Judgment 1. The second appeal was admitted on 13.1.1998 on the following substantial questions of law stated in memo of appeal as 7.3 and 7.4 – “7.3 Whether the courts below were justified in decreeing the suit by holding that even if there is no document of title in her favour, the respondent no.1 has perfected her title by adverse possession, thereby completely contravening the test of doctrine of adverse possession? 7.4 – Whether the courts below were justified in granting decree of possession without determining the status of the appellant as to whether he was a licensee or a trespasser, in absence thereof no decree for mesne profit could be passed under Order 20, rule 12 of the Civil Procedure Code?” 2. The second appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 19.9.1997 delivered by the Additional District Judge, Wardha in RCA No. 161 of 1995 which was dismissed with costs. The said Regular Civil Appeal arose from the judgment and order dated 19.7.1995 passed in RCS No. 50 of 1993 by learned Civil Judge, JD, Pulgaon who was pleased to decree the suit. 3. The facts which appear briefly are as under One Ukandrao Maraskolhe was occupant of the suit house consisting of two rooms bearing GP No. 482 situated at village Rohna, Tahsil Arvi, District Wardha. The house was admeasuring 65 x 18 feet and some portion of the plot was open. It is contended that said Ukandrao was in long possession of the suit property claiming ownership thereof. He died in the year 1968, leaving behind his widow Yamuna and his daughter Nanibai (original plaintiff) who had instituted the suit in the trial Court on the ground that her father was exclusive owner of the suit property. He used to pay house tax and electricity bill in respect of the house. After marriage of plaintiff Nanibai in the year 1975, she went to Seloo, but after death of her mother Yamunabai, the suit house was locked by her. In the month of July 1984, plaintiff came to know that defendant Sonba Shamji took forcible possession of the suit house. According to plaintiff, when she locked the suit house, she had entrusted key to Harishchandra Wahake and requested him to look after the suit property. 4. The plaintiff came to know about forcible dispossession by defendant no. 1 Sonba. Defendant no. According to plaintiff, when she locked the suit house, she had entrusted key to Harishchandra Wahake and requested him to look after the suit property. 4. The plaintiff came to know about forcible dispossession by defendant no. 1 Sonba. Defendant no. 1 told the plaintiff that he is ready to purchase it, but subsequently, he declined to purchase it and refused to give possession of suit house to the plaintiff by notice dated 1st January 1985. The plaintiff gave reply to the notice on 21.1.1985 and demanded possession from defendant no. 1. Defendant no. 1 refused to hand over possession contending that suit house is owned by defendant no. 2 Shamrao Janglu Irpate and also contended that defendant no.3 Ramdas Govindrao Irpate is real owner of suit house. Thus, defendant no. 1 Sonba disputed title and prior possession of plaintiff and refused to vacate the suit house. 5. Parties went to trial. Learned trial Judge upon framing issues and after evidence was led by the parties, recorded findings of facts that plaintiff is owner of the suit house and was in possession while defendant no. 1 Sonba took forcible possession of suit house in the year 1984. Thus, the contention of defendant no. 1 that suit house was owned by other defendants was negatived. The claim as to alleged tenancy pleaded by defendant no. 1 Sonba was also held as not proved. Thus, according to trial Court, it was revealed from evidence that there was sufficient evidence to prove that the plaintiff was in prior possession of the suit house since he was dispossessed by defendant no. 1 of the suit house. Trial Court also held that plaintiff was owner of the suit house and is entitled to get declaration accordingly while against defendant no. 1 it was held that he took forcible possession of the suit house which was in possession of the plaintiff. The trial Court further ordered mesne profit in respect of the income of suit house for the period during which it was possessed by defendant no. 1. Thus, the suit was decreed with costs on the ground that plaintiff is owner of suit house and was entitled to possession as well as mesne profits in respect of the same. 6. The widow of unsuccessful defendant questioned the decree in RCA No. 161 of 1995 in the District Court at Wardha. 1. Thus, the suit was decreed with costs on the ground that plaintiff is owner of suit house and was entitled to possession as well as mesne profits in respect of the same. 6. The widow of unsuccessful defendant questioned the decree in RCA No. 161 of 1995 in the District Court at Wardha. 1st appellate Court reiterated the findings of fact that plaintiff had proved her titled to the suit property. The claim as to tenancy of defendant no. 1 in respect of suit house was negatived and it was held that plaintiff was entitled to the relief of declaration on the ground of ownership and was held entitled to possession. Thus, by a detailed and well-reasoned judgment, 1st appellate Court dismissed the appeal with costs. 7. The substantial questions of law which were formulated by this Court are mainly to find out whether there was justification by both the Courts below to pass decree for possession in favour of the plaintiff in the light of legal position and findings recorded by the Courts below in this regard. 