Dhanna Singh v. Gurbachan Singh @ Bachan Singh through LRs.
2014-01-29
SURYA KANT
body2014
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT SURYA KANT, J. 1. This order shall dispose of Regular Second Appeal No. 1174 of 1985 and Civil Writ Petition No. 13864 of 1991 as the issues involved in both the cases are overlapping. For understanding the controversy in its right perspective, the facts of appeal and writ petition are being referred to separately. 2. Appellants No. 1 and 2 are father and son while appellant No. 3 is a proprietorship firm. They impugn the judgment and decree dated 01.03.1985 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Gurdaspur who reversed the judgment and decree dated 23.05.1983 of the Sub Judge 1st Class, Batala and decreed the suit filed by respondent plaintiffs and granted a decree for permanent injunction restraining the appellants from raising any construction or changing the nature of land measuring 4 kanals 12.93 marlas, fully depicted in the site plan submitted by the Sub Divisional Engineer, Construction Sub Division at Gurdaspur who was appointed as the Local Commissioner. 3. The respondent plaintiffs instituted a suit for mandatory injunction against the appellants for the removal of electric connection installed in Khasra No. 65/3/1 and also to remove Malba of Industrial Sheds, walls and rooms which were recently constructed on the said Khasra Number situated in village Batala Garbi. A decree to permanently injunct the appellants from raising any construction or changing the nature of land comprised in Khasra Nos. 55R/23/3, 65R/1/2, 2/1 and 3/1 without getting the land partitioned, was also sought. 4. The respondent plaintiffs along with the appellants are cosharers in the land in dispute which was in their joint possession and according to the appellant defendants they have got no right, title or interest to raise any construction without getting the subject land partitioned. As the appellants had allegedly started the construction over joint holding, the civil suit with the aforementioned prayer was instituted. 5. The appellants contested the suit questioning locus standi of the plaintiffs. It was claimed that appellant No. 3, namely, New Anmol Foundry came into existence and became functional in the year 1975 when plaintiff No. 2 was not even owner of the property. The said construction was sought to be protected on 'equitable considerations' and that in the partition application before the Collector also, the allegation of raising such construction during partition proceedings was controverted. The appellants claimed that the plaintiff respondents would not suffer any irreparable loss or injury.
The said construction was sought to be protected on 'equitable considerations' and that in the partition application before the Collector also, the allegation of raising such construction during partition proceedings was controverted. The appellants claimed that the plaintiff respondents would not suffer any irreparable loss or injury. It was also their case that Virsa Singh – appellant No. 2 had purchased 7th share out of three Khasra Numbers in dispute on 30.12.1970 and possession of those khasra Numbers was given to him as per the Agreement to Sell where subsequently the factory was constructed. 6. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues: “1. Whether the plaintiffs and defendants No. 1 to 4 are coowners of the suit land? OPP. 2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the injunctions prayed for? OPP. 3. Whether the suit is maintainable in the present form? OPP. 4. Relief”. 7. The trial Court though decided Issue No. 1 in affirmative but took the view that the plaintiff respondents being cosharers had no right to seek injunction to restrain their cosharer from exercising his right in the common property. The civil suit was consequently dismissed. 8. On an appeal by the plaintiff respondents, learned first Appellate Court reversed the findings of the trial Court, holding that though no mandatory injunction for the removal of electric connection or Malba of industrial shed could be granted to the respondent – plaintiffs, they were entitled to injunct the appellants from changing the nature of the land as the respondent plaintiffs were entitled to their share in it on partition without encumbrance of construction. 9. Both the Courts have thus concurrently held that the plaintiff respondents and the appellants are cosharers in the subject land. 10. The substantial question of law that arises for consideration is whether the respondent – plaintiffs being cosharers are entitled to seek permanent injunction to restrain the appellants from changing the nature of land? 11. It is vehemently urged on behalf of the appellants that this Court has consistently viewed against injuncting a cosharers at the instance of another as ruled in Bachan Singh Vs. Swaran Singh, 2000 [2] Revenue Law Report, 192 also. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent – plaintiffs contrarily relies upon a few later decisions of this Court in [i] Ram Niwas Vs.
