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2014 DIGILAW 2245 (MAD)

A. Kumaresan v. Board of Directors

2014-07-24

S.TAMILVANAN

body2014
Judgment : 1. This writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking an order in the nature of Writ of certiorarified mandamus, to call for the records on the file of the second respondent and first respondent in their Proceedings No.E4/35683/2002 (I), dated 19.12.2003 and Ref.No.E4/35683/2002, dated 28.02.2005 respectively and quash the same and also direct the respondents to provide all the benefits to the petitioner withheld by them. 2. The petitioner was appointed to the post of Factory Supervisor by direct recruitment in the year 1978. He was promoted to the post of Assistant Tea Maker in the year 1984 and then to the post of Tea Master in the year 2000. According to him, he has been discharging his duties sincerely, however, a charge memo was issued against him, for which, he submitted his detailed explanation. The Disciplinary Authority appointed an Enquiry Officer to enquire into the charges levelled against the petitioner. Pursuant to the order for Enquiry, the matter was posted to 10.03.2004 by the Enquiry Officer, however, the petitioner got adjournment on health grounds. 3. The petitioner preferred a writ petition in W.P.No.7853 of 2004 against the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and also preferred statutory Appeal to the first respondent. During the pendency of the writ petition, the appellate authority passed an order on 28.02.2005 and the petitioner herein filed W.P.M.P.No.920 of 2006, seeking an order to amend the prayer, so as to challenge the order passed by the appellate authority. Subsequently, the writ petition filed earlier was withdrawn by the petitioner herein with a liberty to file fresh writ petition, in order to challenge both the orders passed by the respondents, by raising necessary grounds. In view of the permission granted by this court, the present writ petition was filed by the petitioner. According to the petitioner, the orders, dated 19.12.2003 and 28.02.2005 passed by the second respondent and the first respondent respectively are legally unsustainable, as ultra vires the Constitution. 4. As per the order, dated 19.12.2003 passed in Proc.No.E4/35683/2002 by the second respondent and the impugned order, dated 28.02.205 made in Proc.No.E4/35683/2002, of the first respondent, the pay of the petitioner as Tea Maker was reduced to bottom scale for 5 years with cumulative effect. 4. As per the order, dated 19.12.2003 passed in Proc.No.E4/35683/2002 by the second respondent and the impugned order, dated 28.02.205 made in Proc.No.E4/35683/2002, of the first respondent, the pay of the petitioner as Tea Maker was reduced to bottom scale for 5 years with cumulative effect. As per the order, dated 28.02.2005, the Tamil Nadu Tea Plantation Corporation Ltd., the Appellate Authority, confirmed the orders passed by the second respondent, dated 19.12.2003 and dismissed the appeal preferred by the petitioner herein. 5. It is seen that as per order, dated 12.07.2006 passed in W.P.No.7853 of 2004, the said writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn with a liberty to the petitioner to challenge any orders passed subsequent to filing of the writ petition. A Division Bench of this Court, delivered its Judgment in W.A.No.2322 of 2005, dated 03.11.2010, wherein it is stated that the order passed in W.P.No.19526 of 2004, dated 01.12.2005 was under challenge before the Division Bench. The prayer in the said writ petition was for a writ of certiorarified mandamus, to call for the records on the file of the second respondent therein in connection with the order passed by him in Na.Ka.No.2913/2004/Pa4, dated 04.05.2004 and quash the same and to direct the respondent not to proceed with the charge memo, dated 29.01.2004 issued by the second respondent therein. 6. The Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.2322 of 2005 has held as follows : "When admittedly, what is challenged in the writ petition is only the proceedings of the enquiry officer, dated 4.5.2004, rejecting the request of the appellant, seeking, adjournment of the enquiry proceedings and before the grant of interim order, the equiry officer completed the enquiry and submitted his report on 12.7.2004, the learned Judge is right in holding that the writ petition has become infructuous. When we expressed our view that we are not inclined to interfere with the order of the learned single Judge, the learned counsel for the appellant sought for time to settle the matter with the respondents and though time has been granted, so far, the learned counsel for the appellant has not reported about any settlement." With the above findings, the writ appeal preferred by the appellant, A.Kumaresan, the petitioner herein was dismissed. 7. 7. In this writ petition, the petitioner, who is the appellant in the writ appeal in W.A.No.2322 of 2005 has sought an order to call for the records pertaining to the order, dated 19.12.2003 passed by the second respondent in his Proceeding No.E4/35683/2002 and the order, dated 28.02.2005 passed in Ref.No.E4/35683/2002 by the first respondent. 