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2014 DIGILAW 2224 (BOM)

Vijaya Balbhim Deshpande v. Nilabai Tayasaheb Birajdar

2014-10-31

R.M.SAVANT

body2014
JUDGMENT R.M. Savant, J. 1. Admit. 2. With the consent of the Learned Counsel for the parties taken up for hearing forthwith. 3. The Revisionary Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked against the order dated 30-8-2011 passed by the Learned IInd Joint Civil Judge Senior Division, Solapur, by which order the application Exhibit 30 filed by the Respondents who are the decree holders for appointment of the Court Commissioner for carrying out the work of execution of the Sale Deed, came to be allowed. 4. The facts necessary to be cited for adjudication of the above Petition can be stated thus: The Respondents herein are the original Plaintiffs who had filed Special Civil Suit No.90 of 1972 for specific performance of the agreement in respect of the Sale Deed of land bearing block No.22/2 admeasuring about 3 Hectors and 84 Ares situated at Village Umarga, Taluka Akkalkot, District Solapur. It is not necessary to refer to the intervening facts. Suffice it to say that the Suit came to be decreed in favour of the Respondent No.7. The Defendants to the said Suit i.e. the Applicants herein filed two First Appeals being Nos.208 of 1978 and 213 of 1978, in this Court. The said First Appeals came to be dismissed by this court on 3-12-1991 and 4-12-1991, respectively. After the dismissal of the First Appeals, the Plaintiffs filed Regular Darkhast No.187 of 1997 seeking execution of the said decree dated 26-6-1977. It appears that a part of the land covered by the decree was notified for acquisition under the Maharashtra Project Affected Persons Rehabilitation Act 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) for the irrigation project known as Kunnur project. In view of the land being notified, the prohibition or bar to transfer the land covered by the notification came into operation by virtue of the mandate of Section 11 of the said Act. In view thereof in the said Darkhast the Defendants i.e. the Applicants herein executed a Sale Deed dated 5-8-1998 of only 1 Hector 43 Ares as the said portion of land was not covered by the notification. In so far as the notification under the said Act is concerned, it is required to be noted that a mutation entry being No.260 came to be effected in the revenue record on 27-7-1998 declaring that the lands have been notified for acquisition. In so far as the notification under the said Act is concerned, it is required to be noted that a mutation entry being No.260 came to be effected in the revenue record on 27-7-1998 declaring that the lands have been notified for acquisition. It seems that the land admeasuring 1 Hector and 43 Ares in respect of which a Sale Deed was executed, was so executed by the Defendants by obtaining permission of the Collector of Solapur in respect of the block No.22/2, which was not notified for acquisition. 5. In so far as the prohibition bar placed by Section 12 of the said Act is concerned, the Collector Solapur, by notification dated 29-5-2004 lifted the restriction on transfer of the lands covered by the notification and the mutation entry to the said effect came to be effected in the revenue record on 24-6-2004 vide mutation entry No.369. Hence during the period 27-7-1998 up to 29-5-2004 the decree could not be executed in so far as part of the land i.e. 2 Hector and 42 Ares is concerned, in view of the legislative bar imposed by Section 12 of the said Act. After the prohibition bar came to be removed in respect of lands covered by the notification, the Plaintiffs filed an application for execution in respect of the balance land admeasuring 2 Hectors and 42 Ares being Special Darkhast No.78 of 2007, in the said execution application the Plaintiffs have referred to the antecedents facts of there being a legislative bar to the execution of the decree and have thereafter sought execution of the decree in respect of the balance portion of land. In the said Special Darkhast in view of the objection of the Defendants, the Plaintiffs have filed an application for appointment of the Court Commissioner for execution of the Sale Deed in their favour. It is the said application Exhibit 30 which has been decided by the impugned order. The said application was opposed to on behalf of the Defendants by contending that on the notification being withdrawn and the land being denotified from acquisition, the same has been transferred to the Defendants whose names have also been recorded in the revenue record and therefore the Plaintiffs are not entitled for execution of the Sale Deed in respect of the said area of 2 Hectors 42 Ares. The application was also objected on the ground that the same was filed beyond a period of 12 years as according to the Defendants the decree had became enforceable in the year 1991 by virtue of the dismissal of the First Appeals by this Court. The said application was considered by the Executing Court i.e. the Learned 2nd Joint Civil Judge Senior Division, Solapur who as indicated above by the impugned order dated 31-8-2011 has rejected the said application and in rejecting the said application has not accepted the principal contention urged on behalf of the Defendants that the execution has been filed after a period of 12 years. The Trial Court has held that since there was a legislative bar between the period 27-7-1998 to 29-5-2004, the Plaintiffs were entitled to file the application for execution after the legislative bar was removed in respect of the balance land covered by the decree in question. 6. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties. 7. The Learned Counsel Mr. Killedar appearing for the Applicant would reiterate the case of the Applicant before the Executing Court and would contend that the decree had became enforceable in the year 1991 and therefore the execution application being Special Darkhast No.78 of 2007 filed after a period of 12 years is not maintainable. The Learned Counsel sought to place reliance on the judgments of the Apex Court in the matter of Hameed Joharan (D) & ors. Vs. Abdul Salam (D) by LRS & ors. AIR 2001 Supreme Court 3404 and in the matter of Bimal Kumar & Anr. Vs. Shakuntala Debi & Ors. AIR 2012 SC 1586 , to buttress his contention that the words contained in Article 136 of the Limitation Act would have to be give a literal meaning and if so given, since the decree has become enforceable in the year 1991, therefore, the execution application filed in the year 2007 is beyond the period of limitation. This was the main thrust of the submissions of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner is the above Civil Revision Application. 8. Per contra Mr. This was the main thrust of the submissions of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner is the above Civil Revision Application. 8. Per contra Mr. Patil, the Learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent Nos.1 to 7 i.e. the original Plaintiffs would contend that the Plaintiffs had initially filed the execution application in the year 1997 which is Regular Darkhast No.187 of 1997 and it is an undisputed position that on 5-8- 1998 the Defendants have executed the Sale Deed in respect of 1 Hector and 42 Ares of land which was free from prohibition bar placed by the said Act. The learned Counsel would contend that in view of the part of the land covered by the decree being notified for acquisition for irrigation project namely the Kurnur project, there was a legislative bar for transfer of the land which includes the Sale Deed to be executed as posited in Section 12 and the Plaintiffs were therefore entitled to apply for execution of the balance portion after such embargo/restriction was removed. The Learned Counsel would contend that in the light of the fact that the Plaintiffs have initially filed the execution application in the year 1997 which was well within limitation, it cannot be said that the application filed for execution being Special Darkhast No.78 of 2007 for the balance land covered by the decree after the embargo/restriction was removed, was filed beyond the period of 12 years and therefore barred by limitation. 9. Having heard the Learned Counsel for the parties, I have bestowed my anxious consideration to the rival contentions. In the instant case, it is required to be noted that there is a decree for specific performance in favour of the Respondent Nos.1 to 7 for an area of 3 Hectors and 84 Ares. The said decree is dated 6-7-1977, a challenge to the said decree can be said to have concluded in the year 1991 by the dismissal of the First Appeals filed by the Defendants which are First Appeal Nos.208 of 1978 and 213 of 1978. In the light of there being no other impediment in the year 1991, the decree had became enforceable. In the light of there being no other impediment in the year 1991, the decree had became enforceable. The Plaintiffs accordingly had filed Regular Darkhast No.187 of 1997, however it is during the pendency of the said Darkhast that part of the land covered by the decree for specific performance was notified for acquisition along with other lands under the provisions of the said Act. The fact that the land being notified as also being recorded in the revenue record by way of mutation entry is undisputed position. In view of the land being notified, the provisions of the said Act came into operation and resultantly the bar as posited in Section 12 to the transfer of the lands covered by the notification, came into play. It would be apposite to reproduce the relevant extract of Section 12 of the said which reads thus: "12. Restrictions on transfer, sub-division, partition, conversion or improvement of land. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, no agricultural land in the villages or areas specified in the notification under section 11 shall, after publication of the notification in the Official Gazette and until Collector makes a declaration to the effect that no further land in the benefited zone of any particular village or area therefrom is required for the purpose of this Act, be- (a) transferred whether by way of sale (including sale in execution of a decree of civil court, or of an award or order of any other competent authority) or by way of gift, exchange, lease or otherwise; (b) ......... (c) .......... (d) .......... (e) .......... (2) .......... (3) .......... (4) .......... (a) (b) 10. The Defendants on 5-8-1998 executed a Sale Deed for area of 1 Hector and 43 Ares, in favour of the Plaintiffs. The said land was part of the land covered by the decree and in respect of which there was no prohibition / bar for transfer as the same was not covered by the notification. Nevertheless the Defendants executed