ORDER Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. Questioning the legality and validity of the judgment of acquittal of offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short 'the Act, 1989'), sole applicant/complainant Milau has filed this revision under Section 397/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (henceforth 'Cr.P.C.'). Brief facts required for determination of this revision are as under:-- 1.1 The State filed a charge-sheet for the offences punishable under Sections 294/34, 323 & 324 of the Indian Penal Code (for short 'IPC') and under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, 1989 against the non-applicants stating that on 5.11.2002 near Bhagwata Tola pond they with common intention abused, assaulted and intentionally insulted or intimidated with intention to humiliate the complainant, who is member of Scheduled Tribe within public view. 1.2 Non-applicants abjured the guilt and entered into defence. During the course of trial, prosecution has examined 8 witnesses and exhibited 6 documents in support of their case whereas defence neither examined any witness nor exhibited any documents in support of their case. 2. The Special Judge, by its judgment convicted the non-applicants for the offences under Sections 294/34 and 323/34 of the IPC and sentenced them till rising of the Court whereas acquitted them of the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, 1989. Against which, the instant revision has been filed by the applicant/complainant. 3. Shri Vijay K. Deshmukh, learned counsel appearing for the applicant/complainant would submit that the Special Judge has committed manifest legal error in acquitting the non-applicants of the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, 1989 as the ingredients constituting the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, 1989 are available on record, therefore, judgment of acquittal for the said offence be set aside and they be punished for the said offence. 4. None present on behalf of the non-applicants to prosecute their case, despite service of notice. 5. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the applicant and perused record of court below with utmost circumspection. 6. The question for consideration is whether the prosecution has proved the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, 1989? 7. In order to appreciate the point, it would be proper to notice under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, 1989, which reads thus:-- 3. 6. The question for consideration is whether the prosecution has proved the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, 1989? 7. In order to appreciate the point, it would be proper to notice under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, 1989, which reads thus:-- 3. Punishments for offences of atrocities.-(1) Whoever, not being a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe,-- XXXXXX XXX XXX XXXXXX XXX XXX XXXXXX XXX XXX (x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view. 8. The ingredients constituting the offence under section 3(1)(x) of the Act, 1989 are as under:-- "(i) that the accused/non-applicant was not a member of Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe....; (ii) the complainant "was intentionally insulted or intimidated by the accused"; (iii) such intentional insult or the intimidation was "with intent to humiliate" such member; and (iv) this intentional insult or intimidation with an intent to humiliate must be in a place with "public view". 9. The question is whether in the instant case prosecution has established the ingredients for constituting the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, 1989? 10. Admittedly and indisputably, the non-applicants/accused are not the member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. 11. In order to establish that the complainant namely Milau was intentionally assaulted or intimidated by the accused persons, complainant Milau himself has been examined as PW-1. A bare perusal of his statement, it does not appear that accused persons insulted or intimidated intentionally or with an intent to humiliate the complainant, who is a member of Scheduled Tribe. It can be gathered from his statement that Milau did not utter any word stating that accused persons knew that he (complainant) is a member of Scheduled Tribe and with an intention to humiliate him the accused persons abused him by the name of the his caste. 12. The other witnesses namely Indal (PW-2), Gorelal (PW-3) and Ramkishan (PW-4) also did not say that accused persons were aware about the caste of complainant and they fully knew that the Milau is the member of Scheduled Tribe and only because he is a member of Scheduled Tribe humiliated and insulted him intentionally. On the other hand, it has not been established that non-applicants/accused persons are not the members of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. 13. On the other hand, it has not been established that non-applicants/accused persons are not the members of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. 13. The Supreme Court in case of Gorige Pentaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others (2008) 12 SCC 531 : (AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 634) while dealing with the ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, 1989 has held as under:- 6.................In the entire complaint, nowhere it is mentioned that the appellant-accused was not a member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he intentionally insulted or intimidated with intent to humiliate respondent No. 3 in a place within public view. When the basic ingredients of the offence are missing in the complaint, then permitting such a complaint to continue and to compel the appellant to face the rigmarole of the criminal trial would be totally unjustified leading to abuse of "process of law." 14. Applying the ratio, of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above referred case in the present case and considering the fact that most important ingredients of constituting the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, 1989 i.e. intentionally insulting or intimidating with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view, is missing in the prosecution case and, therefore, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, 1989 beyond reasonable doubt against the non-applicants/accused. 15. In order to comprehend the challenge to the attack made to the judgment of acquittal, it would be profitable to have a quick look over the legal parameters laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court for interfering with the judgments of acquittal. 16. In Bindeshwari Prasad Singh alias B.P. Singh and others v. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand) and another, AIR 2002 SC 2907 , the Supreme Court has clearly held that the High Court should not re-appreciate the evidence on record and come to a different conclusion by interfering in a revision with the order of acquittal, except in cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a "manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. Paragraph 12 of the decision states as under: "12. Paragraph 12 of the decision states as under: "12. We have carefully considered the material on record and we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in re-appreciating the evidence on record and coming to a different conclusion in a revision preferred by the information under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Sub-section (3) of Section 401 in terms provides that nothing in Section 401 shall be deemed to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The aforesaid sub-section, which places a limitation on the powers of the revisional Court, prohibiting it from convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, is itself indicative of the nature and extent of the revisional power conferred by Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the High Court could not convert a finding of acquittal into one of the conviction directly, it could not do so indirectly by the method of ordering a re-trial. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the High Court will ordinarily not interfere in revision with an order of acquittal except in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. The High Court will not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal merely because the trial Court has taken a wrong view of the law or has erred in appreciation of evidence. It is neither possible nor advisable to make an exhaustive list of circumstances in which exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be justified, but decisions of this Court have laid down the parameters of exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in an appeal against acquittal by a private party. (See AIR 1951 SC 196 , D. Stephens v. Nosibolla; AIR 1962 SC 1788 , K.C. Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 583 ; Akalu Ahir and others v. Ramdeo Ram : AIR 1975 SC 1854 ; Pakalapati Narayana Gajapathi Raju and others v. Bonapalli Peda Appadu and another and AIR 1968 SC 707 , Mahendra Pratap Singh v. Sarju Singh)." 17. Thereafter, in Venkatesan v. Rani and another (2013) 14 SCC 207 : ( AIR 2013 SC 3320 ), the Supreme Court, considering its earlier decision in paragraphs 8 and 9, clearly laid down as to cases in which the High Court should interfere with the finding of acquittal. Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the decision state as under: "8. Specifically and for the purpose of a detailed illumination on the subject, the contents of paras 8 and 10 of the judgment in Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, (1973) 2 SCC 583 : ( AIR 1973 SC 2145 , pp. 2149-2150), may be usefully extracted below (SCC pp. 587-88): "8. ... This Court, however, by way of illustration, indicated the following categories of cases which would justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision: (i) Where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still acquitted the accused; (ii) where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce; (iii) where the appellate court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible; (iv) where the material evidence has been overlooked only (either) by the trial court or by the appellate court; and (v) where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law. These categories were, however, merely illustrative and it was clarified that other cases of similar nature can also be properly held to be of exceptional nature where the High Court can justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal. * * * 10. No doubt, the appraisal of evidence by the trial Judge in the case in hand is not perfect or free from flaw and a court of appeal may well have felt justified in disagreeing with its conclusion, but from this it does not follow that on revision by a private complainant, the High Court is entitled to reappraise the evidence for itself as if it is acting as a court of appeal and then order a retrial. It is unfortunate that a serious offence inspired by rivalry and jealousy in the matter of election to the office of village Mukhia, should go unpunished. But that can scarcely be a valid ground for ignoring or for not strictly following the law as enunciated by this Court. 9. It is unfortunate that a serious offence inspired by rivalry and jealousy in the matter of election to the office of village Mukhia, should go unpunished. But that can scarcely be a valid ground for ignoring or for not strictly following the law as enunciated by this Court. 9. The observations in para 9 in Vimal Singh v. Khuman Singh (1998) 7 SCC 223 : ( AIR 1998 SC 3380 , p. 3382), would also be apt for recapitulation and, therefore, are being extracted below (SCC pp. 226-27): "9. Coming to the ambit of power of the High Court under Section 401 of the Code, the High Court in its revisional power does not ordinarily interfere with judgments of acquittal passed by the trial court unless there has been manifest error of law or procedure. The interference with the order of acquittal passed by the trial court is limited only to exceptional cases when it is found that the order under revision suffers from glaring illegality or has caused miscarriage of justice or when it is found that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case or where the trial court has illegally shut out the evidence which otherwise ought to have been considered or where the material evidence which clinches the issue has been overlooked. These are the instances where the High Court would be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal. Sub-section (3) of Section 401 mandates that the High Court shall not convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. Thus, the High Court would not be justified in substituting an order of acquittal into one of conviction even if it is convinced that the accused deserves conviction. No doubt, the High Court in exercise of its revisional power can set aside an order of acquittal if it comes within the ambit of exceptional cases enumerated above, but it cannot convert an order of acquittal into an order of conviction. The only course left to the High Court in such exceptional cases is to order retrial." 18. No doubt, the High Court in exercise of its revisional power can set aside an order of acquittal if it comes within the ambit of exceptional cases enumerated above, but it cannot convert an order of acquittal into an order of conviction. The only course left to the High Court in such exceptional cases is to order retrial." 18. Thus, after having ascertained the legal position with regard to scope of interference in a revision with the order of acquittal, reverting back to the facts of the instant case, prosecution has failed to prove the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, 1989 beyond reasonable doubt against the accused persons and, thus, this Court is of the opinion that there is no manifest legal error in judgment of the acquittal recorded by the Special Court and keeping in view the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases, I do not consider it a fit case where this Court should re-appreciate the entire evidence on record or it is not a case where the view taken by the Special Judge is so arbitrary or bears manifest error requiring interference taking into consideration the parameters laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above referred cases. As a fall out and the consequence of the aforesaid discussion, the revision is held to be devoid of merit and is, therefore, dismissed.