8. The Chairman-cum-Managing Director, TANTEA, Coonoor, Nilgris, the second respondent herein, passed an order dated 19.12.2003, whereby the pay of the petitioner, A.Kumaresan, Tea maker is reduced to bottom scale for five years with cumulative effect. In appeal, the Board of Directors (Appellate Authority), TANTEA, Coonoor, by order, dated 28.02.2005, upheld the order passed by the second respondent and rejected the appeal preferred by the petitioner herein. Aggrieved by which, the writ petition has been preferred by the petitioner herein. 9. It is an undisputed fact that the following charges were framed against the petitioner / delinquent official, as per the charge memo issued on him : (i) committing theft and dishonesty in connection with the Corporation property; (ii) gross negligence in duty; (iii) an act of subversive of discipline. 10. The explanation submitted by the petitioner / delinquent Tea maker was not satisfactory and convincing to the second respondent. A Senior Manager, Cherambady Tea Division, had been appointed as Enquiry Officer, he conducted enquiry and filed his report. A copy of the enquiry officer's report is available in the typed set of papers filed in this writ petition. The entire charges are mainly based on the first charge of alleged committing of theft, dishonesty in connection with the Corporation property. The second charge, gross negligence in duty relates to the said charge. The next charge is an act subversive of discipline, for which there is no direct evidence or materials available in the enquiry report submitted by the aforesaid enquiry officer, a Senior Manager of the Corporation. In the enquiry report, at page number 7, he has stated that as per the allegations, the theft of the value of the alleged scrap materials with the description given in the charge memo, which is as follows : S.No. Name of material Quantity Approximate Value (Rs.) 1 Rotor Van shaft (M.S) 75 kg 375.00 2 Rotor Van shaft (S.S) 25 kg 500.00 3 Welded mesh (2” x 1 x 8G) 175 sq.ft. 2800.00 4 CTC Mandrel with worn out segment roller 3 Nos 750.00 5 Fermenting drum worn out cast iron idler wheel 6 Nos 350.00 Total 4775.00 11. The Enquiry Officer has specifically stated that none of the witnesses had ever stated that the petitioner herein, Tea maker either committed or involved or facilitated the theft of the scrap materials of the description given above. He has further stated that Item No.3, Welded mesh (2" x 1" x 8 G), 175 sq.ft. is valued at Rs.2,800/-, was recovered near the theft spot on 26.12.2002 and therefore, out of the approximate value of Rs.4,775/- after deducting Rs.2,800/-, balance could be arrived at Rs.1,975/-. The Enquiry Officer has specifically stated that the charges levelled against the petitioner herein were not proved. He has further stated that the charges were based only on suspicion and that there is no evidence to establish the charges levelled against the petitioner, who was Tea maker, on the relevant date of occurrence. Subsequently, the second respondent, Chairman-cum-Managing Director of TANTEA, Nilgris, by his proceedings, dated 19.12.2003 has also stated that the Enquiry Officer has concluded that the charges levelled against the petitioner herein had not been proved. The second respondent has further held in his proceedings, dated 19.12.2003 as follows : "...In the inquiry report, the Inquiry Officer has concluded that the charges were not proved. The charges levelled against the delinquent, the deposition of witnesses / and Inquiry Officer's report have been examined and the disciplinary authority did not agree with the conclusion / report of the Inquiry Officer, as there are sufficient and strong evidence available on the proof of charges levelled against the delinquent..." 12. The finding of the second respondent is based on the allegation that the 3 watch and ward workers at Cherambady Factory were given some other work by the delinquent official on the date of occurrence, 22.12.2002 during night hours and thereby a co-delinquent Pushparaj, Driver had the possibility / facilitation to steal the materials from the Factory. The proceedings of the second respondent, dated 19.12.2003 would clearly show that one Pushparaj, Driver had stolen the aforesaid scrap materials from the factory, however, he has got suspicion on the delinquent official, who is the writ petitioner herein, that he could have facilitated or created circumstance for the said Driver to steal the scrap materials. The proceedings of the second respondent, dated 19.12.2003 would clearly show that one Pushparaj, Driver had stolen the aforesaid scrap materials from the factory, however, he has got suspicion on the delinquent official, who is the writ petitioner herein, that he could have facilitated or created circumstance for the said Driver to steal the scrap materials. Unlike criminal cases, in departmental proceedings, charges levelled against any delinquent need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, even preponderance of probability, to establish the charge is sufficient to prove the charges. 