Judgment : The revision petitioner, who is the auction purchaser filed this revision petition against the order of the Principal District Munsif Court at Ariyalur, dated 24.02.2004 made in E.P.No.80 of 2002 in O.S.No.177 of 1988. 2. Heard the learned counsel appearing for both sides and perused the materials available on record. 3. The revision petitioner has filed an execution petition in E.P.No.80 of 2002 in O.S.No.177 of 1988 for recovery of possession under Order 21 Rule 95 CPC. In the above said execution petition, it is stated that the revision petitioner had purchased the suit property, in Court auction sale dated 03.03.1999 in E.P.No.131 of 1991 for a sum of Rs.15000/-and the above said court auction sale was confirmed on 09.04.2001. The executing court has also issued Sale Certificate to the revision petitioner on 02.05.2002. On the basis of sale certificate, the revision petitioner filed an execution petition in E.P.No.80 of 2002 on 19.06.2002 for recovery of possession under Order 21 Rule 95 CPC. 4. The respondents have filed a counter and they resisted the execution petition by contending that the relief sought for by the revision petitioner was barred by limitation under Article 134 of Limitation Act and therefore, the revision petitioner is not entitled to seeking the relief of recovery of possession under Order 21 Rule 95 CPC. 5. The executing Court has dismissed the above said execution petition on sole ground that it is barred by limitation under Article 134 of Limitation Act. Aggrieved over the above said dismissal order passed in execution petition, the revision petitioner filed this revision petition. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner submitted that the revision petitioner is a court auction purchaser in a court auction sale held on 03.03.1999 and the sale was confirmed on 09.04.2001. Further, the sale certificate was issued on 02.05.2002. In the meantime, after confirmed the above said sale, the 1st respondent filed a review application in EA.No.52 of 2001 and the above said review application was dismissed only on 18.10.2001. After, dismissal of the review application, the revision petitioner filed the execution petition in EP No.80 of 2002 for delivery of possession only on 19.06.2002. 7. In the meantime, after confirmed the above said sale, the 1st respondent filed a review application in EA.No.52 of 2001 and the above said review application was dismissed only on 18.10.2001. After, dismissal of the review application, the revision petitioner filed the execution petition in EP No.80 of 2002 for delivery of possession only on 19.06.2002. 7. The main contention of the revision petitioner is that since the 1st respondent had filed a review application in E.A.No.52 of 2001 against the court auction sale and it was pending till 18.10.2001, the revision petitioner unable to file EP for delivery within one year from the date of court auction sale i.e., 09.04.2001 and hence, it is not barred in filing execution petition for delivery of possession under Order 21 Rule 95 CPC. 8. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent would submit that the court auction sale was confirmed on 09.04.2001. As per Article134 of Limitation Act, the revision petitioner should have filed an execution petition for delivery of possession within one year from the date of confirmation of the court auction sale, but the revision petitioner filed the execution petition only on 19.06.2002 beyond the period of one year and hence, the revision petitioner is not entitled to take delivery of possession as per Order 21 Rule 95 CPC since it is barred by limitation under Article 134 of Limitation Act. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent further submitted that even though the 1st respondent had filed a review application in EA No.52 of 2001, in the same court, but, the executing court has not passed any stay order in the above said proceedings and therefore, there is no bar to file an execution petition for taking delivery of possession as per court auction sale under Order 21 Rule 95 CPC, but, the revision petitioner failed to initiate the proceedings within a period of limitation and therefore, the revision petitioner is not entitled to the relief of delivery of possession. The learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the revision petitioner is only entitled to file a separate suit for recovery of possession as per the sale certificate obtained by the revision petitioner and she is not entitled to the recovery of possession under Order 21 Rule 95 CPC. 9. The learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the revision petitioner is only entitled to file a separate suit for recovery of possession as per the sale certificate obtained by the revision petitioner and she is not entitled to the recovery of possession under Order 21 Rule 95 CPC. 9. It is not in dispute that in the execution proceedings in EP No.131 of 1991, the revision petitioner was successful bidder in the court auction sale brought by the execution court on 03.03.1999 and the above said court auction sale was confirmed by executing court on 09.04.2001. It is also admitted that the 1st respondent/judgment-debtor filed EA No.52 of 2001 under Section 47(R) (1) r/w 151 