the Sale Deed by seeking permission of the Collector Solapur, hence in so far as the part of the land covered by the decree is concerned, the decree was executed. Nevertheless the Defendants executed the Sale Deed by seeking permission of the Collector Solapur, hence in so far as the part of the land covered by the decree is concerned, the decree was executed. However, in so far as the balance portion of which the Plaintiffs were entitled to that is an area of 2 Hectors and 42 Ares in view of the prohibition / bar on transfer, sale, the decree could not be executed and remained unenforceable in view of the legislative bar. It is an undisputed position that the legislative bar operated between 27-7-1998 to 29- 5-2004, after 29-5-2004 the bar came to an end as the lands were withdrawn from acquisition on the withdrawal of the notification, effect to which was also given in the revenue record, the Plaintiffs thereafter have filed the instant Special Darkhast No.78 of 2007 for execution of the decree in so far as the balance portion of the land is concerned. In my view the contention raised on behalf of the Applicant that the application for execution has been filed after a period of 12 years cannot be countenanced firstly for the reason that the original Darkhast has been filed in the year 1997 i.e. Regular Darkhast No.187 of 1997 pursuant to which the decree has been partly executed and remained to be executed for the balance portion of land on account of the legislative bar and secondly that on account of the legislative bar being removed on 29-5-2004, the decree became once again enforceable as contemplated by Article 136 of the Limitation Act, in so far as the balance portion is concerned and the Plaintiffs were therefore entitled to file the application for the balance portion. It is required to be noted that this is not a case where the Plaintiffs i.e. the decree holder have for the first time filed the application in the year 2007, but it is a case where an earlier application for execution was filed well within time and that the decree could not be executed, the Plaintiffs could not be blamed for the same as there was a legislative bar operating. It is well settled by catena of judgments of the Apex Court that the period of 12 years as contemplated by Article 136 begins from the stage when the decree becomes enforceable. 11. It is well settled by catena of judgments of the Apex Court that the period of 12 years as contemplated by Article 136 begins from the stage when the decree becomes enforceable. 11. In the instant case, the decree had became enforceable initially in the year 1991 after the First Appeals were dismissed by this Court. Pursuant to which the Plaintiffs had filed the execution application. However, indubitably the enforceability of the decree became partly affected on account of the legislative bar being imposed on account of the land being notified for acquisition under the said Act. Hence in so far as the balance portion of land covered by the decree is concerned, the enforceability of the decree has recommenced in the year 2004 and therefore the application filed in the year 2007 for execution of the decree in so far as the balance portion of the land is concerned, cannot be said to be beyond the period of limitation prescribed by Article 136. 12. Now coming to the judgments cited on behalf of the Applicant, in my view the said judgments do not aid the Applicants to further their case that the execution application being Special Darkhast No.78 of 2007 has been filed beyond limitation. In so far as the judgment in Hameed Joharan's case (supra) is concerned, the background to the introduction of Article 136 of the Limitation Act which has replaced the original Article 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908, was considered by the Apex Court and especially the report of the Law Commission in respect thereof. However, the Apex Court has ultimately reiterated that the words appearing in Article 136 namely when the decree becomes enforceable are to be given a literal meaning. In so far as the judgment in Bimal Kumar's case (supra) is concerned, the same reiterates what has been held in the judgment of Hameed Joharan's case (Supra) the words when the decree becomes enforceable is to be given a literal meaning. In my view the said judgments do not aid the Applicant in any manner. In the present case, the fact that loomed large over the enforceability of the decree is the legislative bar which operated from 27-7-1998 to 29-5-2004. It is only after the legislative bar was removed on 29-5-2004 that the decree again became enforceable in respect of part of the land covered by the decree. In the present case, the fact that loomed large over the enforceability of the decree is the legislative bar which operated from 27-7-1998 to 29-5-2004. It is only after the legislative bar was removed on 29-5-2004 that the decree again became enforceable in respect of part of the land covered by the decree. In my view, therefore, in the peculiar facts of the present case the judgments of the Apex Court (Supra) would have no application. 13. In that view of the matter, the order passed by the Executing Court cannot be said to suffer from any error of jurisdiction for this Court to interdict in its Revisionary Jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Civil Revision Application is accordingly dismissed.