JUDGMENT : P.N. Deshmukh, J. 1. Rule returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of Ms. Hande, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Shri Kalwaghe, learned Counsel for respondent No. 2. None appears for respondent No. 1 though served. The petitioner has challenged the order dated 6/8/2011 passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Buldhana in Criminal Revision Application No. 39/2008 whereby by partly allowing the revision, the revisional Court rejected the claim of respondent No. 1 and confirmed the order passed by the learned trial Court granting maintenance of Rs. 1500/- per month to respondent No. 2, who is a minor daughter of petitioner, from the date of filing application. It appears that before filing present petition, the petitioner had filed an application under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure being Criminal Application No. 104/2012 challenging the order passed by the revisional Court, which application was, however, allowed to be withdrawn with leave to file appropriate writ petition against the impugned order and accordingly, the present petition came to be filed. 2. To understand the controversy involved in this petition, few facts are stated as follows: "The petitioner married to respondent No. 1 in the year 1996 and on 18/9/1997, respondent No. 2 was born out of their wedlock. In 1999, respondent No. 1 left the company of petitioner and started residing with her parents. On 11/8/2004, respondent No. 1 filed Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 208/2004 for maintenance under Section 125 of Code of Criminal Procedure before Judicial Magistrate, First Class. Chikhli claiming maintenance for herself and respondent No. 2, which was contested by the petitioner by filing reply and simultaneously the petitioner initiated proceedings under Section13(1)(ia) and (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for dissolution of marriage with respondent No. 1 vide H.M.P. No. 51/2005 before Civil Judge, Senior Division, Buldhana. It is the case of the petitioner that in these proceedings, the parties arrived at a compromise, according to which it was agreed between the parties that petitioner would pay lumpsum amount as full and final maintenance amount for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to the extent of Rs. 1,50,000/- and that respondent No. 2 shall not claim any other benefits arising out of marriage between petitioner and respondent No. 1. It was also agreed that respondent No. 1 shall withdraw Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 208/2004 unconditionally. 1 and 2 to the extent of Rs. 1,50,000/- and that respondent No. 2 shall not claim any other benefits arising out of marriage between petitioner and respondent No. 1. It was also agreed that respondent No. 1 shall withdraw Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 208/2004 unconditionally. The terms of compromise were duly signed by the petitioner and respondent No. 1." 3. According to petitioner, in view of above compromise terms, he has paid Rs. 1,50,000/- in cash before the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Buldhana on 12/7/2005 for which respondent No. 1 has issued acknowledgment before the said Court and as such, according to petitioner, in view of terms of compromise, respondent No. 1 has specifically agreed that in future, she will not claim any maintenance amount. On the basis of the terms of compromise as above, the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Buldhana passed consent decree in H.M.P. No. 51/2005. However-, to the surprise of the petitioner, even after passing consent decree as aforesaid, respondent No. 1 did not withdraw Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 208/2004 from the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Chikhli, which was fixed for hearing on 16/7/2005 and petitioner had also placed on record before the said Court consent decree passed in H.M.P. No. 51/2005. However, the learned trial Court without considering the same, ordered petitioner to pay amount of Rs. 1500/- per month each to both the respondents from the date of application. It is the case of the petitioner that the order of the learned trial Court is thus contrary to the terms of the consent decree and thus, he assailed the same by filing revision being Criminal Revision Application No. 39/2008 before the Sessions Judge, Buldhana, which revision by the impugned order dated 6/8/2011 came to be partly allowed, thereby quashing the order passed by the learned trial Court granting maintenance to respondent No. 1 and recording a finding that the respondent No. 2 alone is entitled for maintenance. The petitioner has assailed the said order vide present petition. 4. The respondent No. 2 has resisted the petition by filing reply contending that petition is without any substance since respondent No. 2 is minor daughter of petitioner and hence, being father, the petitioner is duty-bound to make payment of maintenance of Rs. 1500/- per month to her. The petitioner has assailed the said order vide present petition. 4. The respondent No. 2 has resisted the petition by filing reply contending that petition is without any substance since respondent No. 2 is minor daughter of petitioner and hence, being father, the petitioner is duty-bound to make payment of maintenance of Rs. 1500/- per month to her. Rest of the facts about marriage between petitioner and respondent No. 1 and birth of respondent No. 2 out of the said wedlock are not disputed. The respondent No. 2 has also admitted fact of filing Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 208/2004 for maintenance, however, has denied for want of knowledge about petitioner filing Hindu Marriage Petition No. 51/2005 for grant of divorce and compromise, if any, arrived at between petitioner and respondent No. 1. The respondent No. 2 has specifically denied that she is not entitled for any benefit or maintenance from petitioner. She has also denied for want of knowledge that in terms of compromise, amount of Rs. 1,50,000/- was deposited by the petitioner. According to respondent No. 2, at no point of time, she had given consent to withdraw the case filed for grant of maintenance and has thus, contended that the trial Court rightly awarded maintenance to her at the rate of Rs. 1500/- per month from the date of application. 5. According to respondent No. 2, she was born to respondent No. 1 in her maternal grandfather's house and since then, continued to reside there till July 2009 when petitioner took her with him on the false pretext to provide education, etc. However, since petitioner failed to provide even basic needs and ill-treated her, she left his house while she was in Standard VII and alone came to the house of her maternal grandfather at Chikhli in September 2009 on her own will. 6. According to respondent No. 2, her mother has performed second marriage in June 2009 and she is also neglecting to maintain her and that petitioner has also performed second marriage and is having issues from the said wedlock. It is the case of respondent No. 2 that she is without any financial assistance and is residing with her maternal grandfather, who is an aged person. It is the specific case of respondent No. 2 that she is not given any share in the amount of Rs. It is the case of respondent No. 2 that she is without any financial assistance and is residing with her maternal grandfather, who is an aged person. It is the specific case of respondent No. 2 that she is not given any share in the amount of Rs. 1,50,000/- as claimed to be paid by the petitioner to respondent No. 1 in H.M.R No. 51/2005 in terms of settlement. It is thus the case of respondent No. 2 that since she is prosecuting her education and as her grandfather is not in a position to provide her any financial assistance, the petition may be dismissed as even otherwise, the petitioner has failed to pay maintenance amount to her in spite of orders passed by the learned Courts below. 