13. Here in this case, though a Senior Manager of the respondent Corporation was appointed as Enquiry Officer, after conducting enquiry, he has categorically stated that there is no direct evidence against the writ petitioner / delinquent official, to establish the charges levelled against him. Though they have stated that they were taken by the delinquent Tea maker and allotted some other work, the Enquiry Officer had the opportunity of going into the demeanor of witness. There is no allegation by the respondents that the Enquiry Officer had given any perverse finding, in order to support the writ petition / delinquent tea maker. The second respondent, having rejected the finding of the Enquiry Officer, held that the charges were proved, whereby passed the impugned order, reducing the pay scale of the petitioner / delinquent official to bottom scale for 5 years with cumulative effect. 14. Mr.R.Singgaravelan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that there is no evidence available against the petitioner / delinquent official to prove the charges levelled against him by the respondents. Though the Enquiry Officer, after conducting the enquiry has categorically held that the charges were not proved and that there is no evidence by any of the witness, to hold that the delinquent official had committed theft, dishonesty in connection with the Corporation property, the second respondent has held that there are sufficient and strong evidence available to prove the charges levelled against the delinquent. Though he has stated that there are sufficient and strong evidence available against the petitioner to prove the charges, the impugned order passed by the second respondent would show that there is no such evidence available against the writ petitioner, to hold that the charges are proved, as stated by the second respondent. Though he has stated that there are sufficient and strong evidence available against the petitioner to prove the charges, the impugned order passed by the second respondent would show that there is no such evidence available against the writ petitioner, to hold that the charges are proved, as stated by the second respondent. Hence, it could be held that the findings given by the second respondent is contrary to the finding of the Enquiry Officer and also without any evidence, hence, the finding of the second respondent has to be construed perverse, since the same is not based on any evidence or materials, against the writ petitioner. In support of his contention, he relied on the following decisions : 1. State of U.P v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772 2. Roop Singh Nehi v. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2 SCC 570 15. In Roop Singh Nehi v. Punjab National Bank, reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570 , relying on various earlier decisions rendered, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even mere production of documents would not be sufficient to prove the charges in a departmental enquiry, as it is a quasi judicial proceeding. The Hon'ble Apex Court has ruled that the contents of documentary evidence has to be proved by examining witnesses. The contentions raised by the appellants therein were not considered by the Departmental authorities, hence, the appellant therein was dismissed from service. In the said case, though the writ petition was dismissed by the High Court, the same was reversed by the Apex Court, allowing the appeal. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows : "10. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi judicial proceeding. The Enquiry Officer performs a quasi judicial function. The charges leveled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the Investigating Officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, interalia, was placed by the Enquiry Officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, interalia, was placed by the Enquiry Officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence. We have noticed herein before that the only basic evidence whereupon reliance has been placed by the Enquiry Officer was the purported confession made by the appellant before the police. According to the appellant, he was forced to sign on the said confession, as he was tortured in the police station. Appellant being an employee of the bank, the said confession should have been proved. Some evidence should have been brought on record to show that he had indulged in stealing the bank draft book. Admittedly, there was no direct evidence. Even there was no indirect evidence. The tenor of the report demonstrates that the Enquiry Officer had made up his mind to find him guilty as otherwise he would not have proceeded on the basis that the offence was committed in such a manner that no evidence was left." 16. In Union of India v. H.C.Goel, reported in AIR 1964 SC 364 , it was held as follows : "22....The two infirmities are separate and distinct though, conceivably, in some cases, both may be present. There may be cases of no evidence even where the Government is acting bona fide; the said infirmity may also exist where the Government is acting mala fide and in that case, the conclusion of the Government not supported by any evidence may be the result of mala fides, but that does not mean that if it is proved that there is no evidence to support the conclusion of the Government, a writ of certiorari will not issued without further proof of mala fides. That is why we are not prepared to accept the learned Attorney-General's argument that sine no mala fides are alleged against the appellant in the present case, no writ of certiorari can be issued in favour of the respondent. 