Judgment: 1. The original respondent no.1 Sharad Damodar Shrangarpawar filed Insurance Case No.6/1988 in the Employees Insurance Court at Nagpur, challenging the orders of recovery passed under the relevant provision of the Employees State Insurance Act towards unpaid contribution. The Employees Insurance Court in exercise of its power under Section 75(1)(g) of the said Act has set aside the orders. Hence, this appeal has been filed by the Corporation. 2. The Employees' Insurance Court has recorded the finding in the order impugned that the respondent no.1 was the Managing Director of the factory M/s. Vikrant Exchange Engine Company Pvt. Ltd., Nagpur. He submitted resignation on 10.11.1986, which was accepted in the meeting of the Board of Directors on 08.04.1987. The court has recorded the finding that merely because the respondent no.1 was the Managing Director of the Factory, he is neither the owner nor the occupier of the factory. The reliance was placed upon the decision of this Court in case of E.S.I. Corporation vs. G.N. Mathur and others, reported in 1991 L.L.N. Vol.I, 1189. 3. Heard Smt. Maldhure, the learned counsel for the appellant. The learned counsel for the appellant urged that the following substantial questions of law arise in this matter. [i] When the respondent had given the resignation on 10.11.1986 and it was accepted in the Board of Directors' Meeting on 08.04.1987 and when there is no article of association on the record of the E.I. Court, does the E.I. Court's finding that the resignation of respondent became effective from 10.11.1986 i.e when he had resigned from the post of Managing Director, is not perverse? [ii] When it is an admitted fact that the respondent no.1 was the Managing Director looking after the day-to-day affairs of the company, he being the principal employer under Section 2(17) of the E.S.I. Act, is not personally liable for payment of contribution and the recovery certificates against him are not legal? 4. Undisputedly, the respondent no.2 Factory is closed long back. This appeal is also dismissed against the respondent no. 2 on 13.08.2013. Civil Application No. 2739/2014 is pending for setting aside dismissal against Respondent No.2. During the pendency of this first appeal, the respondent no.1 who was the Managing Director of the respondent no.2 factory expired and hence by an order of the Registrar dated 30.07.2013, the appeal was dismissed as abated against the respondent no.1. 2 on 13.08.2013. Civil Application No. 2739/2014 is pending for setting aside dismissal against Respondent No.2. During the pendency of this first appeal, the respondent no.1 who was the Managing Director of the respondent no.2 factory expired and hence by an order of the Registrar dated 30.07.2013, the appeal was dismissed as abated against the respondent no.1. This abatement was set aside and the legal representatives of the respondent no.1 have been brought on record. The respondent No. 1(i) Smt. Jostna Sharad Shrangarpawar was the widow, who is not served. The another legal representative Sachin Sharad Shrangarpawar is on record as respondent no.1(ii). On 15.07.2014, the matter is dismissed against respondent No.1(ii). Civil Application No. 2740/2014 is pending for restoration of appeal against Respondent No. 1(ii). Civil Application No. 2741/2014 is pending for substituted service upon the respondent Nos. 1(i) and 1(ii). 5. In view of the aforesaid factual position now occurring, it is not necessary to wait for the service upon the respondent nos. 1(i) and 1(ii), who are the legal representative of the original respondent no.1 and the matter can be decided. The first question which now arises for consideration is, Whether the financial liabilities against the original respondent no.1. Sharad Damodar Shrangarpawar, the Managing Director of the respondent no.2 Factory determined under the relevant provisions of the said Act can be enforced against his legal representatives? If the answer is in negative, then it will not be necessary for this Court to enter into a larger controversy considering the substantial questions of law urged by the learned counsel for the appellant. It is urged that the respondent nos.1(i) and 1(ii) are the legal representatives of the 'principal employer' as defined under section 2(17) of the said Act and hence, they are liable to pay the dues assessed against the original respondent no.1, the principal employer. 6. It is urged that the respondent nos.1(i) and 1(ii) are the legal representatives of the 'principal employer' as defined under section 2(17) of the said Act and hence, they are liable to pay the dues assessed against the original respondent no.1, the principal employer. 6. In order to consider this question, the definition of the 'principal employer' under Section 2(17) of the said Act need to be reproduced as under; 2(17) “principal employer” means- (i) in a factory, the owner or occupier of the factory and includes the managing agent of such owner or occupier, the legal representative of a deceased owner or occupier, and where a person has been named as the manager of the factory under the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948), the person so named; (ii) in any establishment under the control of any department of any Government in India, the authority appointed by such Government in this behalf or where no authority is so appointed, the head of the Department; (iii) in any other establishment, any person responsible for the supervision and control of the establishment”.. 7. This case is concerned with the definition in clause (i) above. The 'principal employer' means, in case of a factory, the owner or occupier of the factory and includes the managing agent of such owner or occupier, the legal representatives of a deceased owner or occupier and where a person has been named as the Manager of the factory under the Factories Act, 1948, the person so named. The legal representatives of the 'managing agent' of the owner or occupier of a factory is not included in clause (i) of Section 2(17) reproduced above. It is not the case that the respondent no.1 was the owner or occupier of a respondent no.2 Factory. In view of this, it is only the 'Managing Director' of such factory who can be termed as a 'principal employer' and not his legal representatives. The respondent no. 1(i) Smt. Jyotsna Sharad Shrangarpawar and respondent no. 1(ii) Sachin Sharad Shrangarpawar being the legal representative of the 'Managing Director' of the respondent no. 2 Factory, they would not become liable to pay the dues in question. Upon the death of the original respondent no.1 – Sharad Damodar Shrangarpawar, the appeal, therefore, stands abated and the orders of recovery passed against him cannot be enforced against his legal representatives who are the respondent nos. 2 Factory, they would not become liable to pay the dues in question. Upon the death of the original respondent no.1 – Sharad Damodar Shrangarpawar, the appeal, therefore, stands abated and the orders of recovery passed against him cannot be enforced against his legal representatives who are the respondent nos. 1(i) and 1 (ii). The appeal is, therefore, dismissed as abated. No costs. In view of above, Civil Application Nos. 2739/2014, 2740/2014 and 2741/2014 do not survive. The same are, therefore, dismissed.