8. Learned counsel for appellant submitted that there was no proof of ownership of suit property on record as no sale deed was produced by or on behalf of plaintiff in order to establish that Ukandrao was owner of the suit property. According to learned counsel for appellant, plaintiff could not have proved adverse possession in respect of suit house as she was admittedly a married woman, resided at Seloo and in the absence of documentary evidence in her favour of ownership mere fact that entries were made in Gram Panchayat record as she was paying taxes and electricity bill in respect of suit house, finding as to her ownership and her title ought not to have been recorded in her favour. Even the alternative plea that she perfected her title by virtue of adverse possession deserves rejection. Further, it is submitted that both the Courts below did not record positive finding on the ground as to whether appellant was either licensee or trespasser so as to order enquiry into mesne profits as against the appellant. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that both the Courts below recorded concurrent findings of fact in favour of plaintiff to hold her as owner of the suit house and entitled to possession of the suit house. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that both the Courts below recorded concurrent findings of fact in favour of plaintiff to hold her as owner of the suit house and entitled to possession of the suit house. It is contended that since defendant no. 1 took forcible possession of the suit house in the year 1984 and tried to set out title in favour of other defendants no. 2 and 3, defendant no. 1 was liable to face inquiry into mesne profits on account of holding possession of suit house wrongfully for the period during which he had dispossessed the plaintiff and had deprived her of right to possess the suit house. 10. Apart from submissions advanced on merits of the appeal, learned advocate for the appellant made reference to Abasaheb Bali Gharge & anr v. Balaji Ramhari Gharge reported in 1996 (1) Mh. L. J. 209 making reference to head-note (e) contending that mere mutation entries or entries in the Gram Panchayat record cannot be considered as sufficient evidence of title in favour of plaintiff that she is entitled to possession. This Court in the aforesaid case was considering the settled legal position that mutation entries or entries in the Record of Right are made only for the purpose of recovering revenue and that itself cannot be treated as proof of title of holder of the property in favour of whom such entries are made. In the said case, ultimately the learned single Judge of this Court held that the plaintiff in that case had title to the property in question as she had perfected title to the suit property by virtue of adverse possession. The second appeal was thus dismissed. 11. Learned counsel for appellant also made reference to Konda Lakshmana Bapuji v. Govt. of AP & ors reported in (2002) 3 SCC 258 as regards plea of adverse possession that it is a mixed question of law and fact. In that case it was held that mere fact of construction of building by possessor with the permission of the Court did not amount to his permissive possession. The Apex Court held that the question of a person perfecting title by adverse possession is a mixed question of law and fact. In that case it was held that mere fact of construction of building by possessor with the permission of the Court did not amount to his permissive possession. The Apex Court held that the question of a person perfecting title by adverse possession is a mixed question of law and fact. It must be shown by the person claiming title by prescription that he has been in possession of the land for the statutory period which is adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent with the animus of holding the land adverse to the true owner. 12. In the present case, both the Courts below have noted that plea of adverse adverse possession by the plaintiff was alternative. The suit claim of the plaintiff was primarily on the basis of title that it was her ancestral property acquired by her father and inherited by her of which defendant no. 1 took forcible possession from her caretaker in the year 1984 while she was married woman residing at Seloo. 13. Learned counsel for respondent contended that both the Courts below recorded concurrent findings of fact regarding right of the plaintiff to own and recover possession of the suit house and, therefore, in second appeal, this Court would not disturb the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the two courts below. Reference is made to paragraph 7 in Vasantiben Prahladji Nayak & ors v. Somnath Muljibhai and ors reported in (2004) 3 SCC 376 to submit that when concurrent findings of fact are recorded by the courts below regarding possession of suit land and regarding payment of revenue, cess, property taxes paid by person whose name appeared in Panchayat or Revenue record, then in view of concurrent findings of fact on the issues in question, the Apex Court did not see reason to interfere in the matter. 14. Reference is also made to ruling in Aziziv. Mehree & ors reported (2004) 10 SCC 762 . Learned counsel for respondent invited my attention to paragraph 6 of the ruling. He submits that findings of fact recorded by the trial Court and 1st appellate Court ought not to be interfered with in view of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the case of Aziziv. Mehree & ors reported (2004) 10 SCC 762 . Learned counsel for respondent invited my attention to paragraph 6 of the ruling. He submits that findings of fact recorded by the trial Court and 1st appellate Court ought not to be interfered with in view of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the case of Aziziv. Mehree & ors (supra) also the Apex Court had considered the appeal by Special Leave partly and only regarding share in the suit for partition which should have been decreed. 