23. That takes us to the merits of the respondent's contention that the conclusion of the appellant that the third charged framed against the respondent has been proved, is based on no evidence. 23. That takes us to the merits of the respondent's contention that the conclusion of the appellant that the third charged framed against the respondent has been proved, is based on no evidence. The learned Attorney-General has stressed before us that in dealing with this question, we ought to bear in mind the fact that the appellant is acting with the determination to root out corruption, and so, if it is shown that the view taken by he appellant is a reasonably possible view, this Court should not sit in appeal over that decision and seek to decide whether this Court would have taken the same view or not. This contention is no doubt absolutely sound. The only test which we can legitimately apply in dealing with this part of the respondents case is, is there any evidence on which a finding can be made against the respondent that charge No. 3 was proved against him ? In exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226 on such a plea, the High Court cannot consider the question about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular conclusion. That is a matter which is within the competence of the authority which dealt with the question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charges in question is proved against the respondent ? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence legally the impugned conclusion follows or not. Applying this test, we are inclined to hold that the respondent's grievance is well-founded because, in our opinion, the finding which is implicit in the appellant's order dismissing the respondent that charge number 3 is proved against him is based on no evidence." 17. Similarly in Moni Shankar v. Union of India, reported in (2008) 3 SCC 484 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held thus : 18. The departmental proceeding is a quasi judicial one. Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable in the said proceeding, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with. Similarly in Moni Shankar v. Union of India, reported in (2008) 3 SCC 484 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held thus : 18. The departmental proceeding is a quasi judicial one. Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable in the said proceeding, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with. The Court exercising power of judicial review are entitled to consider as to whether while inferring commission of misconduct on the part of a delinquent officer relevant piece of evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts have been excluded therefrom. Inference on facts must be based on evidence which meet the requirements of legal principles. The Tribunal was, thus, entitled to arrive at its own conclusion on the premise that the evidence adduced by the department, even if it is taken on its face value to be correct in its entirety, meet the requirements of burden of proof, namely -preponderance of probability. If on such evidences, the test of the doctrine of proportionality has not been satisfied, the Tribunal was within its domain to interfere. We must place on record that the doctrine of unreasonableness is giving way to the doctrine of proportionality." 19. In Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance Co., Ltd., (2006) 4 SCC 713 , the Hon'ble Apex Court, has held that suspicion or presumption cannot take the place of proof even in a domestic enquiry and that the writ Court is entitled to interfere with the findings of the fact of any tribunal or authority in certain circumstances. In the said Judgment, it has been further held as follows : "26. In our opinion the learned Single Judge and consequently the Division Bench of the High Court did not pose unto themselves the correct question. The matter can be viewed from two angles. Despite limited jurisdiction a civil court, it was entitled to interfere in a case where the report of the Enquiry Officer is based on no evidence. In a suit filed by a delinquent employee in a civil court as also a writ court, in the event the findings arrived at in the departmental proceedings are questioned before it should keep in mind the following: (1) the enquiry officer is not permitted to collect any material from outside sources during the conduct of the enquiry. [ See Stateof Assamand Anr. [ See Stateof Assamand Anr. v. Mahendra Kumar Das and Ors. [ (1970) 1 SCC 709 ] (2) In a domestic enquiry fairness in the procedure is a part of the principles of natural justice [Ses Khem Chand v. Union of India and Ors. ( 1958 SCR 1080 ) and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Om Prakash Gupta (1969) 3 SCC 775 ]. (3) Exercise of discretionary power involve two elements (i) Objective and (ii) subjective and existence of the exercise of an objective element is a condition precedent for exercise of the subjective element. [See K.L.Tripathi v. State of Bank of India and Ors. (1984) 1 SCC 43 ]. (4) It is not possible to lay down any rigid rules of the principles of natural justice which depends on the facts and circumstances