Swaran Singh, 2000 [2] Revenue Law Report, 192 also. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent – plaintiffs contrarily relies upon a few later decisions of this Court in [i] Ram Niwas Vs. Jai Ram @ Tej Ram, 2000[3] CCC, 379 [P&H]; [ii] Pritam Singh & Ors. Vs. Chanan Singh & Ors., 2003[1] CCC, 426[P&H] and [iii] Ronki Ram Vs. Prem Saini & Ors., 2007[4] RCR [Civil], 304. 13. It may be appropriate at this stage to deal with the facts of the writ petition also. 14. As has been noticed while dealing with the 2nd appeal that one of the plea taken by defendant appellants [one of whom is a writ petitioner] before the Civil Court was that the application for partition was still pending before the Collector. It is not in dispute that the private respondents had sought partition and the Assistant Collector st Grade vide order dated 27.05.1981 [P1] finalised the “Mode of Partition” to the following effect: “[i] Total area for partition is 10K8M. No area would be left without partition. [ii] Each party would get two Kurrah. One Kurrah would be of the area falling on Jalandhar Road and other falling away from the road. Whatever is the built up area of the building, that would remain with the owner and the Kami Beshi [deficiency] thereabout would be given in the adjoining area according to Block wise. [iii] The trees would belong to the person holder of that land. [iv] Aad, Khal and Path would be given to each Kurrah. [v] No record would be had to KamiBeshi of 1 Marla land. [vi] In the event of the land given under mortgage or sale, the mortgagee and vendee would be put under the land given to the owners. [vii] The Patwari would prepare the partition papers under the supervision of Girdawar. The Girdawar Halka would be responsible for 100% scrutiny. [viii] The mode of partition had been read over”. 15. Dhanna Singh and his son Virsa Singh [appellants No. 1 and 2 in RSA] felt aggrieved and went in appeal before the Collector, Batala who vide order dated 04.01.1982 held that since Khasra Nos.
The Girdawar Halka would be responsible for 100% scrutiny. [viii] The mode of partition had been read over”. 15. Dhanna Singh and his son Virsa Singh [appellants No. 1 and 2 in RSA] felt aggrieved and went in appeal before the Collector, Batala who vide order dated 04.01.1982 held that since Khasra Nos. 55/23/3 and 65/3/1 were exclusively in possession of the appellants who had constructed factory known as 'Anmol Foundry' since the year 1975, both these Khasra Numbers were liable to be excluded from partition by giving one block to each right holder along with possession. On this premise the matter was remanded to Assistant Collector 1st Grade vide order dated 04.01.1982. [16]. The private respondents felt aggrieved by the order of the Collector and preferred an appeal before the Commissioner [Appeals], Jalandhar Division who, however, vide order dated 14.08.1984 [P4] dismissed their appeal. Still aggrieved, the contesting respondents preferred a revision petition before the Financial Commissioner, Punjab who vide the order dated 13.05.1991 accepted their revision petition and while setting aside the orders passed by the Collector and Commissioner, referred to above, upheld the order of the Assistant Collector 1st Grade saying as follows: “8. Originally the land was owned by Amar Nath and Ganda Mal as shareholder of 10 kanals 8 marlas. Both of them died and Pupshpa Rani was one of the heirs who submitted an application for partition of land on 25.1.1980/6.2.1980 filing the copies of Jamabandi for the year 197475 because the latest jamabandi of 197980 was not ready up to September, 1980. In the jamabandi for the year 1974-75 land has been described as Chahi. The ld. counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in partition cases land as defined in Punjab Tenancy Act is taken into consideration. In the Punjab Tenancy Act land has been described as under: “Land” means which is not occupied as the site of any building in a town or village and is occupied or has been left for agricultural purposes or purposes subservient to agriculture or for pasture, and includes the sites of buildings and other structures on such land”. 9. In the Punjab Land Revenue Act land is not defined.