CPC to review the order of confirmation of sale on 16.04.2001 and the above said EA No.52 of 2001 was dismissed on 18.10.2001. It is also not in dispute that the sale certificate was issued on 02.05.2002. The revision petitioner filed the present execution petition in EP No.80 of 2002 on 19.06.2002 under Order 21 Rule 95 CPC for delivery of possession. But, the above said execution proceedings was dismissed on 24.02.2004, on the sole ground that the revision petitioner has not filed execution petition within a period of one year from the date of confirmation of court auction i.e., on 09.04.2001, as per Article 134 of Limitation Act, but, execution petition filed only on 19.06.2002. In the above said circumstances, only question to be decided is that ''whether the period pending review application (i.e.,) EA No.52 of 2001 can be excluded from calculating the period of limitation as contended by the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner or cannot be excluded as contended by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent ?'' 10. The learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner relied on several decisions of Honourable Apex Court, this Court and other High Courts and submitted that if the order of confirmation is challenged before the competent court and the period pending the above said proceedings to be excluded and therefore, the execution petition filed by the revision petitioner is not barred by limitation under Article 134 of the Limitation Act, since the Review Application filed by the revision petitioner is pending before the same executing court. 11. 11. On a careful reading of the decisions relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner (1)AIR 1934 Privy Council 134 (Full Bench) (Chandra Mani Saha and others v. Anarjan Bibi and others, (2) AIR 1950 ASSAM 89 (DB) (Krishnadatta Bujarbarua v. Sindhuram Choudhury), (3) AIR 1953 SC 425 (Full Bench)(Sri Ranga Nilayam Rama Krishna Rao v. Kandokori Chellayamma and another), (4) AIR 1957 MADRAS 440 (DB) (Kamakshi Ammal and another v. Arukkani Ammal and another), (5) AIR 1967 Kerala 159 (V 54 C 66) (Narayana Pillai Krishna Pillai v. Damodaran Pillai Velayudhan Pillai), (6) AIR 1968 PATNA 70 (DB) (Mani Devi and others v. Ram Prasad and others), (7) 1969 (82) LW 533 (Badrabahu Nainar v. Devendra Nainar and others), (8) AIR 1979 ALLAHABAD 411 (Sukh Lal v. Ghasi Ram), (9) AIR 1989 SC 2113 (Manganlal v. M/s.Jaiswal Industries, Neemach and others), (10) AIR 1993 DELHI 330 (Smt.Ram Jawai and others v. Smt.Shakuntala Devi and others) and (11) AIR 1999 SC 3750 (U.Nilan v. Kannayyan (dead) through LRs.)reveal that the facts of the above said cases are not applicable to the facts of the present case. All the above said case, as against the dismissal order passed by the Executing Court, regular appeal or revision had been preferred and in such circumstances, the courts have held that the period of pendency of the appeal or revision or separate suit can be excluded in filing execution petition under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC. 12. Admittedly in the instant case, the revision petitioner has not filed any appeal or revision against the order of confirmation of court auction sale. But, the revision petitioner filed an application under Order 47 Rule 1 and Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code to review the order of confirmation by stating that the revision petitioner arranged to prefer an appeal and in the meantime, the order of confirmation passed by the executing court is illegal. It is not in dispute that the revision petitioner has not preferred any appeal or revision against the confirmation of sale under the provisions of Civil Procedure Code. Before executing court, the revision petitioner had not seeking the relief of staying the proceedings. Therefore, all the decisions relied on by the revision petitioner are not applicable to the facts of the present case as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 13. Before executing court, the revision petitioner had not seeking the relief of staying the proceedings. Therefore, all the decisions relied on by the revision petitioner are not applicable to the facts of the present case as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 13. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents would submit that the law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court and this Court in recent decisions, the application for delivery of possession as per court auction sale under Order 21 Rule 95 CPC is clearly barred under Article 134 of the Limitation Act. The relevant portion of the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents are as follows:- i) AIR 1987 SC 1443 (Ganpat Sing (dead) by L.Rs., v. Kailash Shankar and others), in which, para 16 and 18 reads as under:- ''16. On our opinion the above decision of the Madras High Court in Kamakshi Ammal's case does not support the contention of the respondent decree-holder. Order XXI Rule, 58 of the Code is a material provision relating to any claim that may be preferred or any objection that may be made to the attachment of any property in execution of a decree. Any sale that is held would, undoubtedly, be subject to the order that may