of each case but the concept of fair play in action is the basis. [See Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1986) 3 SCC 454 ] (5) The enquiry officer is not permitted to travel beyond the charges and any punishment imposed on the basis of a finding which was not the subject matter of the charges is wholly illegal. [See Director (Inspection & quality Control) Export Inspection Council of India and Ors. v. Kalyan Kumar Mitra and Ors. 1987 (2) Cal. LJ 344. (6) Suspicion or presumption cannot take the place of proof even in a domestic enquiry. The writ court is entitled to interfere with the findings of the fact of any tribunal or authority in certain circumstances. [ See Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Jain (1969) 1 SCR 735 , Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police and Ors. (1999) 2 SCC 10 ]." 20. In State of U.P v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 772 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows : "28. An Enquiry officer acting in a quasi judicial authority is in the position of an independent adjudicator. He is not supposed to be a representative of the department/disciplinary authority/Government. His function is to examine the evidence presented by the department, even in the absence of the delinquent official to see as to whether the unrebutted evidence is sufficient to hold that the charges are proved. In the present case the aforesaid procedure has not been observed. He is not supposed to be a representative of the department/disciplinary authority/Government. His function is to examine the evidence presented by the department, even in the absence of the delinquent official to see as to whether the unrebutted evidence is sufficient to hold that the charges are proved. In the present case the aforesaid procedure has not been observed. Since no oral evidence has been examined the documents have not been proved, and could not have been taken into consideration to conclude that the charges have been proved against the respondents. 29. Apart from the above by virtue of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India the departmental inquiry had to be conducted in accordance with rules of natural justice. It is a basic requirement of rules of natural justice that an employee be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in any proceeding which may culminate in a punishment being imposed on the employee. 30. When a department enquiry is conducted against the Government servant it cannot be treated as a casual exercise. The enquiry proceedings also cannot be conducted with a closed mind. The enquiry officer has to be wholly unbiased. The rules of natural justice are required to be observed to ensure not only that justice is done but is manifestly seen to be done. The object of rules of natural justice is to ensure that a government servant is treated fairly in proceedings which may culminate in imposition of punishment including dismissal/removal from service." 21. In the decision referred to above, the Hon'ble Apex Court has also gone through the decision rendered by the Supreme Court of United States in Shaughnessy v. United States, 97 L Ed 956 : 345 US 206 (1952), wherein Jackson, J, a Judge of the United States Supreme Court has observed at page number 69 as follows : "... Procedural fairness and regularity are of the indispensable essence of liberty. Severe substantive laws can be endured if they are fairly and impartially applied." 22. It cannot be disputed that the petitioner, facing disciplinary proceeding was entitled to reasonable opportunity, to defend his case and meet the charges levelled against him in an effective manner. No one facing a departmental enquiry could effectively meet the charges, unless the copies of the relevant materials and documents used against him are made available to him. It cannot be disputed that the petitioner, facing disciplinary proceeding was entitled to reasonable opportunity, to defend his case and meet the charges levelled against him in an effective manner. No one facing a departmental enquiry could effectively meet the charges, unless the copies of the relevant materials and documents used against him are made available to him. In the absence of such opportunity being given, the delinquent official could not raise his defence effectively and cross-examine the prosecution witnesses properly. The respondents should follow principles of natural justice in conducting the domestic enquiry and prove the charges in the manner known to law. 23. It is well settled that principles of natural justice being followed is paramount in any departmental proceeding. Similarly the finding of the Authority must be based on evidence, which cannot be passed on surmises and conjectures, otherwise the finding could be construed only as perverse not sustainable in law. 24. Mr.T.S.Gopalan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents drew the attention of this Court to earlier decision rendered by this Court in D.Kotteeswara Rao v. P.O., reported in 2012-IV-LLJ 330 (Mad). In the light of the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Shri.J.D.Jain v. Management of S.B. of India, reported in AIR 1982 SC 673 and various other decisions, this Court held that an award could be quashed only when the Tribunal has committed any error apparent on the face of the record or when the finding of the fact of the Tribunal is perverse. The dictum laid down by the Supreme Court cannot be disputed. 