ORDER Manindra Mohan Shrivastava, J. 1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been preferred by the petitioner seeking a direction to respondents to provide employment and also pay compensation in respect of the land acquired by the respondents. The South Eastern Coalfields Limited (for short "SECL") required land for carrying out mining activity. This led to acquisition of land held by Bharatlal, father of the petitioner jointly with other holders. The acquisition took place in two phases. First acquisition took place in the year 1977-78, whereas the second in the year 1982-83. In course of time, the SECL, in furtherance of State Govt. policy to provide employment to those whose land were acquired, provided employment to two sons of Bharatlal, namely- Rajulal and Janki Prasad. They are brothers of the petitioner. Two sons of Bharatlal were provided employment by SECL in the year 1998. At that time, the respondent authorities did not provide any job to the petitioner. According to the petitioner, there were recommendations made in his favour by the revenue authorities. In the year 2011, certain representations were again made by the petitioner and by his father claiming employment and when no such relief was granted, this petition has been filed. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the acquisition of land belonging to Bharatlal as joint holder along with other holders in the year 1978 and 1983 entitled the petitioner to get employment under the scheme of rehabilitation promulgated by the State Govt. vide notification dated 25th September, 1991. It is the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that entitlement of the petitioner for grant of employment was duly examined by the Nayab Tahsildar who submitted a report dated 14.7.1998 along with which. the Sub Divisional Officer vide his memo dated 15.9.1988 (Annexure P-4) recommended that appointment be provided to the petitioner also. But, no employment was provided despite such recommendation. The petitioner submitted representation to respondent-authority on 19.12.2000 and on various dates subsequent thereto up to 2011, but when no relief was granted, this writ petition has been filed. It is contended that according to rehabilitation policy of the State Govt., the petitioner had become entitled to be treated as a family and as such entitled to employment. 3. The petitioner submitted representation to respondent-authority on 19.12.2000 and on various dates subsequent thereto up to 2011, but when no relief was granted, this writ petition has been filed. It is contended that according to rehabilitation policy of the State Govt., the petitioner had become entitled to be treated as a family and as such entitled to employment. 3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents opposed the claim of the petitioner and raises objection with regard to very maintainability of the writ petition by submitting that the petition is highly belated and suffers from delay and laches. He submits that if the petitioner claims appointment, he should have approached this Court within a reasonable time. The two brothers of the petitioner were granted employment in the year 1998. The petitioner has filed this petition after 14 years from the date the appointment was given to petitioner's brothers. There is no explanation for delay and the petition is therefore liable to be dismissed on that count alone. On merits, it is submitted that at the time when the land was acquired, there was no policy of rehabilitation in force. Therefore, on the basis of subsequent policy of the year 1991 promulgated by the State Govt., the petitioner is not entitled to appointment as a measure of rehabilitation. Further contention is that even if it is accepted that there was a policy to provide employment irrespective of whether land was acquired prior to or after the date of promulgation of rehabilitation policy 1991, the petitioner is required to establish that on the date of issuance of notification of acquisition he had become major. The petitioner has come not come with any such details in the petition to establish that on the date of issuance of notification of acquisition, he had become major. Therefore, in these circumstances, the petitioner's claim that he should be treated as a separate family cannot be accepted and for that reason also, no relief can be granted to the petitioner. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, having perused the records, I find that there is considerable force in the submission of learned counsel for the respondents with regard to maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches. 5. The land belonging to Bharatlal father of the petitioner was acquired in two phases. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, having perused the records, I find that there is considerable force in the submission of learned counsel for the respondents with regard to maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches. 5. The land belonging to Bharatlal father of the petitioner was acquired in two phases. First in the year 1978 and thereafter in the year 1983. The information received under Right to Information Act, 2005 by the petitioner and placed on record as Annexure P-3 shows that the respondents authority have been granting appointment to displaced persons whose land were acquired by SECL even prior to promulgation of rehabilitation policy 1991. In that process, the SECL considered the case of Bharatlal and his family and granted appointment to two sons of Bharatlal, namely Janki Prasad and Rajulal, who are brothers of petitioner. Admittedly, these two appointments were granted in the year 1998. Thus, at this stage, there was implied rejection of petitioner's claim, if any, for grant of appointment under the rehabilitation policy of 1991. 6. True it is that some recommendation in favour of petitioner was made in the year 1998 by the revenue authorities, all that is seen is that the petitioner had been making certain representations. The petitioner, from 1998, except moving certain representations which are placed on record, did not take any further steps to seek redressal of his grievance in any court of law. Writ petition has been filed by the petitioner in the year 2012. Even if it is taken that the petitioner's claim for employment was impliedly rejected in the year 1998 when employment was granted to his brothers namely Rajulal and Janki Prasad, there is no reasonable explanation as to why the petitioner could not approach the Court of law in all these 14 years. Mere repeated representation do not extend the time nor can by itself be treated as sufficient and reasonable explanation to condone delay in filing writ petition. Particularly when two brothers of the petitioner were granted employment in the year 1998, it was for the petitioner to take steps for expeditious redressal of his grievance. It is not a matter of few years. It is almost after one and half decade after the petitioner has approached this court. 7. In the case of Uttaranchal Forest Development Corpn. Particularly when two brothers of the petitioner were granted employment in the year 1998, it was for the petitioner to take steps for expeditious redressal of his grievance. It is not a matter of few years. It is almost after one and half decade after the petitioner has approached this court. 7. In the case of Uttaranchal Forest Development Corpn. and another v. Jabar Singh and others : (2007) 2 SCC 112, the Supreme Court observed as under: "43. The termination order was made in the year 1995 and the writ petitions were admittedly filed in the year 2005 after a delay of 10 years. The High Court, in our opinion, was not justified in entertaining the writ petition on the ground that the petition has been filed after a delay of 10 years and that the writ petitions should have been dismissed by the High Court on the ground of laches." Further, in the case of New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and others : (2007) 9 SCC 278 , the Supreme Court, reiterating the principles relating to interference in cases where petitioner approached the Court with unexplained delay, held as below: "16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. (See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh and Karnataka Power Corpn. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. (See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh and Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan)" In the case of P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadir : (1975)1 SCC 152 , it has been held as under :-- "It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. The petitioner's petition should, therefore, have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the Court. It clogs the work of the Court and impedes the work of the Court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal work. We consider that the High Court was right in dismissing the appellant's petition as well as the appeal." In the case of Bhoop Singh v. Union of India : (1992) 3 SCC 136 , it was held as under:-- "8. There is another aspect of the matter. Inordinate and unexplained delay or laches is by itself a ground to refuse relief to the petitioner, irrespective of the merit of his claim. If a person entitled to a relief chooses to remain silent for long, he thereby gives rise to a reasonable belief in the mind of others that he is not interested in claiming that relief. Others are then justified in acting on that belief. This is more so in service matters where vacancies are required to be filled promptly. If a person entitled to a relief chooses to remain silent for long, he thereby gives rise to a reasonable belief in the mind of others that he is not interested in claiming that relief. Others are then justified in acting on that belief. This is more so in service matters where vacancies are required to be filled promptly. A person cannot be permitted to challenge the termination of his service after a period of twenty-two years, without any cogent explanation for the inordinate delay, merely because others similarly dismissed had been reinstated as a result of their earlier petitions being allowed." 8. In view of the above, in the considered opinion of this Court, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed only on the ground of delay and laches. The petition is accordingly dismissed. No orders as to costs.