be passed under O.XXI R, 58 of the Code and, thereafter, as provided in the Code before its amendment in 1976, the result of a suit that may be filed challenging such order passed by the executing court under O.XXI R.58 (sic). But after a sale becomes absolute on the dismissal of the application of the judgment-debtor's claim for setting aside the sale, another application for setting aside the sale by the judgment-debtor is not maintainable and the period of limitation as prescribed by Art.138, Limitation Act, cannot be computed from the date of the dismissal of the second application for setting aside the sale. 18. ..... The application by the 4th judgment-debtor not being maintainable in law, the respondent decree-holder was not entitled to compute the period of one year under Art.134, Limitation Act, from the date of dismissal of the second application by the 4th judgment-debtor. 18. ..... The application by the 4th judgment-debtor not being maintainable in law, the respondent decree-holder was not entitled to compute the period of one year under Art.134, Limitation Act, from the date of dismissal of the second application by the 4th judgment-debtor. The contention made on behalf of the respondent decree-holder is without substance and is overruled.” ii) 1996 1 MLJ 142 (Pattam Khader Khan v. Pattam Sardar Khan and another), in which para 13 as under:- ''13. There can be a variety of factors conceivable by which delay can be caused in issuing the sale certificate. The period of one year limitation, now prescribed under Art.134 of the Limitation Act, 1973, in substitution of a three year period prescribed under Art.180 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1908, is reflective of the legislative policy of finalising proceedings in execution as quickly as possible by providing a quick forum to the auction-purchaser to ask delivery of possession of the property purchased within that period from the date of the sale becoming absolute, rather than from the date of issuance of the sale certificate. On his failure to avail such quick remedy the law relegates him to the remedy of a suit for possession in a regular way.'' iii) 1996 1 MLJ 187 (M.V.Govindan v. Venkatarama Chetty and others) in which, para 10 reads as under:- ''10. Thus, considering the facts arising in this case in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court and that of the Bombay High Court cited supra. I hold that R.E.A.No.23 of 1981 which was converted as R.E.A.No.23 of 1983 is barred by limitation, since it was not filed within one year from the date of confirmation of the sale, as per Art.134 of the Limitation Act. In view of the above said decision of the Supreme Court, the decisions cited by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner herein are no longer good law. Therefore, there is no need to interfere with the order passed by the Execution Court dismissing R.E.A.No.23 of 1983. Accordingly, this revision petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.'' iv) 2006 (3) SCC 49 (Balakrishnan v. Malaiyandi Konar) in which, para 13 and 14 as under:- ''13. The limitation for the purpose of Article 134 starts from the date of confirmation of sale. (See Ganpat Singh v. Kailash Shankar). Accordingly, this revision petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.'' iv) 2006 (3) SCC 49 (Balakrishnan v. Malaiyandi Konar) in which, para 13 and 14 as under:- ''13. The limitation for the purpose of Article 134 starts from the date of confirmation of sale. (See Ganpat Singh v. Kailash Shankar). In Pattam Khader Khan v. Pattam Sardar Khan this Court held that it is not from the date when sale certificate is issued that the limitation starts running. The sale becomes absolute on confirmation under Order 21 Rule 92 of the Code effectively passing title. It cannot be said to attain finality only when sale certificate is issued under Order 21 Rule 94. There can be variety of factors conceivable for which delay can be caused in issuing a sale certificate. The period of one-year limitation now prescribed under Article 134 of the Limitation Act in substitution of a three-year period prescribed under Article 180 of the Limitation Act, 1908 is reflective of the legislative policy of finalising proceedings in execution as quickly as possible by providing a quick forum to the auction-purchaser to ask for the delivery of possession of the property purchased within that period from the date of the sale becoming absolute rather than from the date of issuance of the sale certificate. On his failure to avail such a quick remedy the law relegates him to the remedy of a regular suit for possession based on title, subject again to limitation. 