7. Having considered the facts involved in the petition and controversy involved, short point, which needs consideration, is whether in view of terms of settlement arrived at between petitioner and respondent No. 1 in H.M.P. No. 51/2005 filed by the petitioner for divorce, same terms of compromise are binding upon respondent No. 2 particularly with reference to her case under Section 125 of Code of Criminal Procedure, which was admittedly filed by respondent No. 1 for herself and respondent No. 2 before learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Chikhli. 8. In view of above, when scheme of Section 125 of Code of Criminal Procedure is considered, it saddles a person with duty to maintain his legitimate or illegitimate minor child subject to conditions laid down therein. The provision vests corresponding right in the child to claim maintenance from his father in the event the child is unable to maintain itself. The obligation of father to maintain his child does not at any point of time shift to any other person including mother having custody of the child. In other words, even if the child is temporarily living with mother or in custody of any other person, the father continues to be under statutory duty to maintain the child. As such, the right with which the child is vested under Section 125 cannot be bartered away, compromised or surrendered, even by his mother. The language of Section 125(1)(b) makes abundantly clear that the law makers under this Section has cast duty upon father to maintain the child. As such, the right with which the child is vested under Section 125 cannot be bartered away, compromised or surrendered, even by his mother. The language of Section 125(1)(b) makes abundantly clear that the law makers under this Section has cast duty upon father to maintain the child. Having this in mind, reference to "legitimate or illegitimate child" has been made in Section 125(b) and (c) of Code of Criminal Procedure. 9. The case of petitioner based on compromise arrived at between him and respondent No. 1 in H.M.P. No. 51/2005 can in no way hamper the right of respondent No. 2 to claim maintenance from the petitioner. As the spirit of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to prevent starvation and vagrancy of divorced wife, any compromise or agreement by any of the parties to the marriage would in fact be against the spirit of law and would also be opposed to the public policy as it would be against the social order. It is a basic principle of law that an agreement which is opposed to public policy cannot be enforced in a Court of law. Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 renders such an agreement void if its consideration or object is unlawful. If the object or consideration of an agreement would defeat the provisions of any law and if it is opposed to public policy, the agreement would be treated as unlawful and consequently void. Therefore, a clause in an agreement that the wife shall not be entitled to claim maintenance from the husband cannot be used as a defence to proceedings under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The relinquishment of the right to maintenance by the wife will not bar proceedings under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 10. Section 23 of Indian Contract Act, 1872 is reproduced below: "Section 23 - What considerations and objects are lawful and what not - The consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless- it is forbidden by law; or is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law; or is fraudulent; or involves or implies injury to the person or property of another; or the Court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy. In each of these cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is said to be unlawful. Every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void." 11. In view of above stated provisions, the agreement entered into between petitioner and respondent No. 1 cannot be acted upon against respondent No. 2 being unlawful and void and, therefore, clause in the agreement that respondent No. 2 shall not be entitled or even, in that case, respondent No. 1 shall not be entitled to claim maintenance from the petitioner husband cannot be used as a defence to proceedings under Section 125 of Code of Criminal Procedure as relinquishment of right of maintenance as above will not bar proceedings for maintenance. Moreover, by entering into such agreement, petitioner cannot absolve his liability or obligation to pay maintenance allowance to respondent No. 2, who though admittedly is in the custody of her maternal grandfather, has come out with a specific case that now for the purpose of her better education, she needs monetary assistance and her grandfather being an aged person is unable to provide the same. For this reason also, the recitals in the agreement relied upon by the petitioner cannot be made available to him as a defence to the proceedings for grant of maintenance. 12. In the background of above circumstances, I find it useful to refer to the decision in the case of Nanak Chand v. Chandra Kishore Agarwal ( AIR 1970 SC 446 ) wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the word "child" in Section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 did not mean a minor son or daughter and that the real limitation was contained in the expression "unable to maintain itself. Irrespective of whether a son or daughter was a major or minor, a father was bound to maintain the son or daughter if such son or daughter was unable to maintain himself or herself. 13. Having considered the above facts, I find no substance in the criminal writ petition since it is based on the fact of respondent No. 1 being mother of respondent No. 2, relinquishing the right of respondent No. 2 to claim maintenance from her father as mother cannot be competent to relinquish such right. 13. Having considered the above facts, I find no substance in the criminal writ petition since it is based on the fact of respondent No. 1 being mother of respondent No. 2, relinquishing the right of respondent No. 2 to claim maintenance from her father as mother cannot be competent to relinquish such right. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the agreement reached between petitioner and respondent No. 1 before the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Buldhana would not operate as a bar to maintainability of maintenance case of respondent No. 2. In the result, criminal writ petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs. The request made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner to stay this judgment for a period of eight weeks is rejected.