15. It appears basically a case of prior possession of the plaintiff on the ground that suit house was acquired by her father Ukandrao during his lifetime. According to plaintiff, her father Ukandrao died in the year 1968 and house property in question was left in possession of her mother Yanuna and after death of Yamuna, the plaintiff as an legal heir came into her possession. In effect, therefore, the plaintiff had inherited the suit house from her parents although sale deed was not produced on record to establish that suit house was purchased by Ukandrao. It cannot be disputed that after Ukandrao died in the year 1968, then it was left in possession of the plaintiff’s mother in the year 1984 and then after the death of her mother, the plaintiff came into possession of the suit house. The 1st defendant had dispossessed the plaintiff of suit house without prior permission by plaintiff Nanibai. Thus, it was long-standing possession supported by entries in Gram panchayat record, payment of electricity bill and village panchayat taxes. It is pertinent to note that in 1st appellate court, plea of tenancy was also raised by the appellant which was negatived. Under these circumstances, defendant no. 1 could not have set up title in other defendants or in himself for to protect his possession over suit house. It is policy of civil law that no person can forcibly dispossess without having legal recourse or availing the remedy available at law. In the present case, plaintiff had availed of remedy according to law to recover possession of suit house on the basis of her prior possession and title on the premise of her inherited long-standing possession over the suit house. In the present case, plaintiff had availed of remedy according to law to recover possession of suit house on the basis of her prior possession and title on the premise of her inherited long-standing possession over the suit house. Evening assuming for the sake of argument that registered sale deed was not tracable nor produced in order to establish ownership of Ukandrao as purchaser of suit house, the fact that Ukandrao was in possession of suit property till his death and after him, his widow Yamuna succeeded and then the suit house was inherited by plaintiff Nanibai, the entries in village panchayat record, evidence regarding payment of village panchayat taxes, electricity bills etc. strengthened the case of the plaintiff to claim that she was rightful owner of the suit house for to re-enter into possession of suit house. 16. Regarding plea of adverse possession, stray act of trespass cannot ripen into adverse possession. The courts below found that plea tenancy was made by 1st defendant which was negatived. Under these circumstances, when there was specific plea of tenancy which was raised by 1st defendant and negatived by 1st appellate Court, it was not necessary for the Courts below to record finding regarding licence created in favour of 1st defendant or an act of trespass negatived by 1st appellate Court, it was not necessary to record finding regarding licence or trespass on the part of 1st defendant. Hence, conclusions by the trial court and 1st appellate court regarding the findings of fact as to possessory title of the plaintiff and her prior possession and right to recover possession of suit house were pure questions of fact answered by the courts below. For reasons stated therefore, the 2nd appellate Court need not enter into the question as to whether Nanibai had perfected her title by adverse possession and furthermore, as to whether appellant was either licensee or trespasser. Suffice it to say that appellant was in wrongful possession of the suit house since she trespassed in the suit house in the year 1984, and also refused to vacate the suit house and entered into communication with the plaintiff, first, offering to purchase the suit house and then resisted claim by refusing to vacate the suit house by issuing legal notice. As defendant no. As defendant no. 1 on some plea or the other plea like tenancy continued to hold over possession of the suit house, then for such period of wrongful possession, defendant no.1 was answerable for payment of mesne profit as the suit was for recovery of suit house and enquiry was necessary as to what would have been fair return or mesne profit from the date of institution of suit till delivery of possession of suit house to the decree-holder. That being so, no fault can be found with the trial Court who ordered enquiry into mesne profit under Order XX, rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure. For all the aforesaid reasons, considering that right to prefer second appeal is neither natural or inherent, but it is a substantive statutory right regulated by law contained in Section 100 of CPC apart from my view that both the Courts below were justified to decree the suit for possession and mesne profits and in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Courts below were not bound to record findings as to whether defendant no. 1 was licensee or trespasser moreso when he had pleaded tenancy, I must answer both the substantial questions of law accordingly in the negative. In my considered view, notwithstanding ingenuity in framing them in memorandum of appeal by learned Advocate for appellant, substantial question of law as to whether both the courts below were justified in decreeing the suit, must be answered in the affirmative. 17. In the result, appeal is dismissed with costs. Learned counsel for appellant at this stage prays for stay of possession as he wishes to challenge this judgment by adopting a remedy in higher forum. Learned counsel for respondent objected on the ground that appellant was in wrongful possession since long and enquiry into mesne profit is pending. I think, provisional sum towards arrears of mesne profit must be deposited by appellant in the executing court while application for mesne profit remains pending in the sum of Rs.50,000/- in order to show his bonafides within a period of six weeks from today. Subject to this as a condition precedent, there shall be stay of possession for a period of three months from today.