25. It is well settled that a finding could be construed as perverse, when the finding is against the available evidence or not based on any legally acceptable evidence. In the instant case, it has been made clear that the Enquiry Officer, a Senior Manager of the respondents has held that all the three charges levelled against the writ petitioner, Tea maker were not proved and he has given his finding categorically stating that the witnesses have not stated anything against the petitioner in the Departmental enquiry to hold either he had committed the alleged theft or he helped the alleged co-delinquent, a driver of the vehicle that was used for carrying the alleged scrap materials, worth about Rs.4,775/-. It is also not known as to how the third item of the scrap materials, worth Rs.2,800/- was left there itself. On a perusal of the material papers and the order passed by the second respondent, it is crystal clear that there is no legally acceptable evidence available on record to establish the alleged commission of theft of the respondent property or any dishonest act done by the petitioner, as in the charges. 26. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that suspicion or presumption cannot take place of proof even in a domestic enquiry, as per the decision in Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance Co., Ltd., (cited supra). Though the impugned order passed by the second respondent, that was confirmed by the first respondent, a perusal of the same would show that the finding is based on suspicion or presumption, which cannot take place the proof even in a domestic enquiry. Though the finding of the second respondent is not based on any legally acceptable evidence, the same has been confirmed by the first respondent, against law. 27. As contended by Mr. T.S.Gopalan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, in a domestic enquiry, the charges levelled against the delinquent, need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt like criminal cases. Based on the legal concept of preponderance of probability, if charges are proved, that would be sufficient to impose the punishment in a Departmental enquiry. However, in the instant case, even applying the theory of preponderance of probability, in view of various decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the respondent could not have held that the charges were proved merely based on their suspicion or presumption, without any evidence. 28. There is no legally acceptable evidence available against the petitioner to hold that the charges levelled against him were proved, hence, this Court has to hold that the finding of the second respondent in the impugned order, dated 19.12.2003 is only perverse, as the same is not supported by any legally acceptable evidence. However, on appeal, the first respondent, without legally considering the order passed by the second respondent, has mechanically confirmed the finding and the sentence imposed by the second respondent, reducing the scale of pay of the petitioner, Tea maker to his bottom level scale for 5 years with cumulative effect. However, on appeal, the first respondent, without legally considering the order passed by the second respondent, has mechanically confirmed the finding and the sentence imposed by the second respondent, reducing the scale of pay of the petitioner, Tea maker to his bottom level scale for 5 years with cumulative effect. Hence, the petitioner has come forward with the writ petition challenging the aforesaid orders passed by the respondents. 29. In the light of various decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court, I am of the view that the writ petition has to be allowed, to meet the ends of justice and the impugned orders, dated 19.12.2003 passed by the second respondent in Proceedings No.E4/35683/2002 (I) and the order passed by the first respondent, dated 28.02.2005 made in Ref.No.E4/35683/2002 are liable to be set aside. 30. In the result, the writ petition is allowed with costs and the impugned orders, dated 19.12.2003 passed by the second respondent in Proceedings No.E4/35683/2002 (I) and the order passed by the Appellate Authority, the first respondent, dated 28.02.2005 made in Ref.No.E4/35683/2002 are set aside. (ii) In view of this order, the respondents are directed to pay the entire arrears amount, calculated as per Service Rules, holding that there was no punishment imposed on the petitioner to reduce his salary to the bottom level and stoppage of increment for 5 years with cumulative effect. (iii) It is not in dispute that the petitioner has retired from service. However, in view of the order passed in the writ petition, the petitioner is entitled to all the benefits, as if he had not been imposed any punishment. Had there been any promotion given to his immediate junior before the date of his superannuation, the respondents should also be given notional promotion to the petitioner and accordingly, after fixing proper pay scale and calculating such arrears of pay, be paid to the petitioner, within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.