14. Though it was submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent was responsible for the delay caused as he had filed the civil revision before the High Court, the plea is clearly untenable. The civil revision petition was dismissed on 10.09.1987.'' v) (2008) 1 SCC 520 (Manohar and others v. Jaipalsing and others) in para 15 reads as under:- ''15. It is not the contention of the respondent that any order of stay was passed in the review application. There was, thus, no bar in proceeding with the execution case.'' vi) AIR 2001 SC 279 (Ratansingh v. Vijaysingh and others), in which, para 9 as follows:- ''9. Filing of an appeal would not affect the enforceability of the decree, unless the appellate Court stays its operation. There was, thus, no bar in proceeding with the execution case.'' vi) AIR 2001 SC 279 (Ratansingh v. Vijaysingh and others), in which, para 9 as follows:- ''9. Filing of an appeal would not affect the enforceability of the decree, unless the appellate Court stays its operation. But if the appeal results in a decree that would supersede the decree passed by the lower Court and it is the appellate Court decree which becomes enforceable. When the appellate Order does not amount to a decree there would be no supersession and hence the lower Court decree continues to be enforceable.'' vii) (2005) 10 SCC 746 (Dr.Chiranji Lal(dead) by L.Rs., v. Hari Das (Dead) by L.Rs.) in para 26 reads as follows:- ''26. Rules of limitation are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. As above noted, there is no statutory provision prescribing a time-limit for furnishing of the stamp paper for engrossing the decree or time-limit for engrossment of the decree on stamp paper and there is no statutory obligation on the court passing the decree to direct the parties to furnish the stamp paper for engrossing the decree. In the present case the Court has not passed an order directing the parties to furnish the stamp papers for the purpose of engrossing the decree. Merely because there is no direction by the Court to furnish the stamp papers for engrossing of the decree or there is no time-limit fixed by law, does not mean that the party can furnish stamp papers at its sweet will and claim that the period of limitation provided under Article 136 of the Act would start only thereafter as and when the decree is engrossed thereupon. The starting of period of limitation for execution of a partition decree cannot be made contingent upon the engrossment of the decree on the stamp paper. The engrossment of the decree on stamp paper would relate back to the date of the decree, namely, 07.08.1981, in the present case. In this view the execution application filed on 21.03.1994 was time-barred having been filed beyond the period of twelve years prescribed under Article 136 of the Act. The engrossment of the decree on stamp paper would relate back to the date of the decree, namely, 07.08.1981, in the present case. In this view the execution application filed on 21.03.1994 was time-barred having been filed beyond the period of twelve years prescribed under Article 136 of the Act. The High Court committed illegality in coming to the conclusion that it was not barred by limitation.'' viii) AIR 2012 SC 1586 (Bimal Kumar & another v. Shakuntala Debi & others) in which, para 35 as under:- ''35. In the case at hand, the compromise decree had the status of a final decree. The latter suit filed by the appellants was for partition and declaring the exparte compromise decree as null and void. As has already been stated, there was no stay of the earlier judgment or any proceedings emanating therefrom. In the absence of any interdiction from any court, the decree-holder was entitled to execute the decree. It needs no special emphasis to state that there was no impediment or disability in the way of the respondents to execute the decree but the same was not done. Therefore, the irresistible conclusion is that the initiation of execution proceedings was indubitably barred by limitation. Thus analyzed, the reasons ascribed by the learned single Judge are absolutely unsustainable. The period of limitation stipulated under Article 136 of the Act could not have been condoned as has been so presumed by the learned single Judge. The reliance placed on the decision in Bharti Devi ( AIR 2010 Jhar 10 ) (supra) is totally misconceived inasmuch as in the said case, the execution proceeding was initiated for permanent injunction. No exception can be taken to the same and therefore, reliance placed on the said decision is misconceived.'' ix) 2006 SCCR 539 (Ram Bachan Rai and others v. Ram Udar Rai and others), in which para 11 and 12 as under:- ''11. In view of the said decision, the inevitable conclusion is that the Executing Court was not correct in its view. It is to be noted that learned counsel for the respondents conceded to the position that the period of limitation is not to be reckoned from the date of dismissal of the Civil Revision which was filed relating to rejection of the application under Order IX Rule 13, CPC. It is to be noted that learned counsel for the respondents conceded to the position that the period of limitation is not to be reckoned from the date of dismissal of the Civil Revision which was filed relating to rejection of the application under Order IX Rule 13, CPC. The entire focus was on the date from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned. Reliance was placed on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Ram Nath Das and others vs. Saha Chowdhury & Co. Ltd., and others, AIR 1974 Cal 246 where it was held that the decree was enforceable and when cost is assessed. The ratio in the said judgment clearly runs counter to what has been stated in Dr.Chirani Lal's case (supra). 