9. In the Punjab Land Revenue Act land is not defined. But under Section 4[1] of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, it has been mentioned, “that except so far as may be necessary for the record, recovery and administration of villagecesses, nothing in this Act applies to land which is occupied as the site of a village and is not assessed to land revenue”. It has further been mentioned in Section 4 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act that in order to exclude certain land from the operation of this Act two conditions should be there, i.e., it is occupied as the site of a village and [2] it is not assessed to land revenue. Both the conditions must be fulfilled at one and the same time. The learned counsel for the respondents could not refute the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners that as per Jamabandi for the year 197475, which is relevant in this case, the total land was recorded as Chahi and subject to partition. In view of this the orders passed by the Collector/Commissioner can not be sustained and are hereby set aside and both the revision petitions are accepted. The order of AC 1st dated 27.05.1981 is restored”. 17. The petitioners who are statedly in exclusive possession of the disputed two Khasra Numbers accordingly impugn the above stated revisional order. 18. From the resume of facts as noticed in the 2nd appeal and writ petition, there remains hardly any doubt that on the one hand the writ petitioners/appellants have successfully stalled the partition proceedings and on the other hand, they are claiming to have raised construction notwithstanding the restraint order passed against them by the first appellate Court. 19. The fact that the private respondents are cosharers in the subject land is admitted. It further appears that when the parties were litigating before one forum or the other, a part of their joint holding has been acquired by the State. It is undeniable that the total share of the writ petitioners/appellants after excluding the acquired land is less than what they are physically occupying underneath the factory. Interestingly, they claim that since no compensation for the acquired part of the land was received by them, hence that entire part falls to the share of private respondents and appellants should be allowed to retain possession of their original share. 20.
Interestingly, they claim that since no compensation for the acquired part of the land was received by them, hence that entire part falls to the share of private respondents and appellants should be allowed to retain possession of their original share. 20. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am of the considered view that the contention raised by the appellants/writ petitioners is totally frivolous, baseless, unfair, unjust and is contrary to the settled law. Once the land has been compulsorily acquired by State without the consent of parties, the acquired portion shall have to be apportioned amongst all of them. If the appellant/writ petitioners have not received compensation to the extent of their share, it was for them to recover or receive the same in accordance with law. The private respondents cannot be subjected to any disadvantage on this count. Similarly, no interference is warranted in a categoric finding of fact by the first appellate Court that the shed raised by the appellants or permitted to be retained by them was of temporary nature and not a 'permanent construction'. 21. It is well settled that in the case of a joint holding every cosharer holds possession on behalf of each and every cosharer. Since the contesting respondents are always deemed to have continued in joint possession after they became cosharers, plea of the appellants that they are in exclusive possession or are entitled to retain the same, is totally farcical and contrary to the settled law. 22. The writ petitioners' plea that the subject land is no longer an agricultural land, or that the partition proceedings are not maintainable, is also contrary to the proven facts and the settled law. Learned Financial Commissioner has referred to the definition of 'land' as given in Punjab Tenancy Act which reads as follows: “Land” means which is not occupied as the site of any building in a town or village and is occupied or has been left for agricultural purposes or purposes subservient to agriculture or for pasture, and includes the sites of buildings and other structures on such land”. 23. He has further found and the said finding has gone unrebutted and that [i] the land is not within the village abadi; and [ii] is yet to be recorded as agricultural land. Thus, the subject land fulfills both the conditions required for the purpose of initiation of partition proceedings. 24.
23. He has further found and the said finding has gone unrebutted and that [i] the land is not within the village abadi; and [ii] is yet to be recorded as agricultural land. Thus, the subject land fulfills both the conditions required for the purpose of initiation of partition proceedings. 24. Consequently, the writ petition as well as RSA are dismissed with costs quantified at 25,000/-each. The appellant/writ petitioners in the first instance are directed to deposit the costs payable to the contesting respondents within one month. The Executing Court and the Revenue Authorities are directed not to proceed in the matter unless payment of costs. The Revenue Court is further directed to finalise the partition matter at the earliest and put every cosharer into possession by 31.07.2014 and send a compliance report to this Court, failing which Registry is directed to initiate suomoto contempt proceedings against the concerned Collector/Assistant Collector 1st Grade.