Judgment 1. Heard Mr. Pavithran, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant and Mr. Amonkar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the respondent. 2. This appeal is filed by the accused no. 2 of Sessions Case No. 35/2009 against the judgment and order dated 30.07.2011, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (FTC-I), South Goa, Margao (trial Court) in the said Sessions Case, by which the accused no. 2 has been sentenced for offence punishable under Section 506(ii) of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C., for short), to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four years and to pay fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four months. The period during which the accused had been in custody has been set off in terms of Section 428 of Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C., for short). 3. In all four accused persons were tried by the trial Court for offence punishable under Sections 307, 353, 189, 506(i) read with Section 34 of I.P.C. and Section 3 read with Section 25 of the Arms Act. 4. Charge was framed on 15.01.2010, in respect of the said offences and the prosecution had examined 12 witnesses in support of its case. The statement of the accused persons under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. was recorded. The accused persons denied the case of the prosecution and did not examine any witness. 5. The learned trial Court framed points for determination and after considering the entire material on record held that the prosecution failed to prove the charge against any of the accused persons for the offence punishable under Sections 307, 353, 189, 506(i) read with Section 34 of I.P.C. and Section 3 read with Section 25 of the Arms Act. However, the learned trial Court held the accused nos. 2 and 3 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 506(ii) of I.P.C. and convicted them as stated earlier. The accused no. 2 is aggrieved by the said judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court and has preferred this appeal. 6. The point no. However, the learned trial Court held the accused nos. 2 and 3 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 506(ii) of I.P.C. and convicted them as stated earlier. The accused no. 2 is aggrieved by the said judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court and has preferred this appeal. 6. The point no. 2 for determination as framed by the learned trial Court, reads thus: “Whether the prosecution has proved that the accused persons with their common intentions gave threats of injury to the public servants i.e. P.C. Shri Narendra Parit and P.C. Shri Nilesh Sawant while they were doing their duty as public servants and committed offence punishable under Sections 189, 506(i) read with Section 34 of I.P.C.?” The answer by the learned trial Court to the above point is as follows: “Partly proved to the extent that accused nos. 2 and 3 have committed offence punishable under Section 506(ii) of I.P.C.” 7. Section 222 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) provides as under: “222. When offence proved included in offence charged – (1) When a person is charged with an offence consisting of several particulars, a combination of some only of which constitutes a complete minor offence, and such combination is proved, but the remaining particulars are not proved, he may be convicted of the minor offence, though he was not charged with it. (2) When a person is charged with an offence and facts are proved which reduce it to a minor offence, he may be convicted of the minor offence, although he is not charged with it. (3) When a person is charged with an offence, he may be convicted of an attempt to commit such offence although the attempt is not separately charged. (4) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorise a conviction of any minor offence where the conditions requisite for the initiation of proceedings in respect of that minor offence have not been satisfied.” 8. Admittedly, no charge was framed by the trial Court in respect of the offence punishable under Section 506(ii) of I.P.C.. It is clear from the above provision of Section 222 of Cr.P.C. that the Court would be entitled to convict the accused person for offence which is minor in comparison for which the accused is tried for. Admittedly, no charge was framed by the trial Court in respect of the offence punishable under Section 506(ii) of I.P.C.. It is clear from the above provision of Section 222 of Cr.P.C. that the Court would be entitled to convict the accused person for offence which is minor in comparison for which the accused is tried for. Let us therefore see whether the offence punishable under Section 506(ii) of I.P.C. is minor as compared to the offences punishable under Sections 189 and 506(i) of I.P.C.. Section 189 of I.P.C. reads as under: “189. Threat of injury to public servant.— Whoever holds out any threat of injury to any public servant, or to any person in whom he believes that public servant to be interested, for the purpose of inducing that public servant to do any act, or to forbear or delay to do any act, connected with the exercise of the public functions of such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.” Section 506 of I.P.C. provides as under: “506. Punishment for criminal intimidation.— Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.— And if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute, unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.” 