Order Heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and learned counsel appearing for the State. 2. This application has been filed for quashing of the order dated 25.02.2012 passed in Ranka P.S. Case No.84 of 2011 [G.R. No.782 of 2011] whereby and whereunder cognizance of the offence punishable under Sections 328, 302, 420, 506 of the Indian Penal Code has been taken against the petitioner. 3. Mr. Deepak Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that earlier on the same allegation a complaint was lodged, alleging therein that the accused conveyed to the complainant that his house is haunted with ghost and if she wants to get rid of it, she will have to pay Rs.6,000/-. The complainant being an illiterate lady, gave a sum of Rs.5,700/-. After some days, the accused person again came to the house of the complainant and asked for Rs.2,000/-, but the complainant refused to give the money rather told the accused to return back all the money. Thereafter the accused gave two ladoos mixed with poison to the grand-son of the complainant to eat it. As soon as the boy ate it, he died. Thereupon when the complainant intended to inform the Police Station about the said incident, she was threatened by the accused of dire consequences. On 29.01.2002, when she was returning home from market, accused met with her and caught her hand with a view to outrage her modesty. At the same time, she was assaulted and snatched away her chain from neck. 4. On such allegation, a complaint was registered as Complaint Case No.64 of 2002. The matter was taken up for enquiry. After completion of the enquiry, the court took cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 323, 354, 379, 504 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner. Subsequently, the complainant left doing pairvi in the complaint case and thereby, the court discharged the petitioner on 28.01.2004. Much before of petitioner being discharged, 2nd complaint was filed on the same allegation suppressing that earlier also she had filed a complaint. That complaint was sent before the concerned Police Station under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for its institution and investigation. Accordingly, on such complaint, an F.I.R. was lodged as Ranka P.S. Case No.84 of 2011 [G.R. No.782 of 2011] under Sections 328, 302, 420, 506 I.P.C.. The matter was taken for investigation.
That complaint was sent before the concerned Police Station under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for its institution and investigation. Accordingly, on such complaint, an F.I.R. was lodged as Ranka P.S. Case No.84 of 2011 [G.R. No.782 of 2011] under Sections 328, 302, 420, 506 I.P.C.. The matter was taken for investigation. After completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was submitted upon which cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 328, 302, 420, 506 I.P.C. had been taken against the petitioner vide order dated 25.02.2012 which is under-challenge in this application. 5. Learned counsel further submits that from the facts, stated above, it would appear that for the same set of allegations, two complaints had been lodged, one being Complaint Case No.64 of 2002 and other being Complaint Case No.217 of 2002, which cannot be allowed to be maintained in view of the decision, rendered in a case of Qayamuddin Khan Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Anr. [ 2013(3) JLJR 568 ]. 6. Further submission is that once, the petitioner has been discharged from the accusation for whatever the reason, the petitioner cannot be put to trial in a case which was subsequently lodged on the same allegation and thereby, the court committed illegality in taking cognizance of the offence. 7. There has been no denial of the proposition of law that normally for the same set of allegation, two complaints cannot be lodged. However, situations are there wherein on the same set of allegation, two complaints can be lodged, but that should be in exceptional circumstances. The exceptional circumstances have been spelt out in the case of Pramatha Nath Vs. Saroj Ranjan, reported in [1962 (1) Cri. L. J.] which are as follows:- “Where the previous order was passed on incomplete record or on an misunderstanding of the nature of the complaint or it was manifestly absurd, unjust or foolish or where new facts which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been brought on the record in the previous proceedings, have been adduced.” 8. More or less similar issue fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahesh Chand Vs. B. Janerdhan Reddy and Anr. [ 2003 (1) SCC 734 ]. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while following the decision rendered in the case of Ram Narayan Choubey Vs.
More or less similar issue fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahesh Chand Vs. B. Janerdhan Reddy and Anr. [ 2003 (1) SCC 734 ]. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while following the decision rendered in the case of Ram Narayan Choubey Vs. Panchanan Jain [AIR 1949 Pat 256] and also different decisions did hold that it is settled law that there is no statutory bar in filing second complaint on the same fact in a case where the previous complaint is dismissed without assigning any reason and in that event the Magistrate under Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code may take cognizance of an offence and issue process if there is sufficient ground for proceeding. However, it has been held that second complaint on the same facts could be entertained only in exceptional circumstances, namely, where the previous order was passed on an incomplete record or on a misunderstanding of the nature of complaint or it was manifestly absurd, unjust, or where new facts which could not with reasonable diligence, have been brought on record in the previous proceeding. 9. In the instant case, the situation is somewhat different. It is true that a complaint bearing Complaint Case No. 64 of 2002 was lodged on 31.01.2002. While that complaint was pending, again a second complaint almost on the same facts was filed on 26.04.2002 which was registered as Complaint Case No.217 of 2002. That complaint was never proceeded under Chapter XV Cr.P.C. rather the complaint was sent under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for registration and its investigation. Therefore, it is evident that for the same set of allegation, one complaint was there and one F.I.R. was there. If that was the situation, the court should have been informed about the case being lodged as Police case and thereby, the court, in view of the provisions as contained in Section 210 Cr.P.C. would not have proceeded with the complaint case. 10.
If that was the situation, the court should have been informed about the case being lodged as Police case and thereby, the court, in view of the provisions as contained in Section 210 Cr.P.C. would not have proceeded with the complaint case. 10. However, it does appear that the court proceeded with the complaint case bearing No.64 of 2002 in which according to the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, the petitioner was discharged on 28.01.2004 not upon considering the merit of the case, but on account of the laches on the part of the complainant, during which period, 2nd complaint had already been sent before the Police Station for its registration and investigation though the F.I.R. could only be registered on the basis of the said complaint on 21.06.2011. Upon its investigation, charge-sheet was submitted and thereupon the court took cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 328, 302, 420, 506 I.P.C. though the court earlier in the complaint case bearing No.64 of 2002 had never taken cognizance of the offences, as aforesaid rather has taken cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 323, 354, 379 and 504 I.P.C. though the allegation was there in the said complaint also that upon eating of ladoos mixed with poison, the boy died. 11. Under the circumstances, I do not find substance in the submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner that the F.I.R. in the event of petitioner being discharged in a complaint cannot be lodged and thus, I do not find any illegality with the order taking cognizance and thereby, that order never warrants to be quashed. 12. Accordingly, this petition stands dismissed. At this stage, it was stated on behalf of the petitioner that since the petitioner had earlier been granted anticipatory bail, same protection be provided to the petitioner in this case also. The order if any, is passed by this Court, that would certainly be an order without jurisdiction. However, it be observed that if the petitioner files an appropriate application for grant of bail, the same be considered in the facts and circumstances, as stated above. Petition dismissed.