12. For the reasons aforesaid, the application for execution filed on 5.4.1991 was clearly time barred having been filed beyond the period of twelve years prescribed under Article 136 of the Limitation Act. Accordingly, the High Court as well as the Executing Court committed illegality in coming to a conclusion that it was not barred by limitation. Therefore, the inevitable result is that the order passed by the High Court and the Executing Court cannot be maintained and are set aside. The appeal is allowed. The application for execution stands rejected. No costs.'' x) 2012 2 LW 839 (S.Sivasubramanian v. N.Chinnasamy and others), in which para 10 as under:- ''10. As laid down in the aforesaid two decisions of the Apex Court, the period of limitation of one year prescribed under Article 134 of the Limitation Act starts running from the date of confirmation of sale and the period of limitation does not start from the date when the sale certificate is issued. The sale becomes absolute on confirmation under Order 21 Rule 95 of the Code effectively passing title. It cannot be said to attain finality only when sale certificate is issued under Order 21, Rule 94 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is unfortunate that the trial court has not properly considered the objections raised by the judgment debtor basing reliance on Article 134 of the Limitation Act. It cannot be said to attain finality only when sale certificate is issued under Order 21, Rule 94 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is unfortunate that the trial court has not properly considered the objections raised by the judgment debtor basing reliance on Article 134 of the Limitation Act. The lower court has not at all adverted to the date of confirmation of the sale and had the Court done that exercise, the erroneous order could not have been passed and therefore, the order of the court below is liable to be set-aside and accordingly, the same is set-aside and the Civil Revision Petition stands allowed. However, though the auction purchaser had not availed the remedy provided under the code of Civil Procedure, it is always open to him to file a regular suit for possession based on title subject to the period of limitation prescribed therefor. Therefore, it is open to the auction purchaser / first respondent herein to file an appropriate suit if he is so entitled to in law. No costs. Consequently, the connected MP is closed.'' 14. As already discussed, in the instant case, the court auction sale was confirmed on 09.04.2001. As per Article 134 of the Limitation Act, the revision petitioner is entitled to file an application for delivery under Order 21 Rule 95 CPC within one year from the date of confirmation of sale i.e., from 09.04.2001. In the instant case, the revision petitioner filed execution petition only on 19.06.2002 beyond the period of limitation of one year. As per the settled principles of law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court and this Court in various recent decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents, the above said execution petition in E.P.No.80 of 2002 filed by the revision petitioner is clearly barred by limitation under Article 134 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, the findings of the executing court are not perverse or illegal. 15. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents further pointed out that the revision petitioner is entitled to approach the competent Civil Court for recovery of possession on the basis of sale deed executed in terms of the court auction sale within 12 years from the date of sale. 15. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents further pointed out that the revision petitioner is entitled to approach the competent Civil Court for recovery of possession on the basis of sale deed executed in terms of the court auction sale within 12 years from the date of sale. But, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner submitted that since this Civil Revision Petition is pending before this Court, the revision petitioner was unable to file a suit for recovery of possession on the basis of court auction within a period of 12 years and therefore, if this Court feels that separate suit is to be filed, the period of pending the Civil Revision Petition before this Court may be excluded. This Court has already held in a decision reported in 2012-2-LW-839 (S.Sivasubramanian v. N.Chinnasamy and others) directed the court auction purchaser to file appropriate suit on the basis of court auction sale for recovery of possession. In the above said circumstances, this Court is of the view that opportunity is to be given to the revision petitioner to approach the competent civil court for recovery of possession and the period of pending the present Civil Revision Petition is to be excluded for calculating the period of limitation. 16. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed with liberty given to the revision petitioner to file a separate suit for recovery of possession on the basis of court auction sale and the period of pending the present Civil Revision Petition is ordered to be excluded if a separate suit is filed by the revision petitioner within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No order as to costs.