court. 5. It is not res integra that this Court has the power to issue a writ of mandamus restraining the police officer if it is convinced that the power of investigation has been exercised by the investigating agency in a malafide manner. Thus, on merits the case set up by the petitioner falls short of any interference by this Court. 5. A very pertinent and important question has cropped up in this petition, about the maintainability of the petition during investigation for any direction to the investigating officer, Is it necessary for the complainant/victim/first informant of a criminal case to approach the Court to invoke its extra ordinary jurisdiction, whenever he or she finds that the investigating officer is not conducting the investigation properly It is well-settled that the Court’s seldom interferes in the investigation, then what would be the remedy for such a person who is aggrieved with the line of investigation conducted by the police? Whether every body is required to rush to this Court for redressal of his grievance with regard to highhandedness of the investigating officer in the investigation or the remedy lies in the district Court itself? This moot question has been elaborately dealt with by the Apex Court in the case of Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. and others, (2008) 2 SCC 409 . The Apex Court after examining the scope of Section 156(3) Cr. P. C. has observed in para-15, 17, 25 to 28 as under: 15. Section 156(3) provides for a check by the Magistrate on the police performing its duties under Chapter XII Cr.P.C. In cases where the Magistrate finds that the police has not done its duty of investigating the case at all, or has not done it satisfactorily, he can issue a direction to the police to do the investigation properly, and can monitor the same. 17. In our opinion Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include all such powers in a Magistrate which are necessary for ensuring a proper investigation, and it includes the power to order registration of an F.I.R. and of ordering a proper investigation if the Magistrate is satisfied that a proper investigation has not been done, or is not being done by the police. Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., though briefly worded, in our opinion, is very wide and it will include all such incidental powers as are necessary for ensuring a proper investigation. 25. Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., though briefly worded, in our opinion, is very wide and it will include all such incidental powers as are necessary for ensuring a proper investigation. 25. We have elaborated on the above matter because we often find that when someone has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered at the police station and/or a proper investigation is not being done by the police, he rushes to the High Court to file a writ petition or a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. We are of the opinion that the High Court should not encourage this practice and should ordinarily refuse to interfere in such matters, and relegate the petitioner to his alternating remedy, firstly under Section 154(3) and Section 36 Cr.P.C. before the concerned police officers, and if that is of no avail, by approaching the concerned Magistrate under Section 156(3). 26. If a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the police station his first remedy is to approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3) Cr.P.C. or other police officer referred to in Section 36 Cr.P.C. If despite approaching the Superintendent of Police or the officer referred to in Section 36 his grievance still persists, then he can approach a Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. instead of rushing to the High Court by way of a writ petition or a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Moreover he has a further remedy of filing a criminal complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. Why then should writ petitions or Section 482 petitions be entertained when there are so many alternative remedies? 27. As we have already observed above, the Magistrate has very wide powers to direct registration of an FIR and to ensure a proper investigation, and for this purpose he can monitor the investigation to ensure that the investigation is done properly (though he cannot investigate himself). The High Court should discourage the practice of filing a writ petition or petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. simply because a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the police, or after being registered, proper investigation has not been done by the police. The High Court should discourage the practice of filing a writ petition or petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. simply because a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the police, or after being registered, proper investigation has not been done by the police. For this grievance, the remedy lies under Sections 36 and 154(3) before the concerned police officers, and if that is of no avail, under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate or by filing a criminal complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and not by filing a writ petition or a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 28. It is true that alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to a writ petition, but it is equally well-settled that if there is an alternative remedy the High Court should not ordinarily interfere.” 6. We may supplement here by referring to the proviso (a) of Section 167(2) Cr. P. C., which empowers the Magistrate to authorise the detention of the accused person otherwise than in the custody of the police beyond the period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so. In exercise of these powers the Magistrate by examining the entries of the case diary monitors and supervises the investigation. In view of the above proposition of law with regard to the registration of the FIR at the instance of the order of the Magistrate and his power to supervise the investigation, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the petition like the instant one, is not at all maintainable. If the complainant is aggrieved with the investigation, then he can approach the Magistrate concerned under Section 156(3) Cr. P. C. by making out a clear cut case for suitable direction to the investigating officer in accordance with law. The Magistrate had to take care that investigation is the sole domain of the investigating officer and so least interference is required by the Courts. P. C. by making out a clear cut case for suitable direction to the investigating officer in accordance with law. The Magistrate had to take care that investigation is the sole domain of the investigating officer and so least interference is required by the Courts. We may now refer to the case of Union Of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja and another, (2003) 6 SCC 195 , where the Apex Court while considering whether the Court can go into the validity or otherwise of the investigation done by the authorities charged with the duty of investigation under the relevant statutes and whether any error or illegality committed during the course of investigation would so vitiate the charge-sheet so as to render the cognizance taken thereon bad and invalid, after examining the scheme of the Code on the point, in para-20 has observed as under: “20. Thus the legal position is absolutely clear and also settled by judicial authorities that the Court would not interfere with the investigation or during the course of investigation which would mean from the time of the lodging of the First Information Report till the submission of the report by the officer in charge of police station in Court under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C., this field being exclusively reserved for the investigating agency.” However, this case had been distinguished by the Hon’ble Surpeme Court in the case of Sakiri Vasu (supra) in para-29 of the report as under: 29. In Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja and another, 2003 (6) SCC 195 (vide para 13), it has been observed by this Court that a Magistrate cannot interfere with the investigation by the police. However, in our opinion, the ratio of this decision would only apply when a proper investigation is being done by the police. If the Magistrate on an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is satisfied that proper investigation has not been done, or is not being done by the officer-in-charge of the concerned police station, he can certainly direct the officer in charge of the police station to make a proper investigation and can further monitor the same (though he should not himself investigate). 7. 7. Thus, the Magistrate would be required to cautiously exercise this jurisdiction only when during investigation serious lapse, irregularities or illegalities are brought to his notice by the complainant or the victim and he may give suitable directions to the investigating officer strictly within the four corners of the law, which may not even remotely be taken to be an interference in the investigation. 8. In view of the above discussion, we find that in routine manner this Court should not be approached by way of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution or under Section 482 Cr. P. C. for seeking suitable directions to the investigating officers during pendency of the investigation and this Court may monitor an investigation into an offence only when it is objectively satisfied that either the investigation is not being proceeded with or is being influenced by interested persons. We close our discussion by referring to the case of Director CBI and others v. ‘Niyamavedi’ represented by its member K. Nandini, Advocate and others, (1995) 3 SCC 601 , wherein the Apex Court has deprecated adverse comments by the High Court disclosing the material contained in the case diaries and statements, especially when the investigation in the case was in progress. It was further observed: “Any observations which may amount to interference in the investigation should not be made. Ordinarily the Court should refrain from interfering at a premature stage of the investigation as that may derail the investigation and demoralize the investigation. Of late, the tendency to interfere in the investigation is on the increase and Court should be wary of its possible consequences. We say no more.” 9. For all the aforestated reasons, we find that the petition is merit less and is also not maintainable. It is accordingly dismissed as such. ————