9. From the above, it is clear that Section 189 of I.P.C. as well as Section 506(i) of I.P.C. is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both. But Section 506(ii) of I.P.C. is punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.” Thus, offence under Section 506(ii) of I.P.C. cannot be termed as minor offence as compared to the offences under Sections 189 and 506(i) of I.P.C.. 10. But Section 506(ii) of I.P.C. is punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.” Thus, offence under Section 506(ii) of I.P.C. cannot be termed as minor offence as compared to the offences under Sections 189 and 506(i) of I.P.C.. 10. In paragraph 20 of the impugned judgment, the learned trial Court has observed that application of Section 307 of I.P.C. is ruled out since the ingredients of said offence, which necessarily involve the intention to kill or the knowledge to that effect, are missing from the facts of the case. The learned trial Court, however, held that since the accused nos. 2 and 3 criminally intimidated the police constables by lifting beer bottles, by aiming pistol towards P.C. Narendra Parit and then by firing from the pistol while both the constables were running away from the scene of offence, the ingredients of Section 506(ii) of I.P.C. are attracted in the instant case since threat was to cause death or grievous injury to both the police constables. Mr. Pavithran, learned Counsel for the accused no. 2 has relied upon the case of “Shamnsaheb M. Multtani Vs. State of Karnataka”, [ (2001) 2 SCC 577 ], wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court, at paragraphs 15 and 16 has held thus: “15. Section 222(1) of the Code deals with a case “when a person is charged with an offence consisting of several particulars”. The Section permits the court to convict the accused “of the minor offence, though he was not charged with it”. Sub-section (2) deals with a similar, but slightly different, situation. '222.(2) When a person is charged with an offence and facts are proved which reduce it to a minor offence, he may be convicted of the minor offence, although he is not charged with it.' 16. What is meant by “a minor offence” for the purpose of Section 222 of the Code? Although the said expression is not defined in the Code it can be discerned from the context that the test of minor offence is not merely that the prescribed punishment is less than the major offence. The two illustrations provided in the section would bring the above point home well. Although the said expression is not defined in the Code it can be discerned from the context that the test of minor offence is not merely that the prescribed punishment is less than the major offence. The two illustrations provided in the section would bring the above point home well. Only if the two offences are cognate offences, wherein the main ingredients are common, the one punishable among them with a lesser sentence can be regarded as minor offence vis-à-vis the other offence.” 11. The ingredients of Section 307 of I.P.C. are totally different from that of Section 506(ii) of I.P.C. The two offences are not cognate offences wherein main ingredients are common. Similarly, the ingredients of Section 353 of I.P.C. are different from the offence under Section 506(ii) of I.P.C. In my view, a person charged with the offences punishable under Sections 307, 353, 189, 506(i) read with Section 34 of I.P.C. and Section 3 read with Section 25 of the Arms Act cannot be convicted for an offence under Section 506(ii) of I.P.C., without a charge under that Section. In the case of “Sabbi Mallesu and Ors. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh” ( AIR 2006 SC 2747 ), relied upon by learned Counsel for the accused no. 2, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the power of the Court to alter the charges is neither in doubt nor in dispute but in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 246, Cr.P.C., it was obligatory on the part of the learned sessions Judge to bring it to the notice of the accused and explain the same to the accused. It has been held that the same having not been done, it cannot be said that the requirements of Section 246 of Cr.P.C. stood complied with. In the case of “Alizar Pereira Vs. The State of Goa”, [ 2014 ALL MR (Cri.) 1664], also relied upon by the learned Counsel for the accused no. 2, this Court has held that it is a settled position of law that the accused should be made aware of the charge for which he is going to be tried before the Court. If the charge is not framed under a particular Section then to convict the accused of that particular charge for that particular offence in the absence of a charge is an illegality. 12. If the charge is not framed under a particular Section then to convict the accused of that particular charge for that particular offence in the absence of a charge is an illegality. 12. In the complaint (Exhibit-41) filed by PW7, Nagendra Parit, there is no allegation that the accused no. 2 gave threat to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute unchastity to a woman. There is no allegation that any threatening was given with intent to cause alarm to PW6, Nagendra or to any one else. Though Ayaz Sayeed, PW7 deposed that the accused no. 2 then removed the gun and aimed at him and told that he was going to kill them all, however, there is no corroboration to the said statement from any other witness. Such a statement without corroboration is not wholly reliable. 13. In the circumstances above, the learned trial Court could not have convicted the accused no. 2 and sentenced him for offence punishable under Section 506(ii) for which, no charge was framed as against him and also, no trial was held for the said offence and lastly no sufficient evidence was there on record, with regard to the said offence. 14. In view of the above, the judgment dated 30.07.2011, passed by the learned trial Court, thereby holding the accused guilty under Section 506(ii) of I.P.C. cannot be sustained. Hence, the said judgment, to that extent, is liable to be quashed and set aside and the accused no. 2 is entitled for acquittal. 15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Judgment convicting and sentencing the accused no. 2 of the offence under Section 506(ii) of I.P.C., is quashed and set aside. The accused no. 2 is acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 506(ii) of I.P.C. The accused no. 2 shall be released, if not required in any other case. Muddemal properties to be dealt with in the manner as directed by the trial Court. 16. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly.