Judgment T. Nandakumar Singh, J. 1. Heard Mr. P. Nongbri, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and also Ms. P.S. Nongbri, learned counsel appearing for the respondents No. 1 to 6 and Mr. N.D. Chullai, learned Sr. GA assisted by Mr. B. Khyriem, learned counsel appearing for the respondents No. 7 to 13. 2. By this writ petition, the petitioner is praying for a direction to the respondents No. 1 to 6 to recall the proceedings pursuant to the complaint dated 07.06.2011 filed by the private respondents No. 7 to 13 against the petitioner to the Executive Committee In charge of Elaka Administration, Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council (In short 'KHADC'), Shillong and also for a direction to the private respondents No. 7 to 13 to first place their complaint dated 07.06.2011 before the Durbar Hima as per relevant Rules and Regulations. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the parties had drawn the attention of this court to the various provisions of the KHADC (Appointment and Succession of the Sirdar and Headmen of Jyrngam Sirdarship) Act, 2005 and the Administration of Jyrngam Sirdarship Rules, 2006. 4. It is the case of the petitioner that any complaint filed against the petitioner should be considered by the concerned authority in compliance with the provisions of the KHADC (Appointment and Succession of the Sirdar and Headmen of Jyrngam Sirdarship) Act, 2005 and the Administration of Jyrngam Sirdarship Rules, 2006. Under Section 2(d) of the said Act 2005: "Durbar Hima" or "Durbar Pyllun" means the general Durbar of the Jyrngam Sirdarship convened on the advice of the Executive Durbar by the Sirdar, Acting Sirdar or any person acting as such. And also under Section 2(g) of the said Act 2005: "Executive Durbar" means the Committee consisting of the Sirdar, Deputy Sirdar, the Lyngdohs, Myntris, the Kongors and such persons belonging to the Khasi-Muliang/Khasi-Nongtrai//Khasi community appointed as members by the Durbar Hima and approved by the Executive Committee to run the day-to-day administration of the Jyrngam Sirdarship, and it shall be presided over by the Sirdar and in his absence, by the Deputy Sirdar and in the absence of both; by any member elected by the members present in the meeting". 5. Mr. N.D. Chullai, learned Sr. 5. Mr. N.D. Chullai, learned Sr. GA appearing for respondents No. 7 to 13 strenuously contended that the Sirdar can be removed from office or suspended by the Executive Committee under Section 6 of the said Act 2005 for the reasons mentioned therein. For easy reference, Section 6 of the said Act 2005 is quoted hereunder: "6. Term of Office-The Sirdar shall hold office during his life time provided that he may be removed from office or suspended by the Executive Committee if:- (a) he violates any of the terms and conditions of his appointment. Or (b) he violates any of the laws, regulations, rules and resolution passed by the Council. Or (c) he refuse to carry out the orders and instructions issued by the Executive Committee. Or (d) he is found to be mentally unfit to carry out his functions. Or (e) he is found incapable of carrying on the administration to the satisfaction of the Executive Committee due to ill health, old age or habitual drunkenness. Or (f) he violates any customary rights and practices prevailing in the Elaka and duly recognized by the Executive Committee. Or (g) he has been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude. Or (h) he is found to have oppressed the people of the Elaka and they have just cause for dissatisfaction with his misrule. Or (i) he has lost the confidence of the majority of his electors or of the people of the Elaka. Or (j) he is undischarged insolvent. Or (k) he does not reside within the Elaka Or (l) he is found to have been conducting himself in a manner derogatory to his office or pre-judicial to the interest of the Elaka or part thereof. Or (m) has been conducting himself in a manner which may undermine the authority of the Executive Committee or the District Council. Provided that (i) every such case be placed before the Council in its next session and (ii) the Sirdar shall not be removed from office or punished with suspension unless he is given an opportunity of being heard: Provided further the requirements of the above proviso shall not apply- (i) In the case where the order or removal or punishment or suspension is awarded on account of his being convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude. (ii) In the case of order of suspension pending inquiry". Mr. N.D. Chullai, learned Sr. (ii) In the case of order of suspension pending inquiry". Mr. N.D. Chullai, learned Sr. GA further contended that the Executive Committee is the competent authority to remove the Sirdar from his office for the reasons mentioned under Section 6 of the said Act, 2005. 6. Mr. P. Nongbri, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is not disputing the contention made by Mr. N.D. Chullai, learned Sr. GA appearing for respondents No. 7 to 13 but the submission of Ms. P.S. Nongbri, learned counsel appearing for respondents No. 1 to 6 is that the Executive Committee has to follow the procedure prescribed by them under Section 12 of the said Act i.e. the Administration of Jyrngam Sirdarship Rules, 2006. It is a fairly settled law that the rule is framed for compliance and not for violation. Under Rule 28(4) of the said Rules, 2006 any complaint relating to the functioning and conduct of the Sirdar/Acting Sirdar/Deputy Sirdar shall not be taken up directly by the Executive Committee without any knowledge of the Durbar Hima. For easy reference, Rule 28(4) of the said Rules, 2006 is quoted here under: "28. Power of the Durbar Hima: (4) Any complaint relating to the functioning and conduct of the Sirdar/Acting Sirdar/Deputy Sirdar shall not be taken up directly with the Executive Committee without the knowledge of the Durbar Hima". 7. It is, no doubt, well settled that it is the basic principle of construction of statute that the same should be read as a whole, then chapter by chapter, section by section and word by word. Recourse to construction or interpretation of statute is necessary when there is ambiguity, obscurity, or inconsistency therein and not otherwise. An effort should be made to give effect to all parts of the statute and unless absolutely necessary, no part thereof shall be rendered superfluous or redundant. True meaning of a provision of law is to be determined on the basis of what it provides by its clear language, with due regard to the scheme of law (Reference may bemade to Bhavnagar University Vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. & Ors, reported in : (2003) 2 SCC 111 . It is cardinal rule of construction that no word should be construed redundant or surplus in interpreting the provision of a statute or rule (Ref: Dinesh Chandra Sangma Vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. & Ors, reported in : (2003) 2 SCC 111 . It is cardinal rule of construction that no word should be construed redundant or surplus in interpreting the provision of a statute or rule (Ref: Dinesh Chandra Sangma Vs. State of Assam & Ors: : AIR 1978 SC 17 ). The Apex Court in State of Maharashtra & Ors. Vs. Santosh Shanker Acharya: : (2000) 7 SCC 463 held that it is too well known principle of construction of statute that the legislature engrafted every part of the statue for a purpose. The legislative intention is that every part of the statute should be given effect. Legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. The Apex Court in Bhavnagar University Vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. & Ors. : (2003) 2 SCC 111 held that it is the basic principle of construction of statute that statutory enactment must ordinarily be construed according to their plain meaning and no words should be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute. 8. The Apex Court in State of Gujrat & Anr. v. Justice R.A. Mehta (Retired) & Ors: : (2013) 3 SCC 1 held that: "96. In the process of statutory construction, the court must construe the Act before it, bearing in mind the legal maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat which means it is better for a thing to have effect than for it to be made void, i.e., a statute must be construed in such a manner, so as to make it workable. Viscount Simon, L.C. in Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd.: 1940 AC 1014: (1940) 3 All ER 549 (HL) stated as follows: (AC p. 1022) "......if the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result." 97. Similarly in Whitney v. IRC: 1926 AC 37 (HL), it was observed as under: (AC p. 52) "...... A statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure that object, unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable." 98. The doctrine of purposive construction may be taken recourse to for the purpose of giving full effect to statutory provisions, and the courts must state what meaning the statute should bear, rather than rendering the statute a nullity, as Page 25 of 31 statutes are meant to be operative and not inept. The courts must refrain from declaring a statute to be unworkable. The rules of interpretation require that construction, which carries forward the objectives of the statute, protects interest of the parties and keeps the remedy alive, should be preferred, looking into the text and context of the statute. Construction given by the court must promote the object of the statute and serve the purpose for which it has been enacted and not efface its very purpose. "The courts strongly lean against any construction which tends to reduce a statute to futility. The provision of the statute must be so construed so as to make it effective and operative." The court must take a pragmatic view and must keep in mind the purpose for which the statute was enacted, as the purpose of law itself provides good guidance to courts as they interpret the true meaning of the Act and thus, legislative futility must be ruled out. A statute must be construed in such a manner so as to ensure that the Act itself does not become a dead letter, and the obvious intention of the legislature does not stand defeated, unless it leads to a case of absolute intractability in use. The court must adopt a construction which suppresses the mischief and advances the remedy and "to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico". The court must give effect to the purpose and object of the Act for the reason that legislature is presumed to have enacted a reasonable statute. The court must give effect to the purpose and object of the Act for the reason that legislature is presumed to have enacted a reasonable statute. (Vide: M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa: : AIR 1961 SC 1107 , S.P. Jain v. Krishna Mohan Gupta: : (1987) 1 SCC 191 : AIR 1987 SC 222 , RBI v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd.:: (1987) 1 SCC 424 : AIR 1987 SC 1023 , Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam : (1989) 3 SCC 709 : AIR 1990 SC 123 SCC p. 754 para 118, UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor : (2008) 5 SCC 257 : (2008) 2 SCC (L & S) 263 and Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. v. Eastern Metals and Ferro Alloys:: (2011) 11 SCC 334 )." 9. The Apex Court in Raghunath Rai Bareja & Anr. v. Punjab National Bank & Ors:: (2007) 2 SCC 230 held that: "40. It may be mentioned in this connection that the first and foremost principle of interpretation of a statute in every system of interpretation is the literal rule of interpretation. The other rules of interpretation e.g. the mischief rule, purposive interpretation, etc. can only be resorted to when the plain words of a statute are ambiguous or lead to no intelligible results or if read literally would nullify the very object of the statute. Where the words of a statute are absolutely clear and unambiguous, recourse cannot be had to the principles of interpretation other than the literal rule, vide Swedish Match AB vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India:: (2004) 11 SCC 641 : AIR 2004 SC 4219 . As held in Prakash Nath Khanna v. C.I.T.: : (2004) 9 SCC 686 , the language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of the legislative intent. The legislature is presumed to have made no mistake. The presumption is that it intended to say what it has said. Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the Court cannot correct or make up the deficiency, especially when a literal reading thereof produces an intelligible result, vide Delhi Financial Corpn. v. Rajiv Anand : (2004) 11 SCC 625 . The presumption is that it intended to say what it has said. Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the Court cannot correct or make up the deficiency, especially when a literal reading thereof produces an intelligible result, vide Delhi Financial Corpn. v. Rajiv Anand : (2004) 11 SCC 625 . Where the legislative intent is clear from the language, the Court should give effect to it, vide Government of A.P. v. Road Rollers Owners Welfare Assn.: (2004) 6 SCC 210 and the Court should not seek to amend the law in the garb of interpretation. 46. The rules of interpretation other than the literal rule would come into play it there is any doubt with regard to the express language used or if the plain meaning would lead to an absurdity. Where the words are unequivocal, there is no scope for importing any rule of interpretation vide Pandian Chemicals Ltd. v. CIT:: (2003) 5 SCC 590 . 47. It is only where the provisions of a statue are ambiguous that the court can depart from a literal or strict construction vide Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal : (2003) 2 SCC 577 : AIR 2003 SC 1543 . Where the words of a statue are plain and unambiguous effect must be given to them vide Bhaiji v. Sub-Divisional Officer : (2003) 1 SCC 692 ." 10. The Administration of Jyrngam Sirdarship Rules, 2006 is framed by the Executive Committee in exercise of Section 12 of the said Act 2005 for the day-to-day administration of the Sirdarship in accordance with the customary practice and also in compliance with the provision of the said Act 2005. It is very clear that under Section 6 of the said Act 2005 the Executive Committee is the competent authority to take actions such as, removal of the Sirdar from office or suspension of the Sirdar. The said Rules 2006 only prescribes the procedures to be followed in taking up actions by the Executive Committee under Section 6 of the said Act 2005. Rule 28(4) of the said Rules, 2006 clearly provides that any complaint relating to the functioning and conduct of Sirdar/Acting Sirdar/Deputy Sirdar shall not be taken up directly by the Executive Committee without the knowledge of the Durbar Hima. 11. Mr. N.D. Chullai, learned Sr. Rule 28(4) of the said Rules, 2006 clearly provides that any complaint relating to the functioning and conduct of Sirdar/Acting Sirdar/Deputy Sirdar shall not be taken up directly by the Executive Committee without the knowledge of the Durbar Hima. 11. Mr. N.D. Chullai, learned Sr. GA appearing for the respondents No. 7 to 13 by referring to Section 2(d) of the said Act, 2005 contended that the Durbar Hima is the general Durbar of the Jyrngam Sirdarship convened on the advice of the Executive Durbar by the Sirdar, Acting Sirdar or any person acting as such and, therefore, the complaint filed against the Sirdar cannot be considered by the Durbar Hima in accordance with Rule 28(4) of the said Rules, 2006 inasmuch as the Sirdar cannot decide the complaint filed against him. 12. This court already stated above that the construction of the statutory rule should be made in such a manner that every part of the rules and regulations should be given effect and the harmonious interpretation of the provisions of the Act should be made so that no provision of the Act and Rules would be redundant or surplus. In order to make Rule 28(4) of the said Rules, 2006 effective, the Durbar Hima which is going to consider the said complaint dated 07.06.2011 filed by the respondents No. 7 to 13 should not be presided by the Sirdar or his relative i.e. the Deputy Sirdar but by one of the Members of the Durbar Hima authorized by District Council for this purpose. It is made clear that if the Durbar Hima requires the hearing of the private respondents No. 7 to 13 while considering their complaint dated 07.06.2011, the private respondents No. 7 to 13 and also the petitioner may be heard. The Durbar Hima shall consider and decide the complaint within 3(three) months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this judgment and order. It is also made clear that the Executive Committee of the KHADC, Shillong may take decision deemed appropriate under Section 6 of the said Act 2005 after receiving the decisions/resolutions of the Durbar Hima. 13. With the above direction and observation, this writ petition is disposed of.